The Nuremberg Interviews (77 page)

“I used to analyze Hitler’s speeches. I always asked myself, What could Hitler have said? In most cases the only alternative was silence. What else could he have said? So a great many of his speeches were meaningless. If he wanted to make a speech at all, he was forced to say what he did say.”

I asked Schmidt whether he had any contact with Himmler and what his impression of the man had been. “I met him officially only once, at which time I translated for him. He had a meeting with Marshal Antonescu and we discussed police methods. I had no personal impression of Himmler. He was just a background figure as far as I was concerned. I was in the front group.”

Had he ever met Bormann? “Yes, he was a sinister-looking fellow. I believe he was the evil spirit behind the scenes, but I have no personal knowledge of his activities. Bormann was Hess’s successor. He was really the deputy leader, though he was not called that. He was the head of the party secretariat. Bormann was the first man in the party after Hitler.

“In September 1938, there was a meeting at Berchtesgaden between Hitler and Chamberlain. Hitler put forth Germany’s claim to the Sudeten territories. Chamberlain did not agree. There were no Czech representatives. The Czechs were not even invited and were hardly informed. One ally quietly signed away territory belonging to another ally. It was a terrible encouragement to Hitler, who saw the weakness of the Allied situation. France was an ally of Czechoslovakia but also ceded Czech territory through the French prime minister, Daladier.

“There was a meeting at Bad Godesberg seven to ten days after the one at Berchtesgaden. Chamberlain and Hitler met without any other parties present, except myself. The famous Munich Conference of September 29–30, 1938, took place two weeks after Bad Godesberg. The parties met on the basis of the proposition put forth by Mussolini to the French. Mussolini made the initial Munich draft. He saw things more realistically than my own people. That was always so. The Mediterraneans are always greater realists than the people of the north. The fact that war was avoided in 1938 was as much due to Mussolini as to Chamberlain. We Germans had no part in it. Hitler was quite prepared to go to war.

“At Berchtesgaden feelings were strained. The atmosphere improved a little at the Godesberg meeting. At Munich the personal relationships were again strained. But once the agreement had been reached and the famous ‘no more war’ agreement was arranged between Britain and Germany, the atmosphere was better. I thought Chamberlain was very happy to have Hitler sign the paper he had typed and brought along with him from England. Chamberlain was warmly welcomed at Munich. He was the hero of the German people on that occasion. It was definitely Chamberlain who was the idol of the German people in Munich — not Hitler. The German masses gave flowers to Chamberlain. One could see on their faces that they thanked Chamberlain for saving the peace of Europe despite Hitler.

“Hitler didn’t like this show at all. He feared that it would give the impression that the German people were pacifists, which, of course, would be unpardonable in the eyes of the Nazis. Therefore, the Nazis didn’t like this Munich show at all.”

On points of detail when Chamberlain repeatedly raised the issue of Czech property and the proper financial settlements that should be agreed on, Hitler became nervous. But these were comparatively rare occurrences. The Munich agreement as such was certain before it took place. It was practically a certainty as to what would transpire. There was no reason for Hitler to become excited. Hitler always became excited on slight points of detail and not of fundamental points. This time he was exercised about the question of the Sudetenland.

“In January 1939, there was an interview with Colonel Beck, the Polish foreign minister. Hitler hinted that something would have to be done about Danzig. Beck cold-shouldered the proposals of Hitler regarding
the return of Danzig to Germany. Beck did not see eye to eye with us. He said that Danzig was always a part of Poland and that it would be difficult to influence Polish public opinion to agree to changes.

“Beck and the whole Polish government were fascists. They were supposed to be on friendly terms with us for ideological reasons. Pilsudski was held in high esteem in Germany. Certainly Hitler could easily have been made an ally of Poland for ideological reasons.

“Hitler’s idea was to regain German territory and to reincorporate the city of Danzig into the Reich. He resented Poland’s unwillingness to surrender these territories to him. Despite fascist leanings, Beck refused to contemplate a solution of that kind.”

I asked him what sort of a man Beck appeared to be. “He was a sinister-looking chap about forty-five years of age. He was also held in high esteem in Nazi circles. He believed in the ‘strong-hand policy,’ and that was much appreciated in Germany.”

