Tank Tracks to Rangoon (30 page)

Similar battles were fought for other villages round the perimeter, notably Kanlan Ywachit and Yezin, which were largely the responsibility of the 7th’s B Squadron. Japanese suicide squads tried to break into the tanks’ harbour, and on one occasion came so perilously close to success that two officers were forced to grab the nearest weapons to hand—respectively a brick and a piece of wood.

The pace was too hot to last. Here and there the enemy disabled a tank or two, but they were always back with the infantry next day, and Japanese were being killed at a rate with which the reinforcements could not keep up. Inevitably, pressure around the perimeter slackened, and General Gracey, 20th Division’s commander, felt strong enough to go over to the offensive in early March. As the Japanese began to give ground he sensed their disorganization, and planned a major breakout by his armour which would make a wide encircling move to the south, disrupt their communications, destroy any forces encountered, and, if possible, make contact with 17th Indian Division at Meiktila. The force would act as an independent battle group and consist of all 20th Division’s armour plus most of 18 Field Regiment with their 105-mm Priest self-propelled
guns, 3/4th Gurkha Rifles, a company of 3rd Bombay Grenadiers, an air control post, and supporting arms. It would be commanded by Lt-Colonel Barlow of 7th Light Cavalry, and known as Barcol.

On 19th March Barcol broke force from 20th Division and headed south at speed, clouds of dust being thrown up by the long column of vehicles, whilst ahead and to the flanks probed the armoured cars of PAVO. Pyinzi was taken the following day, Lt Harpartap Singh ambushing four Japanese lorries on the way, and Pindale was rushed the next afternoon by 7th’s B Squadron. At Pindale the enemy had a small garrison, which imagined it was miles from any serious fighting, and the arrival of Barcol must have been a tremendous psychological shock; B Squadron’s terse narrative of the engagement describes the work of experts at the top of their form: ‘Peter, Chhota and Liggi pushed out into some thick surrounding scrub, where there was a position, and returned after it was broken, with two swords, rifles, etc.’ No further comment was considered necessary.

From Pindale, Barcol swung east towards Wundwin, which was taken by a set piece attack, although the town was not strongly held, killing about 200 of the enemy, and effectively cutting the Mandalay–Meiktila road. The column had covered sixty miles in fifty-four hours, had, in Slim’s own words been ‘brilliantly handled’, and by its weight and speed caught the enemy completely on the wrong foot, effectively denying him a major axis of withdrawal, so that he would be forced to direct the majority of his forces well to the east of Meiktila.

Obviously, many Japanese were quite oblivious of this development. On the evening of the capture of Wundwin, the PAVO officers were dining at a table set up close to the road, when four lorry-loads of neatly aligned, and conspicuously silent figures, drove past from the south. ‘They’re Japs!’ yelled Major Boyd, leaping to his feet. The guard car just had time to get a shot into the last vehicle, wrecking it, before the remainder accelerated away northwards into the darkness.

Nor were the Japanese alone affected by the fluid situation. A despatch rider of PAVO’s A Squadron became one of the luckiest men in the 14th Army when, taking a wrong turning, he rode into Meiktila from the north, after passing through miles of Japanese controlled territory, thus providing the first involuntary contact between 33 and 4 Corps. Needless to say, his B
Squadron comrades at Meiktila were more than a little surprised at his sudden appearance.

From Wundwin, Barcol pushed out disruptive patrols before swinging north again. One patrol, pushing south, came across Sherman tracks, obviously made during Ralphcol’s visit earlier in the month.

The road home, however, was not as easy as the road out, for the enemy was thicker on the ground, and was aided by rough country and water obstacles. In one action, 7th’s A Squadron lost three tanks, one being penetrated by 75-mm no less than five times, and one damaged. However, the Japanese were now melting away from the Mandalay front, unwilling to be trapped between Barcol in the south and 20th and 2nd Divisions to the north, and after capturing Kume, Barcol was broken up, having accomplished the purpose for which it had been formed.

