The President's Call: Executive Leadership From FDR to George Bush (61 page)

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Authors: Judith E. Michaels

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nificant component of his model of competent comity in political-career relations.

It is also clear that the hybrid model was employed in the Bush administration with public service and its bureaucrats granted significant respect and support. Given the increasing demands on government and their complexity and government's shrinking resources to meet those demands, future administrations will continue to utilize the hybrid model, giving more policy-making discretion to bureaucrats and further integrating them into the policy-making process.

Conclusion

The often turbulent recent history of relations between the political and career directors of the federal government's bureaucracy must be seen in context to be fully understood. There has been tremendous growth in both camps in the modern era. Beyond the inevitable strain of growing pains is the underlying issue of confusion that arises from the constitutionally mandated separation of powers.

One factor that exacerbates the problem is the burgeoning number of political appointees of all types. The White House could take a significant step toward resolving two of the levels of confusion by reducing the number of appointees and eliminating as many levels of bureaucracy as possible. A flatter hierarchy led by politicals that are fewer in number but committed to the president's agenda and closer to the careerists would make better use of both White House leverage and careerist skills.

Conflicts between political and career executives are an inherent component of democratic life as practiced in the United States. They can be seen as a destructive but necessary evil or as a source of creative tension within the body politic. As numerous theorists have noted, bureaucracy and democracy need one another to ensure the proper functioning of both; there is an intimate relationship between them.

One of the great paradoxes of representative government is that in order for democracy to flourish, bureaucracy must thrive as well. . . . Bureaucracy is the side of government that gets things done-the side that builds roads, safeguards our air and water, protects our rights, and defends our freedoms. Without bureaucracy, we have no government. Without government, we have no civilization. (Huddleston 1987, 27)

Understanding one another's culture, clarity of political purpose and open, "clean" fighting between the two competing camps will lay the

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groundwork for appropriate compromise and cooperation that will in the long run serve the interests of an open and democratic system. As Alexander Hamilton noted in
The Federalist
(Number 68), "The test of a good government is its aptitude and tendency to produce a good administration."

The quiet crisis in public service demands credible solutions if there is to be the good administration that is the prerequisite for a good government. Some solutions can be found in the style of mutuality that Heclo calls conditional cooperation and in Ingraham and Ban's public service model. If they are right, conditional cooperation and commonality of purpose can improve working relations and general morale in the agencies where they are practiced. Meanwhile, as the roles of the two camps continue to overlap, Aberbach's hybrid model will more firmly establish itself, creating more support for cooperation and mutual respect.

Greater respect between the two camps of political and career executives would yield important benefits for the political, career, and overall agency positions. The political side would see greater facility in recruitment, higher quality, and longer tenure for political appointees. On the career side, improved self-esteem and morale would follow from a renewed sense of the importance and value of public service and acknowledgement of the key role of the career civil service leadership in it. On the agency side, an increase in workforce quality and morale would lead to improved performance, agency esteem, and general credibility, particularly in those agencies that make appropriate use of career expertise in the policy-making arenas.

As discussed in the next two chapters, while George Bush took appropriate steps to restore respect for the career bureaucracy in general, his appointments were not met with rousing cheers. Further, he did not make any moves to reduce the number of political appointees or to reclassify key political positions as career reserved, as the great majority of theorists and studies urge. This task awaits future administrations.

The challenge for the next generation of presidents and political appointees is to create a viable system that is both responsive and competent to meet the nation's needs. How can this be accomplished? The following chapters suggest solutions by answering the identity, qualifications, and intra- and interbureaucratic relationship questions surrounding a particular cohort of presidential appointees, those of the Bush administration. Who they were, what their senses of accomplishment and their reputations were, among their peers and their subordinates as well as within the larger political context, can prove instructive for those who succeed them, both in appointing and in serving.

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7
The Bush Senate-Confirmed Presidential Appointees: Political Hacks or Savvy Politicians?

Who were the presidential appointees of George Bush's administration? What were their basic demographics (gender, race, age, party affiliation, etc.)? How did they achieve their PAS positions? What were the benefits and sacrifices of accepting their jobs? Further, what were the Bush PASs' backgrounds and experience in and knowledge of government? How did their tenure and relations with the White House and with other PASs affect the quality of the PAS workforce? In both categories, identity and qualifications, how did the Bush PASs compare with those who had gone before them, particularly Ronald Reagan's PASs? To what extent is the conventional wisdom about PASs (that they are unqualified political hacks) an accurate characterization of George Bush's appointees?

The data to answer these questions and those posed in subsequent chapters came from three sources: an initial set of interviews with nineteen persons in government, a survey of PASs in the Bush administration that was administered in the summer of 1992 through the auspices of the General Accounting Office, and a series of confidential interviews that was subsequently conducted with PASs (twenty-nine individuals) and others in government (seven). The various interviews are the source of any unattributed quotes used throughout (see the appendixes for the complete survey, survey and interview methodologies, interview questions, and lists of interviewees).

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Identity: Who Were the Bush Appointees?

There were few surprises in the Bush PAS Survey results. In fact, they so closely paralleled the popular image of a senior political official that one could hazard a characterization of the "typical" PAS and probably be right on point. To wit:

The typical Bush PAS in the Bush administration was a white, married, male Republican, aged fifty or older. He was comfortably upper or upper-middle class. He was well educated. His undergraduate degree was in the liberal arts, political science, science, engineering, business, or history. He held at least a master's degree, Ph.D., or law degree. He lived in the larger Washington, D.C., metropolitan area prior to accepting his Bush PAS appointment and had served previously in various levels of government and in at least one of the Reagan administrations. He worked in what might be termed middle management at Executive Level (EL) 3 or 4 in the Bush administration (see table 7.1).

The typical PAS had no or very limited previous experience supervising staff or bearing direct responsibility for budgets over $10 million. Immediately prior to his current PAS service he worked in government at the federal, state, or local level, or in the business sector. After his PAS service he expected to go into the business sector, research, or academia, or to be self-employed, rather than return to government.

He was basically satisfied with most aspects of his job and would continue in it or in another PAS position, should the occasion arise. He was unhappy with the job protections for civil service workers in that he felt unable to dismiss or reassign them easily. However, he was generally well-satisfied with his ability to direct and work with senior career employees.

He thought highly of the responsiveness and competence of his executive colleagues and subordinates, both political and career. He consulted them frequently on all phases of policy from feasibility to implementation, on staff and budget decisions, and on most of his work tasks. He felt he was held accountable for his work to a significant degree. He found working the federal budget process the most difficult of his tasks.

While he took a financial loss to accept his job, he expected a significant gain when he left it. If he were to leave his job prior to the end of the Bush administration, it would probably be to pursue a career opportunity with a higher salary elsewhere, although the stress of his job would factor into any decision to leave early.

He was well-connected to the Republican party and President Bush and knew many other PASs in the administration. He believed recruitment of capable persons to PAS service would be helped by raising salaries

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and by shortening and simplifying the appointment and confirmation process, particularly the White House, FBI, and Senate clearances. The following tables and discussion add detail to the picture of this "typical PAS."

Table 7.1. Who Were the Bush PASs? (in percent)

Age

30-40

41-50

51-60

61-70

71+

Gender

Female

Male

Race/ethnic origin

Caucasian