Their Finest Hour (27 page)
That same evening he made his memorable broadcast to the French people. One passage should be quoted here:
France is not alone. She has a vast Empire behind her. She can unite with the British Empire, which holds the seas, and is continuing the struggle. She can utilise to the full, as England is doing, the vast industrial resources of the United States.
Other Frenchmen who wished to fight on were not so fortunate. When the Pétain Government was formed, the plan of going to Africa to set up a centre of power outside German control was still open. It was discussed at a meeting of the Pétain Cabinet on June 18. The same evening President Lebrun, Pétain, and the Presidents of the Senate and the Chamber met together. There seems to have been general agreement at least to send a representative body to North Africa. Even the Marshal was not hostile. He himself intended to stay, but saw no reason why Chautemps, Vice-President of the Council, should not go and act in his name. When rumours of an impending exodus ran round agitated Bordeaux, Weygand was hostile. Such a move, he thought, would wreck the “honourable” armistice negotiations which had already been begun by way of Madrid, on French initiative, on June 17. Laval was deeply alarmed. He feared that the setting-up of an effective resistance administration outside France would frustrate the policy on which he was resolved. Weygand and Laval set to work on the clusters of Deputies and Senators crowded into Bordeaux.
Darlan, as Minister of Marine, took a different view. To pack off all the principal critics of his conduct in a ship seemed at the moment to him a most convenient solution of many difficulties. Once aboard, all those who went would be in his power, and there would be plenty of time for the Government to settle what to do. With the approval of the new Cabinet, he offered passages on the armed auxiliary cruiser
Massilia
to all political figures of influence who wished to go to Africa. The ship was to sail from the mouth of the Gironde on the 20th. Many, however, who had planned to go to Africa, including Jeanneney and Herriot, suspected a trap, and preferred to travel overland through Spain. The final party, apart from refugees, consisted of twenty-four Deputies and one Senator, and included Mandel, Campinchi, and Daladier, who had all been actively pressing for the move to Africa. On the afternoon of the 21st, the
Massilia
sailed. On the 23d, the ship’s radio announced that the Pétain Government had accepted and signed the armistice with Germany. Campinchi immediately tried to persuade the captain to set his course for England, but this officer no doubt had his instructions and met his former political chief of two days before with a bleak refusal. The unlucky band of patriots passed anxious hours till on the evening of June 24 the
Massilia
anchored at Casablanca.
Mandel now acted with his usual decision. He had with Daladier drafted a proclamation setting up a resistance administration in North Africa with himself as Premier. He went on shore, and, after calling on the British Consul, established himself at the Hôtel Excelsior. He then attempted to send his proclamation out through the Havas Agency. When General Noguès read its text, he was disturbed. He intercepted the message, and it was telegraphed not to the world but to Darlan and Pétain. They had now made up their minds to have no alternative and potentially rival Government outside German power. Mandel was arrested at his hotel and brought before the local court, but the magistrate, afterwards dismissed by Vichy, declared there was no case against him and set him free. He was, however, by the orders of Governor-General Noguès rearrested and put back on the
Massilia,
which henceforth was detained in the harbour under strict control without its passengers having any communication with the shore.
Without, of course, knowing any of the facts here set forth, I was already concerned about the fate of Frenchmen who wished to fight on.
Prime Minister to General Ismay.
24.VI.40.
It seems most important to establish now before the trap closes an organisation for enabling French officers and soldiers, as well as important technicians, who wish to fight, to make their way to various ports. A sort of “underground railway” as in the olden days of slavery should be established and a Scarlet Pimpernel organisation set up. I have no doubt there will be a steady flow of determined men, and we need all we can get for the defence of the French colonies. The Admiralty and Air Force must co-operate. General de Gaulle and his Committee would, of course, be the operative authority.
