The World Was Going Our Way (100 page)
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Authors: Christopher Andrew
Tags: #Biographies & Memoirs, #True Accounts, #Espionage, #History, #Europe, #Ireland, #Military, #Intelligence & Espionage, #Modern (16th-21st Centuries), #20th Century, #Russia, #World
94
. Anwar,
The Terrorist Prince
, pp. 112-16. Colonel Qaddafi went back on an earlier agreement to allow the hijackers to force the crew to fly the plane to Tripoli.
. Anwar,
The Terrorist Prince
, pp. 112-16. Colonel Qaddafi went back on an earlier agreement to allow the hijackers to force the crew to fly the plane to Tripoli.
95
. vol. 1, ch. 7; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, p. 145.
. vol. 1, ch. 7; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, p. 145.
96
. vol. 1, ch. 7; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, p. 143. At the suggestion of Najibullah, the KGB recruited Agent FURMAN, on whom no further details are available, to select agents posing as refugees to target Afghan refugee communities in Pakistan and Iran; vol. 1, app. 1. Though Mitrokhin noted no further examples, the KGB doubtless recruited other agents with the same mission as FURMAN.
. vol. 1, ch. 7; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, p. 143. At the suggestion of Najibullah, the KGB recruited Agent FURMAN, on whom no further details are available, to select agents posing as refugees to target Afghan refugee communities in Pakistan and Iran; vol. 1, app. 1. Though Mitrokhin noted no further examples, the KGB doubtless recruited other agents with the same mission as FURMAN.
97
. vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, para. 145. On KGB active measures to disrupt
mujahideen
operations, see below, pp. 409-10.
. vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, para. 145. On KGB active measures to disrupt
mujahideen
operations, see below, pp. 409-10.
98
. vol. 1, ch. 7; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, p. 143.
. vol. 1, ch. 7; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, p. 143.
99
. See below, pp. 409-10.
. See below, pp. 409-10.
100
. Kryuchkov to Andropov, no. 155/796, 18 April 1981; vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, para. 150.
. Kryuchkov to Andropov, no. 155/796, 18 April 1981; vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, para. 150.
101
. vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, para. 195.
. vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, para. 195.
102
. Ibid., para. 143.
. Ibid., para. 143.
103
. Anwar,
The Terrorist Prince
, pp. 130-37. Anwar’s sources include both the terrorists who had attempted to shoot down Zia’s plane with SAM-7 missiles. In 1992 Murtaza Bhutto declared in a newspaper interview, ‘I had two attacks carried out against General Zia. Once the computer of the missile fired at him malfunctioned, and the second time he had a hair’s breadth escape.’ Mitrokhin’s brief notes on KHAD/KGB dealings with Murtaza Bhutto unfortunately do not go beyond the 1981 hijack.
. Anwar,
The Terrorist Prince
, pp. 130-37. Anwar’s sources include both the terrorists who had attempted to shoot down Zia’s plane with SAM-7 missiles. In 1992 Murtaza Bhutto declared in a newspaper interview, ‘I had two attacks carried out against General Zia. Once the computer of the missile fired at him malfunctioned, and the second time he had a hair’s breadth escape.’ Mitrokhin’s brief notes on KHAD/KGB dealings with Murtaza Bhutto unfortunately do not go beyond the 1981 hijack.
104
. After a series of abysmally planned, unsuccessful operations in 1984 (none of which seems to have benefited from KHAD support), and with most of Al-Zulfikar’s members in jail, Murtaza announced its dissolution in the following year. His stormy career came to a violent end in September 1996 when he was shot dead by Pakistani police outside his Karachi house while his estranged sister, Benazir, was Prime Minister. Anwar,
The Terrorist Prince
, chs. 12-16.
. After a series of abysmally planned, unsuccessful operations in 1984 (none of which seems to have benefited from KHAD support), and with most of Al-Zulfikar’s members in jail, Murtaza announced its dissolution in the following year. His stormy career came to a violent end in September 1996 when he was shot dead by Pakistani police outside his Karachi house while his estranged sister, Benazir, was Prime Minister. Anwar,
The Terrorist Prince
, chs. 12-16.
105
. Ziring,
Pakistan in the Twentieth Century
, p. 459.
