The First Clash (15 page)

By the middle of the sixth century BC, this system made Sparta the undisputed military superpower of the Peloponnesus and probably the rest of Greece. It was for this reason that Lydia’s king Croesus sent for Spartan assistance against Cyrus in the early 550s and why the Ionians begged for their support against Cyrus’s Persians and again when they later revolted against Darius and Persian rule. Sparta, with enough concerns at home, refused both entreaties.

Foremost among Spartan concerns were developments 150 miles to their north, in Athens. Throughout the period of Sparta’s rise to dominance in the Peloponnesus, Athenian power was also growing. Athens’s political institutions, however, were developing in a radically different direction
from those of Sparta. Always slow to send its army far from the Peloponnesus, Sparta at first contented itself just with monitoring developments in Athens, though with growing unease. This hands-off policy ended with the rise of a new king, Cleomenes, who possessed a spirit of adventurism not typical of most Spartans. The start of Cleomenes’ kingship marked the beginning of a fresh policy of active Spartan participation and interference outside of the Peloponnesus, particularly in Athenian affairs. Cleomenes himself is a difficult person to portray in much depth, but Herodotus appears to go out of his way to give him the worst press possible:

Herodotus also states that Cleomenes did not rule for long, which is particularly interesting, as the historical record shows Cleomenes actively ruling as king for over thirty years, a remarkably long time for someone on the verge of madness since his coronation. The truth, which can be pieced together from other scattered segments of Herodotus’s account, shows that the true Cleomenes was clever, unprincipled, cunning, ruthless, and determined. During his reign he bribed the Delphi oracle, deposed his fellow co-ruler, outwitted the ephors during a trial for his life, wiped out a generation of Argive manhood in battle, and played kingmaker in Athens.
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It was a truly remarkable career, which, however, came to an inglorious end in the stocks, where he was either murdered or committed suicide.

For Cleomenes, controversy began before he was even born. After many years of marriage, his father, Anaxandridas of the Agiad royal house, had not had a child with his first wife.
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The ephors, concerned for the continuation of the royal line, ordered him to put her aside and take another. In a very un-Spartan move, Anaxandridas took a second wife but refused to divorce the first, so in violation of Spartan law he became a bigamist. This second wife soon gave birth to a son, Cleomenes. However, shortly after this, Anaxandridas’s first wife also had a son, Dorieus, followed by three more sons. When Anaxandridas died in 520 BC, there was a contested succession that Dorieus expected to win based on his performance in the
agoge
and in war. The tradition-bound Spartans, however,
decided that Cleomenes’ claim, as firstborn, was the stronger, and he became king. For Dorieus’s part, he could not abide a Sparta that he did not rule. He and some followers left, and after several failed attempts to establish a new colony, he was killed in battle with the Phoenicians, who did not approve of him causing trouble in their backyard. Even with Dorieus out of the way, Cleomenes was not free to act as he desired, for the unique Spartan constitution called for two kings of equal power ruling simultaneously. One king, descended from the Agiad family line, was considered a bit senior to the other (descended from the Eurypontid family) but had no authority over him beyond that of his own force of personality. In 515 BC, Cleomenes’ co-king, Ariston, died and was replaced by his son Demaratus. For most of Demaratus’s reign, his claim to history consists primarily of his opposition to the policies of Cleomenes, until he was deposed almost on the eve of the Battle of Marathon. Demaratus ended his days in Persian service and accompanied Xerxes’ army for the second invasion of Greece in 480 BC.

When Cleomenes was free to act, he spent much of his time either interfering in Athenian affairs or working to contain the growing power of Argos. In no small measure, his interference in Athenian internal matters greatly influenced and accelerated the growth of democracy. More important from our perspective, his continuous military interventions and threats propelled Athens to develop a military capability that was second to none, not even that of Sparta. Moreover, even his policy toward Argos was to profoundly influence Athens’s ability to resist the coming Persian invasion. When Cleomenes finally tired of Argive insolence, he led a Spartan army that obliterated Argive military power, eliminating the growing threat of Argos allying itself with Persia. In effect, Cleomenes’ thirty years of frenetic activity made the Athenian victory at Marathon possible.

SPARTA VS. ATHENS

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n 527 BC, Pisistratus died peacefully in his bed. He had guided Athens through almost two decades of peace and unrivaled prosperity. His sons, Hippias and Hipparchos, assumed power without any apparent challenge, with Hippias taking the leading role. However, even though Hippias had many of his father’s personal qualities and talents, he found himself contending with a combination of forces that had never coalesced during his father’s reign but were now coming together to his detriment. Moreover, the powerful Alcmaeonidae clan were unceasing in their intrigues to return to Athens.
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For a time, Hippias did prove to be up to the challenge, but when the Alcmaeonidae found a new leader, Cleisthenes (son of Megacles), who was to make common cause with a temperamental and unpredictable Spartan king, Cleomenes, their combined might ended the reign of the Pisistratidae.

Hippias at first pursued the wise and generally peaceful policies of his father. But as Athens’s economic and military power grew, the surrounding cities became increasingly apprehensive. Thebes had already defeated Thessaly and was now looking to expand its power throughout Boeotia. Cities looking to avoid being dragged into Thebes’s orbit could turn only to distant Sparta or nearby Athens, a situation sure to arouse Theban jealousy. Moreover, Corinth and Megara were both reeling economically as expanding Athenian trade began to capture their traditional markets. When both cities entered the Spartan-dominated Peloponnesian League, their concerns became Sparta’s, causing a fraying of Athenian-Spartan relations. In all likelihood, keeping Sparta as a friend would have been difficult for Athens under any circumstances. Growing Athenian power was
sure to spark first the interest and then the jealousy of Sparta. That Athens was simultaneously trying to maintain close relations with Sparta’s sworn enemy Argos further inflamed a deteriorating situation. Fortunately, for the time being, Sparta’s growing wariness of Athens did not translate into immediate military action. Conservative Sparta, as always, remained slow to act, but that hesitation was ending now that Cleomenes had become king of Sparta.