At our meeting of the War Cabinet late at night on June 25, we heard among other things that a ship with a large number of prominent French politicians on board had passed Rabat. We decided to establish contact with them at once. Mr. Duff Cooper, the Minister of Information, accompanied by Lord Gort, started for Rabat at dawn in a Sunderland flying-boat. They found the town in mourning. Flags were flying at half-mast, church bells were tolling, and a solemn service was taking place in the cathedral to bewail the defeat of France. All their attempts to get in touch with Mandel were prevented. The Deputy Governor, named Morice, declared, not only on the telephone, but in a personal interview which Duff Cooper demanded, that he had no choice but to obey the orders of his superiors. “If General Noguès tells me to shoot myself, I will gladly obey. Unfortunately, the orders he has given me are more cruel.” The former French Ministers and Deputies were in fact to be treated as escaped prisoners. Our mission had no choice but to return the way they came. A few days later (July 1) I gave instructions to the Admiralty to try to cut out the
Massilia
and rescue those on board. No plan could, however, be made, and for nearly three weeks she lay under the batteries of Casablanca, after which the whole party were brought back to France and disposed of as the Vichy Government thought convenient to themselves and agreeable to their German masters. Mandel began his long and painful internment which ended in his murder by German orders at the end of 1944. Thus perished the hope of setting up a strong representative French Government, either in Africa or in London.
* * * * *
Although vain, the process of trying to imagine what would have happened if some important event or decision had been different is often tempting and sometimes instructive. The manner of the fall of France was decided on June 16 by a dozen chances, each measured by a hair’s-breadth. If Paul Reynaud had survived the 16th, I should have been with him at noon on the 17th, accompanied by the most powerful delegation that has ever left our shores, armed with plenary powers in the name of the British nation. Certainly we should have confronted Pétain, Weygand, Chautemps, and the rest with our blunt proposition: “No release from the obligation of March 28 unless the French Fleet is sailed to British ports. On the other hand, we offer an indissoluble Anglo-French Union. Go to Africa and let us fight it out together.” Surely we should have been aided by the President of the Republic, by the Presidents of the two French Chambers, and by all that resolute band who gathered behind Reynaud, Mandel, and de Gaulle. It seems to me probable that we should have uplifted and converted the defeatists round the table, or left them in a minority or even under arrest.
But let us pursue this ghostly speculation further. The French Government would have retired to North Africa. The Anglo-French Super-State or Working Committee, to which it would probably in practice have reduced itself, would have faced Hitler. The British and French Fleets from their harbours would have enjoyed complete mastery of the Mediterranean, and free passage through it for all troops and supplies. Whatever British air force could be spared from the defence of Britain, and what was left of the French air force, nourished by American production and based on the French North African airfields, would soon have become an offensive factor of the first importance. Malta, instead of being for so long a care and peril, would at once have taken its place as our most active naval base. Italy could have been attacked with heavy bombing from Africa far easier than from England. Her communications with the Italian armies in Libya and Tripolitania would have been effectively severed. Using no more fighter aircraft than we actually employed in the defence of Egypt and sending to the Mediterranean theatre no more troops than we actually sent, or held ready to send, we might well, with the remains of the French Army, have transferred the war from the East to the Central Mediterranean, and during 1941 the entire North African shore might have been cleared of Italian forces.
France would never have ceased to be one of the principal belligerent allies and would have been spared the fearful schism which rent and still rends her people. Her homeland no doubt would have lain prostrate under the German rule, but that was only what actually happened after the Anglo-American descent in November, 1942.
Now that the whole story is before us, no one can doubt that the armistice did not spare France a pang.
It is still more shadowy to guess what Hitler would have done. Would he have forced his way through Spain, with or without Spanish agreement, and, after assaulting and perhaps capturing Gibraltar, have invaded Tangier and Morocco? This was an area which deeply concerned the United States, and was ever prominent in President Roosevelt’s mind. How could Hitler have made this major attack through Spain on Africa and yet fight the Battle of Britain? He would have had to choose. If he chose Africa, we, with the command of the sea and the French bases, could have moved both troops and air forces into Morocco and Algeria quicker than he, and in greater strength. We should certainly have welcomed in the autumn and winter of 1940 a vehement campaign in or from a friendly French Northwest Africa.
