Their Finest Hour (60 page)

As the autumn drew into winter I was concerned with the danger of the two great French battleships attempting to make their way back to Toulon, where they could be completed. President Roosevelt’s envoy, Admiral Leahy, had established intimate relations with Marshal Pétain. It was to Roosevelt, therefore, that I turned, and not in vain.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt.

20.X.40.

We hear rumours from various sources that the Vichy Government are preparing their ships and colonial troops to aid the Germans against us. I do not myself believe these reports, but if the French Fleet at Toulon were turned over to Germany, it would be a very heavy blow. It would certainly be a wise precaution, Mr. President, if you would speak in the strongest terms to the French Ambassador emphasising the disapprobation with which the United States would view such a betrayal of the cause of democracy and freedom. They will pay great heed in Vichy to such a warning.

You will have seen what very heavy losses we have suffered in the northwestern approaches to our last two convoys.
¹
This is due to our shortage of destroyers in the gap period I mentioned to you. Thank God your fifty are now coming along, and some will soon be in action. We ought to be much better off by the end of the year, as we have a lot of our own anti-U-boat vessels completing, but naturally we are passing through an anxious and critical period, with so many small craft having to guard against invasion in the Narrow Waters, and with the very great naval effort we are making in the Mediterranean, and the immense amount of convoy work.

The President in consequence sent a very severe personal message to the Pétain Government about the Toulon Fleet. “The fact,” he said, “that a Government is a prisoner of war of another Power does not justify such a prisoner in serving its conqueror in operations against its former ally.” He reminded the Marshal of the solemn assurances he had received that the French Fleet would not be surrendered. If the French Government attempted to permit the Germans to use the French Fleet in hostile operations against the British Fleet, such action would constitute a flagrant and deliberate breach of faith with the United States Government. Any agreement of that character would most definitely wreck the traditional friendship between the French and American peoples. It would create a wave of bitter indignation against France in American public opinion and would permanently end all American aid to the French people. If France pursued such a policy the United States could make no effort when the proper time came to secure for France the retention of her oversea possessions.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt.

26.X.40.

Your cable with terms of splendid warning you gave the French crossed mine to you about a suggested message to Pétain. Most grateful for what you have already done, but everything still in balance. Foreign Office tell me they have cabled you our latest information of German terms, which Pétain is said to be resisting. In this connection the surrender of bases on the African shores for air or U-boats would be just as bad as surrender of ships. In particular Atlantic bases in bad hands would be a menace to you and a grievous embarrassment to us. I hope, therefore, you will make it clear to the French that your argument about ships applies also to the betrayal of bases.

In spite of the invasion threats and air attacks of the last five months, we have maintained a continuous flow of reinforcements round the Cape to Middle East, as well as sending modern aircraft and major units of the Fleet. I do not think the invasion danger is yet at an end, but we are now augmenting our eastern transferences. The strain is very great in both theatres, and all contributions will be thankfully received.

At this time the Admiralty were so deeply concerned about the dangers of a rupture with Vichy that they were inclined to underrate the disadvantages of letting the two French battleships return to Toulon. On this I gave directions.

Prime Minister to First Lord and First Sea Lord. (From the train.)

2.XI.40.

After the defection of France it was considered vital not to allow the
Jean Bart
and the
Richelieu
to fall into enemy hands, or to reach harbours where they could be completed. For this purpose you attacked the
Richelieu
and claimed to have disabled her to a very large extent. The
Jean Bart
is in an unfinished state, and neither ship can be fitted for action in the African harbours on the Atlantic, where they now lie. It is our decided policy not to allow these ships to pass into bad hands. I was therefore surprised to hear the First Sea Lord demur to the idea that the
Jean Bart
should be prevented from returning to Toulon, and argue in the sense that she might safely be allowed to do so. Toulon has always been judged by us to be an enemy-controlled harbour. It was for this reason that the most extreme efforts were made, unhappily without success, to prevent the
Strasbourg
reaching Toulon. I cannot reconcile this action with the apparent readiness to allow the
Jean Bart
to proceed there.