Fighting around the 2nd Division’s bridgehead had not been as bitter as it had around those of 19th and 20th Divisions, but the surrounding Japanese seemed even more ready to the than usual, and brought up a great number of anti-tank guns, including the efficient 47-mms. The two Carabinier squadrons in the bridgehead, A and C, were engaged almost every day in support of infantry operations to expand the perimeter, forming a firm base for a breakout eastwards along the river towards Mandalay. Unfortunately, the country was broken and close, and the tanks were forced to work without a close escort during the early stages, although Bombay Grenadiers were attached later. The Japanese took full advantage of the deficiency.

On 2nd March A Squadron had been detailed to clear Zolokma–Lewingon–Myintha area, and met ‘the most fanatical defence against our tanks we ever encountered’. The country was scrub, broken up by small chaungs, and progress was slow, but steady.

At one point, Captain Cornaby, the squadron’s second-in-command, halted his tank to engage a party of Japanese he had discovered in a chaung. His guns were in action, and the attention of the entire crew was focused ahead. Suddenly, a Japanese artillery lieutenant and a private soldier broke out of the scrub and scrambled onto the rear of the vehicle. The private was sent toppling by a burst of Browning from another tank, but not before the officer had run Cornaby through with his sword, kicked his body down into the turret, and followed him, killing the 37-mm gunner similarly. Only the 37-mm gun breach was
between him and the leader, Tpr Jenkins, who had just enough time to draw his pistol before the officer was slashing and stabbing him. Jenkins fired all six chambers, the bullets thudding into his opponent’s body, but the man was quite berserk in the literal Norse sense, and would not die. Jenkins closed with him and they struggled for a moment on top of the bodies of Cornaby and the gunner, before Jenkins noticed that the latter had fallen off his stool with his pistol holster uppermost. He managed to free the weapon, and fired three more shots, which finished the officer. Meanwhile, the other members of the crew had no idea what was taking place, and the 75-mm had continued in action. Jenkins was awarded the Military Medal.

Elsewhere other Japanese had launched themselves onto A Squadron’s tanks, but had been shot off before they could cause any damage. However, the day was far from over, for as the tanks approached Myintha, a 47-mm anti-tank gun opened up, knocking out two of the Lees in quick succession. The flash from the gun was observed by the squadron leader and his sergeant-major, who destroyed it with 75-mm fire.

At this stage, A Squadron had lost two tanks outright, one bogged down, a fourth crippled by crew casualties, and wounded crew to evacuate. Further fire was exchanged with small Japanese parties, but little further progress was made, and the tanks retired into leaguer, abandoning the bogged vehicle after rendering it immobile and stripping the breach blocks.

Fortunately, enemy resistance elsewhere did not match that encountered by A Squadron on this occasion. Four days later Major Dimsdale’s C Squadron surrounded and captured a village without loss, Lt Shepley stalking two enemy 75-mm guns on foot, and then guiding his tanks into a hull-down position so that they destroyed them with 37-mm gunfire.

By 11th March 2nd Division’s breakout had started. A Squadron advanced with 6 Brigade to cut the Kyauktalon–Myotha road, whilst C Squadron and 5 Brigade advanced east along the river bank to Kyauktalon. An A Squadron attack on a village was notable for the arrival of the divisional commander, Major-General Nicholson, amongst the tanks in his jeep, pennant flying, only 100 yards from the enemy’s position. Having secured their original objectives, A Squadron crossed the Panlaung River, and went on to cut the main road south from Mandalay, at Sizon, whilst C Squadron proceeded to capture Ava fort, at the southern
end of the great bridge which had been so effectively destroyed in 1942.
*

During the entry to Ava fort, the infantry were suddenly pinned down by machine-gun fire. Sergeant Felthouse moved forward to deal with this, was in turn engaged by anti-tank guns, and opened up with all guns.

‘What are you firing at?’ asked his troop leader.

‘I don’t know, but I can see flashes and keep firing at them.’

‘I should hurry up and hit them if I were you; the first flash is usually enough! Out.’

Felthouse was being engaged by two captured British 2-pounders, fortunately without proper sights, and knocked them both out, winning a MM.

On 20th March both Carabinier squadrons were ferried over the Mytinge River, and the defenders of Mandalay were denied any escape route to the south. Contact was made with 19th Division, and the battle of the Irrawaddy was over.