Surveying the whole scene in the afterlight, it seems unlikely that Hitler’s main decision and the major events of the war, namely, the Battle of Britain and the German surge to the East, would have been changed by the retirement of the French Government to North Africa. After the fall of Paris, when Hitler danced his jig of joy, he naturally dealt with very large propositions. Once France was prostrate, he must if possible conquer or destroy Great Britain. His only other choice was Russia. A major operation through Spain into Northwest Africa would have prejudiced both these tremendous adventures, or at least have prevented his attack on the Balkans. I have no doubt that it would have been better for all the Allies if the French Government had gone to North Africa. And that this would have remained true whether Hitler followed them and us thither or not.
One day when I was convalescing at Marrakech in January, 1944, General Georges came to luncheon. In the course of casual conversation I aired the fancy that perhaps the French Government’s failure to go to Africa in June, 1940, had all turned out for the best. At the Pétain trial in August, 1945, the General thought it right to state this in evidence. I make no complaint, but my hypothetical speculation on this occasion does not represent my considered opinion either during the war or now.
| 11 Admiral Darlan and the French Fleet: Oran |
Would Britain Surrender? — My Speech of June
18
— Strong Rally of the Dominions
—
Enduring Comradeship with the French People
—
“Their Finest Hour”
—
Words and Deeds — Reply to Lord Lothian, June
22
— Telegram to Mr. Mackenzie King, June
24
— Telegram of June
27
to General Smuts
—
To Lord Lothian, June
28
— Admiral Darlan’s Opportunity — His Obsession
—
His Fatal Choice
—
Solid Reasons for Confidence of War Cabinet and Chiefs of Staff — The French Navy
—
Armistice, Article
8 —
A Dire Decision
—
“Operation Catapult,” Zero Day, July
3
— Distribution of the French Fleet at the End of June
—
Portsmouth and Plymouth — Distress of the British Admirals at Gibraltar
—
The War Cabinet Inflexible — Our Terms to the French
—
The Tragedy of Oran
—
Alexandria, Dakar, and Martinique — My Report to Parliament, July
4
— Admonition to All British Ministers and Officials
— Tumultuous Approval of the House of Commons
—
World Impression on Elimination of French Navy — His Majesty’s Government Would Stop at Nothing
—
The Genius of France
—
Appendix to Chapter: Admiral Darlan’s Final Letter to Me.
A
FTER THE COLLAPSE
of France the question which arose in the minds of all our friends and foes was, “Would Britain surrender too?” So far as public statements count in the teeth of events, I had in the name of His Majesty’s Government repeatedly declared our resolve to fight on alone. After Dunkirk on June 4 I had used the expression, “if necessary for
years,
if necessary alone.
” This was not inserted without design, and the French Ambassador in London had been instructed the next day to inquire what I actually meant. He was told “exactly what was said.” I could remind the House of my remark when I addressed it on June 18, the morrow of the Bordeaux collapse. I then gave “some indication of the solid practical grounds on which we based our inflexible resolve to continue the war.” I was able to assure Parliament that our professional advisers of the three Services were confident that there were good and reasonable hopes of ultimate victory. I told them that I had received from all the four Dominion Prime Ministers messages in which they endorsed our decision to fight on and declared themselves ready to share our fortunes. “In casting up this dread balance-sheet and contemplating our dangers with a disillusioned eye I see great reasons for vigilance and exertion, but none whatever for panic or fear.” I added:
During the first four years of the last war the Allies experienced nothing but disaster and disappointment…. We repeatedly asked ourselves the question “How are we going to win?” and no one was ever able to answer it with much precision, until at the end, quite suddenly, quite unexpectedly, our terrible foe collapsed before us, and we were so glutted with victory that in our folly we threw it away.
