The Sword And The Olive (23 page)
Read The Sword And The Olive Online
Authors: Martin van Creveld
Though its organizational status was similar to that of the air force, the navy has never approached the latter’s size and importance; indeed air force officers on occasion argued that their aircraft could reach and fight enemy ships long before the navy could and that the navy should be abolished. That advice was not heeded, but the navy clearly was the smallest and least important of the three services. During the early fifties its main vessels were two or three World War II corvettes to which were added a number of equally antiquated torpedo boats and landing craft acquired secondhand. These small vessels scarcely gave Israel any considerable operational reach—neither then nor later could there be any question of a “blue water” navy. Worse, because the Suez Canal was closed to Israeli shipping the available forces had to be divided between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea (only light craft, transported overland, could be shifted from one theater to the next). Reflecting the Mediterranean’s greater importance, the main base was always at Haifa, to which the new port of Ashdod was added during the early sixties.
Since Israel is absolutely dependent on foreign trade, it is vulnerable to naval blockades of both the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. In practice, though, most of the wars that it has fought were so short and the condition of the Arab navies so deplorable that a serious attempt to cut its Mediterranean trade routes has never been made. Not so in the Red Sea, which was closed to Israeli shipping from 1949 to 1956 and again in 1967; however, in both cases geography dictated that the Straits of Tyran should be opened not by the navy but by the land forces following their campaigns in the Sinai. Accordingly, in peacetime the role of the Israeli navy has been limited to patrolling the coast, gathering intelligence of various kinds, shelling the coast (terrorist bases), and the like. In wartime it has fought a few engagements, first destroyer against destroyer and then—for the last time in 1973—missile boat against missile boat. On various occasions it has also supported the IDF by means of landing operations, albeit always on a small scale and never with more than mediocre success. Finally, on several occasions it sent submarines and frogmen to attack enemy ports, particularly in Egypt.
With a sensible doctrine and a unified organization thus in place, it was time to decide on the kind of armed forces that the state would maintain. On the one hand the new state found itself in extreme financial difficulty, made worse by the need to cater to a very large number of immigrants, who for the most part were penniless. On the other hand was the extreme demographic asymmetry between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Between them the two factors precluded any thought of a large, professional standing army. Not only was it too expensive; as Yadin pointed out there was no alternative to making full use of all available manpower. A Swiss-like militia system (in which practically all forces consist of citizens in arms) was apparently considered
31
but rejected because it would provide neither adequate training for large-scale warfare nor forces to address current security problems (which the Swiss, of course, did not have).
32
The solution ultimately adopted and incorporated into the Chok Sherut Bitachon (National Service Law) of 1949 was well suited to Israel’s needs.
33
Contrary to what has sometimes been claimed it was also rather unoriginal, representing but a local variant of the model most advanced countries adopted after the Prussian victories of 1866-1871 and that, having served countries such as France and Germany and Italy during most of the years since, now reached the Middle East.
31
but rejected because it would provide neither adequate training for large-scale warfare nor forces to address current security problems (which the Swiss, of course, did not have).
32
The solution ultimately adopted and incorporated into the Chok Sherut Bitachon (National Service Law) of 1949 was well suited to Israel’s needs.
33
Contrary to what has sometimes been claimed it was also rather unoriginal, representing but a local variant of the model most advanced countries adopted after the Prussian victories of 1866-1871 and that, having served countries such as France and Germany and Italy during most of the years since, now reached the Middle East.
According to this model, the armed forces of the state comprise three parts, a triangle if you will. The first, core force is formed by a relatively small number of professionals, officers, and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) who plan, organize, administrate, train, and maintain the force during peacetime. Their units consist of conscripts, who are the second element of the triangle.
Yeshive
students aside, young men (including members of the Circessian and Druze minorities but excluding Arabs) are inducted at eighteen. They are put through a battery of physical and mental tests
34
and made to serve two years; when the service period was later increased to two and a half years it was the longest of any country. For generations of Israelis, the day their child actually joins the army has become something of a transition point in life, one akin to but much more serious than American parents sending children off to college.
Yeshive
students aside, young men (including members of the Circessian and Druze minorities but excluding Arabs) are inducted at eighteen. They are put through a battery of physical and mental tests
34
and made to serve two years; when the service period was later increased to two and a half years it was the longest of any country. For generations of Israelis, the day their child actually joins the army has become something of a transition point in life, one akin to but much more serious than American parents sending children off to college.
After basic training conscripts are sent to their units. They participate in advanced training courses and maneuvers and undertake such “current” security tasks as guard duty, border patrolling, combating infiltrators, and the like; together with the professionals they constitute the peacetime army. At the end of 1949 that army numbered almost 40,000 men and women;
35
perhaps two-thirds were conscripts. One out of every twenty-five Israelis thus served in the army, a remarkably high proportion. For example, before World War II, Germany, the most militarized country in Europe, maintained only one citizen out of every one hundred in uniform; perhaps the only country that could stand comparison with Israel in this respect was Prussia under Frederick the Great.
