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Authors: Martin van Creveld

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All of the arms in question required maintenance. Others were in need of repair, and for others still no ammunition was available. These problems led to the first attempts to set up an independent arms industry, in reality little more than carefully concealed underground rooms where a handful—originally fewer than ten—of technically gifted men spent hours tinkering around and improvising solutions. Primitive hand grenades, bombs, and similar devices were also produced and tried out during the hikes that Hagana kept organizing for members. For example, by 1935 more than a hundred grenades were being manufactured per day—first under primitive conditions in outlying settlements, then in a more comfortable if wellconcealed workshop in Tel Aviv. The arms thus produced or purchased had to be transported and stored in the
slikkim
, all under the nose of the British Central Intelligence Division (CID). The latter had a good general idea of what was going on but was unable to put an end to Hagana’s activities; in such a situation specific intelligence is everything, and specific intelligence was rarely forthcoming.
Meanwhile training and organization proceeded along lines already familiar since the 1920s. Hagana members—in Tel Aviv alone they now numbered around a thousand—continued to devote Saturday mornings and one evening a week. According to surviving accounts these were highly formal occasions; lacking real coercive authority, commanders sought to substitute by means of parades, salutes, and a show of secrecy that had as much to do with self-esteem as with the need to keep the British at bay.
11
With the aid of foreign military manuals, a training course of 120 hours was devised. It included, besides drill—which accounted for one-quarter of the total—fieldcraft, minor tactics, weapons handling, and, by way of a supreme achievement, firing perhaps ten to fifteen rounds of ammunition each. Exercises were held with the aim of trying out covert approaches to outlying settlements that might require help in an emergency. In these “maneuvers,” no arms could be carried openly (yet a few were secretly carried as a precaution against the ever-present threat of marauders). So the burden of carrying a machine gun, for example, would be simulated by five bricks; enemy shots were simulated by the blowing of whistles, whereupon the men were supposed to take cover or disperse or assault the “enemy” as appropriate.
Taking office, Avigur had brought with him a one-man team of accountants, who soon put order into Hagana’s funds, previously a weak point due to prevailing collectivist ideas making little distinction between the organization’s property and that of individual members. Regular if extremely limited funding—all salaries combined amounted only to some 2,500 British pounds a year—in turn permitted the establishment of a medical department, a legal department, an intelligence service, and a counterintelligence service (known as Sherut Zehirut, literally “Prudence Service”). In all these activities the Tel Aviv branch, incomparably larger and possessing greater financial means than the rest, took the lead. Others followed, with or without guidance from general headquarters.
Hagana’s plans in regard to the future also showed some progress compared to the pre-1929 years. In the cities and the rural settlements the most important task remained the preparation of blocking positions that would be occupied in case Arab mobs emerged from their residential areas and tried to storm Jewish neighborhoods and settlements. During the early thirties a handful of so-called
nodedot
(patrols, literally wanderers) were set up.
12
A typical
nodedet
consisted of perhaps a dozen men—the few surviving sources do not mention any women. With or without orders from general headquarters, they met every week to practice such activities as patrolling, minor tactics, river crossings, and the like. In Tel Aviv some of the members of the local
nodedet
even brought along private cars and motorcycles. As a result, the unit was considered highly mobile by the standards of the day.
Throughout these years the
Yishuv
and its leaders failed to understand, or perhaps merely pretended not to understand,
13
the intense hatred that their growing presence in the country seemed to inspire among the Arab population. Writing
Altneuland
, a utopian novel that contains a description of the future Jewish community in the land of Israel, Theodor Herzl addressed the question by introducing a sympathetic Arab character named Rashid Bey. No, Rashid explained to his newly arrived Jewish friends as he showed them around in his luxurious touring car, he did not mind more of them coming in. On the contrary, was not the arrival of immigrants from Europe precisely the factor that in a mere twenty years had turned the country from a neglected backwater into a bustling center of trade and industry? As to social differences between the two peoples, no problem either. Rashid’s “happy and contented” wife, Fatma, did not mind remaining at home, and all the party got to see of her was “a lovely feminine hand” waving a handkerchief.
