The Burden of Power: Countdown to Iraq - The Alastair Campbell Diaries (95 page)

The most important thing for TB was to communicate to the Iraqis that we would see this through, that they would benefit from the fall of Saddam. But we should not expect them to welcome with open arms, because they will find it hard to believe the Saddam era is ending. We were doing OK with public opinion in our own country, but we were nowhere in Iraq. Reith said we had to separate regime from people, and that meant taking out his media. The march on Baghdad was going OK, but they expected a lot more fighting. Our forces were busy in the Western Desert dealing with his Scud facilities to prevent them trying to draw Israel in. West went through the navy role and said [trained] dolphins were being used in minesweeping. Back at Number 10, TB was clear it was going to take longer than anticipated. Shock and awe had not really happened. So we had taken the political hit of a stupid piece of terminology, and then not actually had the military benefits. He felt reassured by the expertise of our military.

More delay in Basra. War Cabinet was awful. C told me later he found the whole thing ridiculous, and it was. It was necessary to involve
the key ministers and keep them up to speed with everything, but the nature of the discussion did not inspire confidence. Clare blathered away, DB was a bit better today, whilst JR did come over a bit as an armchair general. The truth was we were not totally clear about the picture out there. TB had a bilateral with JP, who said Clare’s behaviour at these meetings was intolerable and he should not put up with her for too long. TB never quite agreed with us on that and he had another meeting with her later, going out of his way to keep her involved and on board, as much as she ever would be. His concern at the moment was that there might be more support for Saddam than we thought, and that explained the level of resistance. Then later, when a bomb hit a Baghdad market, and the Iraqis started to pump out pictures of it, we were looking a bit shaky.

I was doing an email exchange with Dan on the visit, and it was clear Bush was pissed off at the
FT
story suggesting TB would press him for a bigger UN role. They were sensitive to the idea that TB was shaping their strategy, which was understandable. TB asked me to send a message back that this was our media seeking to open divisions. We knew of a Rumsfeld memo to Bush saying that TB would demand a bigger role for the UN, but that they should resist. Jack said Powell was on our side in this, and was trying to put a halt to the neoconservative stuff. TB’s worry was the military campaign. He felt the Americans lacked the absolute single-mindedness needed to get the job done quickly. He said it was beginning to remind him of Kosovo. As we headed to the airport, the market attack was really taking off as a media and political issue, though there were suggestions the Iraqis may have been involved themselves.

TB was working on a long note for Bush on the plane, and I left him to it and had a long chat with Jack, going through all the difficult areas. He was worried just how far out on a limb TB was pushing himself, but was still totally on board for where we were. The main message in TB’s note, when you boiled it down, was that there was a lot of support for the aims of the campaign, and we totally believed the policy was right, but there was real concern at the way the US put over their views and intentions, and that rested in people’s fears about their perceived unilateralism. He was urging him to do more to rebuild with Germany, then Russia, then France, and saying he should seize the moment for a new global agenda, one to unite the world rather than divide it. A distorted view of the US was clouding everything – look at how much cynicism there was at their efforts in the Middle East. We had to break that down. Why had Mexico and Chile gone the other way? Why did so much of Europe?

In the end he wrote a twelve-page note that was both subtle and blunt at the same time. It was a good piece of work and if Bush took it on board would have a good effect. But he still had his own internal battles to deal with. I didn’t really feel Bush had the will to deliver on this new international agenda TB was talking about, but we would see.

We landed in pretty miserable weather conditions, then flew down to Camp David, Bush seemed more nervous than usual, and it came out in that over-cockiness that sometimes spills out. ‘We’re gonna win. I’m sure of it. Basra will fall. The people will rise up, and choose freedom.’ Overall, he was confident we were going to win. He made a jokey little reference to the
FT
story, when TB said we had not been pushing that line. ‘Don’t worry, I blame Alastair.’