. Ziring,
Pakistan in the Twentieth Century
, p. 459.
106
. vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, para. 264.
. vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, para. 264.
107
. See above, ch. 18.
. See above, ch. 18.
108
. vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, paras. 281-9. Mitrokhin’s notes do not give details of the award to the resident.
. vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, paras. 281-9. Mitrokhin’s notes do not give details of the award to the resident.
109
. Talbot,
Pakistan
, pp. 249-50.
. Talbot,
Pakistan
, pp. 249-50.
110
. Arif,
Working with Zia
, pp. 318-19, 334-5, 342.
. Arif,
Working with Zia
, pp. 318-19, 334-5, 342.
111
. Though the Pakistan air force board of enquiry found that ‘the most probable cause’ of the air crash was sabotage, a USAF accident-investigation team concluded that the most likely explanation was mechanical failure. Talbot,
Pakistan
, pp. 284-5.
. Though the Pakistan air force board of enquiry found that ‘the most probable cause’ of the air crash was sabotage, a USAF accident-investigation team concluded that the most likely explanation was mechanical failure. Talbot,
Pakistan
, pp. 284-5.
112
. Arif,
Working with Zia
, p. 319.
. Arif,
Working with Zia
, p. 319.
Islam in the Soviet Union
1
. No single chapter, probably no single volume, can do justice to the complexity of the Soviet Union’s Muslim populations, especially in the Caucasus, one of the most ethnically and linguistically diverse areas in the world. Islam and the struggle against Russian and Soviet rule, however, proved strong unifying factors within the predominantly Muslim areas. Gammer, ‘Unity, Diversity and Conflict in the Northern Caucasus’.
. No single chapter, probably no single volume, can do justice to the complexity of the Soviet Union’s Muslim populations, especially in the Caucasus, one of the most ethnically and linguistically diverse areas in the world. Islam and the struggle against Russian and Soviet rule, however, proved strong unifying factors within the predominantly Muslim areas. Gammer, ‘Unity, Diversity and Conflict in the Northern Caucasus’.
2
. Taheri,
Crescent in a Red Sky
, pp. ix, xiv, 92.
. Taheri,
Crescent in a Red Sky
, pp. ix, xiv, 92.
3
. Flemming, ‘The Deportation of the Chechen and Ingush Peoples’; Smith,
Allah’s Mountains
, pp. 58-67; Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, pp. 101-2.
. Flemming, ‘The Deportation of the Chechen and Ingush Peoples’; Smith,
Allah’s Mountains
, pp. 58-67; Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, pp. 101-2.
4
. According to a report in 1973 by the leading Soviet expert in ‘scientific atheism’, V. G. Pivovranov, 52.9 per cent of Chechens (undoubtedly a considerable underestimate) were religious believers, as compared with only 11.9 per cent of ethnic Russians. Bennigsen and Broxup,
The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State
, pp. 33-4; Dunlop,
Russia Confronts Chechnya
, pp. 81-2.
. According to a report in 1973 by the leading Soviet expert in ‘scientific atheism’, V. G. Pivovranov, 52.9 per cent of Chechens (undoubtedly a considerable underestimate) were religious believers, as compared with only 11.9 per cent of ethnic Russians. Bennigsen and Broxup,
The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State
, pp. 33-4; Dunlop,
Russia Confronts Chechnya
, pp. 81-2.
5
. Taheri,
Crescent in a Red Sky
, p. xiv.
. Taheri,
Crescent in a Red Sky
, p. xiv.
6
. Lewis,
After Atheism
, p. 149.
. Lewis,
After Atheism
, p. 149.
7
. vol. 5 isl., ch. 8, p. 39.
. vol. 5 isl., ch. 8, p. 39.
8
. On KGB policy to the Orthodox Church, see Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, ch. 28.
. On KGB policy to the Orthodox Church, see Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, ch. 28.
9
. vol. 5 isl., ch. 3, pp. 8, 12; ch. 4.
. vol. 5 isl., ch. 3, pp. 8, 12; ch. 4.
10
. Olcott, ‘Islam and Fundamentalism in Independent Central Asia’, p. 24.
. Olcott, ‘Islam and Fundamentalism in Independent Central Asia’, p. 24.
