The President's Call: Executive Leadership From FDR to George Bush (65 page)

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Authors: Judith E. Michaels

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$500,000) to represent Libya in the attack on Pan Am Flight 103, in which 259 passengers and crew members were killed.
2
Tenure and Quality
Because questions of quality are related to length of experience in office, we sought to assess the length of the tenure of Bush PASs. This proved to be impossible without White House assistance, which was not forthcoming. The alternative was to gather that information from the Bush PAS Survey respondents who, since they were still in office, obviously had not completed their tenure. Instead, we focused on tenure-related issues.
However, we encountered considerable difficulty in phrasing a question that would get at those issues for the various classes of executives in the agencies. We settled on two questions that elicited subjective responses, asking PASs, not if tenure were short or long, which proved too difficult to interpret, but rather their assessment of how tenure (of both political and career executives) in their agency impacted the effectiveness of operations there. Contrary to theory and to careerists' widespread conviction, PASs consistently expressed satisfaction with the level of turnover in their agency, with 79 percent saying PAS tenure resulted in "very" or "generally" effective operations; 73 percent said the same for noncareer Senior Executive Service (NSES) members, 79 percent for career SESs (CSES).
When we asked about factors contributing to executive employee turnover we found that many responded "no basis/not applicable," and few reasons were chosen by more than 50 percent of the respondents as having even "some" or a "moderate" impact on tenure. Two factors in particular, interpersonal conflict (52 percent for conflict with other PASs and 53 percent for conflict with NSESs) and stress on personal or family life (PASs' assessment of 57 percent for NSESs), did seem to take their toll on political appointees. PASs cited burnout (50 percent), stress on personal or family life (52 percent), and policy disagreement (62 percent) as major factors in CSES turnover. PAS stress level and the reasons for it are discussed in more depth in chapter 8.
Despite PASs' assertions that they were happy with the degree of turnover in their agency, there was no disagreement among them about the harmful effects of high turnover in the political leadership. As one PAS said, "the viscosity is higher in government due to turnover," it takes longer for agencies to move, to get things done. Additionally, rapid
 
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turnover hurts the agencies because the "time slippage" involved in getting a new secretary and her or his staff on board is repeated when the secretary leaves. As one survey respondent wrote, "By the time political appointees realize that career personnel can be trusted and can in fact be very supportive and loyal, the term of the appointee is over and the cycle begins anew with a new appointee. This way of thinking usually cuts government overall efficiency by 40-60 percent. The government cannot afford this kind of gridlock while the new appointee learns she or he can work with career people."
Another PAS observed, "If the secretary leaves, that is a revolution within the agency. Cabinet government is dictatorship. The departure of the secretary ends the agenda within the agencyit's life and death for the other PASs in the agency. . . . It's less of a problem when lower-level PASs leave; it has less impact on the agency. But when the top leadership goes, everything else grinds to a halt."
Another noted the companion effects of a vacancy at the top. The agency is left without an advocate in the larger political system and with a diminished ability to accomplish its mission: "It leaves a gap, leaves an agency leaderless. The staff can't take on any new initiatives and they lose their access to the external network to get what they need from the White House and the other agencies. An agency needs a political leadernothing can happen in the agency without one."
What causes PASs to leave before the end of an administration? Lack of a promise to stay is a key factor. While Ronald Reagan made no effort to keep his appointees in office, both Jimmy Carter and George Bush asked their appointees to stay for the duration of their terms. Consequently, their appointees stayed longer than did Reagan's. As Frank Hodsoll, deputy for management at OMB, suggested, "Though we don't have involuntary servitude in this country, the White House should make a greater effort at the front end to secure a commitment that the person will stay a reasonable length of time. The greater the responsibility the job carries, the longer should be the time commitment."
The Senate became concerned with the effects of rapid PAS turnover during the Reagan administrations. Senator John Glenn, chair of the Governmental Affairs Committee, was most vocal about this problem. He made a habit of discussing with nominees their tenure expectations during their confirmation hearing and asking them to remain on the job throughout Bush's term.
As discussed above, finances play a part in some PASs' decision to leave early. The reality is that many PASs could (and did) make a great
 
