The First Clash (29 page)

Datis needed a quick decision or he would be forced to withdraw in defeat. Callimachus knew this, of course, so it is fair to wonder if he smiled as he considered the possibilities. If the Persians advanced for a decisive fight, they would find his army arrayed in a fortified position, on ground of his choosing. If Datis ordered a withdrawal, there would be a moment when they would have some troops loaded and others milling on shore. The same chaos that reigned on landing would repeat itself as the Persians boarded their ships over an open beach. In that moment of vulnerability, Callimachus would order the phalanx forward. In the meantime, the Athenians could train, prepare, and await the Spartans.

The Athenian army marched along the south road to Marathon, through Pallene, and skirting the south side of Mount Pentelicus, to enter the plain from the southeast. There was a second route that went through the hills to the north of Pentelicus and entered the plain from the west, at the village of Varna.
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However, this second road was little more than a shepherd’s path and unsuitable for the movement of a major army or its logistics. Upon arrival at the base of the plain, the Athenians made camp
in the sanctuary of Herakles. Here they were joined by a thousand Plataean hoplites. The site the Athenians had chosen was a strong one. The sanctuary possessed an extensive grove, and in ancient times the surrounding area was still heavily wooded. There is also evidence that there was a wall on the site, but this is not likely to have been extensive. Taken as a whole, though, the site provided excellent protection against cavalry and was easily defensible against infantry.
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Before them stretched the Plain of Marathon and the Persian army. All around the plain were hills of sufficient size to hem in the Persians, even if they were not strongly outposted with Athenian hoplites. The Chardra River (a large stream, really) bisected the plain, and the northern half was dominated by the Great Marsh, which was almost impassable for any significant force. At the northern edge of the marsh, the Kynosoura peninsula stuck out at ninety degrees from the beach, providing a perfect shelter for the Persian fleets beached along a narrow strip of sand between the sea and the Great Marsh. Between the marsh and the Athenian position was an almost barren plain, with some sparse tree growth at points.

Herodotus tells us of the Athenians’ arrival at Marathon but leaves us guessing as to what they did at that point. We do know that several days went by without either side engaging. But from Herodotus it would seem that the only notable event during that period was a debate among the ten tribal generals and Callimachus, the overall Athenian commander, on the advisability of attacking at all. In Herodotus’s account, each of the ten Athenian generals had command for one day on a rotating basis. As far as he was concerned, Callimachus’s role as polemarch was mostly honorary, and he had no more authority than any of the other generals. I strongly contest the accuracy of this viewpoint.

Herodotus relates the dispute among these generals:

The ten generals remained evenly divided on the matter, so Miltiades asked Callimachus to make the tie-breaking vote. Herodotus has him do this through a fine piece of oratory that convinced Callimachus to vote for battle:

After this, the four generals who supported Miltiades handed over to him the days they were to command the army so he could attack when he pleased. Miltiades accepted the extra command days, but Herodotus reports that he did not launch the attack until it was his day to command.
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There are a number of good reasons to disbelieve Herodotus’s account. First off, Herodotus states, incorrectly, that the Athenians selected the polemarch by lot. He probably assumed this was the case from later Athenian practices and the fact that there was a council of generals who ran military matters in Athens during peacetime.
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However, in 490 BC, the assembly still elected the polemarch, and once appointed, he was the commander in chief. As noted earlier, in this dire hour the assembly would naturally have turned to a man of proven combat experience, and they certainly wanted a man who had won battles for them in the past. As Herodotus never gives us the name of the man who defeated the Thebans, the Chalcidians, and the Aeginetans and stood down a Spartan army, we can only guess at possibilities. Assuming the Athenians possessed one whit of common sense, which they most assuredly did, they would have turned to this man now.
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So Callimachus was not just a man of some political importance. He was also a soldier and general of no small repute. As such, he would have commanded the respect of the other generals present as well as that of the army.

One would also suspect that the decision to fight had already been made in Athens, and this was confirmed when the army marched. Therefore it was unnecessary to have this discussion at Marathon. It is much more likely that the debate was over how to engage and not whether to engage. Some have argued that the Athenians were stunned by the size of the Persian force and began reconsidering their decision to fight. This is unlikely to be the case, as the Athenians would have already received numerous reports about the size of the Persian force all during their advance across the Aegean and particularly when they were camped on nearby Eretria. In fact, based on the long history of reports on the size of enemy forces since the beginning of warfare, these reports were probably greatly inflated. If anything, the Athenians were probably surprised to find fewer Persians at Marathon than they had feared. Besides, the Athenian army at
Marathon had previously stood down a Peloponnesian force that greatly outnumbered it and was filled with dreaded Spartan warriors. Why would the Athenians turn coward now?

