The World Was Going Our Way (99 page)
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Authors: Christopher Andrew
Tags: #Biographies & Memoirs, #True Accounts, #Espionage, #History, #Europe, #Ireland, #Military, #Intelligence & Espionage, #Modern (16th-21st Centuries), #20th Century, #Russia, #World
77
. Interview with Shebarshin,
Daily Telegraph
, 1 Dec. 1992.
. Interview with Shebarshin,
Daily Telegraph
, 1 Dec. 1992.
78
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 8, p. 72.
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 8, p. 72.
79
. Malhotra,
Indira Gandhi
, pp. 163, 291; Frank,
Indira
, pp. 368, 374-5. On Allende’s death, see above, p. 85.
. Malhotra,
Indira Gandhi
, pp. 163, 291; Frank,
Indira
, pp. 368, 374-5. On Allende’s death, see above, p. 85.
80
. Malhotra,
Indira Gandhi
, pp. 155-6.
. Malhotra,
Indira Gandhi
, pp. 155-6.
81
. Moynihan,
A Dangerous Place
, p. 41.
. Moynihan,
A Dangerous Place
, p. 41.
82
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 8, p. 71.
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 8, p. 71.
83
. Ibid., pp. 72-3.
. Ibid., pp. 72-3.
84
. Malhotra,
Indira Gandhi
, p. 167.
. Malhotra,
Indira Gandhi
, p. 167.
85
. Frank,
Indira
, ch. 16.
. Frank,
Indira
, ch. 16.
86
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 5, p. 32.
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 5, p. 32.
87
. Mallick,
Indian Communism
, p. 149.
. Mallick,
Indian Communism
, p. 149.
88
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 5, p. 32. According to KGB files, the number of articles which it planted in the Indian press none the less declined in 1976 to 1,980, presumably as a result of press censorship during the emergency; vol. 4 ind., ch. 7, pp. 50-51.
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 5, p. 32. According to KGB files, the number of articles which it planted in the Indian press none the less declined in 1976 to 1,980, presumably as a result of press censorship during the emergency; vol. 4 ind., ch. 7, pp. 50-51.
89
. Frank,
Indira
, pp. 388-9. The conspiracy theory that the CIA was behind the murder of Mujibur Rahman was vigorously promoted by the KGB; see below, p. 351. Mrs Gandhi also sent one of her personal assistants to ask Shebarshin whether he thought the Chinese were involved in the coup. Shebarshin said he thought not; Shebarshin,
Ruka Moskvy
, pp. 94-5.
. Frank,
Indira
, pp. 388-9. The conspiracy theory that the CIA was behind the murder of Mujibur Rahman was vigorously promoted by the KGB; see below, p. 351. Mrs Gandhi also sent one of her personal assistants to ask Shebarshin whether he thought the Chinese were involved in the coup. Shebarshin said he thought not; Shebarshin,
Ruka Moskvy
, pp. 94-5.
90
. Ibid., pp. 95-7.
. Ibid., pp. 95-7.
91
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 4, pp. 17-18.
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 4, pp. 17-18.
92
. Bakshi,
Russia and India
, p. 140.
. Bakshi,
Russia and India
, p. 140.
93
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 5, p. 32.
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 5, p. 32.
94
. Bakshi,
Russia and India
, p. 140; Dhar,
Indira Gandhi, the ‘Emergency’, and Indian Democracy
, p. 329.
. Bakshi,
Russia and India
, p. 140; Dhar,
Indira Gandhi, the ‘Emergency’, and Indian Democracy
, p. 329.
95
. Frank,
Indira
, pp. 393-5; Dhar,
Indira Gandhi, the ‘Emergency’, and Indian Democracy
, pp. 325-9. A hand-written note of 27 July 1976 from Mrs Nehru to Dhar about Sanjay’s interview is reproduced on pp. 326-8.
. Frank,
Indira
, pp. 393-5; Dhar,
Indira Gandhi, the ‘Emergency’, and Indian Democracy
, pp. 325-9. A hand-written note of 27 July 1976 from Mrs Nehru to Dhar about Sanjay’s interview is reproduced on pp. 326-8.
96
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 4, p. 19.