The Admiralty is held responsible for preventing the return of either of these two ships to French ports on the Atlantic, or to the Mediterranean, where they could be repaired and completed at Toulon, and then at any time betrayed to the Germans or captured by them.

Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary. (From the train.)

2.XI.40.

I do not know how imminent the movement of the
Jean Bart
may be. I have informed the Admiralty that they are responsible for stopping her from entering the Mediterranean. It would seem, therefore, very important that you should give a clear warning to Vichy that the ship in question will be stopped, and if necessary sunk, if she attempts to go either to a German-controlled port in the Atlantic, or to a Mediterranean port which may at any time fall into German hands. My private office in London is sending you a copy of the Minute I have sent to the First Lord and the First Sea Lord.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt.

10.XI.40.

1. We have been much disturbed by reports of intention of French Government to bring
Jean Bart
and
Richelieu
to Mediterranean for completion. It is difficult to exaggerate [the] potential danger if this were to happen, and so open the way for these ships to fall under German control. We should feel bound to do our best to prevent it.

2. We conveyed a warning to French Government through Ambassador at Madrid a few days ago, on the following lines: “Such a step would greatly increase the temptation to the Germans and Italians to seize the French Fleet. We doubt, not the good faith of the French Government, but their physical ability to implement their assurances that they will not let the Fleet fall into enemy hands. We particularly wish to avoid any clash between British and French naval forces, and therefore hope that if they had thought of moving the ships they will now refrain from doing so.”

3. As we said to French Government, we should not question good faith of assurances, but even if we accept assurances we can feel no security that they will in fact be able to maintain them once the ships are in French ports in the power or reach of the enemy, and I must confess that the desire of French Government to bring these ships back, if this turns out to be well-founded, seems to me to give cause for some suspicion.

4. It would be most helpful if you felt able to give a further warning at Vichy on this matter, for if things went wrong it might well prove of extreme danger for us both.

* * * * *

I kept in close touch with General de Gaulle.

Prime Minister to General de Gaulle (Libreville.)

10.XI.40.

I feel most anxious for consultation with you. Situation between France and Britain has changed remarkably since you left. A very strong feeling has grown throughout France in our favour, as it is seen that we cannot be conquered and that war will go on. We know Vichy Government is deeply alarmed by the very stern pressure administered to them by United States. On the other hand, Laval and revengeful Darlan are trying to force French declaration of war against us and rejoice in provoking minor naval incidents. We have hopes of Weygand in Africa, and no one must underrate advantage that would follow if he were rallied. We are trying to arrive at some
modus vivendi
with Vichy which will minimise the risk of incidents and will enable favourable forces in France to develop. We have told them plainly that, if they bomb Gibraltar or take other aggressive action, we shall bomb Vichy, and pursue the Vichy Government wherever it chooses to go. So far we have had no response. You will see how important it is that you should be here. I therefore hope you will be able to tidy up at Libreville and come home as soon as possible. Let me know your plans.

On November 13, the President replied to my message of the 10th about the possible transfer of the
Jean Bart
and
Richelieu
to the Mediterranean for completion. He had immediately instructed the American Chargé d’Affaires at Vichy to obtain a confirmation or denial of this report and to point out that it was of vital interest to the Government of the United States that these vessels should remain in stations where they would not be exposed to control or seizure by a Power which might employ them to ends in conflict with the interests of the United States in the future of the French Fleet. Any such step on the part of France would inevitably seriously prejudice Franco-American relations. He also offered to buy the ships from the French Government if they would sell them.

The President also informed me that Pétain had stated to the American Chargé d’Affaires that the most solemn assurances had been given by him that the French Fleet, including the two battleships, would never fall into the hands of Germany. The Marshal said he had given those assurances to the United States Government, to the British Government, and even to me personally.