14
So long as Ottoman rule lasted, and clashes with the Arabs were localized, it was possible to dismiss Arab resentment as occasioned by social and economic factors only. But the countrywide disturbances of 1919-1921 made it necessary to look for a new explanation. Some sought it in anti-Semitism, arguing that the “events” were merely local variations of the pogroms familiar in their native countries, with the British taking the place of the czar in refusing to protect Jews.
15
Others thought that the Arab masses were being deliberately incited by their “feudal” masters, that is, the heads of clans, rich landowners, and “capitalists” who feared less their inferiors would become infected by the Jewish socialist community arising in front of their eyes.
16
Blame was also placed on fanatical religious leaders out to conserve Islam’s traditional ways while consolidating their own positions.
In this context, it should not be overlooked that many of
Yishuv
’s left-wing leaders were left-wing intellectuals, past masters in using history in order to bolster their theories and adapt them to shifting reality. The one possibility that most of them did not dare contemplate: that Arabs understood Zionism only too well; in other words, Arab resistance to the movement, far from being a by-product of some conspiracy or terrible misunderstanding that could be taken care of, was merely a mirror image of their own attempt to take over a country from its long-established inhabitants. To admit that the two sides were similar would be tantamount to saying that both of their causes (or none) were, objectively speaking, equally just. Better to close one’s eyes and go on with the self-imposed task of “building our country in the teeth of all those who seek to destroy us,” as the lyrics to one popular song went.
Not that closing one’s eyes was easy during those years. Even at its best, Palestine under British rule remained a mildly violent country with occasional attempts at cattle rustling, attacks on isolated individuals, ambushes of cars driving on deserted roads, and the like. For example, on April 5, 1931, three members of Yagur, a
kibbuts
not far from Haifa, were waylaid and murdered. Similar attacks took place on January 16, March 5, May 1, and December 22, 1932. Some of the assailants were hunted down and put on trial, others not (and no wonder, given that the Palestine police was itself made up of Arabs who formed an absolute majority among the personnel). In October 193 3, Jaffa and Nablus even witnessed small-scale repetitions of the events of 1929, except that this time the British authorities were ready and put down the disturbances at the cost of several dozen Arab dead. In November 1935, British forces hunted down and killed Sheik Izz a-Din al Kassam, a Haifa schoolteacher-turned-terrorist who, some fifty years later, was destined to become the patron saint of the Hamas fundamentalist organization.
17
All these clashes took place against a continuous background of smaller incidents as members of both communities sought to prevent the other from plowing land, uprooted or burned citrus trees, blocked wells, destroyed agricultural equipment, and the like.
Sunday, April 19, 1936, was an ordinary working day, what with the Muslim weekly holiday falling on the previous Friday and the Jewish one on Saturday. Signs of rising tension had been multiplying for some time as both sides attacked individuals belonging to the other. Nevertheless Jewish workers, many of them employed in the port, went to Jaffa as they always did. Just what happened next has never been thoroughly investigated.
18
Apparently there was a rumor that Jews had killed a woman and three
Choranis
(laborers originating in the Choran, a district of Syria), who, as usual, were clustering around the port in search of work. Rioting started, and by the end of the day sixteen Jews had been killed and dozens wounded; some of the corpses were so mangled they could not be identified. Six Arabs had also been killed, all of them by police.
19
As news of the riots spread, Palestinian Arab leaders met in Nablus. On April 25 they set up their first countrywide leadership in the form of a ten-member Supreme Arab Committee. Its president was Amin al Hussayni, whom we have already met.
