A History of China (41 page)

The ideal was coequal forces of
li
and
qi
, but individual Neo-Confucians privileged one or the other. A few conceived only of the existence of
qi
, a conception that barely distinguished it from traditional Confucianism. Others cast
li
as superior because it was the most significant underlying force of the ­universe. In this formulation, it came to be identified with the Great Ultimate, the progenitor of the universe.

The Neo-Confucians’ ultimate objective remained morality or creation of a better man. Human beings started out as pure, but their
qi
could deviate from goodness and proper behavior. If they adhered to
li
, they could move closer to the ideal of a good Confucian man. Adherence required knowledge of
li
. Zhu Xi asserted that “investigation of things” led to such knowledge. He stated that delving into the classics and implementing the moral conduct prescribed in them was the proper path. Scholarly study and use of the rational faculty were his prescriptions for obtaining knowledge of
li
. He tended to deemphasize the intuitive grasp of reality and Buddhist meditation techniques in the quest for
li
. His emphasis on study originally contributed to creativity and learning, but in much later periods Neo-Confucianism became static and increasingly stultified. In this era, it meshed with the openness to new ideas and discoveries. Yet it became identified with the scholar-official class and the new elite based on merit and examinations.

The emphasis on privilege (
yin
), as well as on the content of the examinations, elicited criticism and proposals for reform. In 1043, Fan Zhongyan (989–1052) and Ouyang Xiu (1007–1072), two leading officials who were concerned about the threat of instability and war along the northwestern frontier, the growing economic tensions with the Khitans, and the resultant domestic disturbances, wrote a comprehensive memorial to the emperor in which they advocated a variety of reforms. The main changes involving the bureaucracy were calls for reduction of the
yin
privilege, which favored the elite; a greater emphasis on the candidate’s moral character; and changes in the examination system – ­specifically, a focus on questions of policy and analysis rather than on poetry and the classics and on pure memorization. However, these changes were not implemented. Because the leading reformers, including Fan and Ouyang, were politically naïve, they did not foster alliances with the sympathetic bureaucrats in ­opposition to traditionalists. Their more politically astute enemies, therefore, outmaneuvered them and, within a year, had most of them reassigned to posts outside the capital. Any future attempts at reform would require savvier leadership.

Later in the century, Wang Anshi (1021–1086), more of a pragmatist than the initial reformers, sought and secured a prominent position in government to promote his reforms. Like those of Fan and Ouyang, his proposals were wide ranging, embracing economic, political, and educational changes. Wang’s reforms of the exams entailed elimination of the poetry section and a strong emphasis on using the classics to consider questions of policy – that is, a more pragmatic bent. He wanted the exams to be more than stylistic exercises. He advocated the establishment of schools in the various prefectures to prepare promising young boys for the exams. He subsequently ingratiated himself with Emperor Shenzong (r. 1068–1085) and had himself appointed as the Second Privy Councillor. During the emperor’s reign, Wang sought to implement his reforms despite considerable opposition, and his enemies included some of the leading figures of the Song. Such opposition and the death of the emperor, Wang’s most important supporter, resulted in the subversion of Wang’s reforms. Poetry and memorization of the classics remained the main subjects and the main skills to be evaluated in the exams. A similar reform during Emperor Huizong’s reign (1101–1126) also foundered. By then, the Song faced serious challenges to its survival from its northern neighbors, and the failures of the reforms would eventually harm China, making it vulnerable to foreign attacks.

The Song not only experienced a commercial upsurge but also witnessed the rise of the south to a more prominent position. The south was, in any event, the economic center, both due to seaborne trade and to the rise of commercial agriculture. Such new crops as tea and fruits as well as new, more productive strains of rice permitted substantial population and financial growth and the development of cities in the south. Simultaneously, coal mining, iron and ­porcelain production, and printing enterprises developed rapidly, and the government met the needs of these new concerns by issuing the first paper money in global history. A large number of wine shops, kilns, and silk, oil–pressing, and papermaking workshops were founded. The economic prominence of the south began to translate into greater power in government as a larger and larger percentage of official positions went to southerners. Yet the power of the government itself was eroding. The population increased dramatically, but there was no concomitant increase in government. It stands to reason that fewer officials would translate into less government control. Thus, the Northern Song’s weakness paved the way for the fall of the dynasty in the early twelfth dynasty.

The so-called New Reforms of Wang Anshi constituted one of the last major efforts to stem the decline. Wang had developed a comprehensive program designed to alleviate the sufferings of the peasantry and to strengthen China. He first detailed his plans in his “Ten Thousand Word Memorial” to the throne in 1058. He suggested changes in education and in the civil-service exam, which have been described, but they were only part of a program that was designed to strengthen and enrich the country. It appears too that Wang may have represented the interests of the developing south against the entrenched power of the wealthy northern landlords. He and his close associates derived from middle-level landlords who had but recently entered the bureaucracy. He was thus not sympathetic to northern large landowners who evaded taxes. Identifying with the southern merchants who traded with foreigners landing in the southern ports, he did not oppose merchants or a money economy. In addition, he favored merit rather than the
yin
privilege in selection of officials. In short, he seems to have reflected the concerns and aspirations of a new group that sought to challenge the status quo, including the corruption and tax evasion of the northern landed elite. Because he and his supporters wanted to change, not repair, institutions, their program clashed with the views of officials who wanted merely to tinker with institutions or emphasized the selection of moral Confucian officials. Perhaps incomprehensibly to some Westerners, the two sides bolstered their differing viewpoints by citing ancient texts in their arguments.