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deal more money outside of government (viz., the 51 percent who made a moderate-to-great financial sacrifice to accept their PAS position). After a while, the stress and workload of political service start to make other offers sound tempting, particularly for middle-aged PASs who have children to educate. As one such PAS said, "Being a political appointee is like being a riverboat gambler, but it's not as easy being a riverboat gambler when you're forty-six and have kids in college." And, as another remarked, "The intensity is wearying. If you try to do the right thing, eventually people will come back to get you."
Gerald Shaw, general counsel for the Senior Executive Association, voiced sympathy with those feelings: "The job requires quite a bit of sacrifice. They [PASs] get ripped to shreds in the policy process. Everything you do is questioned, the media and others assign bad motives, your family is fair game, you face a lowered salary and public scrutiny. . . . This is a democracy where the prevailing view of the way you win is by destroying the other." Or, in the immortal words of President Harry S Truman, "If you want a friend in Washington, get a dog."
One PAS contrasted those new to government service with the in-and-outers who had done it before. The newcomers, particularly those coming from business, get frustrated with not getting their agenda through or with the slow pace of dealing with the bureaucracy. Also, through their work they make contacts that offer them good employment opportunities and it simply makes sense to go when they get a choice offer. They are not especially interested in government service, per se. The true in-and-outers, on the other hand, have less interest over time in "the big bucks" and more interest in the work of government. They stay in longer and are more likely to come back to it than are the "here-and-gone types."
The essentially transient nature of the assignment does not call forth much long-term loyalty. It is simply not a long-term job; as noted previously, the prevailing culture is that PASs
not
let any grass grow under their feet. Further, some people do not really know what they are getting into in PAS positions, or for personal reasons, cannot stay too long, or feel they have accomplished their own goals and it is time to move on. "The good ones moved less in Bush. Of those who left, most did so because their agenda was accomplished, there was no reason to stay," commented one careerist. Ambition drives others to leave who want to capitalize on their experience while it is still worth something on the open market.
This transient quality of political jobs can lead to a variety of problems. One PAS addressed the damage caused by
 
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PASs with no experience in government who want to use it to pursue their own agenda and in a fairly ruthless way. They use people and don't understand how bureaucracy functions. It takes so long to learn that they are gone before they do learn. These are the senior officials who show up at the wrong meeting because they want to control everythingthey gut their whole hierarchy by showing up inappropriately at lower-level meetings and taking over. They don't understand the system.
The most troubled government programs were those with the highest turnover. For example, the General Services Agency had three chiefs from 1987 to 1992. Health and Human Services had twelve assistant secretaries of housing in twelve years (ten in the eight Reagan years) before Secretary Sullivan came on board. His long tenure throughout the Bush administration provided the stability the agency needed to get its work done, partly because it kept the same political leadership in place throughout the agency. Doc Cooke, director for administration and management at the Defense Department and one of the most respected senior careerists, noted various incentives for PASs to leave early: "Some don't really like it that much; those who like it and are good at it get promoted as other vacancies arise; a certain number of them screw up in one way or another and get eased out; people coming from business think they're running a hierarchical line structure and they aren't. A certain number of businessmen never get itthey quit in frustration and blame the bureaucracy."
One PAS believed that turnover in itself was not necessarily bad: "Three and a half years are long enough because of the burnout factor." Echoing another, he continued, "But the gaps are more problematic. While the 'Acting X' is running things everyone's waiting for the real appointee to come. Everything's on hold."
However, as one careerist noted, two problems would arise for PASs if all appointees did stay the entire four years: They would all be out on the job market at the same time. Second, outwaiting the ethics code and conflict of interest strictures means that appointees have a one-year delay before being able to lobby their previous agency. They have to be out early enough in an administration to last that time and be available while their contacts are still worth something, that is, while their president still holds office. Timing, in this case, is everything if Washington's door is to revolve for them. Thus, the law of unintended consequences strikesthe ethics code becomes an inadvertent cause of shortened tenure among appointees.
Near the end of an administration a mix of tenure-related issues is at play. One PAS summed up the sense of things among the PASs late in
 
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what turned out to be the only Bush administration:
At the end of the term in an election year the tension among PASs escalates-for most of them Bush's reelection is life and death. They have to figure out how to protect themselves in a presidential transition. Even if Bush is reelected the secretary may go or may not be reappointed, so lower-level appointees are all anxious. They're trying to find other employment while not undercutting their effectiveness, programs, or boss. The secretary is also playing his cards [close to the vest]: ''We're here to do our job, we came to serve this administration, we serve at the pleasure of the president," he says. Everyone pretends everything's calm but in reality everything's crazy beneath the surface. . . . PASs feel the need to get out while they still have some currency to get another job.
What Would Make for Better Recruitment?
Of the various suggestions offered in the PAS survey for recruitment of highly qualified people to PAS positions, only two were rated as being of "great" or "very great" help by a majority of the survey respondents: 55 percent thought salaries should be raised ("but the public won't buy it," as one said) and 72 percent thought the entire nominations and confirmation process should be simplified. This last was particularly telling, given the frequency of complaints voiced by respondents both in the survey and in the interviews about the length and complexity of the appointment and confirmation process. As noted above, eighty-three days was the mean number of days for confirmation from the time the nomination was received. The Senate study of confirmation delay indicated that the White House was largely responsible for the protracted confirmation process. This was corroborated by the responses of 87 percent that shortening the time it took for the White House clearance would be "somewhat" to "very greatly" helpful in facilitating recruitment of highly qualified people to PAS positions.
3
Interviewees indicated that some parts of the process were in themselves enough to drive people away. The universally disliked FBI clearance, for example, was characterized by one as "horrible," going as it does into all of one's activities since birth, including every address and one's neighbors there, every job, every organization one ever belonged to or gave money to, "from the Chamber of Commerce to Scouts to hospital boards," and every drug (prescribed or illegal) ever taken. Investigators also want to know about every trip out of the country and the traveling

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