The Burden of Power: Countdown to Iraq - The Alastair Campbell Diaries (80 page)

Blix had changed the dynamic a little but it was still very difficult. TB was pretty well geared up for the US trip but realised we were in a very tight spot. We got up the idea of ‘material breach’ [of obligations under UNSC resolutions] which Jack did today, and later at the press conference. We really had to motor on Blix, get out lots of material about what it meant, the potential capability of the materials he was talking about. The morning meeting was a lot chirpier than recently, though asylum continued to be really grim, particularly in the
Sun
, where Kavanagh was now clearly driving the policy of the paper, hard, in a pretty inflammatory way.

I had a long chat with Dan Bartlett re Bush’s State of the Union address. David Manning had a couple of difficult calls with Condi because they were getting really impatient now. TB felt that there would be more Blix reports revealing greater non-cooperation, and then there would be much more solid international opinion. But they [the US] were clearly growing tired of waiting, already felt they had bowed to us on this and now they were going to be hard to persuade. TB and I agreed that probably what made us most angry was that they were doing the right thing but in the wrong way. Another good Iraq strategy meeting. At least we were using these meetings to develop proper strategic message, on Islam, outreach, oil. The SIS guys were very good on this, John Scarlett a bit more cautious. But everyone seemed to think we were heading for war, and it was only a question of how and when. We had got hold of all the Iraqi ‘lines to take’ and when I said they weren’t great, one of the SIS guys said that Iraq lacked meetings like this.

I saw Philip, told him about my meeting with Balls. He said I had to get a grip or TB was going under. He had noticed I was more
detached and assumed that the marathon was part of an exit strategy, raise my profile then get out. I said maybe it was a strategy to keep me in, give myself other challenges that weren’t just the ones that did my head in here. He said I had to imagine what it would have been like five years ago if we were in this state – you would be motoring, working out plans, getting people going, firing them up, really going for it. We were tired and worn down. He felt we used the TB/GB thing as an excuse not to motor. There was something in what he was saying.

Balls sent me an email saying that Gordon had been ‘encouraged’ by our meeting and should we do the same next week. Yes. I put to TB what Ed had said about the euro being a condition of succession. TB said ‘That’s a lie. He always says that. He says to me, so are you saying you won’t go unless I do the euro and I say no, I’m not, I’m saying that I’m entitled to be able to have an honest conversation with you about it.’ I asked if he thought it was worth it me trying to develop relations with Ed to put something political back together again. He said yes, but it must be on the basis that whilst we must discuss everything, ultimately he must be allowed to decide. Also they have to get over their paranoia that we are somehow responsible for anything bad that appears about him in the press. He felt Ed’s claim that they didn’t have an operation was ridiculous. He felt GB was worried, now realised that TB might just dare to move him. ‘I know what I have to do. If I don’t do it, I won’t get the job done in the way I have to do it. This is the key to reconstruction and renewal.’

TB spoke to Chirac later and Chirac was doing his usual high-falutin’ stuff, lots of blather. At one point, TB held up the phone with his hand over the mouthpiece, turned to me and said ‘I can’t be bothered with this any more. Bullshit.’ He talked to John Howard [Australian Prime Minister], who was really worried we wouldn’t get a second resolution. Then to [Costas] Simitis [Greek Prime Minister], who was hopeless and totally with the French. [Peter] Foster deported.

Having tried to develop a better relationship with Ed, the first test came today with the
Telegraph
front page, saying GB was constantly asking TB to step aside. GB/Ed wanted us to issue a total denial. I said that was difficult because TB was clear to me that it had happened often enough. Ed said not. I also said TB had disputed their version of events re the discussion on the euro, that he never linked the idea of the job to this or any other policy. Ed was sceptical. We agreed to be totally dismissive of the
Telegraph
story. PMQs meeting was largely
about asylum. TB felt he had been right to deliver the signal he did on
Frost
and wanted to signal more now. For obvious reasons, Iraq was worrying TB more and more. He wasn’t sure Bush got just how difficult it was going to be without the second UNSCR, for the Americans as well as us. Everyone TB was speaking to, including the tough guys like [John] Howard, was saying they needed a second resolution or they wouldn’t get support. TB felt that was the reality for him too, that he couldn’t deliver the party without it. David was in the US today and saw Condi for three hours to go over the whole scene, tried to make her see that rushing our fences was not sensible, stating in terms that TB would not be able to deliver Cabinet or Parliament as things stood. We did however have a rare, for these times, PR hit in the form of an article signed by, eventually, eight European leaders about standing alongside the US in standing with us for Resolution 1441 [on the return of inspectors to Iraq].