I asked him about Spain’s dictator, Francisco Franco; had he ever met the man? “There was a meeting with Hitler at Hendaye, France, in October 1940. Franco and Hitler talked together for a long time. Between the lines of the conversation Gibraltar was discussed. It was our idea to conquer Gibraltar. Special troops were being trained in fortress warfare. Specialists in taking fortified places were trained near Liège in Belgium. There were new methods of approach and attack, studied with a view to an assault on Gibraltar. Of course, it was necessary to obtain Franco’s consent. As I said, this was one of the subjects of discussion between the lines. The meeting didn’t go well at all.

“In the first place, Franco was hesitating, uncertain; he is of weak character. He obviously played for time. We wanted to precipitate matters as usual. We thought that getting Franco’s consent for the attack on Gibraltar would be a matter of one afternoon and that would be enough — but it wasn’t. Hitler and Franco separated without achieving anything. Hitler was disappointed and so was Franco.”

I asked Schmidt in what way Franco played for time. “He was too cautious. He thought the end of things hadn’t yet come. Franco didn’t want to get too involved with the British. In fact, he said that because of the long Spanish coastline, he might be in a very awkward spot.

“Franco’s brother-in-law came to Berlin. That was, of course, Ramón Serrano Suñer. We offered him large slices of the British colonial empire. But Franco wanted a written guarantee. On the way to Hendaye,
we met Laval. On our way back from Hendaye we met Marshal Pétain. Hitler said that if these deals became known, the French colonial empire and the French fleet would, without doubt, join de Gaulle. So it was resented by Franco. We separated in disappointment and mutual distrust, particularly about the cession of French colonial empire in Africa. Serrano Suñer helped himself to large slices of the French colonies in Africa. In exchange we wanted submarine bases in Fernando Póo and in central Africa. Serrano Suñer also cold-shouldered us, saying that these were old Spanish territories.”

What sort of man was Serrano Suñer? “He was extremely intelligent, a thoroughly fascist man. I heard that he had been minister of police in Spain. He was not very popular in Germany. He was far more intelligent than our foreign minister, Ribbentrop. Serrano Suñer had trouble with his brother-in-law, Franco, and he subsequently resigned his office because he had backed the extremist wing of the Falangist Party, at a time when Franco made some concessions to western powers. Serrano Suñer was too pro-German at that time, which was 1943 to 1944. That was just about the period when Franco sent General Beigbeder to the United States, saying that it was a private trip. Franco wanted to be on good terms with Britain. He sent the duke of Alba as ambassador to England. There was an obvious strain in Spanish-German relations, supposedly on the basis of religious persecution within Germany. However, until it appeared that the Allies were winning and Germany was slipping, Franco was on excellent terms with Hitler and the religious persecutions in Germany didn’t seem to bother him.”

I asked Schmidt to tell me something more about his ex-boss Ribbentrop. “That man always made it a point to speak German, although he spoke English well enough. That was because he imitated Hitler to the last degree. He would say that his reason for speaking German instead of English during conferences with English-speaking representatives was that he wanted to concentrate on the subject in hand, and not on the language. Ribbentrop was a complete imitator of Hitler — even to the design of his cap. Originally he had a nice cap, but then he imitated the stationmaster type of cap preferred by Hitler. Ribbentrop invariably wore a uniform. He invented a special Foreign Office uniform, which was black and double-breasted. Those of us in the Foreign Office looked like admirals. Whenever we went to Italy, they would call us the
ammiragli
, which means ‘admirals’ in Italian. I have a friend on the tribunal
prosecution staff who is a German, formerly in the Foreign Office. He had quarreled with Ribbentrop and was sent to Japan. He was always on friendly terms with the other side. He’s now here in Nuremberg with the British delegation. He has been out of Germany since before the Russian war. We knew several months prior to its occurrence that a war with Russia was planned by Hitler and was imminent.”

How long before the outbreak of the Russian war did you know about it? “About three or four months. We did not know officially because Ribbentrop never told us. In fact, Ribbentrop and Hitler supposed that we didn’t know. But we had our informants.”

