The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (100 page)

1547.
[REDACTED] 25533 (231257Z AUG 04).

1548.
[REDACTED] 25533 (231257Z AUG 04).

1549.
In an email, a CIA officer commented on talking points prepared for “ADCI Tuesday Briefing of Kerry/Edwards” on Issa al-Hindi, stating that “KSM didn’t decode the numbers for us (he just provided info on how he may have encoded the numbers—-which when used didn’t result in valid numbers) and address with the number didn’t exist; it was a dead end, and it appears KSM was protecting al-Hindi.” See email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], with multiple ccs; subject: “IMMEDIATE: al-Hindi TPs for ADCI Tuesday Briefing of Kerry/Edwards”; date: August 30, 2004, at 02:51 PM, which contains comments on previous drafts of talking points.

1550.
“Capture of Al-Qa’ida Operative Abu Issa al-Hindi (aka Dhiren Barot, aka Abu Issa al-Britani)” multiple iterations of talking points, including the revised version cited, found in an email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], with multiple ccs; subject: “IMMEDIATE: al-Hindi TPs for ADCI Tuesday Briefing of Kerry/Edwards”; date: August 30, 2004, at 02:51 PM.

1551.
Disseminated intelligence product by the IICT entitled, “Homeland: Reappraising al-Qa’ida’s “Election Threat,” dated September 10, 2004.

1552.
Disseminated intelligence product by the IICT entitled, “Homeland: Reappraising al-Qa’ida’s “Election Threat,” dated September 10, 2004.

1553.
[REDACTED] 29759 █████.

1554.
FBI Intelligence Assessment, “The Gas Limos Project: An al-Qa’ida Urban Attack Plan Assessment,” dated December 14, 2004.

1555.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED] and others; subject: “Re: need answer: request for any info deemed operationally sensitive be passed to brits concerning Dhiren Barot (aka Issa al-Hindi)”; date: December 12, 2005, at 6:08:01 PM, in preparation of a document entitled, “Addendum in Respect of Disclosure - Al Hindi.pdf.”

1556.
See Royal Courts of Justice Appeal, Barot v. R [2007], EWCA Crim 1119 (16 May 2007). The expert assessments determined that the plotting involved “a professional-looking attempt from amateurs who did not really know what they were doing.”
See also
June 15, 2007,
Bloomberg News
article entitled, “Terrorist Gang Jailed for Helping London and New York Bomb Plot.”

1557.
WHDC █████ (242226Z MAR 03) (includes information acquired by the FBI on March 20, 2003).

1558.
ALEC ██████ (261745Z MAR 03).

1559.
ALEC ██████ (180200Z MAR 03)
See also
█████.

1560.
Italics included in CIA Memorandum to the Office of Legal Counsel, entitled, “Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques,” from March 2, 2005.

1561.
From 2003 through 2009, the CIA’s representations regarding the effectiveness of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques provided a specific set of examples of terrorist plots “disrupted” and terrorists captured that the CIA attributed to information obtained from the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques. CIA representations further asserted that the intelligence obtained from the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques was unique, otherwise unavailable, and resulted in “saved lives.” Among other CIA representations, see: (1) CIA representations in the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum, dated May 30, 2005, which relied on a series of highly specific CIA representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques to assess their legality. The CIA representations referenced by the OLC include that the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques was “necessary” to obtain “critical,” “vital,” and “otherwise unavailable actionable intelligence” that was “essential” for the U.S. government to detect and disrupt” terrorist threats. The OLC memorandum further states that “[the CIA] ha[s] informed [the OLC] that the CIA believes that this program is largely responsible for preventing a subsequent attack within the United States.” (See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.) (2) CIA representations in the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum dated July 20, 2007, which also relied on CIA representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. Citing CIA documents and the President’s September 6, 2006 speech describing the CIA’s interrogation program (which was based on CIA-provided information), the OLC memorandum states: “The CIA interrogation program — and, in particular, its use of enhanced interrogation techniques — is intended to serve this paramount interest [security of the Nation] by producing substantial quantities of otherwise unavailable intelligence . . . As the President explained [on September 6, 2006], ‘by giving us information about terrorist plans we could not get anywhere else, the program has saved innocent lives.’” (See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007. Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.) (3) CIA briefings for members of the National Security Council in July and September 2003 represented that “the use of Enhanced Techniques of one kind or another had produced significant intelligence information that had, in the view of CIA professionals, saved lives,” and warned policymakers that “[t]ermination of this program will result in loss of life, possibly extensive.” (See August 5, 2003 Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Member Briefing; and September 26, 2003, Memorandum for the Record from Muller, Subject: CIA Interrogation Program.) (4) The CIA’s response to the Office of Inspector General draft Special Review of the CIA program, which asserts: “Information [the CIA] received… as a result of the lawful use of enhanced interrogation techniques (‘EITs’) has almost certainly saved countless American lives inside the United States and abroad. The evidence points clearly to the fact that without the use of such techniques, we and our allies would [have] suffered major terrorist attacks involving hundreds, if not thousands, of casualties.” (See Memorandum for: Inspector General; from James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, “Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program” 2003-7123-IG; date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA’s Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities.) (5) CIA briefing documents for CIA Director Leon Panetta in February 2009, which state that the “CIA assesses that the RDI program worked and the [enhanced interrogation] techniques were effective in producing foreign intelligence,” and that “[m]ost, if not all, of the timely intelligence acquired from detainees in this program would not have been discovered or reported by other means.” (See CIA briefing documents for Leon Panetta, entitled, “Tab 9: DCIA briefing on RDI Program- 18FEB.2009” and graphic attachment, “Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM),” including “DCIA Briefing on RDI Program” agenda, CIA document “EITs and Effectiveness,” with associated documents, “Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment,” and “supporting references,” to include “Background on Key Captures and Plots Disrupted.”) (6) CIA document faxed to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on March 18, 2009, entitled, “SWIGERT and DUNBAR,” located in Committee databases at DTS #2009-1258, which provides a list of “some of the key captures and disrupted plots” that the CIA had attributed to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, and stating: “CIA assesses that most, if not all, of the timely intelligence acquired from detainees in this program would not have been discovered or reported by any other means.” See Volume II for additional CIA representations asserting that the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques enabled the CIA to obtain unique, otherwise unavailable intelligence that “saved lives.”