I had a long chat with Dan Bartlett re the European signed article and also going over what we hoped to get out of Camp David. I was trying the whole time to get over to them just how bad the politics were. TB really exercised at the moment, said he sometimes wondered if they really got it at all, spelled out some of the risks of going without a resolution. ‘What on earth do we say or do if something goes wrong, which it’s bound to, e.g. there’s nothing to stop Saddam killing kids and saying it was us.’ He was gearing up to be very frank with Bush. He had an OK meeting with [Silvio] Berlusconi [Italian Prime Minister], full of the usual flouncing.

Matthew Rycroft, Danny Pruce and Steve Morris [Number 10 officials] had done a terrific job on the
Wall Street Journal
article which was leading the news, and lots of the other papers followed up. But the build-up to Camp David was going to be tricky. The sense was that the US were totally decided and we just had to go along with it. I did the morning meeting, and chatted with the SIS guys re the report on Iraq’s infrastructure of concealment. Lots of meetings with TB, first on asylum. He was worried by DB at yesterday’s meeting, felt he had been floundering a bit, was just raging at people, not clear what the plan was. CDS, GH, JS and JP came in for a meeting re Iraq. Jack said several times TB had to make clear we couldn’t do it without a UNSCR. He also felt that the Attorney General would not let us hit most of the ‘shock and awe’ targets because he would feel disproportionate force was being applied. The politics of all this were dreadful.

CDS warned that he was worried the Americans felt they would be seen as liberators. It just wasn’t so. They would be resented. We went through the strategy for the next phase. [Colin] Powell’s speech to the UN, then the next Blix report, TB clear that he wanted to try to get GWB to a second UNSCR, clearly getting the message that we couldn’t do it without one. He felt we needed two or three Blix reports, and more time for Arab leaders to push Saddam out. Even Geoff, much more than before, seemed worried, telling us that Rumsfeld was saying inside the administration that the problem with the UN route was that it was open-ended, that other countries just used the process to ensure nothing ever happened. JP and I exchanged very worried looks.

The Iraq discussion in Cabinet was a bit scratchy. Jack said the Blix report was pretty devastating for the regime, and it covered missiles that were banned, weaponised VX [toxic nerve agent]. Clare said we were losing the public because people thought the Americans were hell-bent on war. TB was clear that his role was to pull the Americans into the right position re the UNSCR. GH said 1441 changed the terms of the debate. Clare and JR snapping at each other, Clare having a go and John saying why was it she could say what she liked but if anyone said anything she disagreed with, all she could do was heckle. Robin chipped in to support Clare. Robin was very spiky, in part perhaps because he was sulking over TB and the Lords yesterday.
¹⁰
Then JP on fire, making clear he didn’t favour anti-strike legislation. GB said the unions had been totally behind the curve. He said the trade union movement does not understand what is happening to it out in the country. ‘There’s a shock,’ said TB, to laughter.

Then a discussion on the Olympics. Jack reported on the committee meetings so far, the £2.6 billion estimated costs, the rise in London council tax, some of the pros and cons. JP said we were more experienced than we were at the time of the Dome but what was absolutely essential was that if we went for it, we all went for it, that there could be no division on this. He was broadly positive. When he mentioned the Dome, Clare chipped in ‘Most of us were against it,’ and he gave her one of his snorts. TB said he was struck by how pro the London MPs were. Nobody was saying go for it irrespective, but we had to pin the details down. GB said, very finance director-ish, that it would be desirable to go ahead if the finances are sustainable. DB was
sceptical, Paul Murphy [Northern Ireland Secretary] pro. TB had to leave halfway through to take a call from Bush, from which he returned looking very worried. Overall the Olympic discussion was more negative than I thought it would be. Tessa pro, Charles pro, GH pro, Alan M basically pro. Lots of yes-buts, but the buts were very heavy, particularly on finance, with Andrew Smith and [Alistair] Darling both very clear no’s. John R very opposed. JP less sceptical than before.