11
. vol. 5 isl., app. 1, pp. 42-3.
. vol. 5 isl., app. 1, pp. 42-3.
12
. Bennigsen and Wimbush,
Mystics and Commissars
, pp. 2, 43-4.
. Bennigsen and Wimbush,
Mystics and Commissars
, pp. 2, 43-4.
13
. Bennigsen and Broxup,
The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State
, pp. 104-5.
. Bennigsen and Broxup,
The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State
, pp. 104-5.
14
. vol. 5 isl., ch. 4, p. 17.
. vol. 5 isl., ch. 4, p. 17.
15
. Bennigsen and Broxup,
The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State
, p. 106.
. Bennigsen and Broxup,
The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State
, p. 106.
16
. vol. 5 isl., ch. 4, p. 17.
. vol. 5 isl., ch. 4, p. 17.
17
. vol. 5 isl., ch. 3, para. 38.
. vol. 5 isl., ch. 3, para. 38.
18
. vol. 5 isl., ch. 4, p. 16.
. vol. 5 isl., ch. 4, p. 16.
19
. Olcott, ‘Islam and Fundamentalism in Independent Central Asia’, p. 21.
. Olcott, ‘Islam and Fundamentalism in Independent Central Asia’, p. 21.
20
. vol. 5 isl., ch. 8, p. 39.
. vol. 5 isl., ch. 8, p. 39.
21
. Ibid., pp. 37-8.
. Ibid., pp. 37-8.
22
. Bennigsen and Wimbush,
Mystics and Commissars
, chs. 1, 2. On the Sufi response to the Tsarist advance in the north Caucasus, see Zelkina,
In Quest for God and Freedom
. The Qadiriya had been brought to the north Caucasus in the 1850s by Sheikh Kunta Haji. The KGB, like the rest of the Soviet bureaucracy, referred to the Qadiriya as the ‘Kunta Haji’, and it is so described in the files noted by Mitrokhin. As Yaacov Ro’i has argued, much more research is needed to establish the degree to which the Sufi brotherhoods were responsible for the tenacity of Muslim religious practice; Ro’i, ‘The Secularisation of Islam and the USSR’s Muslim Areas’, p. 13.
. Bennigsen and Wimbush,
Mystics and Commissars
, chs. 1, 2. On the Sufi response to the Tsarist advance in the north Caucasus, see Zelkina,
In Quest for God and Freedom
. The Qadiriya had been brought to the north Caucasus in the 1850s by Sheikh Kunta Haji. The KGB, like the rest of the Soviet bureaucracy, referred to the Qadiriya as the ‘Kunta Haji’, and it is so described in the files noted by Mitrokhin. As Yaacov Ro’i has argued, much more research is needed to establish the degree to which the Sufi brotherhoods were responsible for the tenacity of Muslim religious practice; Ro’i, ‘The Secularisation of Islam and the USSR’s Muslim Areas’, p. 13.
23
. vol. 5 isl., ch. 8, p. 30. Auaev (whose first name was not noted by Mitrokhin) was described in KGB files as leader of the ‘Kunta Haji sect’.
. vol. 5 isl., ch. 8, p. 30. Auaev (whose first name was not noted by Mitrokhin) was described in KGB files as leader of the ‘Kunta Haji sect’.
24
. Bennigsen and Wimbush,
Mystics and Commissars
, p. 31.
. Bennigsen and Wimbush,
Mystics and Commissars
, p. 31.
25
. Mitrokhin’s notes do not record the date of Gaziev’s death, but the context suggests a date in the mid-1960s.
. Mitrokhin’s notes do not record the date of Gaziev’s death, but the context suggests a date in the mid-1960s.
26
. vol. 5 isl., ch. 8, p. 30.
. vol. 5 isl., ch. 8, p. 30.
27
. Ibid., pp. 32-5.
. Ibid., pp. 32-5.
28
. Ibid., p. 35. For examples of similar operations elsewhere in the Soviet bloc, see Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, chs.15,16.
. Ibid., p. 35. For examples of similar operations elsewhere in the Soviet bloc, see Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, chs.15,16.