GWB had clearly read TB’s note and was going through it virtually line by line. He was fairly strong on MEPP. He said he knew there would have to be a reckoning in their relationships with others. He seemed a lot more on top of the detail and in the discussion on the complexities of the Arab world seemed less one-dimensional than before. TB’s note was saying that in essence the US had a choice about what it wanted to do with its power. They had to face up to that choice. The power was a given but how it was used was a series of choices. Jonathan and I were staying in Redwood – the cabins were all named after trees. We went over to see TB who was worrying about the whole UN scene. I felt we had it parked fairly well and there was no real need to take it forward at the moment. We walked down to Laurel where the meeting was to be. At first there was just me, TB, Jonathan and DM. TB felt on the war that we had reached the point we did in Kosovo where it felt like we were holding back slightly and not really going for it. In Kosovo the point came a bit later but it did feel similar.

On the UN Bush had said last night he was happy for a UN role but he was pretty scathing, said their handling of some issues was woeful, that some of them couldn’t run a garbage service. It was a recurring theme. He just wasn’t up for it really. It was interesting how Bush liked to take in different views and experiences round the table. He wasn’t status-conscious in these meetings. He was also prone to go off on conversational tangents, asked me a few times re my running, and telling me he had been doing seven-minute mile pace round the Camp David track, which was faster than I could. They had another confined session then came out to discuss
how we dealt with the press. Condi said we should go over the aftermath issues.

Bush said he understood there had to be some kind of role for the UN but he didn’t trust their competence. He said on Kosovo the UN had been all over the place. Jack said ‘With respect Mr President, Kosovo is not the only model. There is Bosnia, where the UN was light touch. There have been others which they have done well.’ They agreed Sérgio de Mello [UN high commissioner for human rights] would be a good guy to do the UN job [Secretary General’s special representative in Iraq] but Kofi may want him to stay on human rights. Pre the press conference TB was worried re the body language. I said the most important thing was the issue of resolve, and a message to the Iraqi people about seeing it through and being with them for the long term.

As TB walked back to Dogwood cabin afterwards he said to Jonathan and me ‘He’s not wrong about the UN you know.’ I said he may have a point but it doesn’t mean he is a hundred per cent right. We were driven by buggy up to the hangar where the press conference was being held. Dan had told him that I referred to them as ‘the bastards’ and Bush was saying ‘bastards, bastards’ loudly. I had done a script for TB and created a bit of a problem maybe by referring to the dead soldiers being ‘executed’.

TB and Bush went off for a walk and then came back for lunch. Fairly relaxed and informal. GWB was geeing me up re the marathon, said I would love it, that it was one of the best things he ever did. TB and Bush then went out on the terrace for a genuine one-on-one. TB said afterwards they had discussed US politics and the pressures from the hard right. Bush had changed into a tracksuit. He did casual gear a lot better than TB but I guess the White House logo on everything helped a fair bit. He looked very fit for his age though the media had felt he looked tired at the press conference. I had an interesting chat with Dan about how Bush worked. He was a real early to bed, early to rise man. He was obsessed about punctuality and would really go for people who arrived late for meetings. He liked to read a brief, then discuss, then decide. He was open to ideas. He was very religious. He was loyal to friends but once you fell out with him, that was that. We were just whiling away the time while Bush and TB chatted. After half an hour or so they came in and we walked up to the helipad. TB was pleased and excited that Bush seemed to have moved on the road map. He was saying not only that he would publish it but take the lead in implementing it. We had a nice enough journey to New York with a fantastic
view out of the helicopter. To the UN to meet Kofi. The main focus was post-conflict and Oil for Food.
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Kofi was really pleased TB had gone to see him rather than the other way round. It was clear the politics were getting harder and harder. Bush was heavy enough but Cheney and Rumsfeld were even heavier. Back to the plane by chopper.