The first opportunity for Sparta to make trouble for Athens came in 519 BC. Plataea, a small city-state just north of Attica and on the southern edge of Boeotia, came under heavy pressure to submit to Thebes’s rule. In its search for a powerful ally, Plataea first turned to Sparta. For the Spartans, an invitation to expand their writ north of the Peloponnesus must have been tempting. Only the certainty of perpetual Theban enmity, which might become the basis of an effective anti-Spartan alliance with Athens and Thessaly, deterred it from making the deal. Acting with a cunning not typically expected of a Spartan, King Cleomenes advised the Plataeans to seek help from Athens, which being much closer to them could come to their support in a timelier manner.

The Plataeans took this advice, and the Athenians in turn offered them their protection. In a stroke, Cleomenes had placed his two most dangerous potential enemies (Athens and Thebes) at each other’s throats. Predictably, upon hearing news of the new alliance, Theban hoplites immediately set out to conquer Plataea. The Athenians, their policy of peace at all costs now ended, marched to meet them. Before hostilities began, Corinth tried to mediate a settlement. The Corinthian mediators decided that Thebes should not coerce any city into its budding Boeotian League. Thinking the matter resolved, the Athenian army began marching for home. However, the Corinthian decision did not sit well with the Thebans, and they opted to roll the die and try to overturn the verdict through force of arms. Despite being surprised by the sudden Theban attack, the Athenians won the battle decisively enough to extend their borders into Boeotia.
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Unfortunately, this is all that Herodotus tells us of this affair. However, military historians can draw information from these scanty details of the battle that is critical to our full understanding of the Battle of Marathon. First and foremost, this attack wedded the Plataeans to Athens and accounts for the fact that they sent one thousand hoplites to fight beside the Athenians at Marathon. Just as interesting is that this is the first proof that Athenian hoplites had lost little, if any, of their military effectiveness in
the years since the war with Megara and the long peace of Pisistratus. The Theban army was not a force that was easy to dismiss or vanquish. It must be noted that just the year before this battle, Thebes had decisively defeated Thessaly, previously the strongest power in Greece, at the Battle of Ceressus.
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That the Athenians could administer such a thorough beating after being caught by surprise speaks highly of their discipline and martial prowess. Moreover, this battle took place twenty-nine years (or less) before Marathon. So a twenty-year-old hoplite fighting in his first battle would not yet have been fifty at the time of Marathon. As a Greek citizen was liable for military service until age sixty, one can assume that some veterans of this battle were still in the fighting line at Marathon. At the very least, most of the Greek generals at Marathon, including the polemarch (the overall commander), were almost certainly present. Commanders with thirty years’ experience in war surely must have provided a steadying influence at Marathon. This is also the first, but far from the last, indication we have that the Athenian army was not exactly the force of unprofessional farmers of legend.

For the moment, Athens had come out ahead, and Cleomenes’ first attempt to cause trouble by helping to tie it to Plataea had backfired. But in the long term, Hippias had made a fatal mistake. For Thebes, which had supported his father in his bid to return to power, was now a mortal enemy. Within months of being forced to withdraw their claims on Plataea, the Thebans opened their territory for the Alcmaeonidae to use as a base of operations. From here, the new head of the clan, the clever and determined Cleisthenes, gathered his forces and bided his time.

In 514 BC, an attempted assassination changed the character and nature of Hippias’s regime and was to precipitate its eventual downfall. One of two homosexual lovers, Harmodius or Aristogeiton, had suffered an insult from Hippias’s brother, Hipparchus, and determined to kill the tyrants. The two lovers chose the Great Panathenaic Festival for the murders, as during this festival Athenians appeared at the Acropolis fully armed. Moreover, they hoped that the mob would rise up in support and defend them from the wrath of Hippias’s mercenaries. Only a few people were brought into the plot, but on the morning of the festival one of them was seen talking with Hippias. Believing their plan had been betrayed, the lovers ran from Hippias’s location to find his brother, whom they murdered. Alarmed, Hippias moved rapidly in the face of this crisis. Harmodius was killed on the spot, but Aristogeiton was taken prisoner and later put to death. More critically, Hippias took the opportunity to disarm the
Athenians. Presumably, this was done by the many mercenaries in his employ. However, there is no indication that the Athenians resisted this move. For the time being, Athens was without a citizens’ army of hoplites.

Embittered and increasingly paranoid after the murder of his brother, Hippias became despotic and malevolent. He ordered the execution of many citizens on the slimmest suspicion. Furthermore, he began raising taxes to exorbitant levels to pay for the mass of mercenaries he believed necessary to prop up his rule. All the time, the Alcmaeonidae clan was waiting, and it was not long before Cleisthenes judged the moment right for his clan’s return. He ordered an armed incursion from their Theban base into Attica, and they established themselves in a fortified outpost near the frontier, at Leipsydrion near Paionia.
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Presumably, they were hoping this would be enough of a catalyst to prompt a general uprising. But Cleisthenes had mistimed his adventure. The disarmed Athenians were not yet ready to risk all to depose a tyrant who was protected by a multitude of mercenaries. Moreover, Hippias, acting with his normal alacrity, sent his men against the Alcmaeonidae and inflicted a severe defeat on them. Chastised, Cleisthenes led his small army back into Thebes and began a new intrigue that was to prove more successful.
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