However matters may go in France or with the French Government or other French Governments, we in this island and in the British Empire will never lose our sense of comradeship with the French people…. If final victory rewards our toils they shall share the gains – aye, and freedom shall be restored to all. We abate nothing of our just demands; not one jot or tittle do we recede…. Czechs, Poles, Norwegians, Dutch, Belgians, have joined their causes to our own. All these shall be restored.
What General Weygand called the Battle of France is over. I expect that the Battle of Britain is about to begin. Upon this battle depends the survival of Christian civilisation. Upon it depends our own British life, and the long continuity of our institutions and our Empire. The whole fury and might of the enemy must very soon be turned on us. Hitler knows that he will have to break us in this island or lose the war. If we can stand up to him, all Europe may be free and the life of the world may move forward into broad, sunlit uplands. But if we fail, then the whole world, including the United States, including all that we have known and cared for, will sink into the abyss of a new Dark Age, made more sinister, and perhaps more protracted, by the lights of perverted science. Let us therefore brace ourselves to our duties, and so bear ourselves that, if the British Empire and its Commonwealth last for a thousand years, men will say, “This was their finest hour.”
All these often-quoted words were made good in the hour of victory. But now they were only words. Foreigners who do not understand the temper of the British race all over the globe when its blood is up might suppose that they were only a bold front, set up as a good prelude for peace negotiations. Hitler’s need to finish the war in the West was obvious. He was in a position to offer the most tempting terms. To those who like myself had studied his moves, it did not seem impossible that he would consent to leave Britain and her Empire and Fleet intact and make a peace which would have secured him that free hand in the East of which Ribbentrop had talked to me in 1937, and which was his heart’s main desire. So far we had not done him much harm. We had indeed only added our own defeat to his triumph over France. Can one wonder that astute calculators in many countries, ignorant as they mostly were of the problems of overseas invasion, and of the quality of our air force, and who dwelt under the overwhelming impression of German might and terror, were not convinced? Not every Government called into being by Democracy or by Despotism, and not every nation, while quite alone, and as it seemed abandoned, would have courted the horrors of invasion and disdained a fair chance of peace for which many plausible excuses could be presented. Rhetoric was no guarantee. Another administration might come into being. “The warmongers have had their chance and failed.” America had stood aloof. No one was under any obligation to Soviet Russia. Why should not Britain join the spectators who, in Japan and in the United States, in Sweden, and in Spain, might watch with detached interest, or even relish, a mutually destructive struggle between the Nazi and Communist Empires? Future generations will find it hard to believe that the issues I have summarised here were never thought worth a place upon the Cabinet agenda, or even mentioned in our most private conclaves. Doubts could be swept away only by deeds. The deeds were to come.
* * * * *
Meanwhile 1 telegraphed to Lord Lothian, who, at the desire of the United States naval authorities, had asked anxiously whether ammunition for the British Fleet and material for its repair ought not to be sent from England across the Atlantic:
22.VI.40.
There is no warrant for such precautions at the present time.
I also sent the following telegrams to my Dominion friends:
To Mr. Mackenzie King.
24.VI.40.
If you will read again my telegram of June 5 you will see that there is no question of trying to make a bargain with the United States about their entry into the war and our despatch of the Fleet across the Atlantic should the Mother Country be defeated. On the contrary, I doubt very much the wisdom of dwelling upon the last contingency at the present time. I have good confidence in our ability to defend this island, and I see no reason to make preparation for or give any countenance to the transfer of the British Fleet. I shall myself never enter into any peace negotiations with Hitler, but obviously I cannot bind a future Government which, if we were deserted by the United States and beaten down here, might very easily be a kind of Quisling affair ready to accept German overlordship and protection. It would be a help if you would impress this danger upon the President, as I have done in my telegrams to him
All good wishes, and we are very glad your grand Canadian Division is with us in our fight for Britain.