35
perhaps two-thirds were conscripts. One out of every twenty-five Israelis thus served in the army, a remarkably high proportion. For example, before World War II, Germany, the most militarized country in Europe, maintained only one citizen out of every one hundred in uniform; perhaps the only country that could stand comparison with Israel in this respect was Prussia under Frederick the Great.
When their period of service is over the conscripts are discharged into the reserves. Representing the third element of the triangle, the reserves constitute neither a separate organization (such as the British Territorials or the U.S. National Guard) nor a general pool of manpower; instead they are organized in companies, battalions, brigades, and, beginning in 1967, entire divisions. Regularly called up for refresher training, the younger classes (up to age thirty-nine) are considered first-line units, whereas the remainder are assigned to civil defense, garrison duty, and the like. Apart from a small core of professionals who carry out administrative functions and look after equipment in peacetime, officers also are reservists (through 1973 two out of seven division commanders). These skeleton units can and will be called up in an emergency. In that case they are taken to the YAMACHim (emergency depots), processed into the army, issued uniforms and arms, and dispatched to the front as soon as the situation requires and transportation permits.
As in other armed forces that adopted this model, the importance of the three components within each service varies. Professionals on long-term contracts are proportionally most numerous in the air force. Being Israel’s first line of defense it must be in a state of permanent, near-instant readiness; apart from this it also owns and operates more than its share of high technology, which requires a long time to study and master. Thus, in the air force, the simpler tasks are left to conscripts. Much the same applies to the navy. And though the navy and air force have reservists, including pilots called up in emergencies, the ground forces have the largest number of reservists, which indeed account for about three-quarters of wartime strength.
In theory this heavy dependence on reservists constitutes a weakness. In spite of regular refresher training (as many as thirty-five days per year and more for officers), mentally and especially physically the men can hardly be as well prepared as the conscripts. Moreover, since they serve only temporarily and maintain lives outside the military, exercising strict discipline can be a problem; indeed reserve units often assume a decidedly informal, unmilitary appearance. Yet for much of the IDF’s history things have tended to work the other way around. The reserve units experience little personnel turbulence, so the men who constitute them remain together for many years on end. Meeting regularly for maintenance, training, and operational service, they form extremely cohesive units—complete with all the shared worldview, bonhomie, and mutual aid that implies.
36
For example, during the June 1967 war some of the personnel forming the armored
ugda
(division) in the center of Israel’s Egyptian front had served together for five or six years.
37
36
For example, during the June 1967 war some of the personnel forming the armored
ugda
(division) in the center of Israel’s Egyptian front had served together for five or six years.
37
In some of this the IDF, building itself almost from scratch, wittingly or unwittingly took other armed forces as its model. For example, in Germany before 1914 and again before 1939 the younger classes of reservists were also considered first-line troops (though they did not receive nearly as much refresher training); as such, they were committed to battle very soon after mobilization and deployment. As in other countries, the system could operate only on the basis of a modern, integrated, countrywide network of transportation and telecommunications, which then as now constitutes one of Israel’s most important advantages over its larger and more populous, but economically less developed and technologically less sophisticated, Arab neighbors.
38
The system did, however, include some elements that were almost entirely original. Perhaps foremost is the officer selection and training system.
38
The system did, however, include some elements that were almost entirely original. Perhaps foremost is the officer selection and training system.
The regular armed forces of most other countries—
militia perpetua
, as the seventeenth-century saying went—originated during times of absolute rule. Since they were intended for internal and external use—police forces in the modern sense developed after 1780 or so—the first concern of the rulers was to select officers in a way that ensured their loyalty. Even in the United States, never subject to absolute rule, this implied selecting officers mainly from the upper classes for specialized military academies; there, far from civilians and lesser ranks, officer candidates could be thoroughly imbued with the military spirit.
39
Not so Hagana and especially PALMACH. Initially they took any person with military experience they could find. Later they selected junior commanders from among the rank and file. They trained these commanders as best they could, leaving practical experience to fill in the rest.
militia perpetua
, as the seventeenth-century saying went—originated during times of absolute rule. Since they were intended for internal and external use—police forces in the modern sense developed after 1780 or so—the first concern of the rulers was to select officers in a way that ensured their loyalty. Even in the United States, never subject to absolute rule, this implied selecting officers mainly from the upper classes for specialized military academies; there, far from civilians and lesser ranks, officer candidates could be thoroughly imbued with the military spirit.
39
Not so Hagana and especially PALMACH. Initially they took any person with military experience they could find. Later they selected junior commanders from among the rank and file. They trained these commanders as best they could, leaving practical experience to fill in the rest.