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 4, p. 19.
97
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 5, p. 33.
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 5, p. 33.
98
. Bakshi,
Russia and India
, p. 142; Singh,
The Yogi and the Bear
, pp. 133-4.
. Bakshi,
Russia and India
, p. 142; Singh,
The Yogi and the Bear
, pp. 133-4.
99
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 5, p. 33.
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 5, p. 33.
100
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 3, p. 15.
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 3, p. 15.
101
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 4, p. 19.
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 4, p. 19.
102
. Frank,
Indira
, pp. 413-14.
. Frank,
Indira
, pp. 413-14.
The Special Relationship with India Part 2
1
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 5, p. 33.
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 5, p. 33.
2
. Ibid., pp. 33-4.
. Ibid., pp. 33-4.
3
. Dhar,
Indira Gandhi, the ‘Emergency’, and Indian Democracy
, pp. 355-6. Frank,
Indira
, pp. 413-14.
. Dhar,
Indira Gandhi, the ‘Emergency’, and Indian Democracy
, pp. 355-6. Frank,
Indira
, pp. 413-14.
4
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 3, p. 12. Mitrokhin’s notes give no examples of the ‘important information’ obtained from the CPM leadership in West Bengal.
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 3, p. 12. Mitrokhin’s notes give no examples of the ‘important information’ obtained from the CPM leadership in West Bengal.
5
. Singh,
The Yogi and the Bear
, p. 134.
. Singh,
The Yogi and the Bear
, p. 134.
6
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 4, p. 21.
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 4, p. 21.
7
. FCD directive approved by Politburo resolution No. P 50/72 dated 24 March 1977; vol. 4 ind., ch. 7, p. 51.
. FCD directive approved by Politburo resolution No. P 50/72 dated 24 March 1977; vol. 4 ind., ch. 7, p. 51.
8
. Bakshi,
Russia and India
, p. 145.
. Bakshi,
Russia and India
, p. 145.
9
. Politburo resolution No. 1638-A/OV (of special importance), 2 Aug. 1977; vol. 4 ind., ch. 4, p. 21.
. Politburo resolution No. 1638-A/OV (of special importance), 2 Aug. 1977; vol. 4 ind., ch. 4, p. 21.
10
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 7, p. 51.
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 7, p. 51.
11
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 8, pp. 69-70.
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 8, pp. 69-70.
12
. vol. 7 ind., ch. 7, p. 58.
. vol. 7 ind., ch. 7, p. 58.
13
. Frank,
Indira
, pp. 431-2.
. Frank,
Indira
, pp. 431-2.
14
. Singh,
The Yogi and the Bear
, pp. 141-2.
. Singh,
The Yogi and the Bear
, pp. 141-2.
15
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 5, p. 34.
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 5, p. 34.
16
. Frank,
Indira
, p. 432.
. Frank,
Indira
, p. 432.
17
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 5, pp. 34-5.
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 5, pp. 34-5.
18
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 4, para. 31.
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 4, para. 31.
19
. Singh,
The Yogi and the Bear
, p. 173.
. Singh,
The Yogi and the Bear
, p. 173.
20
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 5, p. 36. The Delhi main residency did, however, report that Mrs Gandhi was favourably impressed by the fact that the chief Soviet delegate to the CPI Twelfth Congress in 1982, Eduard Shevardnadze, was a candidate rather than a full member of the Politburo.
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 5, p. 36. The Delhi main residency did, however, report that Mrs Gandhi was favourably impressed by the fact that the chief Soviet delegate to the CPI Twelfth Congress in 1982, Eduard Shevardnadze, was a candidate rather than a full member of the Politburo.
21
. Singh,
The Yogi and the Bear
, p. 174.
. Singh,
The Yogi and the Bear
, p. 174.
22
. Malhotra,
Indira Gandhi
, p. 260.
. Malhotra,
Indira Gandhi
, p. 260.
23
. Bakshi,
Russia and India
, p. 157.
. Bakshi,
Russia and India
, p. 157.
24
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 8, p. 86.
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 8, p. 86.
25
. Malhotra,
Indira Gandhi
, p. 235.
