A History of China (42 page)

Facing such opposition, Wang responded by recruiting and promoting his own supporters, which in turn opened him up to criticism for seeking to create his own clique within government. His enemies “charged that Wang recommended only unscrupulous bureaucrats who knew how to make profits, either for the government, which was contrary to conventional Confucian ideas, or for themselves, which was even worse.”
²

Wang’s efforts to tame the bureaucracy failed, which incalculably jeopardized the New Reforms. Even more troublesome was the lowest level of the bureaucracy (the clerks), who received even worse pay and were thus even more tempted to accept bribes. Wang used rewards and punishments to deal with them, offering them higher salaries while imposing stiff penalties on corruption. Because even the higher salaries could not match the sums the clerks could garner through illegal means, they were not deterred from misappropriating funds and persisted in practices that sabotaged the New Reforms. For example, the land survey that Wang envisioned as the basis for a fairer tax system relied upon measuring and proper reporting by the lower levels of the bureaucracy. Thus, when unscrupulous clerks collaborated with large landowners to shield land from registration, they effectively sabotaged Wang’s efforts. Similarly, when they compelled peasants to request interest-bearing loans whether or not they needed such funds, they subverted the spirit of the reforms.

Wang was fighting a losing battle. Without the wholesale replacement of such corrupt officials and clerks by bureaucrats intent on implementing the reforms, he could not hope to carry out his New Reforms. In turn, even assuming that he had sufficient qualified men as replacements, a program of this kind would provoke the hostility of many Confucian scholars as well as the powerful landlords. Wang could not, even if he had wanted to or had conceived the notion of mobilizing the less privileged (the peasants and small merchants), have provided the sustenance needed to challenge the entrenched bureaucracy and landlords. Lacking strong allies among the groups he championed, he relied instead on attracting the support of Emperor Shenzong, which was a risky gambit. Because the emperors could be capricious, their favorites at one time could easily be abandoned at another time. The current favorites’ ­competitors, seeking the emperor’s attention, would repeatedly look for opportunities, either directly or indirectly, to criticize Wang. This was precisely the scenario that confronted Wang and the emperor, as orthodox Confucians, eunuchs, and bureaucrats whose activities, positions, or wealth were adversely affected by the New Reforms questioned Wang’s ideas and the effectiveness of his reforms, at first privately and later publicly and vociferously. These critics achieved their desired result because the emperor began to deny some of Wang’s demands, jeopardizing efforts to introduce and properly implement important parts of his package of reforms. His dependence on the emperor meant that he was subject to the ruler’s changes of heart, if not capriciousness. Yet, during the emperor’s reign, Wang remained in power, and his reforms were, at least officially, put in place.

The death of the emperor in 1085 marked the end of Wang’s power and ushered in a period when his rivals held sway. With the support of the empress dowager, who now became the dominant force at court, they dismantled many of the reforms and replaced the advocates of reform with their own antireform supporters. Bureaucratic stagnation and corruption quickly reappeared. Clerks in local government, their numbers continuously swollen by their success, retrieved their authority and reverted to the extortion and bribery that had characterized the pre-Wang era. The failures of the bureaucratic reforms ­mirrored the failures of efforts to impose a more equitable tax system and to facilitate and improve the lives of the peasantry. Thus, neither the government’s revenue shortfalls nor the livelihood of the vast majority of the ­population improved. Evidence of the Song’s internal weakness and instability emboldened the foreigners living along China’s northern and western borders to make substantial economic demands on the court and, if denied these special requests, to initiate forays into Chinese territory. The treaties the court had negotiated with the Khitans and the Tanguts started to be ignored. Conditions along the frontiers became increasingly unsettled.

