Triumph and Tragedy (The Second World War) (59 page)

2. Meanwhile I send you a letter I have received
from the King of Greece, to whom we have suggested
the policy of making the Archbishop of Athens Regent.

The King refuses to allow this. Therefore an act of
constitutional violence will be entailed if we finally
decide upon this course. I know nothing of the
Archbishop, except that our people on the spot think he
might stop a gap or bridge a gully.

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It was a pleasure to hear at the same time from one on whose judgment and instinct in such matters I relied.

Field-Marshal Smuts

14 Dec. 44

to Prime Minister

I am very distressed at the anxiety and trouble which
the situation in Greece is causing you and the Cabinet.

I spoke strongly yesterday at Port Elizabeth in favour of
policy pursued by the United Kingdom Government. I
hope my comments have been conveyed by cable in
condensed form. We may, I fear, find, if private Partisan
armies and underground movements are kept alive, the
peace degenerating in civil convulsions and anarchy
not only in Greece but elsewhere also in Europe…. I
hope that it is possible for the Archbishop to act with
greater decision and authority. At this stage firmness is
in any case essential, and weakness in dealing with the
Partisans may end in real civil war at a later, more
inconvenient, stage.

To be frank, I dislike our Ambassador taking this
important role in change of Greek Government, as it
may later be used as an argument against you for
undue interference in the affairs of Greece. My own
view, for what it is worth, is that after the suppression of
the E.A.M. revolt the Greek King should return to
discharge his proper constitutional functions, and the
onus of practically running Greece should no longer be
borne by His Majesty’s Government.

I also received from the Greek 3d Mountain Brigade, which had been fighting loyally with us, a message of thanks for our efforts to protect their country and of grief because British blood was being shed. They asked me to become their Honorary Commander.

But from Harry Hopkins came another warning: Triumph and Tragedy

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Mr. Harry Hopkins to

16 Dec. 44

Prime Minister

Public opinion here is deteriorating rapidly because
of Greek situation and your statement in Parliament
about the United States and Poland.

With the battle joined as it is in Europe and Asia,
with every energy required on everyone’s part to defeat
the enemy, I confess I find myself greatly disturbed at
the diplomatic turn of events, which throw into the
public gaze our several difficulties.

I do not know what the President or Stettinius may
have to say publicly, but it may well be that one or both
of them must state in unequivocal terms our determination to do all that we can to seek a free and secure
world.

We were all agreed on this aim, but the question was whether it could be achieved by allowing the Communists to seize all power in Athens. That was the issue at stake.

Prime Minister to Mr.

17 Dec. 44

Harry Hopkins

I am distressed and puzzled by your message. I
hope you will not hesitate to telegraph me on any
points on which you think we, or I personally, have
been in error, and what you would advise, because I
have great trust in your judgment and friendship, even if
I may at times look at matters from a different angle. All
the President’s telegrams to me have been most kind
and encouraging, and also his telegram to U.J. may do
a world of good.

2. Naturally I should welcome any public statements
in America which set forth the aims stated in your last
sentence. These are also ours. We seek nothing for
ourselves from this struggle.

I also sent my promised reply to the President.

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Prime Minister to

17 Dec. 44

President Roosevelt

About Greece. The present position is that our
representatives on the spot, Macmillan and Leeper,
have strongly recommended the appointment of the
Archbishop as Regent. This is obnoxious to the
Papandreou Government, though they might be
persuaded to advocate a Regency of three, namely, the
Archbishop, General Plastiras, and Dragoumis. There is
suspicion that the Archbishop is ambitious of obtaining
chief political power, and that, supported by E.A.M., he
will use it ruthlessly against existing Ministers. Whether
this be true or not I cannot say. The facts are changing
from hour to hour. I do not feel at all sure that in setting
up a one-man Regency we might not be imposing a
dictatorship on Greece.

2. There is also to be considered the fact that the
King refuses, I think inflexibly, to appoint a Regency,
certainly not a one-man Regency of the Archbishop,
whom he distrusts and fears. According to the Greek
constitution, the Crown Prince is Regent in the absence
of the King. The King also states that all his Ministers
under Papandreou advise him against such a step, and
that, as a constitutional monarch, he cannot be
responsible for it.