. Malhotra,
Indira Gandhi
, p. 235.
26
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 8, para. 16.
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 8, para. 16.
27
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 7, pp. 57-8.
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 7, pp. 57-8.
28
. The congratulations, approved by Kryuchkov, were signed on 5 May 1982 by the head of the FCD Seventeenth Department, Gennadi Afanasyevich Vaulin, who had preceded Lysenko as main resident in Delhi from 1977 until early in 1982 (vol. 4 ind., app. 3, item 59; k-24, 252).
. The congratulations, approved by Kryuchkov, were signed on 5 May 1982 by the head of the FCD Seventeenth Department, Gennadi Afanasyevich Vaulin, who had preceded Lysenko as main resident in Delhi from 1977 until early in 1982 (vol. 4 ind., app. 3, item 59; k-24, 252).
29
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 7, pp. 58-9.
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 7, pp. 58-9.
30
. FCD memorandum No. 155/2351, signed by Kryuchkov on 30 Oct. 1982 and approved by Andropov soon afterwards; vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, pp. 46-7.
. FCD memorandum No. 155/2351, signed by Kryuchkov on 30 Oct. 1982 and approved by Andropov soon afterwards; vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, pp. 46-7.
31
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 8, p. 71; Singh,
The Yogi and the Bear
, p. 300 n. 101.
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 8, p. 71; Singh,
The Yogi and the Bear
, p. 300 n. 101.
32
. Singh,
The Yogi and the Bear
, pp. 199-200. The Soviet Union was also mentioned once, by implication, in a section of the summit communiqué dealing with the responsibilities of the industrialized nations to the developing world.
. Singh,
The Yogi and the Bear
, pp. 199-200. The Soviet Union was also mentioned once, by implication, in a section of the summit communiqué dealing with the responsibilities of the industrialized nations to the developing world.
33
. Singh,
The Yogi and the Bear
, pp. 200-201, 308 n. 83.
. Singh,
The Yogi and the Bear
, pp. 200-201, 308 n. 83.
34
. Ibid., pp. 220-21.
. Ibid., pp. 220-21.
35
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 7, p. 60.
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 7, p. 60.
36
. Frank,
Indira
, ch. 21.
. Frank,
Indira
, ch. 21.
37
. See, e.g., Yajee,
CIA
, pp. 97-9.
. See, e.g., Yajee,
CIA
, pp. 97-9.
38
. Gates,
From the Shadows
, pp. 357-8.
. Gates,
From the Shadows
, pp. 357-8.
39
. US Department of State,
Soviet Influence Activities
; US Information Agency,
Recent Appearances of Soviet Disinformation
; Andrew and Gordievsky,
KGB
, p. 630.
. US Department of State,
Soviet Influence Activities
; US Information Agency,
Recent Appearances of Soviet Disinformation
; Andrew and Gordievsky,
KGB
, p. 630.
40
. Bakshi,
Russia and India
, pp. 165-93.
. Bakshi,
Russia and India
, pp. 165-93.
41
. US Department of State,
Soviet Influence Activities
; US Information Agency,
Recent Appearances of Soviet Disinformation
; Andrew and Gordievsky,
KGB
, pp. 630-31.
. US Department of State,
Soviet Influence Activities
; US Information Agency,
Recent Appearances of Soviet Disinformation
; Andrew and Gordievsky,
KGB
, pp. 630-31.
42
. Andrew and Gordievsky,
KGB
, p. 629.
. Andrew and Gordievsky,
KGB
, p. 629.
43
. Bakshi,
Russia and India
, pp. 200-201.
. Bakshi,
Russia and India
, pp. 200-201.
Pakistan and Bangladesh
1
. Gromyko,
Memories
, pp. 246-7.
. Gromyko,
Memories
, pp. 246-7.
2
. vol. 3 pak., ch. 4, p. 13.
. vol. 3 pak., ch. 4, p. 13.
3
. The earliest amount of the annual subsidy to the SPC recorded by Mitrokhin was for $20,000; his notes, however, do not mention the date. The SPC received $30,000 in 1974, and $25,000 in 1975 and 1976. The larger sum in 1974 is probably to be explained by the SPC in that year asking for an additional sum to found a bi-monthly newsletter in London; vol. 3 pak., ch. 4, p. 13.