On May 15 the committee declared a general strike among the Arab community. It was to last for 172 days and serve as the background for many terrorist attacks. Throughout the country, roads were blocked, railroads cut, agricultural workers waylaid, and urban targets attacked with rocks, knives, firearms, and homemade bombs; British police stations were also targeted. Fauzi al-Kauji, an Iraqi officer of Syrian descent, was invited by the committee to take charge. He brought along three companies—approximately 200 men made up of Iraqi, Syrian, and Druze volunteers; once in Palestine he set up a fourth company of locals. Lacking any logistic organization, they installed themselves in the villages of Samaria, whose inhabitants were made to feed the warriors and provide additional arms—whether they wanted to or not, it should be added. From there they attacked British convoys making way toward Nablus and other cities.
20
These were the days before the British army, and the armies of other imperialist countries, had learned that their roles were to proceed from one defeat to the next. Over the next few months some 20,000 British troops were dispatched to Palestine and took charge. They returned fire, blew up the houses of suspected terrorists, and, aided by spotter aircraft, systematically hunted down rebel gangs in their mountain hideouts. By October 1936 hundreds of Arabs must have been killed; among the Jews there were 80 killed and 400 wounded.
21
Militarily and economically the Arab Palestinians were at the end of their tether. “At the request of the Arab Kings”—there were three at the time—the Supreme Arab Committee met and called off the strike. Kauji and most of his men were able to withdraw to the Jordan and leave the country unmolested, though whether this was part of some secret deal is unknown.
The lull, however, proved temporary. In September 1937 the British governor of Galilee was murdered. The authorities took the occasion to arrest 300 leading Arabs, including Amin Hussayni (who escaped and was able to leave the country). This signaled renewed troubles. By spring 1938 the number of Arab guerrillas was estimated at 15,000. Of those, perhaps 10 percent moved about in small “strike forces” while the rest remained in their villages and joined the fighting as the occasion called .
22
Against them were arrayed British forces complete with armored cars, artillery, and aircraft. The climax came in March 1938, when 2,000 troops commanded by Gen. Archibald Wavell—destined to become British commander in chief of the Middle East—fought a regular battle in the hills around Jenin. From this time on, order was gradually restored as the British systematically hunted down their enemies. After April 1939, when the British succeeded in killing “Supreme Commander” Abd Al Rachim Al Haj Muhamad, the uprising gradually collapsed; individual acts of terrorism were still occurring when World War II broke out in September 1939.
Contrary to the situation in 1929, these events did not catch Hagana off-guard. Forewarned by its intelligence service, the Tel Aviv branch had acted swiftly, sending members to take up blocking positions to the north of Jaffa all the way from the beach, which was fenced off, to the east. Similar measures were taken in other cities; as a result, only in Jerusalem was it necessary to evacuate the Jewish quarter until the construction of a new police station permitted evacuees to return. Meanwhile in the countryside the preceding seven years had been used to provide the settlements with underground bunkers, barbed-wire fences, searchlights, and internal and external communications in the form of buzzers, signaling lamps, and the like—all paid for by an unofficial taxation system known as
kofer ha-yishuv
(the
Yishuv
’s ransom). In 1938 it covered about 70 percent of Hagana’s operating expenses
23
—this at a time when the Arab High Council was barely able to pay for its telephone bills. As a result, when the attacks came, not one
kibbuts
,
moshav,
or
moshava
had to be evacuated.
Faced with the common enemy, Hagana and the British authorities drew closer than ever.
24
As many as 3,000 Jews, selected from a list of “reliable” personnel submitted by the Jewish Agency, were taken into the newly established Supplementary Police. With their pay of 3 pounds a month provided partly by the government, partly by Hagana, the
notrim
or
gafirim,
as they were variously known, were issued arms and uniforms. They were trained by British personnel and dispatched to mount guard wherever needed—including roads, railroads, ports, and airports. Not content with this, the British also sought to make use of the remaining Hagana forces. The country was divided into ten regional commands, each under the authority of an army officer. Supported by a Jewish Agency representative, in an emergency he had the authority to call up the local Hagana members. In time, almost the entire Hagana was incorporated into the so-called Jewish Settlement Police and was thus presented with an invaluable opportunity to carry arms openly and receive professional training.

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