The Nuremberg Interviews (66 page)

Family:
Mother died in 1924, at fifty-six, of pneumonia, father died in 1933, at age sixty-one, following a fall from a construction platform on which he was working as carpenter.
No Siblings:
Family history not obtained at this interview beyond a statement that his parents were “very good.”

He has improved somewhat insofar as his depression and appetite but is still rather morose. Today he asked to tell me all about Denmark as he has been thinking about it and feels if I listened to him it “might take my mind off the subject.”

On September 10, 1943, he received a phone call from Office I of the RSHA, in Berlin, to establish a Security Police office in Denmark. He was called to Berlin for instructions. He went to Hamburg to get seventy-five Gestapo men.

On April 9, 1940, Denmark had been occupied by the Germans. The former German ambassador had a conference with the Danish king, who was assured that there would be no launchings from Danish soil by air or sea against England. Germany was not to attack Denmark. The army commander was put in office for all of Denmark, for civilian and economic affairs. Werner Best had a big conflict with Heydrich and Mueller and that was the reason he was assigned to a foreign post.
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Such was the situation until June or August 1943. Meanwhile certain sabotage was being done by the Danes. The punishment of these Danes was in the hands of Danish officials and at the same time the German military police.

In the summer of 1943 sabotage was great, and strikes broke out. Martial law was dictated by the military commander of Denmark. The reason for calling in the German Security Police, said Mildner, was to combat underground organizations, strikes, and sabotage by illegal groups.

Mildner seemed quite content on that score. I asked him if he didn’t
feel the Danes were to be admired for such resistance to Nazism, but he seemed confused by the question. “No. It was wrong. If they didn’t do those things I wouldn’t have had to arrest people, and the later mass arrests, hostages, et cetera, wouldn’t have occurred.” This business of his “blocking” on such questions of values when on the other hand he tried to get out of going to Prague because the Czechs were “a freedom-loving people and would fight” is something to follow up at a later date.

“On September 17, 1943, I got to Denmark. I carried an order with me from Mueller, to arrest Niels Bohr, a famous atomic physicist. He was a Jew or half Jew. That was the reason for the order.” Mildner said he imagined his work was to be different because he had known many Danes in the past fifteen years, including Danish girls. He didn’t know actual Danish conditions, he said. “I knew there might be some resistance but I didn’t want to mix into Danish affairs any more than I had to. Bohr was a Danish citizen and I didn’t like the order Mueller gave me. I was not in Denmark long, but during that time I received an order from Himmler through Best. I had already established a central office of the Security Police in Denmark in the five larger cities. The telegram said that “the evacuation of Danish Jews was to start at once. There were six thousand Jews in Denmark.”

These Jews, said Mildner, were people who had fled Portugal in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and lived in Denmark for hundreds of years. “I was very distressed. I went to Best and asked why the Jews should be evacuated. They kept quiet and did no harm. They were Danish citizens and Denmark was a sovereign state. Best explained that Ribbentrop had spoken to Hitler and said he thought it was best to have the Jews evacuated from Denmark. Ribbentrop was afraid he might be called on the carpet for not having taken any action against the Jews in Denmark.” In other words, Ribbentrop anticipated Hitler’s wishes in this regard. “Yes. That was what Best said. I can say that the reason for the deportation of Jews from Denmark is Ribbentrop. Whether it would have been ordered later by Hitler, I don’t know.” Do you know of any documents in that regard? “No. Best told me. All of us were distressed, Best as well as my coworkers.

“I immediately sent a telegram to Mueller with recommendations that the deportation of Jews of Denmark would cause many misgivings. First because the Jews were quiet politically, and did not appear in any way disturbing. Second, the deportation would have serious consequences
for the German-Danish relationship, because Danish agriculture sent food to Germany and Danish industry also worked for Germany. Then there were the repercussions it would have on the Scandinavians and in North America. I added that all the Danish people object to it. I said in the telegram, too, that it would result in more sabotage and unrest. I requested that the order for deportation be canceled.”

