The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (21 page)

Under a section of the memorandum entitled, “Results,” the CIA memo asserts that the “CIA’s use of DOJ-approved enhanced interrogation techniques, as part of a comprehensive interrogation approach, has enabled CIA to disrupt terrorist plots [and] capture additional terrorists.” The memorandum then lists examples of “[k]ey intelligence collected from HVD interrogations after applying interrogation techniques,” which led to “disrupte[ed] terrorist plots” and the “capture [of] additional terrorists.” The examples include: the “Karachi Plot,” the “Heathrow Plot,” “the ‘Second Wave’” plotting, the identification of the “the Guraba Cell,” the identification of “Issa al-Hindi,” the arrest of Abu Talha al-Pakistani, “Hambali’s Capture,” information on Jaffar al-Tayyar, the “Dirty Bomb” plot, the arrest of Sajid Badat, and information on Shkai, Pakistan. CIA records do not indicate when, or if, this memorandum was provided to the national security advisor.
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A subsequent CIA memorandum, dated March 5, 2005, concerning an upcoming meeting between the CIA director and the national security advisor on the CIA’s progress in completing the OIG recommended review of the effectiveness of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques states, “we [CIA] believe this study is much needed and should be headed up by highly respected national-level political figures with widely recognized reputations for independence and fairness.”
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On March 21, 2005, the director of the CTC formally proposed the “establishment of an independent ‘blue ribbon’ commission . . . with a charter to study our EITs.”
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The CIA then began the process of establishing a panel that included
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and
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. Both panelists received briefings and papers from CIA personnel who participated in the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program.
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[the first panelist] wrote: “It is clear from our discussions with both DO and DI officers that the program is deemed by them to be a great success, and I would concur. The EITs, as part of the overall program, are credited with enabling the US to disrupt terrorist plots, capture additional terrorists, and collect a high volume of useful intelligence on al-Qa’ida (AQ) . . . There are accounts of numerous plots against the US and the West that were revealed as a result of HVD interrogations.” He also observed, however, that “[n]either my background nor field of expertise particularly lend themselves to judging the effectiveness of interrogation techniques, taken individually or collectively.”
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[the second panelist] concluded that “there is no objective way to answer the question of efficacy,” but stated it was possible to “make some general observations” about the program based on CIA personnel assessments of “the quality of the intelligence provided” by CIA detainees. Regarding the effectiveness of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, he wrote: “here enters the epistemological problem. We can never know whether or not this intelligence could have been extracted though alternative procedures. Spokesmen from within the organization firmly believe it could not have been.”
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4. The CIA Wrongfully Detains Khalid Al-Masri; CIA Director Rejects Accountability for Officer Involved

After the dissemination of the draft CIA Inspector General Special Review in early 2004, approvals from CIA Headquarters to use the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques adhered more closely to the language of the DCI guidelines. Nonetheless, CIA records indicate that officers at CIA Headquarters continued to fail to properly monitor justifications for the capture and detention of detainees, as well as the justification for the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques on particular detainees.
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For example, on January ██, 2004, the CIA rendered German citizen Khalid al-Masri to a Country ██ facility used by the CIA for detention purposes. The rendition was based on the determination by officers in the CIA’s ALEC Station that “al-Masri knows key information that could assist in the capture of other al-Qa’ida operatives that pose a serious threat of violence or death to U.S. persons and interests and who may be planning terrorist activities.
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The cable did not state that Khalid al-Masri himself posed a serious threat of violence or death, the standard required for detention under the September 17, 2001, Memorandum of Notification (MON).

CIA debriefing cables from Country ██ on January 27, 2004, and January 28, 2004, note that Khalid al-Masri “seemed bewildered on why he has been sent to this particular prison,”
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and was “adamant that [CIA] has the wrong person.”
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Despite doubts from CIA officers in Country ██ about Khalid al-Masri’s links to terrorists, and RDG’s concurrence with those doubts, different components within the CIA disagreed on the process for his release.
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As later described by the CIA inspector general, officers in ALEC Station continued to think that releasing Khalid al-Masri would pose a threat to U.S. interests and that monitoring should be required, while those in the CIA’s █████ Division did not want to notify the German government about the rendition of a German citizen.
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Because of the significance of the dispute, the National Security Council settled the matter, concluding that al-Masri should be repatriated and that the Germans should be told about al-Masri’s rendition.
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On May ██, 2004, Khalid al-Masri was transferred from Country ██ to █████.
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After al-Masri arrived in █████, CIA officers released him and sent him toward a fake border crossing, where the officers told him he would be sent back to Germany because he had entered
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illegally.
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At the time of his release, al-Masri was provided 14,500 Euros,
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as well as his belongings.
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On July 16, 2007, the CIA inspector general issued a Report of Investigation on the rendition and detention of Khalid al-Masri, concluding that “[a]vailable intelligence information did not provide a sufficient basis to render and detain Khalid al-Masri,” and that the “Agency’s prolonged detention of al-Masri was unjustified.”
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On October 9, 2007, the CIA informed the Committee that it “lacked sufficient basis to render and detain al-Masri,” and that the judgment by operations officers that al-Masri was associated with terrorists who posed a threat to U.S. interests “was not supported by available intelligence.” The CIA director nonetheless decided that no further action was warranted against
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, then the deputy chief of ALEC Station, who advocated for al-Masri’s rendition, because “[t]he Director strongly believes that mistakes should be expected in a business filled with uncertainty and that, when they result from performance that meets reasonable standards, CIA leadership must stand behind the officers who make them.” The notification also stated that “with regard to counterterrorism operations in general and the al-Masri matter in particular, the Director believes the scale tips decisively in favor of accepting mistakes that over connect the dots against those that under connect them.”
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5. Hassan Ghul Provides Substantial Information—Including Information on a Key UBL Facilitator—Prior to the CIA’s Use of Enhanced Interrogation Techniques