It was snowing as we set off for Madrid [for talks with Spanish Prime Minister José María Aznar, en route to Washington]. On the plane, TB worked on a new note on strategy for Bush. He was clear in his own mind about policy and strategy, but worried Bush would not go for it. David [Manning], back from the US overnight, reported they were really impatient with the UN. TB saw his challenge as persuading Bush that it was in America’s interests to stay with the UN. He felt it would be total madness not to, and he was right, but it was not going to be easy. He was aiming to persuade Bush to wait till the middle or end of March and support a second resolution before action. He went through it all in his note, the military, the diplomatic, the propaganda questions, plus early planning on aftermath. Very simple lines and questions that we had to get answers to.

He was worried after the phone call today because Bush sounded much more frustrated re the UN, definitely listening more to those saying he had to go for it. He wanted to be able to take him to one side and go through the whole thing. They may not like it, but Blix was the key, and they had to see that. They couldn’t just bully here. Blix had to get the evidence of non-cooperation and we had to get the argument round to non-cooperation being a breach, but we needed two or three Blix reports to get that. He also emphasised that the ‘other agenda’ was important, particularly MEPP. He had pretty much given up on Schroeder as being opportunistic, felt that Chirac was going to use whatever happened to do us in, so was keen to build up the other Europeans, hence off to see Aznar.

Landed, helicopter to Moncloa [palace], meeting then press conference, then back on to the plane for the flight to the States. TB was now focusing his mind on crunching down the arguments. He said this is the toughest spot yet. I have to persuade him to stay on the UN route. He wrote another note, said that Blix could put down questions, report on February 14, then again on February 28. If co-operation gets harder and harder to achieve, by March 5 we declare Iraq in breach and maybe go for another UNSCR. We give the Saudis ten days to mobilise Arab opinion to get rid of Saddam. March 15, military action. He then laid out the potential problems on the way
– e.g. Saddam uses WMD, attacks Israel, destroys oil wells, or there is major civil unrest. He went through the aftermath questions, organisation of humanitarian aid, role of the UN. On propaganda, Powell at the UN, the history of Iraqi non-cooperation. The WMD threat more generally, the link to terrorism, the growing worries in the intelligence. They have to understand that Blix is key – I lost count of the number of times he said it during the flight. We were also feeling the beginnings of the global split, Chirac trying to get a little group going of France, Germany, Russia and China, saying the priorities were Afghanistan, MEPP, AIDS, poverty.

TB then set out the forward diplomatic strategy, then asked me to fill in on communications. He also asked me to draft what we would view as ideal GWB clips out of the meeting. I felt we had to get him as close as possible to a second UNSCR, and tone down the rush-to-war talk. TB was in OK mood, but really worried. He just didn’t know how Bush would be. He said he wanted as much time on his own as we could get, to persuade him he was more vulnerable than he thought. There was a risk of hubris. He needed world support more than he thought, especially if something went wrong. Shock and awe, then Iraqi kids dying, Saddam would stop at nothing and would happily inflict civilian casualties and we would be on the back foot straight away.

We went round the Cabinet one by one to assess who would support him without a second resolution. We could probably just about get to a majority but it would be difficult. It was pretty much ‘future on the line’ time. On Clare, TB said he knew the Cabinet hated the way he tolerates her but he didn’t want her outside, as that would be even worse. I said appeasement never worked. He said sometimes it worked better than the alternative. David Manning was telling him we had to fight hard for more time, that we should persuade them it was in their own interests.

Poll in the
Mirror
said two per cent felt a war on Iraq would make the world a safer place. I made sure Dan [Bartlett] knew and made sure he told Bush just so he knew we were up against it. TB had also slept badly and was up and about, going over the same questions again and again, kept saying we needed a clear intellectual construct which was that 1441 focus should be on the co-operation issues, if the Iraqis didn’t co-operate and Blix makes that clear repeatedly, we should say so and then we go for a second resolution and action could follow. We had allowed the goalposts to be moved to the
smoking-gun issue, and instead it had to be about the inspectors not getting co-operation. We typed up all the relevant past resolutions, so he could read from them, particularly 1441. I had a long chat with Dan, made clear the issue for us was the second resolution, that that was where the press would go for the gaps and therefore we should try to close them. It was difficult because of course in the US the UN was not popular. Also Peter Reid [embassy official] was worried that the UK stories of TB trying to press GWB would backfire. ‘They hate being pressured.’