. The earliest amount of the annual subsidy to the SPC recorded by Mitrokhin was for $20,000; his notes, however, do not mention the date. The SPC received $30,000 in 1974, and $25,000 in 1975 and 1976. The larger sum in 1974 is probably to be explained by the SPC in that year asking for an additional sum to found a bi-monthly newsletter in London; vol. 3 pak., ch. 4, p. 13.
4
. vol. 3 ban., ch. 2, p. 96.
. vol. 3 ban., ch. 2, p. 96.
5
. vol. 3 pak., ch. 4, p. 18.
. vol. 3 pak., ch. 4, p. 18.
6
. Ibid., p. 14.
. Ibid., p. 14.
7
. vol. 3 pak., ch. 2, p. 3.
. vol. 3 pak., ch. 2, p. 3.
8
. Ibid., p. 6; vol. 6, ch. 3.
. Ibid., p. 6; vol. 6, ch. 3.
9
. vol. 3 pak., ch. 2, p. 5. Mitrokhin’s notes give no indication of the intelligence GREM supplied.
. vol. 3 pak., ch. 2, p. 5. Mitrokhin’s notes give no indication of the intelligence GREM supplied.
10
. Ibid., p. 3. Mitrokhin’s notes give no indication of the intelligence that Hasan supplied. The fact that he had at least five successive FCD controllers (L. V. Shebarshin, N. V. Mardoniyev, G. V. Lazarev, A. V. Korneyev and S. P. Kuznetsov) strongly suggests that his material was of real significance. While Hasan was stationed in Saudi Arabia, where there was no legal KGB residency, the illegal KHALEF and a KGB Fifth Directorate officer masquerading as a pilgrim on the Haj were sent to make contact with him.
. Ibid., p. 3. Mitrokhin’s notes give no indication of the intelligence that Hasan supplied. The fact that he had at least five successive FCD controllers (L. V. Shebarshin, N. V. Mardoniyev, G. V. Lazarev, A. V. Korneyev and S. P. Kuznetsov) strongly suggests that his material was of real significance. While Hasan was stationed in Saudi Arabia, where there was no legal KGB residency, the illegal KHALEF and a KGB Fifth Directorate officer masquerading as a pilgrim on the Haj were sent to make contact with him.
11
. On the Eighth and Sixteenth Directorates, see Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, ch. 21. Mitrokhin did not have access to their archives.
. On the Eighth and Sixteenth Directorates, see Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, ch. 21. Mitrokhin did not have access to their archives.
12
. ALI’s other controllers included Leonid Shebarshin; vol. 3 misc., p. 115.
. ALI’s other controllers included Leonid Shebarshin; vol. 3 misc., p. 115.
13
. Shebarshin later concluded, possibly incorrectly, that Bhutto had been speaking with the approval of Ayub Khan; Shebarshin,
Ruka Moskvy
, pp. 34-6.
. Shebarshin later concluded, possibly incorrectly, that Bhutto had been speaking with the approval of Ayub Khan; Shebarshin,
Ruka Moskvy
, pp. 34-6.
14
. vol. 3 pak., ch. 7, pp. 55-6.
. vol. 3 pak., ch. 7, pp. 55-6.
15
. Raza,
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan
, p. 237.
. Raza,
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan
, p. 237.
16
. vol. 3 pak., ch. 7, paras. 240-47.
. vol. 3 pak., ch. 7, paras. 240-47.
17
. Shebarshin,
Ruka Moskvy
, pp. 62-3. The resident’s codename is given in vol. 3 pak., ch. 7, para. 245. Shebarshin refers to him only as Vasili B.
. Shebarshin,
Ruka Moskvy
, pp. 62-3. The resident’s codename is given in vol. 3 pak., ch. 7, para. 245. Shebarshin refers to him only as Vasili B.
18
. Raza,
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan
, pp. 5-7.
. Raza,
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan
, pp. 5-7.
19
. Ibid.; Talbot,
Pakistan
, pp. 179-84.
. Ibid.; Talbot,
Pakistan
, pp. 179-84.
