The First Clash (18 page)

The most remarkable thing we note upon returning to Athens in the immediate aftermath of the defeat of Thebes is that Cleisthenes disappears from the pages of history. Historians have often remarked on a very weak tradition that he was a victim of ostracism and died in exile, while others note that he died of old age (he was about sixty-four). I discount these traditions as Pausanias, in his description of Greece, mentions he saw Cleisthenes’ tomb among Athens’s honored war dead.
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There is no reason to doubt this, as many of the tombs of the period were undisturbed when Pausanias visited the location in the second century AD.
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It is therefore likely that he was killed during the war with Chalcis and Thebes, for if he had survived these engagements, it is doubtful Herodotus would have failed to mention him again.
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With or without Cleisthenes, the war with Thebes and the rest of their Boeotian allies continued, despite their shattering defeat in battle. In 506 BC, the Thebans asked the Aeginetans, longstanding enemies of Athens, for assistance but received only sacred images
that were supposed to aid them in battle. Inspired by the images, the Theban army with its Boeotian allies marched once more against Athens. Again, Herodotus presents us with no details except to say that the Thebans were roughly handled. Disappointed with the mystical powers of the images, the Thebans returned them and asked Aegina for more practical support.

In answer, the Aeginetans sent their fleet against the Attic coast, burning the Athenian port at Phaleron to the ground and damaging many coastal demes. Before deciding on how to respond to this “unheralded war,” the Athenians consulted the Delphic oracle and were told to wait thirty years before avenging themselves on Aegina. They were further informed that they might win if they attacked before that time, but only after a long war and much suffering. The oracle’s answer was not to Athens’s liking, and it immediately began preparing to inflict vengeance upon Aegina. Preparations were well along when word came that Sparta was once again preparing for war, and Athens turned from Aegina to face its most dangerous enemy.

Herodotus relates that the Spartans had only recently learned that Cleisthenes had bribed the Delphic oracle to convince the Spartans to march against their good friend Hippias. This, however, is likely another fabrication presented to justify Sparta’s intention to pursue an offensive war. For as was already noted, Sparta maintained extremely close relations with the priestesses at Delphi, and it is implausible that leading Spartans would not have known of these bribes at the time. Assumedly, Cleomenes, still burning with the humiliation of his surrender at the Acropolis and now with a failed previous campaign against Athens, was using the claim as propaganda to stir up the Spartans and Peloponnesian masses. Moreover, many other leading Spartans were beginning to see that a powerful democratic Athens was not in their best interest, and they conveniently forgot what Hippias had done to anger them in the first place. Sparta, apparently without Cleomenes taking the lead, asked Hippias to leave Sigeum and join them for a conference of the Peloponnesian League. As far as Sparta and Cleomenes were concerned, the conference was a failure, as once again the Corinthians took the lead in opposing plans to attack Athens. So another threat to Athens dissolved.

It needs to be noted that Athens had just won another major battle against Thebes and was preparing, with great confidence, for war with Aegina. Furthermore, they turned from this plan to prepare for war with Sparta without any indication of the fear such an encounter had filled
them with the previous year, when Cleisthenes was so worried that he sent for Persian help. For all practical purposes, Athens, during this period, was just as much a nation in arms as Sparta. Herodotus attributes the wondrous improvement in Athens’s fighting capabilities to democracy, telling us that men fight harder and better for themselves than they will for any tyrant. For the more practically minded, the improvements could be accounted for by increased training and superb generalship.

Hippias did make one final plea before the Peloponnesian allies, asking them to come to his aid and return him to Athens. When the plea fell on deaf ears, he gave up and returned to Sigeum. Soon afterward, though, he traveled to Sardis and enlisted the support of the satrap, Artaphrenes, in his quest to return to Athens as its tyrant. Athens, upon hearing that Hippias was at Sardis, sent its own envoys to Artaphrenes to request that he ignore the supplicant. Instead, the envoys were told to accept Hippias back or prepare to suffer Persian wrath. When the envoys returned, the request was summarily dismissed and Athens became an enemy of the Persian Empire.

It was at this juncture that an Ionian Greek named Aristagoras arrived in Athens asking for support for the Ionian revolt then racking the Persian Empire. The angry Athenians, despite the Spartans’ having turned Aristagoras away, offered to help, and soon thereafter they boarded hoplites on twenty ships and sailed to confront the awesome might of Persia.

PRELIMINARY MOVES

PERSIA’S RETURN TO WAR

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n 513 BC, Darius the “shopkeeper” returned to his true avocation—war. By doing so, he brought a halt to Persia’s economic expansion, almost lost Persia’s main field army, and set in motion the tide of events that would lead to war with Greece just two decades later. Historians have long debated what was behind Darius’s invasion first of Thrace and then, more disastrously, of Scythia. The best explanation is that Darius had long looked toward the west as the next arena for Persian expansion. Now, with the empire’s internal affairs finally settled and its other borders secured, it was time to prove he was every bit the conqueror Cyrus was. Moreover, Darius probably viewed Thrace as a secure base in Europe to support further Persian expansion to the west. Once Thrace was conquered, the march into Scythia seems a typical example of the mission creep that has found its way into almost every victorious campaign in history.