Factionalism continued to handicap the government. Although the ­conservatives gained the upper hand in 1085 and dismissed many of Wang’s supporters, they still had to contend with covert opposition from the reformers. Their restoration of ineffective and corrupt bureaucrats offered Wang’s old allies an opportunity to act and to succeed in creating a postreform era, starting in 1093. Wang’s brother-in-law and, in particular, the latter’s brother Cai Jing (1047–1126) took charge, and, like their predecessors and opponents, purged the conservatives and reinstated their own allies. Although some modest reforms were implemented, Cai, who was also renowned for his excellent calligraphy, tolerated favoritism and corruption among his own adherents, and proposed the dispatch of gifts and tribute to the emperor, the Son of Heaven, in an attempt to win him over. Government deteriorated, and the dichotomy between reformers and conservatives was not bridged. Cai remained in power until 1126, when he was denounced for corruption and exiled (though he died en route to his place of exile); his departure no doubt contributed to the collapse of the Northern Song dynasty in the same year. Later historians ­portrayed him in such a negative light that he appears as a villain in
Shuihuzhuan
(
Water Margin
), one of the most famous Chinese novels. His policies actually assisted the Jurchens, the foreigners who eventually defeated and compelled the Song to flee to the south. There the Song set up a new capital in Hangzhou and reestablished its dynasty (later known as the Southern Song dynasty), which enjoyed a great, though precarious, prosperity based upon bountiful ­agriculture and far-flung commercial networks.

Just as there have been many Chinas, there have been considerable variations in the statuses and roles of women in different regions and during different dynasties and eras. Confucian orthodoxy would, in theory, dictate a patriarchal society in which the stereotypical woman had limited authority in the family, clan, or polity. To be sure, women could not take part in ancestor ­worship and were generally not eligible for formal education, but they often had considerable leverage within the family, especially if they gave birth to a male heir or brought a sizable dowry. The stereotype of women who were totally dominated within the family and scarcely played any role in the public area requires some modification.

The Song witnessed an apparent decline in the status of women, although some of their economic rights were affirmed. Families arranged marriages based on status and wealth and did not consult the couple. Men, in theory had leverage in relations with women. Traditionally, they could divorce their spouses for barrenness, licentiousness, failure to serve parents-in-law, loquacity, theft, jealousy, or serious disease, while women did not have the right of divorce. However, divorce was relatively rare, partly due to the paucity of women caused, in part, by female infanticide. Moreover, women who had observed a three-year mourning period for their parents-in-law or had no relatives to whom they could return or whose husbands had suddenly become wealthy could not be divorced.

Women could hold on to their dowries and could inherit property in early Song but their positions had eroded by the late Song. If a husband died young, his widow had jurisdiction over and protected the household’s property until her sons gained maturity – a vital responsibility for the family’s survival. The revival of Confucianism, which accorded women a lower position in society, may have undermined their position. Greater physical separation between men and women, in line with the separatism dictated by the association of women with
yin
and men with
yang
, limited the role of women in rituals.

Foot-binding, which began on a limited scale in the late Tang and perhaps originated with Turkic dancers at the court, became more common – still another impediment for women. Excavations of late Song tombs prove that elite girls had their feet wrapped in cloth to prevent them from growing and had specially made small shoes. The practice, which was first adopted by courtesans, originated among the elite, who did not need much mobility, and then gradually spread to the lower classes. Eventually, prospective bridegrooms’ parents sought to arrange marriages with women whose feet had been bound because the practice came to represent modesty and a moral reputation. Poor parents bound their daughters’ feet in order to improve their chances of social mobility. Families who wished to have their daughters marry well were under considerable pressure to have their feet bound. The older women were responsible for binding a child’s feet when she was five to eight years old. The precise day for binding the feet with cloth was carefully chosen, and rituals were ­performed and offerings made to the Tiny-Footed Maiden Goddess and especially to Guanyin, the bodhisattva to whom women, in particular, prayed. Girls were taught to make their own shoes, some decorated elaborately with symbols of good luck and other things. This turned out to be an important skill because the shoes, often made of silk or cotton, frequently needed repair or replacement. In addition, a prospective bride showed her mettle by making shoes for her future in-laws.

Whatever the ritual and marital significance, the physical impediment of bound feet restricted not only women’s movement but also their participation in social and political life. In later times, many Westerners who reached China would find the practice to be evidence of sexual depravity and of bizarre and cruel infliction of pain and deformity on young children. In any event, these limitations accorded with the Confucian perception of women as playing roles primarily in the household – as supervisors, major caretakers for children, respectful providers for the needs of their in-laws, and confidantes and ­assistants for their husbands.

