Their Finest Hour (57 page)

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I kept General Smuts fully informed.

Prime Minister to General Smuts.

22.IX.40.

You will have seen my message about Dakar. I have been thinking a great deal about what you said in your various messages about not neglecting the African sphere. The de Gaulle movement to rescue the French colonies has prospered in Equatoria and the Cameroons. We could not allow these solid gains to be destroyed by French warships and personnel from Vichy, sent probably at German dictation. If Dakar fell under German control and became a U-boat base, the consequences to the Cape route would be deadly. We have therefore set out upon the business of putting de Gaulle into Dakar, peaceably if we can, forcibly if we must, and the expedition now about to strike seems to have the necessary force.

Naturally the risk of a bloody collision with the French sailors and part of the garrison is not a light one. On the whole, I think the odds are heavily against any serious resistance, having regard to the low morale and unhappy plight of this French colony, and the ruin and starvation which faces them through our sea control. Still, no one can be sure till we try. The argument that such a risk ought not to be run at a time when French opinion, encouraged by British resistance, is veering towards us even at Vichy, and that anything like a second Oran would be a great set-back, has weighed heavily with us. Nevertheless, we came to the united conclusion that this objection might not turn out to be valid, and must in any case be surpassed by the dangers of doing nothing and of allowing Vichy to prevail against de Gaulle. If Vichy did not declare war after Oran, or under the pressure of our blockade, there is no reason why they should do so if there is a fight at Dakar. Besides the strategical importance of Dakar and political effects of its capture by de Gaulle, there are sixty or seventy millions of Belgian and Polish gold wrongfully held in the interior, and the great battleship
Richelieu,
by no means permanently disabled, would indirectly come into our hands. Anyhow, the die is cast.

We do not intend to disturb Morocco at present on account of the German pressure on Spain and Spanish interests there. We are very hopeful about Syria, whither General Catroux will go next week. An important battle is now impending at Mersa Matruh, and I hope our armoured reinforcements will arrive in time.

I am not particularly impressed with the dangers in Kenya, especially if we lie back and fight from the broad-gauge railway, leaving the enemy the difficult communications. I am trying to send a few suitable tanks to this theatre, which otherwise I feel is overstocked with troops needed in the Soudan and in the Delta.

It gives me so much pleasure and confidence to be trekking with you along the path we have followed together for so many years.

To President Roosevelt I telegraphed:

Former Naval Person to President.

23.IX.40.

I was encouraged by your reception of information conveyed by Lord Lothian about Dakar. It would be against our joint interests if strong German submarine and aircraft bases were established there. It looks as if there might be a stiff fight. Perhaps not, but anyhow orders have been given to ram it through. We should be delighted if you would send some American warships to Monrovia and Freetown, and I hope by that time to have Dakar ready for your call. But what really matters now is that you should put it across the French Government that a war declaration would be very bad indeed for them in all that concerns United States. If Vichy declares war, that is the same thing as Germany, and Vichy possessions in the Western Hemisphere must be considered potentially German possessions.

Many thanks also for your hint about invasion. We are all ready for them. I am very glad to hear about the rifles.

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It is not necessary here to narrate in detail all that happened during the three days in which Dakar was attacked. These deserve their place in military chronicles, and are a further good example of bad luck. The meteorologists at the Air Ministry had, of course, carefully studied climatic conditions on the West African coast. A long survey of records reveals uniform, regular bright sunlight and clear weather at this season of the year. On September 23, when the Anglo-French armada approached the fortress, with de Gaulle and his French ships well in the van, fog reigned supreme. We had hoped, since the great majority of the population, French and native, was on our side, that the appearance of all these ships with the British lying far back on the horizon would have decided the action of the Governor. It soon proved, however, that the Vichy partisans were masters, and there can be no doubt that the arrival of the cruisers with their troops had blotted out any hope of Dakar joining the Free French movement. De Gaulle’s two aeroplanes landed on the local airfield, and their pilots were immediately arrested. One of them had on his person a list of the leading Free French adherents. De Gaulle’s emissaries, sent under the Tricolour and the white flag, were rebuffed, and others who entered later in a launch were fired upon and one of them wounded. All hearts were hardened, and the British Fleet approached through the mist to within five thousand yards. At 10
A.M.
a harbour battery opened fire on one of our wing destroyers. The fire was returned, and the engagement soon became general. The destroyers
Inglefield
and
Foresight
were slightly damaged, and the
Cumberland
was struck in the engine-room and had to quit. One French submarine was bombed by an aircraft at periscope depth, and one French destroyer set on fire.

There is an age-long argument about ships
versus
forts. Nelson said that a six-gun battery could fight a hundred-gun ship-of-the-line. Mr. Balfour, in the Dardanelles inquiry, said in 1916, “If the ship has guns which can hit the fort at ranges where the fort cannot reply, the duel is not necessarily so unequal.” On this occasion the British Fleet, with proper spotting, could in theory engage, and after a certain number of rounds destroy, the Dakar batteries of 9.4-inch guns at 27,000 yards. But the Vichy forces had at this time also the battleship
Richelieu,
which proved capable of firing two-gun salvos from fifteen-inch artillery. This had to be taken into account by the British Admiral. Above all there was the fog. The firing, therefore, died away at about 11.30, and all British and Free French ships retired.

In the afternoon General de Gaulle tried to land his troops at Rufisque, but the fog and the confusion had now become so dense that the attempt was abandoned. By 4.30
P.M.
the commanders decided to withdraw the troopships and resume the operation next day. The signal with this information reached London at 7.19
P.M
., and I thereupon sent the following personal message to the commander timed at fourteen minutes past ten o’clock on September 23:

Having begun, we must go on to the end. Stop at nothing.

