The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (17 page)

H. The Growth of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program

1. Fifty-Three CIA Detainees Enter the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program in 2003

While the CIA held detainees from 2002 to 2008, early 2003 was the most active period of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program. Of the 119 detainees identified by the Committee as held by the CIA, 53 were brought into custody in 2003, and of the 39 detainees the Committee has found to have been subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, 17 were subjected to such techniques between January 2003 and August 2003. The CIA’s enhanced interrogations during that time were primarily used at DETENTION SITE COBALT and DETENTION SITE BLUE.
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Other interrogations using the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques took place at a CIA ██████ in Country ██, at which at least one CIA detainee was submerged in a bathtub filled with ice water.
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In 2003, CIA interrogators sought and received approval to use the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against at least five detainees prior to their arrival at a CIA detention facility.
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In two of those cases, CIA Headquarters approved the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques before they were requested by CIA personnel at the detention sites.
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2. The CIA Establishes DETENTION SITE BLACK in Country ██ and DETENTION SITE VIOLET in Country ██

The CIA entered into an agreement with the █████████████ in Country ██ to host a CIA detention facility in ███████ 2002.
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In █████ 2003, CIA Headquarters invited the CIA Station in Country ██ to identify ways to support the █████████ in Country ██ to “demonstrate to ███████ and the highest levels of the [Country ██] government that we deeply appreciate their cooperation and support” for the detention program.
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The Station responded with an $█ million “wish list”
████████████████████████
;
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CIA Headquarters provided the Station with $█ million more than was requested for the purposes of the ████ subsidy.
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CIA detainees were transferred to DETENTION SITE BLACK in Country ██ in the fall of 2003.
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In August 2003, the U.S. ambassador in Country ██ sought to contact State Department officials to ensure that the State Department was aware of the CIA detention facility and its “potential impact on our policy vis-à-vis the [Country ██] government.”
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The U.S. ambassador was told by the CIA Station that this was not possible, and that no one at the State Department, including the secretary of state, was informed about the CIA detention facility in Country ██. Describing the CIA’s position as “unacceptable,” the ambassador then requested a signed document from “at least the President’s National Security Advisor” describing the authorities for the program, including a statement that the CIA’s interrogation techniques met “legal and human rights standards,” and an explicit order to him not to discuss the program with the secretary of state.
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CIA Headquarters then sought the intervention of Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, who called the U.S. ambassador. Deputy Secretary Armitage told the CIA to keep him and the secretary of state informed so that they would not be caught unaware when an ambassador raised concerns.
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Nearly a year later, in May 2004, revelations about U.S. detainee abuses at the U.S. military prison in Abu Ghraib, Iraq, prompted the same U.S. ambassador in Country ██ to seek information on CIA detention standards and interrogation methods.
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In the fall of 2004, when
█████
U.S. ambassador to Country
██
sought documents authorizing the program, the CIA again sought the intervention of Deputy Secretary Armitage, who once again made “strong remarks” to the CIA about how he and the secretary of state were “cut out of the NSC [National Security Council] clearance/coordination process” with regard to the CIA program. According to CIA records, Armitage also questioned the efficacy of the program and the value of the intelligence derived from the program.
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While it is unclear how the ambassador’s concerns were resolved, he later joined the chief of Station in making a presentation to Country ██’s ███████ on the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program. The presentation talking points did not describe the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, but represented that “[w]ithout the full range of these interrogation measures, we would not have succeeded in overcoming the resistance of [Khalid Shaykh Muhammad] and other equally resistant HVDs.” The talking points included many of the same inaccurate representations
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made to U.S. policymakers and others, attributing to CIA detainees critical information on the “Karachi Plot,” the “Heathrow Plot,” the “Second Wave Plot,” and the “Guraba Cell”; as well as intelligence related to Issa al-Hindi, Abu Talha al-Pakistani, Hambali, Jose Padilla, Binyam Mohammed, Sajid Badat, and Jaffar al-Tayyar. The presentation also noted that the President of the United States had directed that he not be informed of the locations of the CIA detention facilities to ensure he would not accidentally disclose the information.
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In a separate country, Country ██, the CIA obtained the approval of the
█████████████████
and the political leadership to establish a detention facility before informing the U.S. ambassador.
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As the CIA chief of Station stated in his request to CIA Headquarters to brief the ambassador, Country ██’s █████████████████ and the █████ probably would ask the ambassador about the CIA detention facility.
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After ████████████████████████████████ delayed briefing the ████████ for ██months, to the consternation of the CIA Station, which wanted political approval prior to the arrival of CIA detainees.
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The █████████████████ Country ██ official outside of the
██████████████████████████
aware of the facility, was described as “shocked,” but nonetheless approved.
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By mid-2003 the CIA had concluded that its completed, but still unused “holding cell” in Country ██ was insufficient, given the growing number of CIA detainees in the program and the CIA’s interest in interrogating multiple detainees at the same detention site. The CIA thus sought to build a new, expanded detention facility in the country.
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The CIA also offered $█ million to the ███████ to “show appreciation” for the █████ support for the program.
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According to a CIA cable, however, the
█████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████
.”
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While the plan to construct the expanded facility was approved by the █████ of Country ██, the CIA and
█████████████████
developed complex mechanisms to
██████████████████████████████████
in order to provide the $█ million to the
████████
.
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███████████████████████████████████████████████
in Country █ complicated the arrangements.
████████████████████████████████████████
when the Country █
█████
requested an update on planning for the CIA detention site, he was told
██████████████
—inaccurately—that the planning had been discontinued.
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In
███████
, when the facility received its first CIA detainees,
█████
informed the CIA
███████
that the
██████
of Country █ “probably has an incomplete notion [regarding the facility’s] actual function, i.e., he probably believes that it is some sort of
████████████
center.”
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3. At Least 17 CIA Detainees Subjected to the CIA’s Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Without CIA Headquarters Authorization

