The Modern Middle East (84 page)

69.
F. Gregory Gause,
Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States
(New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994), p. 23.

70.
Ibid., p. 25.

71.
Zahlan,
Making of the Modern Gulf States,
p. 79.

72.
Ibid., p. 88.

73.
Peter Wilson and Douglas Graham,
Saudi Arabia: The Coming Storm
(Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), pp. 20–21.

74.
Nevertheless, princely privileges appear more extensive in Saudi Arabia than in the other Gulf monarchies. The Saudi royal family has a separate satellite telephone network of its own, and all princes receive annual salaries ranging from $200,000 to $500,000. See ibid., pp. 19–22.

75.
Gause,
Oil Monarchies,
pp. 56–57.

76.
Ibid., p. 54.

77.
In 1986, in an attempt to shore up his Islamic credentials, King Fahd dropped the title of “His Majesty” and instead adopted the more humble “Custodian of Islam’s Two Holy Mosques.”

78.
In this respect, in fact, family control over state institutions is far more extensive in Syria than in Jordan.

79.
Omar Bendourou, “Power and Opposition in Morocco,”
Journal of Democracy
7, no. 3 (1996): 110–11.

80.
Ibid., p. 110.

81.
Quoted in ibid., p. 114.

82.
Saad Eddin Ibrahim, “Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World: An Overview,” in Brynen, Korany, and Noble,
Political Liberalization,
vol. 1, pp. 46–47.

83.
For a detailed discussion of the distinctions between “viable” and quasi democracies, see Mehran Kamrava,
Politics and Society in the Developing World,
2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 198–205.

84.
Jeremy Salt, “Turkey’s Military ‘Democracy,’”
Current History
98 (February 1999): 72–78, and Mehran Kamrava, “Military-Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East,”
Political Science Quarterly
115 (Spring 2000): 70–76.

85.
Henri Barkey and Graham Fuller,
Turkey’s Kurdish Question
(Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998), p. 12.

86.
Feroz Ahmad,
The Making of Modern Turkey
(London: Routledge, 1993), p. 12.

87.
Quoted in ibid., p. 181.

88.
Ahmet Evin, “Demilitarization and Civilianization of the Regime,” in
Politics in the Third Turkish Republic,
ed. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 30–32.

89.
Mehran Kamrava, “Pseudo-democratic Politics and Populist Possibilities: The Rise and Demise of Turkey’s Refah Party,”
British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies
25 (November 1998): 288.

90.
Barkey and Fuller,
Turkey’s Kurdish Question,
p. 140.

91.
The 1996 and 1999 elections have shown that the electoral reforms of 1992 have not had their intended consequences of strengthening the prime minister’s hand in dealing with the Knesset. See Gideon Doron and Michael Harris,
Public Policy and Electoral Reform: The Case of Israel
(Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2000), pp. 71–73.

92.
Asher Arian,
The Second Republic: Politics in Israel
(Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1998), p. 266.

93.
Central Bureau of Statistics of Israel,
Statistical Abstract of Israel,
2012, no. 63 (Tel Aviv: Government Publishing House, 2013), pp. 88, 90. Of Arab Israelis, approximately 82 percent are Muslim, 10 percent Christian, and 8 percent Druze. Although Israeli authorities consider the two as members of separate communities, the Druze are actually Muslims with their own ethno-sectarian identity.

94.
Don Peretz and Gideon Doron,
The Government and Politics of Israel,
3rd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), p. 56.

95.
Arian,
Second Republic,
p. 38.

96.
Peretz and Doron,
Government and Politics of Israel,
p. 7.

97.
Arian,
Second Republic,
p. 294.

98.
Ibid., p. 297.

99.
Eva Etzioni-Halvey, “Civil-Military Relations and Democracy: The Case of the Military-Political Elites’ Connection in Israel,”
Armed Forces and Society
22 (Spring 1996): 413.

100.
Tom Najem,
The Collapse and Reconstruction of Lebanon,
Durham Middle East Papers 59 (Durham, NC: University of Durham Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 1998), p. 7.