In a few days the order came from Himmler to Best, informing him to proceed with the given order. “Desperate about it, I went to the airport and flew to Berlin. I wanted to see Kaltenbrunner. I actually saw Mueller. I again told Mueller all the misgivings, although I had to omit the humane reasons — I had to use other arguments.” Mueller called his secretary, in Mildner’s presence, and dictated a telegram to Himmler. He wrote all that Mildner told him. “I flew back although Mueller said the cable wouldn’t do much good. I still had some hope. Paul Kanstein was assigned for liaison between Best and the Danish government. Kanstein knew Denmark well. He was very friendly with all the Danish ministers. A meeting was called with Kanstein, Best, and myself present and we decided that all Jews should be warned. If the order had to be carried out, I had no interest that any Jews should fall into our hands. A few days later another cable came from Himmler — to deport the Jews at once. A representative of Eichmann came with two ships and a detachment from Oslo consisting of a battalion of Ordinary Police. One night, October 1, I think, the action began. I spent that evening with Kanstein. In all they seized four to five hundred Jews. They were put on a ship, and I believe went via Oslo to Stettin to Theresienstadt [Czechoslovakia]. The other Jews, who were warned, were hidden by Danes and by night fled to Sweden. There was very lively traffic. One could go by rowboat — the distance was only three kilometers. That was the whole action.
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“There was big excitement in the Führer’s headquarters. Hitler and Himmler were furious and issued orders that all Jewish capital should be confiscated.” Did they blame it on you? “I don’t know. But Himmler was furious at me, and Eichmann was also angry at me and Best. They assumed correctly that the Jews had been warned. Therefore the whole action fell through.” Do you consider it insignificant that four hundred to five hundred Jews were shipped away from their homes? “No. But think of what it could have been.

“In addition, I didn’t arrest Niels Bohr because I didn’t want to arrest Danish scientists. Bohr fled to Sweden. That was long after the Jewish
deportation. From Sweden Bohr went to England, was received by Churchill, and Radio London announced that Bohr decided to give his work to the Allies.

“Then came a cable from Himmler, after Bohr’s visit to Churchill, that the official responsible for Bohr’s escape was to be made accountable at once. Mueller in Berlin gave the order to confiscate the Institute of Physics in Copenhagen. I wrote back that they should send experts from Berlin. This they later did.

“I was about to sign an agreement with the Danish police regarding the increasing Danish sabotage and murder of Germans by Danes. Trains were being derailed. German officers and enlisted men were shot in the back even during the daytime. Dynamite exploded in factories working for Germany. There were wounded and dead. Time bombs went off in restaurants frequented by Germans and Danish girls. Thirty died that way. Every day there were explosions in factories.

“The Danish police did not participate in the prosecution of these people. It was in the hands of the military commission. The prosecution was up to the German military and secret police. People caught were turned over to the army and tried by court-martial.

“I made a pact with the Danish police that they assist in the prosecution of these saboteurs. Everybody then caught by the Danish police could be tried by the Danes themselves. Various parties were intact — not forbidden in Denmark as they were in Norway — and the police agreed to my proposal. If Germany won the war, then amnesty would be given the political prisoners — they would still be prisoners because there is no death penalty in Denmark. If the Allies won the war, people would be released and made heroes.”

General Hermann von Hannekan, army commander in Denmark, had to be consulted about this pact, Mildner continued. His court-martial would have to relinquish the trying of saboteurs caught by the Danish police. “I received permission from Hannekan but I needed Himmler’s approval. That was still in doubt but something else entered the picture in between. Up to that time there was no higher SS or police leader in Denmark. I was under Best. After the Jewish deportation and the increasing sabotage, a cable arrived from Himmler to Best saying: “In order to prevent sabotage and murder by Danes, act immediately with countersabotage.” Best called me, gave me the cable, was upset, feared we might have to take hostages and shoot them as they did in
Norway and France. By doing that Himmler would destroy all of my plans of being friendly with the Danes. My plans included capture of saboteurs and getting them away from the public. Himmler would destroy the cooperation of the Danish police. I immediately sent a cable to Mueller telling him of Himmler’s cable.