I remarked that Ribbentrop claimed that he never knew of the atrocities and of the extermination camps. Did Schmidt think this was so? “To a certain extent it might be true. If he had known, he might have raised objections for international reasons. But that he heard rumors about the exterminations and atrocities is unquestionable. The fact is Ribbentrop was not interested in those things. He was interested mainly, I might say, solely in his personal standing with Hitler. He spent hours and days drafting letters of protest about Goebbels’s interference in his affairs — merely because he was jealous of maintaining his prestige. Ribbentrop had an abnormal desire for rank and position. He wanted personal influence and good standing with Hitler. He did not want anybody to be closer to Hitler than himself. In this way he was unlike Himmler, who, I am convinced, wanted military power. Ribbentrop wanted to satisfy his own vanity. He is a very superficial man.”

I asked Schmidt about his impression of Ribbentrop’s wife. “She played a large part in pushing him. I always avoided her. She suspected everyone of not being respectful enough to her husband. She was socially ambitious. She came from the Henkell champagne family. She was more intelligent than her husband. For example, she expressed more intelligent views on how the English would resist invasion. On that subject she had much more sense than her husband. She said that the English would fight to the last ditch. Ribbentrop on the other hand always described how England was on the brink of collapse. His desire to please Hitler led him to say these things unconsciously even when Hitler was not present.”

Had Schmidt any contact with the economic minister, Funk? “I had a little contact through some economic talks with foreigners. Furthermore, Funk is a reasonable fellow, as quiet and sleepy as he appears in
court. Whereas he doesn’t have any principles, he is not the criminal type. He is a sort of intelligent middle-class man without much principle. Of course, I never knew him when he was at the Propaganda Ministry. It is not difficult to imagine him as the editor of the right-wing
Börsen-Zeitung
. We knew comparatively little of things, which have come out since the beginning of the trial, so I don’t know too much about what has happened in court. I know that Funk plays the piano well, is a type of man who wakes up after midnight, and is the life of any party he attends.”

Had Schmidt any impression of Sauckel? “That man who is responsible for slave labor in Germany does not have my sympathy. I did not like the whole idea of what he did. After all, there are limits to what one can do with foreign populations in the forced labor business. In the first place, the whole idea is completely unproductive. One needs three or four men to watch one compulsory worker. Sauckel deserves the severest punishment. You can see that there were no strong characters surrounding Hitler. There were only weaklings like Ribbentrop, Funk, and so forth. Hitler wanted a silent audience. Even Goering, who superficially gives the appearance of a strong man, was in reality a childlike, weak character who was known as a dope addict in the inner circles.

“I remember one time at Goering’s place, Karin Hall, I happened to be sitting next to the Japanese representative, Yosuke Matsuoka.
²
He said to me, ‘Do you know that Goering is crazy?’ He added that Goering had been in an asylum in Sweden for dope addiction. Matsuoka said, ‘But never mind; they also say that I am crazy.’ Matsuoka was a highly intelligent fellow. He represented Japan in the Manchurian conflict. When I congratulated him on it at the time, he said shrewdly, ‘I was not entirely successful at Geneva because Japan had to leave the League.’

“I happened to be at Geneva at the time when Japan walked out. It was not an impressive exit, as had been calculated. The Japanese walkout from the League took place at the lunch hour and it was a trickle and sort of fell flat.”

I asked him about his feelings toward Russia. Schmidt replied, “I am naturally anti-Russian just as most Germans are. I admire their achievements in industrial fields. I was in Moscow personally. I would not be in favor of the Russian system in the western nations. I don’t condemn the system — I recognize the good results that it has produced in its proper setting. But in order to be Communist, one must be a fanatic. I am very
suspicious of all systems requiring fanaticism. I am convinced that the world would be a better place if people were satisfied with enough to eat and a job to keep them occupied.

“If that problem were solved, there would be no isms. Therefore, the economic problem is the fundamental issue. If the economic problem were solved, the extremists would be unable to disturb the world. Extremism arises only as a result of economic depression. The Russian system requires such a different type of man. It just isn’t dear to my heart. I consider myself a capitalist. Communism and National Socialism are not the same by any means — but they spring from the same sources. If one respects the individual, everything is all right. On the other hand, if the individual is considered but a grain of sand, the system is no good. I am not in favor of such a system. In that respect I am an individualist.