101.
Charles Winslow,
Lebanon: War and Politics in a Fragmented Society
(London: Routledge, 1996), p. 80.

102.
Arend Lijphart, “Consociational Democracy,”
World Politics
21, no. 2 (1969): 216. See also Arend Lijphart,
Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999), pp. 31–47.

103.
Winslow,
Lebanon,
p. 274.

104.
See Human Rights Watch,
Fatal Strikes: Israel’s Indiscriminate Attacks against Civilians in Lebanon
(New York: Human Rights Watch, 2006).

105.
The phrase “Ministry of Mobilization” was originally used by I. William Zartman, quoted in Ibrahim Karawan, “Political Parties between State Power and Islamist Opposition,” in
Between the State and Islam,
ed. Charles E. Butterworth and I. William Zartman (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 179.

106.
Karawan, “Political Parties,” p. 182.

107.
Timothy Piro, “Liberal Professionals in the Contemporary Arab World,” in Butterworth and Zartman,
Between the State and Islam,
p. 186.

108.
Fouad Ajami,
The Dream Palace of the Arabs: A Generation’s Odyssey
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1998), p. 7.

109.
For an account of these and other Arab intellectuals of their generation, see ibid.

110.
John E. Esposito and John O. Voll,
Makers of Contemporary Islam
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 16–17.

111.
Much of the information contained in this and the following paragraph comes from Esposito and Voll,
Makers of Contemporary Islam.

112.
Suha Taji-Farouki, “Islamic State Theories and Contemporary Realities,” in
Islamic Fundamentalism,
ed. Abdel Salam Sidahmed and Anoushiravan Ehteshami (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), p. 38.

113.
Maha Azzam, “Egypt: The Islamists and the State under Mubarak,” in Salam Sidahmed and Ehteshami,
Islamic Fundamentalism,
p. 111.

114.
Jihad,
which literally means “struggle,” has been given different meanings by observers and practitioners of Islam since the earliest days, with some believing it to connote an inner-self struggle for personal betterment, while others see it as a call to fight Islam’s enemies, and still others take it to mean a combination of both alternatives. As the scholar John Esposito has observed, “There is no single doctrine of jihad that has always and everywhere existed or been universally accepted. Muslim understanding of what is required by the Quran and the practice of the Prophet regarding jihad has changed over time. The doctrine of jihad is not a product of a single authoritative individual
or organization’s interpretation. It is rather a product of diverse individuals and authorities interpreting and applying the principles of sacred texts in specific historical and political contexts.” John Esposito,
Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 64.

8. REPRESSION AND REBELLION

1.
Roger Owen,
The Rise and Fall of Arab Presidents for Life
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), p. 172.

2.
Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany, and Paul Noble, introduction to
Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World,
vol. 1,
Theoretical Perspectives,
ed. Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany, and Paul Noble (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995), p. 19.

3.
Fouad Ajami, “The Sorrows of Egypt: A Tale of Two Men,” in
The New Arab Revolt,
ed. Council on Foreign Relations (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2011), p. 15.

4.
Dina Shehata, “Fall of the Pharaoh: How Hosni Mubarak’s Reign Came to an End,” in Council on Foreign Relations,
New Arab Revolt,
pp. 138–39.

5.
Owen,
Rise and Fall,
p. 6.

6.
Ibid., p. 28.

7.
Saad Eddin Ibrahim, “Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World: An Overview,” in Brynen, Korany, and Noble,
Political Liberalization,
vol. 1, p. 37.

8.
Filipe R. Campante and Davin Chor, “Why Was the Arab World Poised for Revolution? Schooling, Economic Opportunities, and the Arab Spring,”
Journal of Economic Perspectives
26, no. 2 (Spring 2012): 167–68.

9.
Ibid., p. 174.

10.
Jack A. Goldstone, “Understanding the Revolutions of 2011: Weakness and Resilience in Middle Eastern Autocracies,” in Council on Foreign Relations,
New Arab Revolt,
p. 336.

11.
Shibley Telhami, 2011
Annual Arab Public Opinion Survey,
2011,
www.brookings.edu/∼/media/events/2011/11/21%20arab%20public%20opinion/20111121_arab_public_opinion
, p. 56.