1562.
CIA memorandum for the Record, “Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003,” prepared by CIA General Counsel Scott Muller, dated August 5, 2003; briefing slides entitled, “
CIA Interrogation Program,
” dated July 29, 2003, presented to senior White House officials.

1563.
Italics added. CIA memorandum for the Record, “Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003,” prepared by CIA General Counsel Scott Muller, dated August 5, 2003; briefing slides entitled, “
CIA Interrogation Program
,” dated July 29, 2003, presented to senior White House officials.

1564.
Memorandum to the Inspector General from James Pavitt, CIA’s Deputy Director for Operations, dated February 27, 2004, with the subject line, “Comments to Draft IG Special Review, ‘Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program’ (2003-7123-IG),” Attachment, “Successes of CIA’s Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities,” dated February 24, 2004.

1565.
Memorandum to the Inspector General from James Pavitt, CIA’s Deputy Director for Operations, dated February 27, 2004, with the subject line, “Comments to Draft IG Special Review, ‘Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program’ (2003-7123-IG),” Attachment, “Successes of CIA’s Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities,” dated February 24, 2004.

1566.
Italics added. CIA Office of Inspector General, Special Review — Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program (2003-7123-IG) May 2004.

1567.
The relevant sections of the Special Review were also cited in the OLC’s May 30, 2005 memorandum which stated that “we understand that interrogations have led to specific, actionable intelligence,” and that “[w]e understand that the use of enhanced techniques in the interrogations of KSM, Zubaydah and others . . . has yielded critical information.” (see memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be Used in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees, p. 9 (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 11), citing
Special Review
at 86, 90-91). Like the Special Review, the OLC memorandum has been declassified with redactions.

1568.
Italics added. CIA briefing documents for Leon Panetta, entitled, “Tab 9: DCIA Briefing on RDI Program- 18FEB.2009” and graphic attachment, “Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM).” The documents include “DCIA Briefing on RDI Program” agenda, CIA document “EITs and Effectiveness,” with associated documents, “Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and KSM),” “Background on Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment,” and “supporting references,” to include “Background on Key Captures and Plots Disrupted.”

1569.
CIA document faxed to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on March 18, 2009, at 3:46 PM, entitled, “[SWIGERT and DUNBAR]” (DTS #2009-1258).

1570.
See list of CIA prepared briefings and memoranda from 2003 through 2009 with representations on the effectiveness of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques referenced in this summary and described in detail in Volume II.

1571.
The CIA’s June 2013 Response acknowledges that “we incorrectly stated or implied that KSM’s information led to the investigation of Faris.” Elsewhere, the CIA’s June 2013 Response states that “[CIA] imprecisely characterized KSM’s information as having ‘led’ to the investigation of Iyman Faris, rather than more accurately characterizing it as a key contribution to the investigation.” As described in more detail in Volume II, the CIA and FBI had significant information on Iyman Faris prior to any reporting from KSM. The CIA’s June 2013 Response also states that the CIA’s inaccurate statements that KSM’s reporting “led” to the investigation of Iyman Faris were only made “[i]n a few cases,” and “[i]n a small number of… representations.” As described in the full Committee Study, the CIA repeatedly represented that KSM’s reporting “led” to the investigation of Iyman Faris, and was responsible for the “identification” and “capture” of Iyman Faris.

1572.
Information provided by the FBI to the Committee on November, 30, 2010. Records do not provide an explanation for the closing of the investigation.

1573.
WHDC █████ (102129Z MAR 03).
See also
ALEC █████ (180200Z MAR 03).

1574.
ALEC █████ (261725Z MAR 03).

1575.
Information provided to the Committee by the FBI on November, 30, 2010.

1576.
████████ 13658 (050318Z MAR 03).
See
the section on the capture of Majid Khan in this summary and in Volume II.

1577.
ALEC █████ (060353Z MAR 03).

1578.
ALEC █████ (060353Z MAR 03).

1579.
ALEC █████ (060353Z MAR 03).

1580.
FBI information relayed in ALEC █████ ███████████.

1581.
FBI information confirmed for the Committee on November, 30. 2010.

1582.
13678 (070724Z MAR 03). The cable states: “a [foreign government officer] talked quietly to [Majid Khan] alone for about ten minutes before the interview began and was able to establish an excellent level of rapport. The first hour and [a] half of the interview was a review of bio-data and information previously [reported]. When [foreign government interrogators] started putting pressure on [Majid Khan] by pulling apart his story about his ‘honeymoon’ in Bangkok and his attempt to rent an apartment, safehouse, for his cousin [Mansoor Maqsood, aka Iqbal, aka Talha, aka Moeen, aka Habib], at 1400, [Majid Khan] slumped in his chair and said he would reveal everything to officers….”