Again I reiterate them [he said]. These ships will be used to defend the possessions and territories of France. Unless we are attacked by the British, they will never be used against England. Even if I wanted to, I cannot sell those ships. It is impossible under the terms of the armistice, and even if it were possible it would never be permitted by the Germans. France is under Germany’s heel and impotent. I would gladly sell them, if I were free, on condition that they be returned to us after the war, and save them for France in this way. I must repeat I have neither the right nor the possibility of selling them under present circumstances.

Marshal Pétain had made this statement with great seriousness, but with no sign of either surprise or resentment at the suggestion. President Roosevelt had further instructed the Chargé d’Affaires to inform Marshal Pétain that the American offer remained open both about these vessels as well as about any others in the French Navy.

On November 23, the President sent me further reassurances. Marshal Pétain had stated categorically that he would keep the vessels now at Dakar and Casablanca where they were, and that if there was any change in this plan he would give the President previous notice.

* * * * *

The attitude of Spain was of even more consequence to us than that of Vichy, with which it was so closely linked. Spain had much to give and even more to take away. We had been neutral in the sanguinary Spanish Civil War. General Franco owed little or nothing to us, but much – perhaps life itself – to the Axis Powers. Hitler and Mussolini had come to his aid. He disliked and feared Hitler. He liked and did not fear Mussolini. At the beginning of the World War, Spain had declared, and since then strictly observed, neutrality. A fertile and needful trade flowed between our two countries, and the iron ore from Biscayan ports was important for our munitions. But now in May the “Twilight War” was over. The might of Nazi Germany was proved. The French front was broken. The Allied armies of the North were in peril. It was at this moment that I had gladly offered to a former colleague, displaced by the Ministerial changes, a new sphere of responsibility, for which his gifts and temperament were suited. On May 17 Sir Samuel Hoare had been appointed Ambassador to Spain, and certainly I believe that no one could have carried out better this wearing, delicate, and cardinal five years’ mission. Thus we were very well represented at Madrid, not only by the Ambassador and by the Counsellor of the Embassy, Mr. Arthur Yencken,
²
but also by the Naval Attaché, Captain Hillgarth, who had retired from the Navy and lived in Majorca, but now returned to duty equipped with profound knowledge of Spanish affairs.

General Franco’s policy throughout the war was entirely selfish and cold-blooded. He thought only of Spain and Spanish interests. Gratitude to Hitler and Mussolini for their help never entered his head. Nor, on the other hand, did he bear any grudge to England for the hostility of our Left-Wing parties. This narrow-minded tyrant only thought about keeping his blood-drained people out of another war. They had had enough of war. A million men had been slaughtered by their brothers’ hands. Poverty, high prices, and hard times froze the stony peninsula. No more war for Spain and no more war for Franco! Such were the commonplace sentiments with which he viewed and met the awful convulsion which now shook the world.

His Majesty’s Government was quite content with this unheroic outlook. All we wanted was the neutrality of Spain. We wanted to trade with Spain. We wanted her ports to be denied to German and Italian submarines. We wanted not only an unmolested Gibraltar, but the use of the anchorage of Algeciras for our ships and the use of the ground which joins the Rock to the mainland for our ever-expanding air base. On these facilities depended in large measure our access to the Mediterranean. Nothing was easier than for the Spaniards to mount or allow to be mounted a dozen heavy guns in the hills behind Algeciras. They had a right to do so at any time, and, once mounted, they could at any moment be fired, and our naval and air bases would become unusable. The Rock might once again stand a long siege, but it would be only a rock. Spain held the key to all British enterprises in the Mediterranean, and never in the darkest hours did she turn the lock against us. So great was the danger that for nearly two years we kept constantly at a few days’ notice an expedition of over five thousand men and their ships, ready to seize the Canary Islands, by which we could maintain air and sea control over the U-boats, and contact with Australasia round the Cape, if ever the harbour of Gibraltar were denied to us by the Spaniards.