There was definitely a changed mood, lots of it media-driven. The morning meetings were developing a rhythm. First a pre-meeting with TB, GH, JS, C, CDS, John S and the key Number 10 people and then through to the broader meeting. CDS was confident things were going OK though it would be a while before there would be a commonly understood acceptance of military success. The weather was not helping and there had been more resistance than predicted. Not all bad news but there had been another friendly-fire incident. TB felt the Bush visit had been good and yet again today we saw how the propaganda could quickly go wrong. There was another attack on a Baghdad market. No evidence it was ours but the Arab media were straight out saying it was. At the morning meeting, we had a long discussion about how to improve outreach to the Arab media and also how to deal with the embedded media. As I said to TB, the problem was that the military had gone native on the media, rather than the other way round. They were all getting too much access and putting over little snapshots, so that there was very little communication of a big picture.

War Cabinet was pretty grim, with Clare blathering on about the UN. It was quite clear she was going to quit. She kept saying the issue was not fudge-able because it was a question of legality. TB said nobody was saying we were going to do something illegal. But she said there was a US draft that did suggest that. She said it was a matter of principle for her, and it should be for all of us. TB and Jack both had a go, not really clear what she was on about. C and John S said to me afterwards it was extraordinary that she behaved in the way she did. James Harrower [Number 10 security] and Mohny [Bahra, protection officer] called about how to handle demonstrations at home. James said the police were also discussing the possible need
for security on the marathon route. TB was planning to speak to Chirac and Schroeder tomorrow. He said we needed to start putting together the main European relationships again. [Royal Fleet Auxiliary ship]
Sir Galahad
finally docked at Umm Qasr [delivering humanitarian aid, after being delayed by mine clearance].

In for the 9am meeting. The head of the Iraqi air defences had been sacked because of malfunctioning air defences, which may have caused two explosions in Baghdad. 24-hour news was a bit of a nightmare at the moment, as they covered it like any other story, with a mix of hysteria and comment the whole time, and the settled view was that it wasn’t really happening. They seemed to think wars should only last a few days and then they should get on to the next thing. There were suggestions the public were getting sick of all the comment though, and making up their own minds. But a combination of dead soldiers, friendly fire, lack of progress towards Baghdad, Rumsfeld mouthing off re Syria [warning Syria not to aid Iraq] was not great. Dan told me they were delighted that Richard Perle [Rumsfeld-appointed Pentagon adviser and neoconservative lobbyist] was having to resign as chairman of a defence group [Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee, Department of Defense], though he was staying on the board.

At the War Cabinet Jack said we would be in a better place if Bush was not surrounded by ‘loonies’. ORHA [Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, established by the US to become a caretaker government in Iraq] was in a state of chaos because of internal US difficulties. They appeared unable to agree on anything. TB asked me afterwards if I thought the propaganda effort was working. I said not. He agreed. The problem was the US were pretty much doing their own thing, and they lacked coherence at the centre. The embedded media were treating the whole thing like scenes from a war movie, and there was no place for the big picture. The media here were pretty much set on presenting things in the worst light. So the mix was not good. We had to raise our own game, but also get the US and the military to raise theirs, and co-ordinate better. The pressure for instant comment and analysis was a real added problem in modern conflict situations.

The papers were not good. The overall impression was that things were not really going our way. TB and I had both come to the view
over the weekend that we needed to beef up the whole communications effort. If we were moving from ‘shock and awe’ to a message of steady progress, it required a different communications plan and approach. I went to Greenwich to run the first half of the marathon course with Hugh Jones [runner]. Did 14.08 miles in two hours flat. I quite liked the course and could see no real problems in it.

TB called a couple of times later, as he was preparing another note, including on the media, and we tossed around a few ideas. The Americans were still causing us problems on the media and political front, e.g. Rumsfeld suddenly turning on Syria had apparently also been a shock to the White House. Things not great with Fiona, and were unlikely to improve until I was out of it. Even with all this going on, there was a large part of me wanted out. I had pretty much lost it with the media, had very little time or respect for any of them, which was not a great position to be in, and maybe it was time for someone else.