12.
Ibid., pp. 57–58.

13.
Azzedine Layachi, “Meanwhile in the Maghreb: Have Algeria and Morocco Avoided North Africa’s Unrests?,” in Council on Foreign Relations,
New Arab Revolt,
p. 217.

14.
Amr Hamzawy, “The Saudi Labyrinth: Is There a Political Opening?,” in
Beyond the Façade: Political Reform in the Arab World,
ed. Marina Ottaway and Julia Choucair-Vizoco (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008), pp. 187–88.

15.
Stephen J. King,
The New Authoritarianism in the Middle East and North Africa
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), pp. 4–5.

16.
Steven Heydemann, “Social Pacts and the Persistence of Authoritarianism in the Middle East,” in
Debating Arab Authoritarianism: Dynamics and Durability in Nondemocratic Regimes,
ed. Oliver Schlumberger (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), p. 22.

17.
Owen,
Rise and Fall,
p. 2.

18.
Ibid., p. 54.

19.
Nathan J. Brown, “Egypt’s Constitutional Ghosts: Deciding the Terms of Cairo’s Democratic Transition,” in Council on Foreign Relations,
New Arab Revolt,
p. 126.

20.
Michele Dunne and Amr Hamzawy, “The Ups and Downs of Political Reform in Egypt,” in Ottaway and Choucair-Vizoco,
Beyond the Façade,
p. 26. For a list of the amendments passed during this time, see pp. 41–42.

21.
Owen,
Rise and Fall,
p. 32.

22.
Michel Penner Angrist, “Morning in Tunisia: The Frustrations of the Arab World Boil Over,” in Council on Foreign Relations,
New Arab Revolt,
p. 76.

23.
Owen,
Rise and Fall,
p. 39.

24.
Ibid., p. 45.

25.
Ibid., p. 35.

26.
Ibid., p. 38.

27.
Michael Broning, “The Sturdy House That Assad Built: Why Damascus Is Not Cairo,” in Council on Foreign Relations,
New Arab Revolt,
p. 202.

28.
Owen,
Rise and Fall,
p. 44.

29.
Goldstone, “Understanding the Revolutions,” p. 335.

30.
Lisa Anderson, “Demystifying the Arab Spring: Parsing the Differences between Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya,” in Council on Foreign Relations,
New Arab Revolt,
p. 322.

31.
Owen,
Rise and Fall,
p. 52.

32.
Ibid., p. 3.

33.
Ibid., pp. 174–75.

34.
Ibid., p. 37.

35.
Ibid., pp. 8–9.

36.
Ibid., p. 61.

37.
Hugh Roberts, “Demilitarizing Algeria,” in Ottaway and Choucair-Vizoco,
Beyond the Façade,
p. 138.

38.
Eric Trager, “Letter from Cairo: The People’s Military in Egypt?,” in Council on Foreign Relations,
New Arab Revolt,
p. 82.

39.
Owen,
Rise and Fall,
p. 67.

40.
Roberts, “Demilitarizing Algeria,” p. 153.

41.
Owen,
Rise and Fall,
p. 39.

42.
Ibid., p. 46.

43.
Ibid., p. 78.

44.
Jean-Pierre Filiu,
The Arab Revolution: Ten Lessons from the Democratic Uprising
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 15.

45.
Joshua Stacher,
Adaptable Autocrats: Regime Power in Egypt and Syria
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), p. 7.

46.
Owen,
Rise and Fall,
p. 51.

47.
Steven A. Cook, “Adrift on the Nile: The Limits of the Opposition in Egypt,” in Council on Foreign Relations,
New Arab Revolt,
p. 64.

48.
Daniela Pioppi, “Privatization of Social Services as a Regime Strategy: The Revival of Islamic Endowments (
Awqaf
) in Egypt,” in Schlumberger,
Debating Arab Authoritarianism,
pp. 129–30.

49.
Ibid., p. 142.

50.
Heydemann, “Social Pacts,” p. 23.

51.
Ibrahim, “Liberalization and Democratization,” p. 47.