Yet Wang also believed that government ought to pursue policies based upon current conditions and that such programs ought to be evaluated on pragmatic grounds. Unlike many Confucians of his time, he did not denigrate law and institutional change, although he did emphasize the employment of good officials in the bureaucracy. Again as distinct from the Confucians of his time, Wang considered excellence in an official to consist of competence and skill at the specific ­position, not simply the official’s embodiment of the Confucian moral virtues. This new kind of official, Wang said, ought to be concerned about the current financial shortfalls faced by the court and to remedy this deficiency both by preventing tax evasion and by helping to increase productivity. Such efforts would entail informing peasants about the latest advances in agronomy and helping them to preserve their lands from the control of rapacious landlords and moneylenders.

Aside from the aim of attracting additional competent officials, Wang’s specific program was rooted in economic reforms. He proposed the creation of a Finance Planning Commission to consolidate the operations of the various government agencies that dealt with finances. He also suggested the conduct of a new land survey that would provide data for a fairer tax system and thus fewer opportunities for tax evasion by large landowners. Complementing the hard-line policy toward the landlords were programs designed to assist the peasantry. The government would provide low-cost loans at the time of planting, which peasants would repay at harvesting time. Peasants would thus no longer have to obtain high-interest loans from landlords and usurers. Under the “hired-services” system, peasants who had earlier been liable for corvée labor, sometimes at busy times in the agricultural cycle, could now pay an additional tax that could be used to employ a substitute. Another group that would benefit from Wang’s reforms would be merchants. The government would mint more coins to promote commercial activity and would purchase goods directly from small merchants to prevent domination by the wealthy. Finally, local authorities would profit from Wang’s additional innovations. He would organize a
baojia
system, in which each ten families would band together in a unit to maintain order on the local level. The
baojia
would save funds for the government by assuming some of the tax-collection, militia, and justice functions and would also offer more autonomy to local regions.

Sima Guang (1019–1086) – a renowned historian, essayist, and official – and other bureaucrats from the north criticized Wang’s program because they opposed government activism and defended tradition and the existing ­bureaucracy. Perhaps unfairly accused of representing the interests of the large landowners and of de-emphasizing Wang’s goals of increasing wealth and power, they tended to be concerned with recruiting capable officials rather than changing institutions to cope with China’s problems. If the leading officials were ­competent, they could develop a system of rewards and punishments to ensure that lower-level bureaucrats performed their duties properly. Such an emphasis on individuals and on the hierarchy of authority would be the only means of coping with and overcoming China’s fiscal, military, and social difficulties. Unity and order, based upon such a hierarchy, ought to be the objective of government, and reforms ought to be directed at making the bureaucracy perform better rather than at institutional changes.

Sima opposed an activist government. Rectifying the bureaucracy and ensuring that it performed its duties properly were his solutions to the ­problems the government faced. Thus, he was critical of Wang’s New Reforms. Sima ­contended, for example, that Wang’s Finance Planning Commission would be managed by inexperienced individuals who would supervise traditional bureaucrats. Such a disruption in the hierarchical structure would be doomed to fail. Similarly, government attempts to promote an increase in production – an ­integral motivation for Wang’s New Reforms – would be counterproductive. Instead, the government ought to curb its own expenditures and recruit officials who were more knowledgeable about financial matters to manage the state’s resources. The farming loans program marked further government intrusion in the economy, an intrusion that according to Sima actually ­subverted the order of society. It undercut the wealthy, who often provided the loans, while not substantially improving the peasants’ lot. Local officials could, for example, compel peasants to request loans so that the government could profit from interest payments. Were the New Reforms designed to ­benefit the peasants or the court?

Sima was also critical of the hired-services program. He portrayed it as still another tax on the peasants. He argued that, in addition, payments in cash contributed to the commercialization of the economy. Peasants would become increasingly dependent on the commercial economy to obtain the cash necessary to pay the government for the program, and the rural economy would be subverted, with merchants making the greatest gains and peasants suffering the greatest losses from this system. Peasants would also be burdened by the
baojia
system, which would compel them to assume police and military responsibilities, which would distract them from their primary concerns of farming.

In short, Sima represented orthodoxy and the current elite while Wang reflected the interests of the reformers and the less favored. Wang sought an activist government while Sima opposed government intrusion into what he perceived to be the proper order and hierarchy in society. Sima went further, insisting that “it was in the interest of the state to leave wealth in private hands in order to maintain social stability.”
¹
Even in foreign relations, Wang sought a more assertive government that challenged rather than appeased foreigners, particularly the Tanguts, who shared a common border with China. Such a policy would entail a substantial increase in the army and in military ­expeditions. Sima disapproved of any such increases and instead proposed a policy of conciliation, though not submissiveness. He pointed out that stability in relations and peace with the Tanguts and other foreigners were preferable to instability and disruption.

The controversy between the reformers and the conservatives, as reflected by Wang Anshi and Sima Guang respectively, persisted throughout Wang’s ­tenure in office, but a general bias against institutional reform and a less-than-supportive bureaucracy truly undermined Wang’s efforts. Conservatives looked askance at the proposed institutional changes because such innovations were an implicit critique of the dynastic founders who had established the structures. Thus, any change encountered obstacles, and Wang’s comprehensive reforms were even more subject to such criticism. However, the bureaucracy remained the most recalcitrant stumbling block to Wang’s efforts to promote change. Although most bureaucrats were well-educated and respectable, low salaries inspired many to capitalize on their positions to extort funds and to extract bribes. Because they recognized that Wang’s reforms might undercut such corruption, they were disenchanted with his New Reforms and attempted to avoid implementing them. Wang, himself a paragon of virtue in financial matters, raised the salaries of officials to prevent temptation and to curb ­corruption. However, clever manipulators who could fabricate or distort evidence to discredit Wang and his allies abounded among the officials.