29
The real names of the illegals were as follows: AKBAR: Makhmudzhen Ariudzhanov (k-24, 245); STELLA: real name not recorded by Mitrokhin, but trained with AKBAR in 1970-76; the two operated as a married couple (vol. 2, app. 1, p. 70; k-24, 25); SABIR: Mutalim Agaverdioglu Talybov (k-27, 400; vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 26): ALI: Sebukh Apkaryan (k-5, 115; k-27, 37); STRELTSOV: Murmon Iosivovich Lokhov (vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 25; k-20, 197); MARK: identity uncertain but probably Vyacheslav Petrovich Makarov (k-16, 379) - MARK was one of the commoner KGB codenames used at various times to refer to several different illegals; RAFIEV: no identifying details recorded in Mitrokhin’s notes; DEREVLYOV and DEREVLYOVA: Oleg Petrovich and Zinaida Nikiforovna Buryen (vol. 8, ch. 8, p. 33); KHALEF: Shamil Abdullazyanovich Khamsin (vol. 10, ch. 2); BERTRAND: Georgi Ivanovich Kotlyar (k-21, 17; vol. 6, ch. 5, p. 154).29. Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, pp. 312-13.
The real names of the illegals were as follows: AKBAR: Makhmudzhen Ariudzhanov (k-24, 245); STELLA: real name not recorded by Mitrokhin, but trained with AKBAR in 1970-76; the two operated as a married couple (vol. 2, app. 1, p. 70; k-24, 25); SABIR: Mutalim Agaverdioglu Talybov (k-27, 400; vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 26): ALI: Sebukh Apkaryan (k-5, 115; k-27, 37); STRELTSOV: Murmon Iosivovich Lokhov (vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 25; k-20, 197); MARK: identity uncertain but probably Vyacheslav Petrovich Makarov (k-16, 379) - MARK was one of the commoner KGB codenames used at various times to refer to several different illegals; RAFIEV: no identifying details recorded in Mitrokhin’s notes; DEREVLYOV and DEREVLYOVA: Oleg Petrovich and Zinaida Nikiforovna Buryen (vol. 8, ch. 8, p. 33); KHALEF: Shamil Abdullazyanovich Khamsin (vol. 10, ch. 2); BERTRAND: Georgi Ivanovich Kotlyar (k-21, 17; vol. 6, ch. 5, p. 154).29. Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, pp. 312-13.
30
. vol. 5 isl., ch. 8, p. 35.
. vol. 5 isl., ch. 8, p. 35.
31
. Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, p. 512.
. Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, p. 512.
32
. vol. 5 isl., ch. 8, pp. 36-7.
. vol. 5 isl., ch. 8, pp. 36-7.
33
. Ibid., p. 39.
. Ibid., p. 39.
34
. Lieven,
Chechnya
, p. 28.
. Lieven,
Chechnya
, p. 28.
35
. Bennigsen and Wimbush,
Mystics and Commissars
, p. 117. The pilgrims referred to were clearly associated with Qadiris rather than the Naqshbandis. The Naqshbandi
zikr
(‘remembrance’ of God) was a silent collective prayer.
. Bennigsen and Wimbush,
Mystics and Commissars
, p. 117. The pilgrims referred to were clearly associated with Qadiris rather than the Naqshbandis. The Naqshbandi
zikr
(‘remembrance’ of God) was a silent collective prayer.
36
. vol. 5 isl., ch. 6, p. 21.
. vol. 5 isl., ch. 6, p. 21.
37
. vol. 5 isl., ch. 3, p. 11.
. vol. 5 isl., ch. 3, p. 11.
38
. Bennigsen and Broxup,
The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State
, p. 115.
. Bennigsen and Broxup,
The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State
, p. 115.
39
. See above, p. 186.
. See above, p. 186.
40
. Bennigsen and Broxup,
The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State
, pp. 116-17.
. Bennigsen and Broxup,
The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State
, pp. 116-17.
41
. Bennigsen and Wimbush,
Mystics and Commissars
, p. 108.
. Bennigsen and Wimbush,
Mystics and Commissars
, p. 108.
42
. For example, the Khorzhem district in Uzbekistan and Kurgan-Tube in Tajikistan; vol. 5 isl., ch. 3, p. 14.
