The United Nations Security Council and War:The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945 (167 page)

⁷¹
SC Res. 1160 of 31 Mar. 1998. The Resolution also called for an end to the violence, established an arms embargo, and supported the peaceful path of resistance employed by the Democratic League of Kosovo (PDK), which had claimed to represent the Kosovo Albanians since Milosevic’s revocation of the province’s autonomy in 1989.

⁷²
Wheeler,
Saving Strangers
, 259–60. As Wheeler shows, former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair was a driving force in these NATO discussions.

⁷³
Nicholas Morris, ‘Humanitarian Intervention in the Balkans’, in Welsh (ed.),
Humanitarian Intervention
, 112–13. As Morris notes, the UN lacked any senior political presence in Kosovo; therefore, decision-makers in the Council relied heavily on the monthly reports of Kofi Annan. These reports, in turn, depended on input from humanitarian organizations such as UNHCR. Later, Milosevic blamed these humanitarian groups for exaggerating their assessment of civilian suffering and encouraging NATO action.

⁷⁴
SC Res. 1199 of 23 Sep. 1998.

⁷⁵
NATO members also appealed to different rationale to justify intervention, including the moral responsibility to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe, the strategic imperative to address a long-term threat to European security, and the need to preserve the credibility of the alliance itself.

⁷⁶
See the findings of the Independent International Commission on Kosovo,
Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). It should also be noted that members of NATO (most notably Germany) voiced concerns about the legality of the operation in the lead-up to the bombing campaign. For a review of the arguments that NATO’s action was legal, see Ian Johnstone, ‘Security Council Deliberations: The Power of the Better Argument’,
European Journal of International Law
14, no. 3,(2003), 437–80.

⁷⁷
David Clark, ‘Iraq has Wrecked Our Case for Humanitarian Wars’,
Guardian
, 12 Aug. 2003; and Nicholas Wheeler, ‘The Humanitarian Responsibilities of Sovereignty: Explaining the Development of a New Norm of Military Intervention for Humanitarian Purposes in International Society’, in Welsh (ed.),
Humanitarian Intervention
, 44–7.

⁷⁸
The resolution was defeated by twelve votes to three. Russia, China, and Namibia voted in favour.

⁷⁹
Justin Morris and Nicholas J. Wheeler, ‘The Security Council’s Crisis of Legitimacy and the Use of Force’,
International Politics
44, nos. 2/3 (Mar./May 2007), 221.

⁸⁰
See Dan Sarooshi’s discussion of this issue in
Chapter 9
.

⁸¹
Wheeler, ‘The Humanitarian Responsibilities of Sovereignty’, 46.

⁸²
SC Res. 1244 of 10 June 1999, Annex 2.

⁸³
See UN doc. S/PV.4011 of 10 June 1999, 9.

⁸⁴
See the discussion of this issue in
Chapter 15
.

⁸⁵
During the preceding two decades, the Council was inactive with regards to the situation in East Timor with the exception of SC Res. 384 of 22 Dec. 1975 and SC Res. 389 of 22 Apr. 1976, which called upon all states ‘to respect the territorial integrity of East Timor and on Indonesia to withdraw its forces from the territory’.

⁸⁶
To facilitate its advisory role, the Council authorized the deployment of up to 280 civilian police officers and fifty military liaison officers. This was expanded in SC Res. 1262 of 27 Aug. 1999 to include a civilian police component of up to 450 personnel and a military liaison component of up to 300 personnel.

⁸⁷
SC Res. 1246 of 11 June 1999.

⁸⁸
Joel C. Beauvais, ‘Benevolent Despot: A Critique of U.N. State-Building in East Timor’,
New York University Journal of International Law and Politics
33, no. 4 (2001), 1103.

⁸⁹
Former UNAMET official Ian Martin has highlighted the role of several actors in putting pressure on the Indonesian government, including non-governmental East Timor solidarity networks, regional actors (APEC), the IMF and World Bank, the US Government, and the United Nations itself. See Ian Martin, ‘International Intervention in East Timor’, in Welsh (ed.),
Humanitarian Intervention
, 142–62.

⁹⁰
UN doc. S/PV. 4043 of 11 Sep. 1999.

⁹¹
Ibid.

⁹²
Ibid. This comparison was based on a testimony made the previous day by Bernard Kouchner (SG Special Representative in Kosovo).

⁹³
Ibid.