Recent studies imply that women were less submissive than this image may convey. Although only one major woman writer, the poet Li Qingzhao (ca. 1081–1141), published her works, literacy among elite women was not uncommon. Women could, on occasion, make choices about remarriage, their ­children, and their own dowries. They had significant economic leverage because they could contribute to their households through their work as weavers. The Song witnessed an extraordinary rise in demand for silk, offering women a more important position in the family’s finances.

The increase in the number of concubines in wealthy families may, paradoxically, have bolstered the position of women. Concubines, who generally derived from lower-class backgrounds and lived with the family, rose in status and thus ensured somewhat closer relations between elite and ordinary families. Moreover, wives would presumably have been more secure because their husbands could satisfy their sexual urges within the household rather than expending untold sums in visiting and maintaining courtesans outside the household.

To be sure, women faced numerous constraints. Young couples had no choice in marriages. Girls were married at a young age, in many cases just as they became teenagers, and in their new families their relations with their mother-in-law were vital. Images of conflict between daughters-in-law and mothers-in-law were pervasive in popular literature. Other potential hazards were high incidences of maternal mortality as well as the psychological damage of female infanticide. Poor families with scant resources might allow an infant daughter to die, as she would have to be maintained and reared and would be married before she made a financial contribution to the household. Still, overall, one of the main limitations imposed upon women was exclusion from the public sphere.

The Liao dynasty (907–1125) of China and the Western Liao (1124–1211), its successor, were founded by the Khitans, a proto-Mongol people who were originally nomadic pastoralists residing in modern Inner Mongolia, Mongolia, Manchuria, and perhaps as far north as Lake Baikal. Mentioned in the Chinese sources as early as the fourth century
CE
, the Khitans, like other pastoral nomads, depended largely on their animals for survival, although a few groups supplemented their incomes by fishing and farming. Their reliance on animals in regions plagued by high winds and considerable snow and ice made them vulnerable to their capricious environment. A devastating winter could lead to the deaths of many of their animals. In those circumstances, China often ­provided a safety net by permitting the pastoral nomads to trade for such necessities as grain and craft articles and such luxuries as silk and tea. On the other hand, when China was disunited, its northern pastoral neighbors would, on occasion, capitalize on its weakness to annex Chinese territories.

Indeed, the Khitans sought to take advantage of the turbulence following the collapse of the Tang dynasty. Having been influenced by the Uyghurs, the first of the pastoral peoples of Mongolia to build a capital city and to devise an administrative system, they had begun to shift from a small pastoral organization to a larger confederation. They became intent on ruling rather than plundering the territories they occupied in China. By 938, when China was still disunited, the Khitans had wrested control over sixteen prefectures, including the area of modern Beijing.

Even earlier, they had manifested their desire to govern the Chinese regions they had seized and to establish a true dynasty. In 907 their ruler, Abaoji, proclaimed himself khaghan of a Khitan confederation, and within a decade he adopted a Chinese title for his reign. Khitan precedent dictated elections every three years for a new ruler, but Abaoji (872–926), known to the Chinese as Taizu, rejected that custom and instead sought to impose a hereditary rather than an elective system of succession that had been characteristic of the pastoral nomadic societies. He overwhelmed opposition to his plan and retained power for almost two decades, setting a precedent for a Chinese-like system, which, however, continued to be contested. To bolster his legitimacy and to indicate his intent to rule both sedentary agricultural and mobile pastoral societies, he began to construct a capital city in 918. Although the capital, known by the Chinese name Huangdu (later changed to Shangjing), was based in modern Inner Mongolia, not at that time part of China, it signaled a change in Abaoji’s conception of governance. He now attempted to rule the sedentary population in his domains from a stationary site, with a regular administration. Inhabitants could count on relatively fixed and stable taxes rather than irregular and perhaps capricious demands. They could also rest assured that the government would not expropriate their farmland and convert it to pasture.