The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (99 page)

1476.
CIA █████ (242144Z AUG 04).

1477.
███████████████████████.

1478.
A June 25, 2004, CIA Serial Flyer entitled, “Guantanamo Bay Detainee Moazzem Begg’s Links to Active Operatives,” states that, after being captured in February 2002 and being held in U.S. military custody,” Begg has been cooperative in debriefings and has provided background information and descriptions of a number of his past associates that have helped shed light on the extent of the Islamic extremist network in the United Kingdom and its ties to al-Qa’ida.” According to the CIA report, in June 2004, Begg’s “description and resulting sketch of UK contact Issa al-Hindi”—whose true identity was then unknown—“was compared to a still shot of an unidentified man taken from a surveillance video of UK extremists.” The comparison “revealed that the man in the video probably [was] the elusive Issa al-Hindi.” Begg co-owned the Maktabah al-Ansar bookshop in Birmingham, United Kingdom, that would later be found to have published a book written by “Esa al-Hindi” that was well known among U.K. extremists, “The Army of Madinah in Kashmir.”

1479.
See [REDACTED] 72330 █████████████████ “Guantanamo Bay Detainee Moazzem Begg’s Links to Active Operatives,” June 2004 for intelligence referencing earlier reporting. See also open source reporting on U.K. raids of the bookstore in the year 2000, as well as subsequent raids, including. “Bookshop linked to Bin Laden’s ‘General,”
The Telegraph
February 1, 2007.

1480.
On April ██ 2004, ████████ relayed information acquired from Sajid Badat, the other U.K. “Issa.” Badat stated that “anyone who had been involved with jihad in Britain since the mid-90s” would know the other Issa, naming among other individuals, Moazzem Begg. See ██████████ 19907 (231744Z APR 04).

1481.
CIA █████ (262213Z SEP 03) (cable referencing information collected in 1999).

1482.
██████████ 49612 (281213Z JUL03).

1483.
[REDACTED] 72330 ██████████████ (table discusses historical reporting). See
also
“Bookshop linked to Bin Laden’s ‘General,”
The Telegraph
, dated February 1, 2007.

1484.
███████████████████.

1485.
The CIA’s June 2013 Response states that the “Study highlights and mischaracterizes” this intelligence because the author of “The Army of Madinah in Kashmir,” is not identified in the intelligence report. The CIA Response states that the report “identifies the author only as ‘an Afghanistan-trained British convert writing about Hindu atrocities in Kashmir.’” Notwithstanding the CIA’s Response, the Committee found the intelligence report references the book, “The Army of Madinah in Kashmir,” and describes the author as “a brother from England who was a Hindu and became a Muslim about six years ago” and who “got training in Afghanistan then went to fight in Kashmir.” According to open sources, the 1999 book advocated “worldwide jihad” in order to bring nations “to their knees.” An Internet archive search for the title of the book, “The Army of Madinah in Kashmir,” found the book prominently advertised among the “Recommended Products” in 2002 on the website for the Maktabah al-Ansar bookstore (www.maktabah.net/books/images/kashmir.jpg: internet archive 2002). The website archive from 2002 states that the author “Esa al-Hindi” converted “to Islam at the age of 20” and recalls his “personal experience in occupied Kashmir fighting the Indian forces.” The bookstore’s website and related jihadi websites list the author of the book as “Esa Al-Hindi.” CIA cables suggest it was not until June 2003 that the CIA conducted an internet search for “The Army of Madinah in Kashmir.” When the search was conducted, the CIA found “it is one of the recommended reads featured” on the website of the Maktabah al-Ansar bookstore. See ALEC ████████ (052206Z JUN 03). As noted, the same information on the book was prominently listed on the same website more than a year earlier.

1486.
DIRECTOR ████████ (23 JUL 01); DIRECTOR ████████ (20 JUL 01).

1487.
June 25, 2004, CIA Serial Flyer entitled, “Guantanamo Bay Detainee Moazzem Begg’s Links to Active Operatives.’

1488.
███████████████ 14083 ███████████████ DIRECTOR ██████ ██████████████████; DIRECTOR █████.

1489.
DIRECTOR ██████ ██████████████████; DIRECTOR █████.

1490.
██████████ 77599, ███████████.

1491.
See 2002 reporting detailed in the Volume II intelligence chronology. At this point it was still unknown how many Issas the reporting was referencing. In September 2003, however, a CIA officer assessed there were “two (or three) Abu Issas” in intelligence reporting. See 99093 (020931Z SEP 03).

1492.
[REDACTED] 80508 █████████████████.

1493.
[REDACTED] 80508 █████████████████.

1494.
[REDACTED] 83917 ████████████████.