After crossing into Europe, Darius sent his fleet, almost all of it impressed from the Greek cities of Ionia, along the western coast of the Black Sea to the Danube River. Once there, the fleet sailed upriver for two days and constructed a bridge at the mouth of the Danube delta, where it waited for the arrival of the army. The tribes of southern Thrace, awed by the size of the Persian army, offered no resistance, and Darius’s easy victories must have greatly encouraged him and his army. Only when they approached the Danube did they encounter the first serious resistance from the Getae. Of this tribe, Herodotus relates:

With the Getae crushed, the Persian army crossed the Danube into Scythia.

Unfortunately, it is almost impossible to give more than the barest sketch of events that took place after Darius crossed the Danube into Scythian territory. To an even greater extent than is typical for most major events in ancient history, the course of the Scythian invasion is lost to us. What is absolutely known is that the expedition was a near disaster.

As his army marched away from the Danube, Darius left the Greek crews behind with their ships. Although Herodotus does not mention any Persian force being left behind, I find it unlikely that Darius would have marched off without leaving a loyal Persian force at the bridgehead to guard his baggage, protect the bridge, and keep a wary eye on the Greeks. It is almost inconceivable that a commander of Darius’s proven ability would have left his base solely in the hands of the Greeks, the most unreliable element of his army.

The Scythians, alerted to a large army marching through Thrace, had plenty of time to mobilize a hot welcome for the Persians, who were probably overconfident after the easy destruction of Getae military power. Darius was probably caught by surprise at the size of the force the Scythians mobilized against him, the extent to which they had denuded the territory, and their elusiveness. Harried from the start by horse archers who could outrange his best bowmen, unable to gather supplies, and incapable of bringing his opponent to battle, Darius stubbornly persevered in his aim until he was threatened with his own annihilation.

It was at this point that one of the most important events in Herodotus’s history takes place. With Darius’s army in trouble on the north side of the Danube, a large Scythian cavalry force approached the bridgehead and bade the Greeks destroy the bridge, return to Ionia, and raise the banner of revolt. The Greeks were further informed that Darius and the Persians would be dealt with so that they could never make war on them again. According to Herodotus’s version of events, the Greeks held a conference to discuss the proposal, whereupon Miltiades of Athens, who was then the tyrant of the Hellespontine Chersonese, initially persuaded most of the other Greeks to destroy the bridge. However, he was opposed by Histiaios, tyrant of Miletus. Histiaios reminded each of the Greek commanders
that they were all tyrants of their own cities and held their grasp of power only through the support of Persian arms. If the Persians were overthrown, Histiaios told them, they would all be deposed. With their own best interest in mind, the Greeks voted to hold the bridge, although they did remove the portion within bow shot of the north shore. Disgusted, the Scythians departed, judging

Eventually, Darius and his haggard army reached the Danube. In the darkness, he was unable to see that only a portion of the bridge had been disassembled. With the Scythians closing in, there were a few panicked minutes before he realized the Greeks were still there and the bridge was being extended back to the north shore.

What makes this story important is that it is the first time Herodotus calls our full attention to Miltiades, who was later heralded as Athens’s savior and served as a senior commander against the Persian army at Marathon. As we will see, upon his much later return to Athens, Miltiades was put on trial for his life, accused of being a tyrant and a supporter of the Persian king. The keystone of his defense was the claim that he had been the only Greek to advocate destroying the Danube bridge and therefore to leave the Persian army and its king to face certain destruction. It was a strong defense at the time and helped him pull off a surprise acquittal.

Historians have long puzzled over the truthfulness of Miltiades’ account. How likely was it that he could have advocated stranding the Great King and then survived in power for almost another decade? One would assume such a traitor would have felt Darius’s wrath soon after the king had returned to safety. This alone is sufficient reason to doubt Herodotus’s account of what took place at the bridge and to believe instead that it is a fabrication Miltiades crafted to secure his acquittal.
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Most likely Miltiades fully supported the decision to hold the bridge for Darius. Word must certainly have reached the Greeks that Darius was in trouble somewhere deep in the Scythian hinterland. This news must have stirred the camp with excitement, and there were likely enough Greeks present to overpower whatever Persians Darius had left behind, although they could not be certain of success. The revolts of the Greek cities near
the Bosporus, including Byzantium and Chalcedon, attest to the fact that news of the Persian army having met some kind of disaster in Scythia was spreading rapidly throughout the empire. It is unlikely these cities would have considered such a course if they feared the Persian army was still intact in nearby Thrace. However, the Greeks on the Danube lost nothing by staying in place a bit longer and risked much by sailing away. In the end, practical, selfish concerns won out and they stayed.

Several points of evidence lead us to conclude that Miltiades was lying at his trial. First, upon his return, Darius appeared to have been in a hurry to show himself alive and well in the heart of the empire. As the revolt in the Bosporus made it impossible to return by the most practical route, he instead crossed the Hellespont at Sestos, in the heart of Miltiades’ domain. Darius, who returned to his western capital, Sardis, with only a small bodyguard, surely would not have been able to move through Miltiades’ territory if his loyalty had been in doubt. Moreover, there were no Greek tyrants of this era who did not have enemies, and Miltiades had more than his share. In fact, some of his foremost rivals were at the bridgehead with him. If Miltiades had campaigned publicly for the destruction of the bridge, it would surely have come to Darius’s attention. Given Darius’s proven ruthlessness to his enemies, one would expect Miltiades’ well-being to have suffered dramatically soon after Darius’s return to the heart of his empire. Instead, Miltiades was soon back at the Chersonese, resuming his role as tyrant. Here he remained for at least the next fifteen years, a loyal supplicant of the Great King.