3. The War Cabinet decided to await for three or
four days the course of military operations. Our
reinforcements are arriving rapidly, and the British
General Staff Intelligence says that there are not more
than twelve thousand E.L.A.S. in Athens and the
Piraeus. The Greek King’s estimate is fifteen to twenty-two thousand. Anyhow, we shall by the middle of next
week be far superior in numbers. I am not prepared, as
at present informed, to give way to unconstitutional
violence in such circumstances.

4. Our immediate task is to secure control of Athens
and the Piraeus. According to the latest reports, E.L.A.

S. may agree to depart. This will give us a firm basis
from which to negotiate the best settlement possible
between the warring Greek factions. It will certainly

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have to provide for the disarming of the guerrilla forces.

The disarmament of the Greek Mountain Brigade, who
took Rimini, and the Sacred Squadron, who have
fought so well at the side of British and American
troops, would seriously weaken our forces, and in any
case we could not abandon them to massacre. They
may however be removed elsewhere as part of a
general settlement.

5. I am sure you would not wish us to cast down our
painful and thankless task at this time. We embarked
upon it with your full consent. We desire nothing from
Greece but to do our duty by the common cause. In the
midst of our task of bringing food and relief and
maintaining the rudiments of order for a Government
which has no armed forces we have become involved
in a furious, though not as yet very bloody, struggle. I
have felt it much that you were unable to give a word of
explanation for our action, but I understand your
difficulties.

6. Meanwhile the Cabinet is united and the Socialist
Ministers approve Mr. Bevin’s declarations at the
Labour conference, which on this matter endorsed the
official platform by a majority of 2,455,000 votes to
137,000. I could at any time obtain, I believe, a ten to
one majority in the House of Commons. I am sure you
will do whatever you can. I will keep you constantly
informed.

Mr. Mackenzie King in Canada also felt the unfavourable reactions to our Greek policy which had been so volubly expressed in the United States. He revealed his embarrassments in several telegrams.

Prime Minister to

15 Dec. 44

Prime Minister of

Canada

In the House I have done my best to clarify our
position. To my mind the essential point is that, having
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obtained the written assent of all parties, including the
E.A.M., the Greek Prime Minister invited British troops
to enter Greece to keep order and safeguard supplies.

We accepted this invitation, and must still do our best to
carry it out. The task is ungrateful, but we could not in
honour shirk our responsibilities. With tempers inflamed
on both sides in Athens, the situation is inevitably
difficult. But the visit of Alexander was most valuable,
and on the whole latest reports are more encouraging.

I also sent Mr. Mackenzie King the telegrams which I had exchanged with the President in August,
8
and drew his attention to the Caserta Agreement, which by now had been made public. I told him that I had the verbal approval of Stalin to our entering Greece and liberating Athens.

“Although,” I concluded, “Communists are at the root of the business, Stalin has not so far made any public reflection on our action.”

In deference to these facts, arguments, and appeals, Mr.

Mackenzie King refrained from any public act of dissociation.

It is odd, looking back on these events, now that some years have passed, to see how completely the policy for which I and my colleagues fought so stubbornly has been justified by events. Myself, I never had any doubts about it, for I saw quite plainly that Communism would be the peril civilisation would have to face after the defeat of Nazism and Fascism. It did not fall to us to end the task in Greece. I little thought however at the end of 1944 that the State Department, supported by overwhelming American opinion, would in little more than two years not only adopt and carry on the course we had opened, but would make vehement and costly exertions, even of a military character, to bring it to fruition. In his evidence before the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee, Mr. Dean Triumph and Tragedy

367

Acheson, the United States Acting Secretary of State, is reported to have testified on March 21, 1947, as follows:
A Communist-dominated government in Greece
would be considered dangerous to United States
security.

If Greece has escaped the fate of Czechoslovakia and survives today as one of the free nations, it is due not only to British action in 1944, but the steadfast efforts of what was presently to become the united strength of the English-speaking world.