⁹⁴
The force – comprised of approximately 2,500 soldiers – had contributions from seventeen other countries. These included: Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Malaysia, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Portugal, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Thailand, United Kingdom, and United States. In addition, Japan contributed roughly US$100 million in funds to the trust for INTERFET and the subsequent mission, UNTAET.

⁹⁵
This latter mission, UNTAET, was created under SC Res. 1272 on 25 Oct. 1999.

⁹⁶
Nicholas J. Wheeler and Alex J. Bellamy, ‘Humanitarian Intervention in World Politics’, in John Baylis and Steve Smith (eds.),
The Globalization of World Politics
, 3rd edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 570–72.

⁹⁷
Michael Walzer,
Arguing about War
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 20–1. See also Bikhu Parekh, ‘Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention’,
International Political Science Review
18, no. 1 (1997), 49–70.

⁹⁸
Sebastian von Einsiedel and David M. Malone, ‘Peace and Democracy for Haiti: A UN Mission Impossible?’,
International Relations
20, no. 2 (Spring 2006), 153–74.

⁹⁹
Wheeler and Bellamy, ‘Humanitarian Intervention in World Politics’, 571.

¹⁰⁰
The Kosovo intervention is excluded from this analysis, as it was not a UN mission.

¹⁰¹
Martin, ‘International Intervention in East Timor’, 152.

¹⁰²
Von Einsiedel and Malone, ‘Peace and Democracy for Haiti’.

¹⁰³
Alex de Waal, ‘Dangerous Precedents? Famine Relief in Somalia 1991–93’, in J. Macrae and A. Zwi (eds.),
War and Hunger
(London: Zed Books, 1994), 152. De Waal argues that by the time UNITAF arrived the bigger problem was death from disease.

¹⁰⁴
Walter Clarke and Jefrey Herbst, ‘Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention,
Foreign Affairs
75, no. 2 (1996), 74–5.

¹⁰⁵
Report of the Commission of Inquiry Established by SC Res. 885 of 16 Nov. 1993,(Feb., 1994), 39.

¹⁰⁶
Speech by the British Prime Minister Tony Blair to the Economic Club of Chicago, 22 April 1999.

¹⁰⁷
Gareth Evans, ‘When is it Right to Fight?’,
Survival
46, no. 3 (2004), 59–81.

¹⁰⁸
Michael Reisman and Myers S. McDougal, ‘Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos’, in Lillich (ed.),
Humanitarian Intervention
, 168–95. See also Dennis T. Fenwick, ‘Note: A Proposed Resolution Providing for the Authorization of Intervention by the United Nations, a Regional Organization, or a Group of States in a State Committing Gross Violations of Human Rights’,
Virginia Journal of International Law
13 (1972–3), 340–74. A sub-committee of the International Law Association was tasked with drafting the Protocol, but the group was eventually disbanded.

¹⁰⁹
See
The Responsibility to Protect.

¹¹⁰
High-level Panel,
A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility – Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change
, UN doc. A/59/565 of 2 Dec. 2004. It should be emphasized that the panel’s remit included all uses of force mandated by the Security Council – not just those for humanitarian purposes.

¹¹¹
Kofi Annan,
In Larger Freedom: Towards Security, Development and Human Rights for All – Report of the Secretary-General
, UN doc. A/59/2005 of 21 Mar. 2005.

¹¹²
See Nicholas J. Wheeler, ‘Legitimating Humanitarian Intervention: Principles and Procedures’,
Melbourne Journal of International Law
2, no. 2 (October 2001), 550–67; Jennifer M. Welsh, ‘The Responsibility to Protect: Securing the Individual in International Society, in Goold and Lazarus (eds.),
Security and Human Rights
, 363–83; and Alexander Cameron, ‘Criteria and Humanitarian Intervention: An Appraisal of the Proposal to Codify Just War Principles’, Unpublished M. Phil. Thesis, University of Oxford, April 2007.

¹¹³
‘2005 World Summit Outcome’ (16 Sep. 2005), UN doc. A/RES/60/1 of 24 Oct. 2005. The relevant articles of the Outcome Document (138 and 139) were reiterated by the Security Council in its Resolution on The Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, SC Res. 1674 of 28 Apr. 2006.

¹¹⁴
For a discussion of the evolution of language from the preliminary to final drafts of the Outcome Document, see Alex Bellamy, ‘Whither the Responsibility to Protect? Humanitarian Intervention and the 2005 World Summit’,
Ethics and International Affairs
20, no. 2 (2006), 164–5.

