Tank Tracks to Rangoon (32 page)

On 16th January the Commandos were relieved by 74 Brigade of 25th Indian Division, and the following day A Squadron supported 3/2 Gurkhas’ attack on Hill 262, Pagoda Hill.

This feature was covered in jungle, and had twin summits, one of which was crowned with a ruined pagoda. A chaung ran across its front, but a good fire position for the tanks was found just west of Kauntha village.

At 1130 an air strike by Thunderbolts slammed accurately into the twin summits clearing away a certain amount of vegetation, and the leading Gurkha company moved off with Captain Wright acting as FTO. Slowly the infantry climbed the jungle clad slopes, their progress being marked only by the smoke of bursting grenades filtering up through the trees. Fire orders began to come in from Wright, and soon all of Sample’s seven tanks were engaging invisible targets to good effect.

A bunker in the central saddle twice beat off a Gurkha attack, and Wright concentrated the squadron’s fire on this until it was destroyed. The Gurkhas moved in, only to be stalled again by heavy fire from the pagoda.

The tanks’ ammunition was now running low, and Wright made a fresh plan with the company commander whilst replenishment took place. Then all tanks opened a rapid and punishing
fire on the pagoda area, which ceased abruptly at Wright’s command. Through the strange silence came the dreadful menacing yell ‘Ayo Gurkhali!’
*
and then the infantry were swarming over the pagoda, shooting, bombing and chopping. 81 Japanese bodies were counted afterwards, and the Gurkhas were loud in their praise of the support given by the tanks and the FTO.

With this action, enemy resistance in the Myebon Peninsula virtually ceased, and plans were at once put in hand for a landing at Kangaw. For this A Squadron, less one troop left with 74 Brigade, would again be working under the Commandos.

The Marines landed successfully on 23rd January, taking Hill 170, but the tanks did not get ashore until 27th, as the landing sites were hopelessly unsuitable, consisting of mangrove swamp and mud. In the end, the tanks landed from Landing Craft Mechanical Transport which had not been designed to take tanks, and which, in the Navy’s opinion were quite likely to turn turtle. However, by traversing the turrets, a trim was achieved, and the squadron set off for Kangaw.

Arriving at the new landing ground up the South Chaung Robin and Sam Fitze found the landing drill quite unorthodox. The performance to an onlooker was quite extraordinary as no one appeared to know what the other person was doing or trying to do. The sappers put down wire track—we implored them to remove it—we lost the argument. The LCM opened his door, whereupon the water poured in and continued to pour in until the officer concerned managed to convince the individual who operated it that it would be a good idea to close it. The door being closed, we shot back into mid-stream with a severe list and about four feet of water underneath us. We were again ordered to rush into the bank, but this time to keep the door shut. Having complied with this order amid much splashing we were then told to ride the tanks straight at the door, knocking it down, and from there go straight up the bank. Virsa Singh did as he was bid and literally leapt out of the LCM, which in its turn leapt back into the middle of the stream. As we previously anticipated, the sappers’ ‘Army Track’ ruined this excellent performance, and we spent the next half hour removing it from the tank tracks.

The Jap, meanwhile, evidently guessing something was afoot, proceeded to drop bricks north and south of us with great accuracy, tearing bedding, chuggles and water cans from their moorings with amazing success.

In spite of these various harassments, in which tempers were inevitably lost, A Squadron succeeded in getting a troop ashore,
and set up a harbour area at the northern end of Hill 170. Here they were plagued by a 75-mm gun firing from a feature known as the ‘Fingers’ manned by a sharp eyed crew with an excellent range card. The gun commander evidently required little sleep, and made it his business to see that no one else had any either, his nightly activities making him extremely unpopular.

During the 29th and 30th, therefore, it was with some pleasure that Lt Fitze carried out shoots onto the ‘Fingers’, ‘Perth’ and ‘Dunns’. However, by now the Japanese were beginning to react sharply to the threat posed by the landing to their line of retreat, and on 31st January mounted a heavy attack on Hill 170.