. For example, the Khorzhem district in Uzbekistan and Kurgan-Tube in Tajikistan; vol. 5 isl., ch. 3, p. 14.
43
. vol. 5 isl., ch. 6, p. 22.
. vol. 5 isl., ch. 6, p. 22.
44
. Politburo resolution No. P 29/27 of 25 Sept. 1981; vol. 5 isl., ch. 5, p. 19.
. Politburo resolution No. P 29/27 of 25 Sept. 1981; vol. 5 isl., ch. 5, p. 19.
45
. vol. 5 isl., ch. 5, pp. 19-20.
. vol. 5 isl., ch. 5, pp. 19-20.
46
. For details of the annual votes in the UN General Assembly, see Rogers,
The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan
, part II.
. For details of the annual votes in the UN General Assembly, see Rogers,
The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan
, part II.
47
. See below, pp. 417-18.
. See below, pp. 417-18.
48
. Bennigsen and Broxup,
The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State
, pp. 113-15.
. Bennigsen and Broxup,
The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State
, pp. 113-15.
49
. Liakhovskii,
Plamia Afgana
, pp. 591-2; ‘More East-Bloc Sources on Afghanistan’, p. 270.
. Liakhovskii,
Plamia Afgana
, pp. 591-2; ‘More East-Bloc Sources on Afghanistan’, p. 270.
50
. Two such conference successes by ‘a particularly highly regarded agent of the Azerbaijan KGB’ are noted in vol. 5 isl., ch. 6, p. 23.
. Two such conference successes by ‘a particularly highly regarded agent of the Azerbaijan KGB’ are noted in vol. 5 isl., ch. 6, p. 23.
51
. vol. 5 isl., ch. 4, p. 17. It is not suggested that Babakhanov was a KGB agent.
. vol. 5 isl., ch. 4, p. 17. It is not suggested that Babakhanov was a KGB agent.
52
. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.),
Instructions from the Centre
, p. 7.
. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.),
Instructions from the Centre
, p. 7.
53
. Hosking,
A History of the Soviet Union
, pp. 445-6; Taheri,
Crescent in a Red Sky
, p. 130.
. Hosking,
A History of the Soviet Union
, pp. 445-6; Taheri,
Crescent in a Red Sky
, p. 130.
54
. Remnick,
Lenin’s Tomb
, pp. 180-81; Taheri,
Crescent in a Red Sky
, pp. 148, 170.
. Remnick,
Lenin’s Tomb
, pp. 180-81; Taheri,
Crescent in a Red Sky
, pp. 148, 170.
55
. vol. 1, app. 3.
. vol. 1, app. 3.
56
. vol. 5 isl., app. 2, p. 50.
. vol. 5 isl., app. 2, p. 50.
57
. Taheri,
Crescent in a Red Sky
, pp. 147, 154; Remnick,
Lenin’s Tomb
, p. 190.
. Taheri,
Crescent in a Red Sky
, pp. 147, 154; Remnick,
Lenin’s Tomb
, p. 190.
58
. k-25, 32.
. k-25, 32.
59
. vol. 5 isl., app. 2, p. 61.
. vol. 5 isl., app. 2, p. 61.
60
. Vaisman, ‘Regionalism and Clan Loyalty in the Political Life of Uzbekistan’, p. 116.
. Vaisman, ‘Regionalism and Clan Loyalty in the Political Life of Uzbekistan’, p. 116.
61
. Remnick,
Lenin’s Tomb
, pp. 182, 187, 194; Taheri,
Crescent in a Red Sky
, pp. 149-50.
. Remnick,
Lenin’s Tomb
, pp. 182, 187, 194; Taheri,
Crescent in a Red Sky
, pp. 149-50.
62
. Vaisman, ‘Regionalism and Clan Loyalty in the Political Life of Uzbekistan’, p. 121 n. 38.
. Vaisman, ‘Regionalism and Clan Loyalty in the Political Life of Uzbekistan’, p. 121 n. 38.