An ultimatum was sent that night to the Governor of Dakar, to which reply was made that he would defend the fortress to the last. The commanders answered that they intended continuing the operation. Visibility was better than on the previous day, but still poor. The shore batteries opened on our ships as they closed, and
Barham
and
Resolution
engaged
Richelieu
at 13,600 yards. Shortly afterwards
Devonshire
and
Australia
engaged a cruiser and a destroyer, damaging the latter. The bombardment ended at about ten o’clock, by which time
Richelieu
had been hit by a fifteen-inch shell, as also had
Fort Manuel,
and a light cruiser was on fire. Moreover, one enemy submarine, which had tried to interfere with our approach, had been forced to the surface by a depth charge, the crew surrendering. None of our ships was hit. In the afternoon the bombardment was renewed for a short time. On this occasion
Barham
was hit four times without serious damage. The bombardment was inconclusive except to indicate that the defences were strong and the garrison determined to resist.

On September 25, the action was resumed. The weather was clear, and our fleet bombarded at 21,000 yards’ range, when they were replied to, not only by the very accurate coastal batteries, but by double salvos from the fifteen-inch guns of the
Richelieu.
A smoke-screen used by the Dakar commander baffled our aim. Soon after 9
A.M
. the battleship
Resolution
was hit by a torpedo from a Vichy submarine. After this the Admiral decided to withdraw to seaward, “in view of the condition of the
Resolution,
the continued danger from submarines, and the great accuracy and determination of the shore defences.”

Meanwhile, the Defence Committee, which met at 10
A.M.
without me, had formed the opinion that no pressure should be brought to bear on the commanders to take any action against their better judgment. The Cabinet met at 11.30
A.M.
and news of the results of the morning’s operations reached us during the meeting. On these tidings it seemed clear that the matter had been pressed as far as prudence and our resources would allow. Several good ships had been severely damaged. It was obvious that Dakar would be defended to the death. No one could be sure that the fierce passions of protracted fighting would not provoke a French declaration of war from Vichy. We, therefore, after a painful discussion, were all agreed to push no more.

Accordingly I sent the following telegram (1.27
P.M
., September 25) to the commanders:

On all the information now before us, including damage to
Resolution,
we have decided that the enterprise against Dakar should be abandoned, the obvious evil consequences being faced. Unless something has happened which we do not know, which makes you wish to attempt landing in force, you should forthwith break off. You should inform us “Most Immediate” whether you concur, but unless the position has entirely changed in our favour, you should not actually begin landing till you receive our reply.

Assuming enterprise abandoned, we shall endeavour to cover Duala by naval force, but we cannot safeguard de Gaulle’s forces [if they remain] at Bathurst. Question of reinforcing Freetown with troops is being considered. Instructions regarding disposal of remainder of forces will be given on receipt of your reply.

The commanders made the following reply:

Concur in breaking off.

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Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt.

25.IX.40.

I much regret we had to abandon Dakar enterprise. Vichy got in before us and animated defence with partisans and gunnery experts. All friendly elements were gripped and held down. Several of our ships were hit, and to persist with landing in force would have tied us to an undue commitment when you think of what we have on our hands already.

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In the three days’ bombardment no British ships were sunk, but the battleship
Resolution
was disabled for several months, and two destroyers sustained damage which required considerable repairs in home dockyards. Two Vichy submarines were sunk, the crew of one being saved, two destroyers were burnt out and beached, and the battleship
Richelieu
was hit by a fifteen-inch shell and damaged by two near misses of two-hundred-fifty-pound bombs. There was, of course, no means at Dakar of repairing this formidable vessel, which had already been rendered temporarily immobile in July, and it could now be definitely dismissed as a hostile factor from our calculations.

It is interesting to note the changes of rôle of the War Cabinet and of its commanders in the enterprise. The commanders were at first by no means enthusiastic, and General Irwin protected himself by a lengthy reasoned memorandum to the V.C.I.G.S. in which all the difficulties were stressed. After the expedition had got south of the Canary Islands, the French cruiser squadron, with its reinforcements of Vichy partisans, carrying with it in physical as well as moral form the authority of the French Republic, slipped through the Straits of Gibraltar. I had no doubt from that moment that the situation had been transformed; and the War Cabinet on my advice, supported by the Chiefs of the Staff, agreed that we should stop the enterprise while time remained and no loss had been incurred, and no failure would be exposed.

Then the commanders on the spot came forward with their strong desire to take action, and the War Cabinet, quite rightly in my view, felt that the commanders should be the judges and be given a free hand. Accordingly the attempt was made, and it was immediately apparent, by the efficient and vehement resistance of Dakar, that the War Cabinet were right and rightly advised.

Although the fighting at Dakar had been far more serious than had been expected, we were not wrong in our judgment that the Vichy Government would not declare war upon Great Britain. They contented themselves with air retaliation upon Gibraltar from North Africa. On September 24 and 25, successive raids were made upon the harbour and dockyard; in the first, fifty bombs were dropped, and in the second, in which about a hundred aircraft took part, four times as many. The French aviators did not seem to have their hearts in the business, and most of the bombs fell in the sea. Damage was negligible and no one was hurt. Our anti-aircraft batteries shot down three aircraft. Fighting at Dakar having ended in a Vichy success, the incident was tacitly treated as “quits.”

No blame attached to the British naval and military commanders, and both were constantly employed until the end of the war, the Admiral attaining the highest distinction. It was one of my rules that
errors towards the enemy
must be lightly judged. They were quite right to try, if with their knowledge on the spot they thought they could carry the matter through; and the fact that they underestimated the effect produced on the Vichy garrison by the arrival of the cruisers and their reinforcements was in no way counted against them. Of General de Gaulle I said in the House of Commons that his conduct and bearing on this occasion had made my confidence in him greater than ever.