CIA cables from the spring of 2003 and afterwards describe multiple examples of interrogation practices at CIA detention sites that were inconsistent with the CIA’s detention and interrogation guidelines. CIA officers at DETENTION SITE COBALT—led principally by Chief of Interrogations
████████████
—also described a number of interrogation activities in cables that were not approved by CIA Headquarters. CIA Headquarters failed to respond, inquire, or investigate:

• Cables revealing that the CIA’s chief of interrogations used water dousing against detainees, including with cold water and/or ice water baths, as an interrogation technique without prior approval from CIA Headquarters;
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• Cables and records indicating that CIA detainees who were undergoing or had undergone the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques were subjected to rectal rehydration, without evidence of medical necessity, and that others were threatened with it;
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• Cables noting that groups of four or more interrogators, who required practical experience to acquire their CIA interrogation “certification,” were allowed to apply the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques as a group against a single detainee;
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  and
  
• Cables revealing that the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques were used at CIA ███████ that were not designated as CIA detention sites.
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In the first half of 2003, the CIA interrogated four detainees with medical complications in their lower extremities: two detainees had a broken foot, one detainee had a sprained ankle, and one detainee had a prosthetic leg.
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CIA interrogators shackled each of these detainees in the standing position for sleep deprivation for extended periods of time until medical personnel assessed that they could not maintain the position. The two detainees that each had a broken foot were also subjected to walling, stress positions, and cramped confinement, despite the note in their interrogation plans that these specific enhanced interrogation techniques were not requested because of the medical condition of the detainees.
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CIA Headquarters did not react to the site’s use of these CIA enhanced interrogation techniques despite the lack of approval.

Over the course of the CIA program, at least 39 detainees were subjected to one or more of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.
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CIA records indicate that there were at least 17 CIA detainees who were subjected to one or more CIA enhanced interrogation techniques without CIA Headquarters approval. This count includes detainees who were approved for the use of some techniques, but were subjected to unapproved techniques, as well as detainees for whom interrogators had no approvals to use any of the techniques. This count also takes into account distinctions between techniques categorized as “enhanced” or “standard” by the CIA at the time they were applied.
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The 17 detainees who were subjected to techniques without the approval of CIA Headquarters were: Rafiq Bashir al-Hami,
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Tawfiq Nasir Awad al-Bihandi,
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Hikmat Nafi Shaukat,
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Lufti al-Arabi al-Gharisi,
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Muhammad Ahmad Ghulam Rabbani aka Abu Badr,
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Gul Rahman,
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Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri,
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Ramzi bin al-Shibh,
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Asadallah,
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Mustafa al-Hawsawi,
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Abu Khalid,
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Laid bin Duhman aka Abu Hudhaifa,
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Abd al-Karim,
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Abu Hazim,
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Sayyid Ibrahim,
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Abu Yasir al-Jaza’iri,
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and Suleiman Abdullah.
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In every case except al-Nashiri, the unauthorized interrogation techniques were detailed in CIA cables, but CIA Headquarters did not respond or take action against the CIA personnel applying the unauthorized interrogation techniques.
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This list does not include examples in which CIA interrogators were authorized to use the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, but then implemented the techniques in a manner that diverged from the authorization. Examples include Abu Zubair
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and, as detailed, KSM, whose interrogators developed methods of applying the waterboard in a manner that differed from how the technique had previously been used and how it had been described to the Department of Justice. This count also excludes additional allegations of the unauthorized use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.
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Over the course of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, numerous detainees were subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques by untrained interrogators. As noted, the CIA did not conduct its first training course until November 2002, by which time at least nine detainees had already been subjected to the techniques.
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The DCI’s January 28, 2003, guidelines, which stated that the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques “may be employed only by approved interrogators for use with specific detainees,” raised the additional issue of approved techniques used by unapproved interrogators.
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The January 28, 2003, DCI guidelines did not explicitly require CIA Headquarters to approve who could use the CIA’s “standard” interrogation techniques, including techniques that were not previously considered “standard” and that would later be reclassified as “enhanced” interrogation techniques. Rather, the DCI guidelines required only that “all personnel directly engaged in the interrogation” be “appropriately screened,” that they review the guidelines, and that they receive “appropriate training” in the implementation of the guidelines.
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