To Smuts I cabled again:
27.VI.40.
Obviously, we have first to repulse any attack on Great Britain by invasion, and show ourselves able to maintain our development of air power. This can only be settled by trial.
If Hitler fails to beat us here, he will probably recoil eastward. Indeed, he may do this even without trying invasion,
to find employment for his Army, and take the edge off the winter strain upon him.I do not expect the winter strain will prove decisive, but to try to hold all Europe down in a starving condition with only Gestapo and military occupation
and no large theme appealing to the masses
is not an arrangement which can last long.Development of our air power, particularly in regions unaffected by bombing, should cause him ever-increasing difficulties, possibly decisive difficulties, in Germany, no matter what successes he has in Europe
or Asia.Our large Army now being created for Home Defence is being formed on the principle of attack,
and opportunity for large-scale offensive amphibious operations may come in
1940
and
1941. We are still working on the fifty-five-division basis here, but as our munitions supply expands and Empire resources are mobilised larger numbers may be possible. After all, we are now at last on interior lines. Hitler has vast hungry areas to defend, and we have the command of the seas. Choice of objectives in Western Europe is therefore wide.I send you these personal notes in order to keep in closest contact with your thoughts, which ever weigh with me.
It was with good confidence that we entered upon the supreme test.
Prime Minister to Lord Lothian (Washington).
28.VI.40.
No doubt I shall make some broadcast presently, but I don’t think words count for much now. Too much attention should not be paid to eddies of United States opinion. Only force of events can govern them. Up till April they were so sure the Allies would win that they did not think help necessary. Now they are so sure we shall lose that they do not think it possible. I feel good confidence we can repel invasion and keep alive in the air. Anyhow, we are going to try. Never cease to impress on President and others that, if this country were successfully invaded and largely occupied after heavy fighting, some Quisling Government would be formed to make peace on the basis of our becoming a German Protectorate. In this case the British Fleet would be the solid contribution with which this Peace Government would buy terms. Feeling in England against United States would be similar to French bitterness against us now. We have really not had any help worth speaking of from the United States so far. [The rifles and field guns did not arrive till the end of July. The destroyers had been refused.] We know President is our best friend, but it is no use trying to dance attendance upon Republican and Democratic Conventions. What really matters is whether Hitler is master of Britain in three months or not. I think not. But this is a matter which cannot be argued beforehand. Your mood should be bland and phlegmatic. No one is downhearted here.
* * * * *
In the closing days at Bordeaux, Admiral Darlan became very important. My contacts with him had been few and formal. I respected him for the work he had done in re-creating the French Navy, which after ten years of his professional control was more efficient than at any time since the French Revolution. When in November, 1939, he had visited England, we gave him an official dinner at the Admiralty. In response to the toast, he began by reminding us that his great-grandfather had been killed at the Battle of Trafalgar. I therefore thought of him as one of those good Frenchmen who hate England. Our Anglo-French naval discussions in January had also shown how very jealous the Admiral was of his professional position in relation to whoever was the political Minister of Marine. This had become a positive obsession, and I believe played a definite part in his action.
For the rest, Darlan had been present at most of the conferences which I have described, and as the end of the French resistance approached, he had repeatedly assured me that whatever happened the French Fleet should never fall into German hands. Now at Bordeaux came the fateful moment in the career of this ambitious, self-seeking, and capable Admiral. His authority over the Fleet was for all practical purposes absolute. He had only to order the ships to British, American, or French colonial harbours – some had already started – to be obeyed. In the morning of June 17, after the fall of M. Reynaud’s Cabinet, he declared to General Georges that he was resolved to give the order. The next day Georges met him in the afternoon and asked him what had happened. Darlan replied that he had changed his mind. When asked why, he answered simply, “I am now Minister of Marine.” This did not mean that he had changed his mind in order to become Minister of Marine, but that being Minister of Marine he had a different point of view.