20
. vol. 3 pak., ch. 6, para. 205.
. vol. 3 pak., ch. 6, para. 205.
21
. vol. 3 pak., ch. 7, paras. 246-9.
. vol. 3 pak., ch. 7, paras. 246-9.
22
. vol. 3 pak., ch. 6, paras. 206-24.
. vol. 3 pak., ch. 6, paras. 206-24.
23
. Kolbenev, ‘Kak Pakistan raskololsia na dva gosudarstva’, p. 75.
. Kolbenev, ‘Kak Pakistan raskololsia na dva gosudarstva’, p. 75.
24
. There is, however, no KGB file noted by Mitrokhin which says so explicitly.
. There is, however, no KGB file noted by Mitrokhin which says so explicitly.
25
. vol. 3 pak., ch. 7, paras. 248-9. The ‘Agartala conspiracy’ trial turned into a public relations disaster for Ayub Khan. Evidence emerged that Pakistani police had tortured the alleged conspirators, and one of the defendants was murdered while in custody. The trial also offered Mujib a welcome opportunity to publicize the cause of the Awami League. The trial was never completed and charges were dropped as a precondition to meetings between opposition leaders and Ayub early in 1969. Ziring,
Pakistan in the Twentieth Century
, pp. 310-11.
. vol. 3 pak., ch. 7, paras. 248-9. The ‘Agartala conspiracy’ trial turned into a public relations disaster for Ayub Khan. Evidence emerged that Pakistani police had tortured the alleged conspirators, and one of the defendants was murdered while in custody. The trial also offered Mujib a welcome opportunity to publicize the cause of the Awami League. The trial was never completed and charges were dropped as a precondition to meetings between opposition leaders and Ayub early in 1969. Ziring,
Pakistan in the Twentieth Century
, pp. 310-11.
26
. This strategy may be safely deduced from the active-measures operations designed to discredit all the main opponents of the PPP and the Awami League.
. This strategy may be safely deduced from the active-measures operations designed to discredit all the main opponents of the PPP and the Awami League.
27
. vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, para. 101.
. vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, para. 101.
28
. Kolbenev, ‘Kak Pakistan raskololsia na dva gosudarstva’, p. 79.
. Kolbenev, ‘Kak Pakistan raskololsia na dva gosudarstva’, p. 79.
29
. Raza,
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan
, pp. 251-4; Ziring,
Pakistan in the Twentieth Century
, p. 408.
. Raza,
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan
, pp. 251-4; Ziring,
Pakistan in the Twentieth Century
, p. 408.
30
. Raza,
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan
, pp. 250-51.
. Raza,
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan
, pp. 250-51.
31
. Ziring,
Bangladesh
, pp. 88-9.
. Ziring,
Bangladesh
, pp. 88-9.
32
. Mascarenhas,
Bangladesh
, p. 28.
. Mascarenhas,
Bangladesh
, p. 28.
33
. Ziring,
Bangladesh
, pp. 84-9.
. Ziring,
Bangladesh
, pp. 84-9.
34
. vol. 3 ban., ch. 1, para. 415.
. vol. 3 ban., ch. 1, para. 415.
35
. Ibid.; Directorate of National Security codename in vol. 3 ban., ch. 3, para. 441.
. Ibid.; Directorate of National Security codename in vol. 3 ban., ch. 3, para. 441.
36
. vol. 3 ban., ch. 1, para. 416.
. vol. 3 ban., ch. 1, para. 416.
37
. Politburo resolution No. N 76/VIII OP, 2 Feb. 1973; vol. 3 ban., ch. 3, para. 434.
. Politburo resolution No. N 76/VIII OP, 2 Feb. 1973; vol. 3 ban., ch. 3, para. 434.
38
. vol. 3 ban., ch. 2, paras. 430-31.
. vol. 3 ban., ch. 2, paras. 430-31.
39
. Mitrokhin noted no file on the foundation of BAKSAL.
. Mitrokhin noted no file on the foundation of BAKSAL.
40
. vol. 6, ch. 2, part 3. Mitrokhin’s notes do not identify the dates of their recruitment or give any information on the operations against the United States in which they were involved.