1495.
████████.

1496.
ALEC ████ (102238Z MAR 03).

1497.
Update on Email Activity ██████████████████████████████ Messages Derived from ████ Coverage
, ███████████ CIA ███; ████.

1498.
See KSM detainee review in Volume III for additional details.

1499.
There are no other records indicating that Dhiren Barot, aka Issa, was connected to KSM’s Heathrow Plotting. ██████████ 10828 (151310Z MAR 03); ██████████ 10815 (141819Z MAR 03); ██████████ 10871 (172037Z MAR 03).

1500.
██████████ 10932 (212132Z MAR 03); ██████████ 10921 (211046Z MAR 03).

1501.
██████████ 10942 (221610Z MAR 03). According to KSM, Shaykh abu Hamza al-Masri had contacts in Montana.

1502.
DIRECTOR ██████ (312243Z MAR 03); ██████████ 10942 (221521Z MAR 03); ██████████ 11070 (302115Z MAR 03), disseminated as ██████████████.

1503.
██████████ 10948 (222101Z MAR 03).

1504.
ALEC ██████ (182330Z APR 03).

1505.
███████ 12095 (222049Z JUN 03).

1506.
ALEC ██████ (260043Z JUN 03). No individuals related to KSM’s reporting were ever identified in Montana. KSM also retracted his statement connecting Issa to the Heathrow Airport plotting. There are no CIA records to indicate that either U.K.-based Issas (Sajid Badat or Dhiren Barot) was ever involved in the Heathrow Airport plotting. See intelligence chronology in Volume II and information on the Heathrow plotting in this summary for additional information.

1507.
ALEC ██████ (302258Z JUN 03).

1508.
ALEC ██████ ██████████.

1509.
ALEC ██████ (182330Z APR 03). The Committee did not have access to U.S. military detainee reporting.

1510.
ALEC █████ (052206Z JUN 03).
See also
ALEC ███ and █████ 93759 (160919Z MAY 03).

1511.
████████████ 280438Z (280746Z MAY 03).

1512.
██████ 77599, █████ 2002.

1513.
████████████ 280438Z █280746Z MAY 03), █████ 77599, ████████2002█. Ujaama provided detailed information on Issa al-Hindi, including a description, biographical data, and information on Issa al-Hindi’s contacts, which could be used to locate and identify Issa al-Hindi.

1514.
██████████ 11909 (022030Z JUN 03).

1515.
ALEC ███████ (052206Z JUN 03).

1516.
[REDACTED] 94931 █████████████████. The U.K. also reported that, in June of 1999, an individual assessed to be Issa provided Moazzem Begg with telephone numbers for a lawyer known as Sulyman. See [REDACTED] 95463 █████████████████; ALEC ██████ █████████████████.

1517.
████████ 12825 (131747Z SEP 03); ALEC ██████ (141942Z SEP 03); ALEC ██████ (210159Z OCT 03).

1518.
Email from: ██████████████; to: █████████████, ██████████████, ████████████, ████████████, ████████████████, ██████████████, [REDACTED]; cc: ██████████; subject: KSM and Khallad Issues; date: October 16, 2003, at 5:25:13 PM.

1519.
██████████ 10053 ██████████████.

1520.
ALEC ████ (210159Z OCT 03).

1521.
Email from: ██████████████; to: █████████████, ██████████████, ████████████, ████████████, ████████████████, ██████████████, [REDACTED]; cc: ██████████; subject: KSM and Khallad Issues; date: October 16, 2003, at 5:25:13 PM. See
also
email from: ████
█████████
; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc:
██████████████,
█████████████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Some things to ping Mukie on—cable coming; date: April 11, 2003 at 5:00:12 PM; and ALEC ██████ (222153Z APR 03).

1522.
ALEC ██████ (210159Z OCT 03).

1523.
Draft cable included in an email from: [REDACTED]; to: ███████████████ and █████████████████; subject: “Abu Issa al-Hindi Targeting Study”; date: October 22, 2003, at 6:49:41 PM.

1524.
ALEC ██████ ██████████████████.

1525.
ALEC ██████ ██████████████████.

1526.
██████████ 22359 ██████████; ██████████ 22246 ████████████████. See
also
[REDACTED] email to: ████████████████ and others; subject: “For Immed. Coord: Al-Hindi ID Highlight”; date; June 17, 2004, at 3:06:29 PM.

1527.
[REDACTED] 22406 (04 9023184 |17/JUN/2004).

1528.
A June 25, 2004, CIA Serial Flyer entitled, “Guantanamo Bay Detainee Moazzem Begg’s Links to Active Operatives.”

1529.
[REDACTED] 22406 (04 9023184 |17/JUN/2004).