¹¹⁵
Paul D. Williams and Alex J. Bellamy, ‘The Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis in Darfur’,
Security Dialogue
6, no. 1 (2005), 27–47.

¹¹⁶
Kofi Annan, ‘Address to the 2005 World Summit’, New York, 14 Sep. 2005.

¹¹⁷
Statement of the President of the Security Council, 26 May 2004. See UN doc. S/PRST/2004/18.

¹¹⁸
In a joint statement of early Apr. 2004, the Secretary-General and the heads of all of the UN agencies expressed their deep concern over the serious human rights abuses in Darfur. See UN News Centre (3 Apr. 2004).

¹¹⁹
SC Res. 1556 of 30 July 2004. In an earlier resolution, passed on 11 June 2004, the Council called for an immediate halt to the fighting in Darfur. See SC Res. 1547.

¹²⁰
SC Res. 1556 of 30 July 2004, which was taken under
Chapter VII
, passed by thirteen to two (China and Pakistan abstained).

¹²¹
Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, ‘The UN Security Council and the Question of Humanitarian Intervention in Darfur’,
Journal of Military Ethics
5, no. 2 (2006), 150.

¹²²
S/PV/5080 and S/PV/5081 of 18 Nov. 2004.

¹²³
SC Res. 1564 of 18 Sep. 2004.

¹²⁴
See the Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the UN Secretary-General (Geneva: 25 Jan. 2005). While the Commission found evidence of attacks that were deliberately and indiscriminately directed against civilians, it concluded that the Government of Sudan was
not
pursuing a policy of genocide. Here, the issue was the absence of clear genocidal intent on the part of the government.

¹²⁵
SC Res. 1593 of 31 Mar. 2005. The resolution passed 11–0, with the United States, China, Algeria, and Brazil abstaining. Two days earlier, the Security Council had adopted a resolution strengthening the arms embargo on Sudan and imposing a travel ban on those considered responsible for the killings in Darfur: SC Res. 1591 of 29 Mar. 2005.

¹²⁶
Anne Patterson, Deputy US Permanent Representative to the United Nations, in
Keesing’s Record of World Events
, 46557. In place of the ICC, US diplomats had suggested that the Council respond to the Commission’s report on atrocities in Darfur by expanding the mandate of the existing International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Some analysts have argued that Resolution 1593, while an important precedent, had a number of problematic features stemming from the compromise needed to win approval for the reference to the ICC. See Matthew Happold, ‘Darfur, the Security Council and the International Criminal Court’,
International and Comparative Law Quarterly
55 (January 2006), 226–36.

¹²⁷
SC Res. 1679 of 16 May 2006.

¹²⁸
SC Res. 1769 of 31 July 2007.

¹
Ralph Wilde, ‘From Danzig to East Timor and Beyond: The Role of International Territorial Administrations’,
American Journal of International Law
95, no. 3 (2001), 583–606.

²
Ulrich Fastenrath, ‘Article 73’, in Bruno Simma (ed.),
The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary
(Munich: C. H. Beck, 1995), 923–4.

³
Simon Chesterman,
You, The People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 38. There was also some opposition within the US government to trusteeship: for strategic reasons the US Navy was reluctant to relinquish US control over Japanese islands seized during the Second World War, a number of which had been under League of Nations mandate. See Jean Krasno, ‘Founding the United Nations: An Evolutionary Process’, in Jean Krasno (ed.),
The United Nations: Confronting the Challenges of a Global Society
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004), 34–5.

⁴
In May 1994, the Trusteeship Council changed its rules of procedure to meet only as occasion required, rather than annually. See Trusteeship Council Res. 2200 of 25 May 1994.

⁵
GA Res. 60/1 of 24 Oct. 2005, para. 176.

⁶
This is not entirely true as one of the territories in question was a colonial possession of a former enemy state – i.e. South West Africa, a former German colony administered by South Africa under a League of Nations mandate after the First World War; others were mandate territories of another enemy state (Japan) – notably the Pacific islands of Marianas, Caroline, and the Marshall Islands, which were transferred to the United States as trust territories after the Second World War; and one other territory – Somaliland, a colony of yet another enemy state (Italy) – was detached from that state and placed under trusteeship with Italy as the administering authority. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the administration of all of these territories was primarily a part of the colonial legacy.