other EOP political offices." Nixon had gone so far as to move the OMB director's office into the White House West Wing, giving him the status of presidential assistant. Its directors, George Schultz and Roy Ash, shifted from the "neutral competence" of their former role to active involvement in policy decisions (Newland 1985, 139-40).
|
Soon the OMB director became a key policy player. "Because no president can spend more than a fraction of his own time on management, he must depend in this aspect of his job on the skills and stature of a managerial alter ego. The Director of the Budget, since that office was created, has been the nearest thing to such a person" (Sundquist 1979, 5).
|
While Ford tried to depoliticize the office somewhat, Carter repoliticized OMB, thanks to his interest in budget details and in OMB's executive branch reorganization, and his close personal association with his budget director, Bert Lance. Consequently, OMB fared no better under Carter:
|
| | Every chief executive before Carter at least searched carefully for a director with the special talents and interests required to enable him to master the details of government and to act for the president in monitoring the implementation of governmental programs. Jimmy Carter did not. In appointing Bert Lance, he gave priority to considerations other than capacity for management and became the first president to bring the directorship of OMB within the ambit of home-state cronyism. Then Lance himself, instead of applying himself to learning the job of Management and Budget, became best known as the president's emissary to the business community. [Lance likewise surrounded himself with political appointees several levels down who were equally unschooled and unconcerned with knowledge of the federal government, budget or management.] . . . Of the top 10 political appointees in OMB, only one had worked in the executive branch of the federal government. (Ibid., 5)
|
Reagan raised the stakes by adding more political appointees to OMB, further politicizing the budget function. OMB also suffered self-inflicted wounds in Reagan's first term. Under Budget Director David Stockman, OMB cut back 20 percent of some ten thousand federal regulations and involved the office in lobbying Congress for the passage of the budget for the first time. "As it became more and more embroiled in partisan politics its credibility as the source of objective numbers plummeted" (Hess 1988, 163).
|
Stockman, widely termed brilliant, eventually admitted in an interview with the Atlantic Monthly (August 1981) that even he never really believed the numbers and budgetary projections his office was publishing.
|
|