The President's Call: Executive Leadership From FDR to George Bush (29 page)

BOOK: The President's Call: Executive Leadership From FDR to George Bush
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Page 88
Johnson seems rarely to have thought about appointments in the abstract. Engaged in the active, daily business of making decisions, he appears to have considered cabinet appointments as means to ends. The ends were the policy directions in which he wished to move. The particular cabinet members selected were those he felt most suited personally and politically to move their departments closer to his goals. Most of those men already in office appeared well suited to provide the necessary leadership. (Ibid., 59)
Party service or even affiliation did not particularly interest Johnson. For example, he did not inquire as to John Gardner's party and only found out he was a Republican after his nomination was announced. The survey of Johnson's political executives "indicated less partisanship among them than among the appointees of previous Democratic administrations" (ibid., 204).
What did matter to Johnson was loyalty to him and his policies. Early on, the primary criterion was the candidate's allegiance to Johnson, as opposed to loyalty to Robert F. Kennedy, JFK's and then Johnson's attorney general. After 1964 the litmus test was fidelity to the Great Society programs and the activist role of the federal government in various policy areas; then it was personal loyalty to Johnson vis-à-vis his critics. Finally, the criterion was the candidate's support of the war in Vietnam (ibid., 204).
As popular discontent with the war grew, recruitment became more difficult; many potential candidates simply did not want to be associated with the war and the administration waging it. After Johnson announced in March 1968 that he would not run for reelection, recruitment from outside government became even more difficult and there was then a tendency to promote from within, to take the closest and most trusted people, or to fill positions on an acting basis (ibid., 31-33).
Nevertheless, Johnson's desire to be remembered as a great domestic president, though foiled by the war, can be seen in the quality and caliber of his appointments. Indeed, his
"system" worked well. Almost without exception, the individuals selected to PAS positions in the Johnson administration were of very high caliber, experienced, and qualified. The Johnson executive group stands up well in comparison with those of Franklin Roosevelt and John Kennedy-although, as we have noted, most of Johnson's cabinet members were originally drafted by Kennedy . . . the end result of the appointments process he developed was a cadre of exceptionally talented in-
 
Page 89
dividuals [committed to] social reform and a mechanism for the amelioration of social ills. There were, finally, also persons of substantial character and high ethical standards who led an administration remarkably free of the scandal, personal pettiness, and adventurism which, unfortunately, came to characterize the presidency that was to follow. (Ibid., 209)
Nixon's personnel staff, determined to establish its own recruiting operation, spurned any guidance from LBJ's outgoing administration. Lack of institutional memory meant that they had to start from scratch and, being fragmented and disorganized, they did not do well, according to Macy et al. (1983).
An early and fundamental problem was the president's personal indifference to and dissociation from the selection process. In this regard, he and Lyndon Johnson were polar opposites. Nixon rarely suggested possible candidates for vacant positions, consistently delegated final selection authority to his chief of staff, and almost never took the time to meet with his nominees before their names were sent to the Senate (Mackenzie 1981, 44). According to some of his personal aides, Nixon possessed a ''consuming desire" to master the government and its servants. It is ironic that Nixon's administration, so intent on controlling the government, was
so poorly organized to do it. . . . Indeed, in some ways the personnel operation interfered with, rather than facilitated, the accomplishment of that objective. By keeping his distance from both the selection process and the nominees it produced, Nixon constrained the ability of his personnel staff to clarify the criteria he deemed most important and lost the opportunity to imbue his new appointees with his own order of priorities and objectives. In the long run, this course of action weakened his administration's efforts to "get control of the government." (Ibid., 45)
The result of Nixon's delegation of authority was that the White House lost much of the initiative and had great difficulty centralizing appointments in a way that supported administration policy objectives.
The combination of an inexperienced personnel staff, ambiguous selection criteria, presidential noninvolvement, conflicts with the departments, and an opposition Congress constituted a nest of trouble for the White House personnel operation. It was soon acknowledged both inside and outside the White House that the personnel function was dysfunctional. (Ibid., 46)

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