We were rudely awakened by some very fast and accurate shell fire at about 0545 which continued until about 0620, when a babble of voices in the nearby bushes west of our position, followed by the noise of machine guns and grenades, indicated that we were being attacked. It would not be true to say that the Jap surprised us, as for some odd reason everyone had gone to bed with a strong hunch that it was coming—it seemed the obvious place to come.

The first twenty minutes were more than confused as it was definitely a case of the queen getting into the back line, inasmuch that the Jap got into our perimeter! Grenades were whizzing through the air from both sides, in fact Peter and Robin, who were emerging from their excellent dug-out, were driven back more or less by the first shower. Bing Wilson started the ball rolling by shooting the leader of the suicide squad in the face with his Sten, but there were many more fanatics behind him and they, after overrunning our forward position, planted some large type of explosive onto the truck. There was a terrific green flash and a tremendous bang which drove most people back to their trenches. Ron Kent and Sam at the time were having a battle of their own underneath the D8 and surprisingly were unhurt.

After things cooled down a bit we discovered that the Jap was almost succeeding in lodging himself in the small feature directly above us. However, Bing, who was seen jumping from tree to tree the whole time, led a section of the Bombay Grenadiers up and pushed them off. Two tanks (Sam’s and Jemadar Piara Singh’s) had managed to get out and away, and the third tank was burning fiercely, the entire crew having been killed.

Bill Sample went back to get the tanks to blast the jungle in front of us from which the noise of wounded Japs was coming. Rozario had taken command of the Grenadier section at the top of the hill and Bing continued to hop round the hill visiting his sections, who were doing great work picking off anyone who ventured forth into the paddy.

Major Sample was badly wounded in bringing up the tanks, one of which was now immobile as a result of smashed track
connectors. However, during the day, the remaining tank continued to blast the surviving enemy from their positions on Hill 170, and by evening the position had been consolidated.

Two further tanks were shipped in during the following day, and the track from the burned out tank used to replace the smashed track on the cripple. Various fire tasks were carried out, but the battle for Hill 170 had been decided. The 300 Japanese dead lay so thick that bulldozers were needed to bury them.
*

By now, 74th Infantry Brigade had linked up with the advancing West Africans and Kangaw itself had been captured by 51st Indian Infantry Brigade after bitter fighting. The Japanese, finding their route southwards blocked, broke up into small parties and headed eastwards into the hills.

Whilst these operations were taking place, heavy fighting was going on at Ramree Island, where 71st Brigade from 26th Indian Division had landed on 21st January. The landing, which was made under cover of a heavy air programme and a wealth of naval gunfire provided by the battleship
Queen Elizabeth
, the cruiser
Phoebe
, and the destroyers
Norman, Pathfinder, Raider, Rapid
and
Napier
, was completed successfully, including the disembarkation of the Lees of A Squadron 146 Regiment RAC under Major H. A. R. Bucknall anxious to revenge the affair at Donbaik almost two years earlier.

The landing had been made at Kyaukpyu on the north of the island. The landing was not without incident, as General Christison relates. ‘The landing beaches were protected by a minefield, which the Navy had not suspected. The leading motor launch and LCA went up with no survivors. The advance of the LCAs stopped until I was lowered from HMS
Phoebe
and put in a pinnace in which I led the assault craft through the gap that had been made in the minefield. I had welcomed the assault troops on Akyab, and this time landed ahead of them in five feet of water under fire, only to be cursed later by the leading Brigadier, Cottrell-Hill, for getting in his way!’

Opposition was slight, and the enemy was clearly withdrawing
southwards, having mined the road and blown all the bridges. It became clear early the next morning that the infantry were going to get along much faster without the tanks, so the latter returned to Kyaukpyu, and re-embarked on their LCTs.

It was not long before they were needed again. The Japanese had decided to make their stand along the wide Yenbauk Chaung, and had brought the advance to a halt, causing the leading battalions some casualties. Neither gunfire from the ships offshore, nor strikes made by planes flying off the escort carrier
Ameer
, showed any signs of dislodging them, so Brigadier Cottrell-Hill decided to lever them out of the position by a wide turning movement, moving some twenty miles inland to the source of the chaung.