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foreign authorities captured Hassan Ghul in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region on January █, 2004.
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After his identity was confirmed on January █, 2004,
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Ghul was rendered from U.S. military custody to CIA custody at DETENTION SITE COBALT on January
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, 2004.
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The detention site interrogators, who, according to CIA records, did not use the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques on Ghul, sent at least 21 intelligence reports to CIA Headquarters based on their debriefings of Hassan Ghul from the two days he spent at the facility.
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As detailed in this summary, and in greater detail in Volume II, CIA records indicate that the most accurate CIA detainee reporting on the facilitator who led to Usama bin Laden (UBL) was acquired from Hassan Ghul—prior to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.
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Ghul speculated that “UBL was likely living in [the] Peshawar area,” and that “it was well known that he was always with Abu Ahmed [al-Kuwaiti].”
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Ghul described Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti as UBL’s “closest assistant,”
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who couriered messages to al-Qa’ida’s chief of operations, and listed al-Kuwaiti as one of three individuals likely with UBL.
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Ghul further speculated that:

“UBL’s security apparatus would be minimal, and that the group likely lived in a house with a family somewhere in Pakistan . . . Ghul speculated that Abu Ahmed likely handled all of UBL’s needs, including moving messages out to Abu Faraj [al-Libi] . . .”
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During this same period, prior to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, Ghul provided information related to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Abu Faraj al-Libi (including his role in delivering messages from UBL), Jaffar al-Tayyar, ‘Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, Hamza Rabi’a, Shaik Sa’id al-Masri, Sharif al-Masri, Abu ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Najdi, Abu Talha al-Pakistani, and numerous other al-Qa’ida operatives. He also provided information on the locations, movements, operational security, and training of al-Qa’ida leaders living in Shkai, Pakistan, as well as on the visits of other leaders and operatives to Shkai.
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Ghul’s reporting on Shkai, which was included in at least 16 of the 21 intelligence reports,
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confirmed earlier reporting that the Shkai valley served as al-Qa’ida’s command and control center after the group’s 2001 exodus from Afghanistan.
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Notwithstanding these facts, in March 2005, the CIA represented to the Department of Justice that Hassan Ghul’s reporting on Shkai was acquired ‘‘
after
’’’ the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.
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After two days of questioning at DETENTION SITE COBALT and the dissemination of 21 intelligence reports, Ghul was transferred to DETENTION SITE BLACK.
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According to CIA records, upon arrival, Ghul was “shaved and barbered, stripped, and placed in the standing position against the wall” with “his hands above his head” with plans to lower his hands after two hours.
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The CIA interrogators at the detention site then requested to use the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques on Ghul, writing:

“[the] interrogation team believes, based on [Hassan Ghul’s] reaction to the initial contact, that his al-Qa’ida briefings and his earlier experiences with U.S. military interrogators have convinced him there are limits to the physical contact interrogators can have with him. The interrogation team believes the approval and employment of enhanced measures should sufficiently shift [Hassan Ghul’s] paradigm of what he expects to happen. The lack of these increasd [
sic
] measures may limit the team’s capability to collect critical and reliable information in a timely manner.”
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CIA Headquarters approved the request the same day.
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Following 59 hours of sleep deprivation,
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Hassan Ghul experienced hallucinations, but was told by a psychologist that his reactions were “consistent with what many others experience in his condition,” and that he should calm himself by telling himself his experiences are normal and will subside when he decides to be truthful.
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The sleep deprivation, as well as other enhanced interrogations, continued,
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as did Ghul’s hallucinations.
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Ghul also complained of back pain and asked to see a doctor,
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but interrogators responded that the “pain was normal, and would stop when [Ghul] was confirmed as telling the truth.” A cable states that “[i]nterrogators told [Ghul] they did not care if he was in pain, but cared only if he provided complete and truthful information.
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A CIA physician assistant later observed that Hassan Ghul was experiencing “notable physiological fatigue,” including “abdominal and back muscle pain/spasm, ‘heaviness’ and mild paralysis of arms, legs and feet [that] are secondary to his hanging position and extreme degree of sleep deprivation,” but that Ghul was clinically stable and had “essentially normal vital signs,” despite an “occasional premature heart beat” that the cable linked to Ghul’s fatigue.
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Throughout this period, Ghul provided no actionable threat information, and as detailed later in this summary, much of his reporting on the al-Qa’ida presence in Shkai was repetitive of his reporting prior to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. Ghul also provided no other information of substance on UBL facilitator Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti.
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Nonetheless, on May 5, 2011, the CIA provided a document to the Committee entitled, “Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti,” which lists Hassan Ghul as a CIA detainee who was subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques and who provided “Tier One” information “link[ing] Abu Ahmad to Bin Ladin.”
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Hassan Ghul was ███████████████████████████████████, and later released.
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6. Other Detainees Wrongfully Held in 2004; CIA Sources Subjected to the CIA’s Enhanced Interrogation Techniques; CIA Officer Testifies that the CIA Is “Not Authorized” “to Do Anything Like What You Have Seen” in Abu Ghraib Photographs