. vol. 6, ch. 2, part 3. Mitrokhin’s notes do not identify the dates of their recruitment or give any information on the operations against the United States in which they were involved.
41
. vol. 3 ban., ch. 2, para. 432; ch. 3, paras. 437-9, 442-3.
. vol. 3 ban., ch. 2, para. 432; ch. 3, paras. 437-9, 442-3.
42
. vol. 3 ban., ch. 3, para. 444.
. vol. 3 ban., ch. 3, para. 444.
43
. Raza,
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan
, p. 226.
. Raza,
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan
, p. 226.
44
. vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, para. 104.
. vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, para. 104.
45
. Ibid., para. 120.
. Ibid., para. 120.
46
. Ibid., para. 109.
. Ibid., para. 109.
47
. Ibid., para. 111.
. Ibid., para. 111.
48
. Ibid., para. 109.
. Ibid., para. 109.
49
. Ibid., para. 107.
. Ibid., para. 107.
50
. Ibid., para. 108.
. Ibid., para. 108.
51
. Ibid., para. 103.
. Ibid., para. 103.
52
. Raza,
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan
, pp. 250-51, 232-4.
. Raza,
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan
, pp. 250-51, 232-4.
53
. Politburo resolution No. P 30/49 of 20 Oct. 1976, ‘On our position regarding the proposal of Pakistan that a top-level conference of developing countries be held’; vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, para. 115.
. Politburo resolution No. P 30/49 of 20 Oct. 1976, ‘On our position regarding the proposal of Pakistan that a top-level conference of developing countries be held’; vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, para. 115.
54
. vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, paras. 115-18.
. vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, paras. 115-18.
55
. Anwar,
The Terrorist Prince
, p. 27.
. Anwar,
The Terrorist Prince
, p. 27.
56
. vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, para. 119.
. vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, para. 119.
57
. Zafarullah (ed.),
The Zia Episode
, pp. 127-9, 133-5.
. Zafarullah (ed.),
The Zia Episode
, pp. 127-9, 133-5.
58
. vol. 3 ban., ch. 3, para. 444.
. vol. 3 ban., ch. 3, para. 444.
59
. Ibid., para. 446.
. Ibid., para. 446.
60
. Ibid., para. 441.
. Ibid., para. 441.
61
. Ibid., paras. 448-51.
. Ibid., paras. 448-51.
62
. Ibid., para. 452.
. Ibid., para. 452.
63
. Ibid., para. 453.
. Ibid., para. 453.
64
. Zafarullah (ed.),
The Zia Episode
, pp. 154-6, 164 n. 1.
. Zafarullah (ed.),
The Zia Episode
, pp. 154-6, 164 n. 1.
65
. Arif,
Working with Zia
, pp. 313-14, 412.
. Arif,
Working with Zia
, pp. 313-14, 412.
66
. Gates,
From the Shadows
, pp. 146-8. The Carter administration had secretly decided to give non-military support to the
mujahideen
in July 1979.
. Gates,
From the Shadows
, pp. 146-8. The Carter administration had secretly decided to give non-military support to the
mujahideen
in July 1979.
67
. vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, para. 1; Arif,
Working with Zia
, p. 315.
. vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, para. 1; Arif,
Working with Zia
, p. 315.
68
. vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, para. 127.
. vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, para. 127.
69
. Gates,
From the Shadows
, pp. 147-8.
. Gates,
From the Shadows
, pp. 147-8.
70
. vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, paras. 127-45. In operation SARDAR-5, for example, carried out on the evening of 14 to 15 March, a further series of Service A leaflets purporting to come from ‘a group of young officers’ were distributed by KGB officers in Islamabad, Rawalpindi and Karachi. Other leaflets were distributed by post. All denounced Zia and demanded his overthrow.
. vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, paras. 127-45. In operation SARDAR-5, for example, carried out on the evening of 14 to 15 March, a further series of Service A leaflets purporting to come from ‘a group of young officers’ were distributed by KGB officers in Islamabad, Rawalpindi and Karachi. Other leaflets were distributed by post. All denounced Zia and demanded his overthrow.
71
. vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, paras. 127-45.
. vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, paras. 127-45.
72
. vol. 3 pak., ch. 7, para. 254.
. vol. 3 pak., ch. 7, para. 254.
73
. vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, para. 127.
. vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, para. 127.
74
. Ibid., para. 144.
. Ibid., para. 144.
75
. Ibid., para. 129.
. Ibid., para. 129.
76
. Bradsher,
Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention
, pp. 181-4; Urban,
War in Afghanistan
, p. 17.
. Bradsher,
Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention
, pp. 181-4; Urban,
War in Afghanistan
, p. 17.
77
. Arif,
Working with Zia
, pp. 337-8. In October 1980 Arif visited CIA headquarters at Langley for talks on Afghanistan.
. Arif,
Working with Zia
, pp. 337-8. In October 1980 Arif visited CIA headquarters at Langley for talks on Afghanistan.
78
. Barron,
KGB Today
, pp. 45-6. Mitrokhin did not note any file dealing with the expulsion.
. Barron,
KGB Today
, pp. 45-6. Mitrokhin did not note any file dealing with the expulsion.
79
. vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, para. 128.
. vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, para. 128.
80
. Anwar,
The Terrorist Prince
, p. 60.
. Anwar,
The Terrorist Prince
, p. 60.
81
. vol. 1, ch. 7; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, p. 140.
. vol. 1, ch. 7; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, p. 140.
82
. Anwar,
The Terrorist Prince
, pp. 43-5, 63-4.
. Anwar,
The Terrorist Prince
, pp. 43-5, 63-4.
83
. vol. 1, ch. 7; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, p. 140.
. vol. 1, ch. 7; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, p. 140.
84
. On the KGB and KHAD, see below, pp. 408-9.
. On the KGB and KHAD, see below, pp. 408-9.
85
. Although on occasion Murtaza spoke mysteriously about possible Russian connections, it is possible that this derived from his habit of unsubstantiated boasting rather than any conscious contact on his part with the KGB; Anwar,
The Terrorist Prince
, p. 75.
. Although on occasion Murtaza spoke mysteriously about possible Russian connections, it is possible that this derived from his habit of unsubstantiated boasting rather than any conscious contact on his part with the KGB; Anwar,
The Terrorist Prince
, p. 75.
86
. Ibid., pp. 87-8. Though Mitrokhin’s reference to discussions between Murtaza and Najibullah do not specifically mention these terrorist attacks, there can be little doubt that they were agreed between them since KHAD provided the bombs used.
. Ibid., pp. 87-8. Though Mitrokhin’s reference to discussions between Murtaza and Najibullah do not specifically mention these terrorist attacks, there can be little doubt that they were agreed between them since KHAD provided the bombs used.
87
. vol. 1, ch. 7; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, p. 140.
. vol. 1, ch. 7; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, p. 140.
88
. Anwar,
The Terrorist Prince
, pp. 95-8.
. Anwar,
The Terrorist Prince
, pp. 95-8.
89
. vol. 1, ch. 7; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, p. 140.
. vol. 1, ch. 7; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, p. 140.
90
. Anahita Ratebzad, codenamed SIMA, appears on a list which Mitrokhin compiled from KGB files of Afghan ‘agents and confidential contacts’; vol. 1, app. 1. Unusually, however, the list fails to distinguish between the two categories. On Ratebzad, see below, p. 407.
. Anahita Ratebzad, codenamed SIMA, appears on a list which Mitrokhin compiled from KGB files of Afghan ‘agents and confidential contacts’; vol. 1, app. 1. Unusually, however, the list fails to distinguish between the two categories. On Ratebzad, see below, p. 407.
91
. Anwar,
The Terrorist Prince
, pp. 103-5. On Karmal’s background as a KGB agent, see below, pp. 387, 403-4.
. Anwar,
The Terrorist Prince
, pp. 103-5. On Karmal’s background as a KGB agent, see below, pp. 387, 403-4.
92
. Anwar,
The Terrorist Prince
, pp. 107-9.
. Anwar,
The Terrorist Prince
, pp. 107-9.
93
. vol. 1, ch. 7; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, p. 140.
. vol. 1, ch. 7; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, p. 140.
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