Once the state was founded the ministry of defense opened one school (later a second) that took in fourteen-year-olds with military aspirations and trained them as officer candidates; both schools continue to operate and provide the IDF with a disproportionate number of its midgrade officers. Yet the great majority of future commanders continued to come via the rank and file. At entry level no distinction was made between prospective officers and anybody else. Soldiers who distinguished themselves during their conscript service were sent to the squad commanders course, long reputed to be the toughest in the army, and the most physically demanding on the students. Upon graduating they were made to play the NCO role for a while; volunteers underwent officer-qualification tests on the basis of superiors’ recommendations.
40
Although the air force and navy maintain their own officer schools, the ground forces have only a single comprehensive course, so there is no segregation by arm. The specialized training of infantrymen, armor, and the like would follow later.
40
Although the air force and navy maintain their own officer schools, the ground forces have only a single comprehensive course, so there is no segregation by arm. The specialized training of infantrymen, armor, and the like would follow later.
The upshot is that ground officers start their careers in common with enlisted personnel. Having commanded some of the latter as an NCO, each spends another period with fellow ground officers before going on to specialize. Contrary to that in many other armies, this system has ensured that commanders have a good understanding of their troops. It also put a greater emphasis on proven military competence and leadership as opposed to social origin or education—the latter being something of a sore point for the IDF.
41
There can be no doubt that from 1949 to 1973 this system served the IDF well. It not only produced first-class platoon commanders—the highest position soldiers could hold during their period of conscript service—but also provided an excellent pool from which senior officers could be selected. Whether this remains true is debatable, however; the issue will be discussed elsewhere (see Chapter 18). For the moment we will continue analyzing the officer corps.
41
There can be no doubt that from 1949 to 1973 this system served the IDF well. It not only produced first-class platoon commanders—the highest position soldiers could hold during their period of conscript service—but also provided an excellent pool from which senior officers could be selected. Whether this remains true is debatable, however; the issue will be discussed elsewhere (see Chapter 18). For the moment we will continue analyzing the officer corps.
Israeli officers traditionally have been younger than officers in other armed forces. In part this was the result of the War of Independence, which, as revolutionary wars often will, caused a winnowing-out of elderly personnel and the rapid promotion of outstanding young officers. Thus Yadin became chief of staff at thirty-two, his successor Mordechai Makleff at thirty-two, Dayan at thirty-seven, and Laskov—a true antediluvian by the standards of those days—at thirty-nine. If only because these youngsters did not want their subordinates to be older than they, what had begun as the product of circumstance turned into a matter of principle, and thus the IDF developed an officer corps that was much younger than those in other armies.
Having entered the IDF as conscripts, Israelis often served less than two years before being promoted second lieutenant, for there was no four-year academy that offered the equivalent of a university education. Once commissioned, and assuming they signed up for the
tsva keva
(standing forces), promotion was fast. As in all armies there are minimal periods, known as PAZAM, to be spent in each rank. And whereas thirty years of total service is common elsewhere, the vast majority of Israeli officers who did not rise higher than major (later lieutenant colonel) could expect to retire in their late thirties or early forties.
42
At that point they were expected to take up a second career—usually in politics, government, or business.
43
Compared to those of other armies, the Israelis’ system has probably produced a certain originality and freshness of approach,
44
though whether that is still true is questionable. At the same time, however, it has also meant a large and growing burden of separation and pension payments.
tsva keva
(standing forces), promotion was fast. As in all armies there are minimal periods, known as PAZAM, to be spent in each rank. And whereas thirty years of total service is common elsewhere, the vast majority of Israeli officers who did not rise higher than major (later lieutenant colonel) could expect to retire in their late thirties or early forties.
42
At that point they were expected to take up a second career—usually in politics, government, or business.
43
Compared to those of other armies, the Israelis’ system has probably produced a certain originality and freshness of approach,
44
though whether that is still true is questionable. At the same time, however, it has also meant a large and growing burden of separation and pension payments.
The feature that has attracted the greatest amount of attention—and which is the subject of the worst misunderstandings—is the conscription of women. Throughout history, war has been the manly activity par excellence; women participated, if at all, almost exclusively as eggers-on, auxiliaries, spectators, and victims. The advent of modern warfare did not change that situation to any great extent. Unlike men, women in modern times have rarely been subject to conscription. If called upon to volunteer—as in many countries during World War I and World War II—they were assigned almost entirely to auxiliary tasks such as rear-echelon communication, administration, nursing, liaison, driving motor vehicles, and the like. With very few exceptions, only in extremis were women allowed to enter combat, as in World War II Britain, where women operated heavy home-based antiaircraft batteries, carrying out every task but pressing the firing button; and the USSR, where three regiments of female pilots were formed to fight the Nazis.
45
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