63
. Taheri,
Crescent in a Red Sky
, pp. 149-50. Rashidov later made a posthumous return to political popularity. In independent Uzbekistan he is widely regarded as a wily Uzbek patriot who succeeded in outwitting the supposedly more sophisticated Russians. In 1992 a large statue of him was erected in Tashkent and one of the main avenues, formerly Lenin Prospekt, was named after him (Carlisle, ‘Geopolitics and Ethnic Problems of Uzbekistan’, pp. 82-3; Stephen Kinzer, ‘Free of Russians but Imprisoned in Cotton’,
Uzbekistan Journal
, 20 Nov. 1997).
. Taheri,
Crescent in a Red Sky
, pp. 149-50. Rashidov later made a posthumous return to political popularity. In independent Uzbekistan he is widely regarded as a wily Uzbek patriot who succeeded in outwitting the supposedly more sophisticated Russians. In 1992 a large statue of him was erected in Tashkent and one of the main avenues, formerly Lenin Prospekt, was named after him (Carlisle, ‘Geopolitics and Ethnic Problems of Uzbekistan’, pp. 82-3; Stephen Kinzer, ‘Free of Russians but Imprisoned in Cotton’,
Uzbekistan Journal
, 20 Nov. 1997).
64
. Kunayev died in 1993 after spending the last seven years of his life under virtual house arrest.
. Kunayev died in 1993 after spending the last seven years of his life under virtual house arrest.
65
. Aliyev later made a remarkable political comeback, becoming President of independent Azerbaijan in 1993. During a visit to Baku in 2001 President Putin presented him with his certificate of graduation from the MGB (later KGB) Leningrad Higher School in 1949;
RFE/RL Newsline
, 11 Jan. 2001.
. Aliyev later made a remarkable political comeback, becoming President of independent Azerbaijan in 1993. During a visit to Baku in 2001 President Putin presented him with his certificate of graduation from the MGB (later KGB) Leningrad Higher School in 1949;
RFE/RL Newsline
, 11 Jan. 2001.
66
. On the subsequent history of SADUM and the removal of Kazakhstan from its jurisdiction, see Olcott, ‘Islam and Fundamentalism in Independent Central Asia’, pp. 26-32.
. On the subsequent history of SADUM and the removal of Kazakhstan from its jurisdiction, see Olcott, ‘Islam and Fundamentalism in Independent Central Asia’, pp. 26-32.
67
. Taheri,
Crescent in a Red Sky
, p. 138.
. Taheri,
Crescent in a Red Sky
, p. 138.
68
. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.),
Instructions from the Centre
, pp. 218-21.
. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.),
Instructions from the Centre
, pp. 218-21.
69
. vol. 5 isl., ch. 8, p. 38.
. vol. 5 isl., ch. 8, p. 38.
70
. Remnick,
Resurrection
, p. 272.
. Remnick,
Resurrection
, p. 272.
71
. Dunlop,
Russia Confronts Chechnya
, pp. 112-13.
. Dunlop,
Russia Confronts Chechnya
, pp. 112-13.
72
. Chechen and Ingush writers who protested against the fiction of the ‘voluntary union’ were singled out for persecution by the KGB and lost their jobs; ibid., p. 82.
. Chechen and Ingush writers who protested against the fiction of the ‘voluntary union’ were singled out for persecution by the KGB and lost their jobs; ibid., p. 82.
73
. Ingushetiya voted to remain within the Russian Federation, partly to obtain Russian support in settling its territorial disputes with the Chechens and Ossetians, partly to avoid being submerged in a union with the far more numerous Chechens; ibid., p. 122.
. Ingushetiya voted to remain within the Russian Federation, partly to obtain Russian support in settling its territorial disputes with the Chechens and Ossetians, partly to avoid being submerged in a union with the far more numerous Chechens; ibid., p. 122.
74
. One of the major influences on Yeltsin’s decision to begin the war with Chechnya was the FSK, the post-Soviet successor to the internal directorates of the KGB (Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, p. 563 ). For the KGB old guard, some of whom held senior posts in the FSK (subsequently the FSB), the invasion of 1994 was revenge for the humiliation of 1991.
. One of the major influences on Yeltsin’s decision to begin the war with Chechnya was the FSK, the post-Soviet successor to the internal directorates of the KGB (Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, p. 563 ). For the KGB old guard, some of whom held senior posts in the FSK (subsequently the FSB), the invasion of 1994 was revenge for the humiliation of 1991.
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