1530.
CIA records indicate that other detainees also identified this individual as Issa al-Hindi.

1531.
See ████████████████████ 280438Z (280746Z MAY 03) and ██████████ 77599 ██████████████. Ujaama provided detailed information on Issa al-Hindi, including a description, biographical data, and information on Issa al-Hindi’s contacts, which could be used to locate and identify Issa al-Hindi. There are no specific CIA records of James Ujaama providing exact location data for Issaal-Hindi. As noted, however, senior CIA personnel expressed frustration that the U.K. was not sharing all known information on their investigations, writing in August 2003 that “[the FBI is] clearly working closely with the [U.K. service] on these matters and [the CIA is] at the mercy” of what it is told. As described in this summary, James Ujaama was in FBI custody.

1532.
██████████ 23226 █████████████.

1533.
CIA WASHINGTON DC ██████ ████████████████. ██████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████.

1534.
██████████ 3924 ███████████████; email from: [REDACTED]; to ██████████████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: ██████████████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: DRAFT DCI SPECIAL ITEM - 14Jul04; date: July 14, 2004, at 03:48 PM. This information was obtained from sources unrelated to the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program.

1535.
██████████ 3924 ██████████████; ██████████ 3889 ████████████.

1536.
Email from: ██████████; to: James Pavitt, [REDACTED], ██████████████, Rodriguez, John P. Mudd, [REDACTED], ██████████████, ██████████████, ██████████████, ██████████████, ████████████ [REDACTED], ████████████; cc: ████████████, [REDACTED]; subject: Laptop docex from recent raid may yield pre-election threat information date July ██, 2004, at 07:35 AM.

1537.
See Terrorist Threat Integration Center, Terrorist Threats to US Interests Worldwide. See
also
██████████████████; ██████████████████; ██████████████████; ██████████████████; ██████████████████; ██████████████████; and ██████████████████.

1538.
████████ 1477 █████████.

1539.
Email from: ██████████; to James Pavitt [REDACTED], ██████████, Rodriguez, John P. Mudd, [REDACTED], ██████████, ██████████, ██████████, █████, █████, [REDACTED], ██████████; cc: ██████████. [REDACTED]; subject: Laptop docex from recent raid may yield pre-election threat information; date: July ██, 2004 at 07:35 AM.

1540.
Email from: ██████████; to: James Pavitt [REDACTED], ███████████████, Rodriguez, John P. Mudd, [REDACTED], ██████████, ██████████, ██████████, ██████████, ██████████, [REDACTED], ██████████; cc: ██████████, [REDACTED]; subject: Laptop docex from recent raid may yield pre-election threat information; date: July ██, 2004 AT 07:35 AM.

1541.
DIRECTOR █████ ███████████████.
See also
reissue, DIRECTOR █████ ███████████████.

1542.
DIRECTOR █████ (032140Z AUG 04).

1543.
CIA █████ (261529Z AUG 04).

1544.
CIA Operational Developments Against Al Qa’ida Worldwide, 09 August 2004, 1700 Hours.

1545.
██████████████.

1546.
[REDACTED] 25533 (231257Z AUG 04).
See also
CIA █████ (242144Z AUG 04). Internal CIA communications related to August 30, 2004, CIA talking points concerning Dhiren Barot state that a sketch of Issa al-Hindi, by U.S. military detainee Moazzem Begg, ultimately played a central role, as a surveillance photo of a suspected Issa Al-Hindi “looked so much like the sketch.” The CIA talking points identify █████ [technical collection] capabilities as the CIA’s primary contribution to the investigation, stating: “Probably the most important intelligence tool we used in breaking this case was our ███████████████ [technical collection] enabled by the USA Patriot Act. From beginning to end ████ [technical collection] played a role, but it was not the only tool that was used. HUMINT and SIGINT threads were followed and contributed to our understanding of the ████████████ [technical collection] and in finding new ████ [technical collection] leads. Exploitation of computers and other information obtained in the raids before and during the case also contributed significantly, as did surveillance. However, none of these tools are stand-alones. Good old fashioned hard targeting and analysis of these maddeningly vague and disparate and incomplete threads of information was the glue that put it all together.” See “Capture of Al-Qa’ida Operative Abu Issa al-Hindi (aka Dhiren Barot, aka Abu Issa al-Britani),” multiple iterations of talking points, including the revised version cited, found in an email from: [REDACTED]; to [REDACTED], with multiple ccs; subject: “IMMEDIATE: al-Hindi TPs for ADCI Tuesday Briefing of Kerry/Edwards”; date: August 30, 2004, at 02:51 PM.