Kimura’s Burma Area Army, its nervous system paralysed at Meiktila, its limbs mangled and bruised along the Irrawaddy, staggered away as best it could. The only remaining question for Kimura was whether he could organize an effective defensive front somewhere between Meiktila and Rangoon
before
the monsoon broke? If he could, Slim’s communications would be so badly stretched by bad going and impossible flying weather, that a stalemate would ensue, giving him time to reinforce and re-form his shattered forces.

The same thoughts were going through Slim’s mind. If Kimura could be prevented from forming his defensive front, he might be able to break through to Rangoon on a narrow front before the monsoon. If not?

In war, time is more precious than the finest gold, and at this stage both commanders were desperately short of it. Whoever used his time and resources to best advantage would win the next battle.

*
Rees’s eventual chief-of-staff was John Masters, the famous novelist, who had recently commanded a Chindit column, and was therefore better able to administer his general’s division in spite of the latter’s highly individualistic style of command.

*
The northern end had been captured by the Intelligence Officer of 268 Brigade, leading a force of Bombay Grenadiers disguised as Burmans and riding in bullock carts. 3rd Carabiniers’ B Squadron was supporting Brigade’s operations on the opposite bank to 2nd Division’s advance.

Following the appalling collapse of their
U-Go
offensive on the Central front, the Japanese began to withdraw slowly from the Arakan, not only to avoid being strategically isolated by the Allied drive on Mandalay, but also in attempt to use the garrison as replacements for the catastrophic losses suffered at Kohima and Imphal. Kimura was quite prepared to write off the Northern Arakan for a period, using the troops so released for the major battle he had hoped to fight around Mandalay.

None of this was known to the Allies, who went ahead with plans for a major offensive by 15 Corps, commanded by Lt-General A. F. P. Christison, designed to clear the Arakan mainland and also to capture the islands of Akyab, Ramree and Cheduba, which contained airfields from which vital support could be given to the forces operating on the Central front.

15 Corps contained 25th and 26th Indian and 82nd West African Divisions, two Brigades of 81st West African Division and 3rd Commando Brigade. Armoured support would be supplied by 50th Indian Tank Brigade, commanded by Brigadier G. H. N. Todd.

50th Tank Brigade consisted of the Shermans of 19th (King George Vth’s Own) Lancers, commanded by Lt-Colonel G. H. Critchley, the Lees of 146 Regiment RAC under Lt-Colonel R. L. Agnew, and 45th Cavalry’s Stuarts, recently returned from Manipur. In the event, the Japanese withdrawal led to the majority of General Christison’s air support being diverted elsewhere, and the brunt of the fighting fell on two squadrons, to the bitter disappointment of the remainder. There were no longer enough Japanese to go round.

As we have seen, the Arakan is one of the most unpleasant places in the world in which to fight, and the conduct of armoured operations is particularly difficult in view of the close and hilly nature of the terrain, which is further broken by the muddy
meanderings of countless coastal chaungs. It is therefore worth pausing here to examine the tactical developments which had taken place since the last Arakan offensive.

19th Lancers have been described elsewhere as ‘a Regiment that could shoot’, and as shoot they certainly could, members of other regiments which also took a pride in their gunnery will not object to my describing the techniques they employed during the last Arakan offensive.

19th Lancers also contained some outstandingly good wireless operators, as one might expect from a regiment which had been equipped with armoured cars before converting to tanks. Their expertise kept Colonel Critchley, up with the forward squadron, in regular contact with his rear headquarters, 200 miles away.

Critchley had spent some time with 25th Dragoons after their battle in the Admin Box, and had brought his regiment to a high standard of co-operation with its Forward Tank Officers. The FTOs were to the tanks what the Forward Observation Officers were to the artillery, and their function was to accompany the infantry and direct the tanks’ fire onto bunkers and strongpoints which were invisible to the crews. A minimum requirement was that the tank gunners should be able to hit a 4-gallon petrol tin every time at 800 yards. This might not sound particularly demanding today, but at the time there were gunners who could not reach this standard, and it must be remembered that although the Sherman possessed comparatively sophisticated gun-control equipment, there has been thirty years development since. This then, was 19th Lancers’ method of tackling a heavily wooded hill feature which was to be attacked by the infantry; it was practised endlessly, and similar methods were used by other regiments.