“I added to that cable that it was impossible to execute the order with the staff I had, that the cooperation between the German and Danish police would be an illusion, and furthermore be very bad for the name of the German Secret Police in Denmark. The cooperation between my people and the Danish officials was excellent at the time.

“I told Mueller that it would be useless to use countersabotage — that it was just murder.” What did countersabotage mean? “That I shall explain in a moment. It’s very interesting. Whenever a Danish or German businessman who did business with the Germans was murdered, an important Dane should be murdered — at first unofficially; later it became quite official. Or if a Danish factory working for Germany was blown up by sabotage, another factory working only for the Danes should be destroyed.” A crazy idea. “Yes. It was Hitler’s idea, not Himmler’s, I can prove it. And if such was the case, the work of the Security Police in Denmark was finished because there would be continuous murderous activity, blowing up of businesses, and giving the Reich a bad name.

“Mueller agreed that we could not use the Danish officials for countersabotage and agreed to send a detachment from Berlin. I believe it was just one of those spontaneous thoughts of Himmler’s; he gave an order and it had to be executed at once. I thought Himmler might forget all about it.” I understood you to say it was Hitler’s orders. “No. The basic idea of countersabotage was Hitler’s. That is what I meant.

“I didn’t do anything. I knew Guenther Pancke was to come to Copenhagen to be my immediate superior. I decided to wait until Pancke came, and then ask him to go to headquarters and try to talk Himmler out of it. I did nothing. Pancke came in mid-October. He became the highest SS and police chief in Denmark.

“I advised him of the situation. Best was afraid because we had not done anything as yet about countersabotage. I asked Pancke to go to Himmler and he agreed and went in the middle of November. They met in East Prussia, in Rastenburg. Pancke said that Himmler was furious with me and demanded immediate countersabotage with his own staff. I
postponed the whole thing. There was still slight hope something might change.

“An SS and police court had been established for crimes committed in Denmark by Germans. But Pancke opposed my plan of turning over Danish sabotage to Danish police because he was eager to extend the court’s powers to the SS and police courts. While in Berlin, Kaltenbrunner and Mueller agreed to my plan; Pancke, an agent of Himmler, canceled it and induced Himmler to be against it too. The police and SS court was enforced only after I left Denmark in January 1944.

“I just want to add something about Jewish persecution. Every day letters were received from the Danish people protesting the action against Jews, against strikes. One day a telegram came to Pancke that the Danish minister of economics was to be arrested together with his family. I did not even know who this man was or where he was. I wrote back to Himmler via Mueller, which resulted in another cable from Himmler to Best that orders must be executed in Denmark. I learned the Dane was in the Ministry of Economics and had declared that if the Jews were deported, there would be a general strike. I sent back a cable that if we were to arrest this man we must arrest the whole Danish people, because as he thinks, so think the whole Danish people. These things happen like that quite frequently.

“One day I received an order that the Italian consul in Copenhagen should be arrested because he was against Mussolini. By the time I got around to it the consul was in Sweden with everything he owned.” Mildner laughs a bit at this.

“Hitler had a great dislike for the Danes for the following reason: the Danish king had been congratulated by Hitler on his birthday, and the king answered cryptically with ‘Many thanks.’ Hitler was said to have had an attack of rage. And ever since then Hitler hated Denmark.”

The Danish king was never arrested during Mildner’s time there. Also, listening to foreign radio broadcasts was not forbidden, nor was Jewish capital confiscated, until January 1944.

What happened to the property of the four hundred to five hundred Jews deported during your time? “I don’t know.” In other words, actual laws regarding confiscation of Jewish property were not existent during your time? “That’s what it amounts to.”

At the time of declaration of martial law in Denmark, Mildner continued, the Danish army of three thousand men was interned by the Germans
in Denmark. Best and Mildner, he said, tried to have the army released. “Then Himmler had the crazy idea to take the Danish army and force them into the armed SS. Best spoke against the plan.