So what are we to make of Herodotus’s version? First, no army places ten generals in charge. Based on the workings of almost every army in history, what Herodotus presents is a “council of war” empowered to give advice but not to command. Callimachus may have asked their advice, as many commanders throughout history have done, but the power to decide was his alone. The Athenian generals, upon their arrival at Marathon, had much to take in and debate. However, whether to fight or not was not among the decisions they were called on to make. The Athenians had already made that decision, and if tradition is correct, Miltiades may have been instrumental in getting the assembly to commit to battle. One might also note that conducting a withdrawal in the face of a superior and unbroken enemy is the most difficult of all military operations. If the Persians caught the Athenian army in a state of disorder (as happens to almost all withdrawing armies) on the Attic plain, they would have annihilated it.

The Athenians had come to fight. What they did not yet know was how or when to attack. It is here that Miltiades was instrumental, as he was the only one who could lay claim to having experience in dealing with a Persian army. That Callimachus was willing to listen to his advice is to his credit, but it is also no less than what is expected of a first-rate commander.
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There is one strong piece of evidence from the period that supports the contention that Callimachus was the supreme leader and true hero of the battle. In 490 BC, the Athenians erected a memorial to Callimachus on top of the Acropolis, a high honor indeed. They never did that for Miltiades, who was then languishing close to death in prison.
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The inscription:

At least in 490 BC, the Athenians had no doubt as to who was in command, who distinguished himself in heroic combat, and who led them to victory. It is unfortunate that Callimachus died on the Marathon battlefield
and was not present to protect his reputation and place in history. Unfortunately for history, a generation of Philaidae propaganda and the unceasing toil of Cimon (Miltiades’ son) to resurrect his father’s reputation took their toll on the truth about Marathon.

As for the other generals turning over their days of command to Miltiades, the most logical explanation is that although Callimachus commanded, the other ten generals rotated as something approaching the modern concept of officer of the day. In that position, they would have been responsible for ensuring the accomplishment of the camp’s daily activities, including training and mustering the force for the probable daily show of force. As only Miltiades had experience with the Persians, his advice on battle tactics and how best to train for fighting a Persian army would prove critical to success. It was therefore efficient to place Miltiades in charge of training and preparations for successive days. In fact, he may have been thought of as a chief of staff or deputy commander under Callimachus.

This also helps to explain why the Athenians delayed in launching their attack upon their arrival at Marathon. Of course, the primary reason was that the Spartans had promised to come to their aid. There was no reason to go it alone if by waiting just a few days there was a chance you could have a few thousand murderous Spartans pitch in with you. But waiting did not mean the Athenians were idle, as has been assumed by many historians.

It is a mistake to assume that because Herodotus does not tell us what the Athenian army was doing during this delay, it was doing nothing. Armies that sit idle quickly lose their edge. No competent commander would have allowed the Athenian hoplites to lie about, thinking and worrying. Besides, it should never be forgotten that this was a veteran army that knew what had to be done and what its commanders expected of it. Upon their arrival, the Athenians would have established a camp and probably fortified it. This more than anything else accounts for why the Persians did not move to the attack themselves. Coming straight at a phalanx would have been a dangerous enough proposition without having to deal with a fortified position at the same time.

Furthermore, each morning the hoplites would have mustered for battle in front of the camp. At the least, this was an important psychological device to build confidence and show the Persians that the Greeks did not fear them. The Persians would have done the same thing, and for long hours both sides would have stood there throwing taunts at each other,
building up their courage, and baking in the hot sun. But these displays also paid an important dividend to the Persians. They removed all guesswork about how the Athenians would attack. Ten thousand hoplites of nonvarying quality would form up in a dense formation and come straight at them. It appears odd, then, that the Persians were so unprepared to meet the charge. But despite what knowledge Miltiades could supply, there was still much about the Persians the Athenians did not know.
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But they were learning.

One pictures Callimachus, with Miltiades at his side, watching each day as the Persians assembled. Callimachus’s practiced eye would have taken in much. He would have noticed the Persians always aligned themselves in the same order with their best troops, the Persians and Saka, always in the center. He would have watched for where the cavalry deployed. He would have seen that some units were slower than others to get into formation and which ones lacked the discipline to stand fast in the line as they stood in the hot August sun. He could not have missed that enemy units farther away from the elite center were decidedly less disciplined. He saw what others missed.

The Persian flanks were weak and unsure.

A plan began to form in Callimachus’s mind. The old general, the polemarch of Athens, knew how to defeat the Persian army.

THE DAY BEFORE

D
atis could not wait any longer. After five days, he was out of food, and conditions in the camp were becoming intolerable. He probably considered attacking the Greek position, but it must have been a daunting prospect. Every day he could see the Greeks assembled in front of their camp, their shields glistening and spears bristling, daring him to attack. But as he studied the ten thousand disciplined hoplites massed behind fallen trees, with thousands of light troops crowded behind them, he always thought better of it. Without a large body of reliable heavy infantry, he simply had no way of pushing the Greeks out of their fortifications. If only he could do something to make the Greeks march out into the plain and attack him, where away from their protective cover they would be easy prey for his archers. Unfortunately for Datis, the Athenians had not yet shown any tendency toward suicide.