The President's Call: Executive Leadership From FDR to George Bush (27 page)

BOOK: The President's Call: Executive Leadership From FDR to George Bush
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mined to clean up "that mess in Washington" and "Kennedy was intent on imposing presidential control over 'the feudal barons of the permanent government, entrenched in their domains and fortified by their sense of proprietorship.' Nixon referred to the federal bureaucracy as 'a faceless machine.' Carter gained the presidency as a crusader against Washington, and Reagan insisted that Washington was the problem, not the solution" (ibid., 55).
Theoretically, presidents have far-reaching power to appoint individuals to deal with "the problem" of the federal bureaucracy. But while they are aware of the political capital to be gained from the judicious appointment of several thousand persons, for the most part, time and interest force them to focus chiefly on the high-level positions: "Carter candidly confessed, 'The constant pressure of making lesser appointments was a real headache.' Nixon dealt with lower-ranking appointments exclusively through memoranda, and Reagan passively [went] through the motions of rubber-stamping them" (ibid., 55).
Traditionally, political appointments were filled in this country using the method known affectionately (by some) as "BOGSAT, a bunch of guys sitting around a table asking each other 'Whom do you know?"' (Macy et al. 1983, 27). However, the personnel system has, of necessity, grown in the past several decades with each administration adding incrementally to it.
Truman was the first to set up a personnel section in the White House independent of the party and separate from patronage demands. Eisenhower established the office of special assistant to the president for personnel management and was the first to require FBI clearance for prospective nominees. Kennedy's personnel staff developed a national network of sources and initiated an outreach recruiting operation and eventually compiled a list of potential appointees.
Lyndon Johnson extended the work of his predecessors by institutionalizing modern personnel techniques, introducing the use of computers, and demonstrating the benefits of presidential participation in the system. Nixon aides further professionalized the process through the use of personnel recruitment specialists and sophisticated managerial practices. Ford formally created the White House personnel office and emphasized ethical considerations in the appointments process. Carter formed a nonpartisan nomination commission in a move toward the merit selection of federal judges. Under Reagan, the circle of White House aides involved in the process was expanded, and tighter control was exercised over a broad array of appointments. (Bonafede 1987a, 56-57)
 
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The overall result of these changes, as discussed in chapter 3, was greater centralization of the personnel selection process in the White House, the emergence of the EOP as a command and control center, and the conversion of the appointment power into an instrument of control for the president (ibid., 56-57).
As the personnel selection function expanded, its staff size kept pace with its growing importance:
The recruiting that Dan Fenn was doing [for Kennedy] with three people, Frederic Malek was doing [for Nixon] with 25 to 30 and William Walker with 37 or 38. In 1981 Pendelton James had 100 people on his staff to recruit for the Reagan administration. The rank and access to the president of the chief personnel person [had] also increased, with James holding the title of assistant to the president (Executive Level II) and having an office in the West Wing of the White House. (Pfiffner 1987a, 69)
Nevertheless, the personnel function is still undervalued and no president has fully used this tool so readily at his disposal:
The personnel office is accorded middle-level status. It lacks institutional stability; the process varies from one presidency to another, and it even varies in the zeal and orderliness with which it is conducted within the same administration. Each incoming administration, distrustful of past personnel procedures, feels compelled to reinvent its own system. Few presidents have been willing to lend their prestige to the office. (Bonafede 1987a, 57)
No matter how efficient and proficient the personnel office, then, it will not work to the president's best advantage if he or she does not lend it presidential prestige and communicate staffing priorities clearly to it.
But the freshly minted president may not be in a position to communicate her or his policy desires. New presidents are never prepared for their job.
If he is like most of his predecessors, he probably has a background as a legislator or a governor. If the nation has recently fought in a popular war, he may be a military man. It is possible that he has served as vice president. The odds, however, are great that he has not held an executive position in the federal government. . . . One consequence is that a new president will make some of his most important decisions at a time when he is least capable of deciding wisely. (Hess 1988, 12)

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