The tanks were therefore landed at Kauktale, and the whole force set out on 31st January.

‘There was no road; the country consisted of stretches of hard dry paddy bunds varying from one to four feet in height and connected by numerous saddles densely covered with scrub or rock. Beyond were narrow defiles of dense scrub, continually crossed by wet chaungs some twenty feet in width, with the inevitable steep bank on both sides. The solitary bulldozer was the key to the situation as far as the tanks were concerned, but even this was beaten at times. Trees which could not be pushed down were blown up by the tanks, and despite breakdowns and sudden drops the squadron arrived at the saddle at 1530, and Major Bucknall decided to push on via Minbyin–Paukpyin with the object of reaching Sane before nightfall.’
*

‘We moved in what must have looked like a gala procession,’ wrote Bucknall. ‘In front John Cull and his Sikh sappers with the bulldozer. Close behind the tanks and all around Jats and Garhwalis. The track was now a 4-foot path which skirted, and continually crossed, a stream by footbridges; lack of the latter necessitated a detour, fortunately generally over paddy-fields, and the squadron, somewhat battered, arrived at a saddle about a mile from Sane just as it was getting dark.’

Here Cottrell-Hill modified his original plan, having decided to get across the Yenbauk Chaung’s defenders’ lines of communication by taking the Yebadin Gap on the main road to Ramree Town. It required two more days before the tanks arrived at Yebadin, the last six miles taking eight hours, the
sappers having to blast the way forward, aided by the tanks’ HE shells, the bulldozer, and sheer muscle power. The leading tank found itself being used as a battering ram, and occasionally having to wrench an obstinate tree out by the roots, by using its towing chain.

The Japanese were, however, fully alive to their danger, and whilst they had been manoeuvred out of their positions along the Yenbauk Chaung, they were now occupying several strong positions, known as ‘Bean’, ‘Banana’ and Point 233, south of Yebadin village.

A plan of attack was made for the following day. A company of 1/8th Garhwal Rifles was to secure ‘Banana’ by 1330; at 1425 two more companies from the same battalion would attack ‘Bean’, supported by A Squadron; when this had been taken, the tanks would support 1st Lincoln’s assault on Point 233.

The results were disappointing, as Major Bucknall’s account shows:

‘At 1430 we moved into the paddy and began to plaster “Bean”. I could see the Garhwalis streaming across the paddy onto the “Bean” feature. Almost at once I saw a stream of bullets kicking up the dust all round them. The fire was coming in enfilade from “Banana”, which meant that it had not been taken in the earlier assault.

‘The end of the day came with none of the objectives secured. At nightfall we went back to harbour at Saingkhon, carrying on the tanks about seventy wounded Garhwalis. I was loath to do this because it was a very rough ride and I thought it would do them more harm than good. However, we got them back and were very glad to be able to do so.’

Throughout the action, the Japanese had mortared the tanks continuously, but had only succeeded in slightly wounding three of the commanders.

During the 5th February the pressure was maintained on ‘Bean’ and ‘Banana’, the tanks firing several hundred rounds into the two features to good effect, for during the night the enemy withdrew.

The back of the Japanese resistance had now been broken, but the enemy’s rearguard put up a stiff and prolonged fight in an attempt to gain time for their comrades’ evacuation to the mainland. They had mined the road, using 500-pound aerial bombs connected to anti-tank mines to slow down the tanks, and they contested every possible defensive position.

It took three days to cover the six miles from Yebadin to Ramree Town, and throughout the Lees were engaged in numerous small actions against machine guns and bunkers. A captured British 25-pounder could have caused serious damage, but was spotted by a sharp-eyed tank commander before it could open fire, and was destroyed. Another troop arrived, having come up the now open road from Kyaukpyu across the Yenbauk Chaung.

During the morning of 9th February 71st Brigade broke through the last thin crust of the defence, and infantry and tanks fanned out across the paddy to enter Ramree unopposed.

Very few of the Japanese garrison escaped. They had conducted a skilful and stubborn defence, but now they were hunted down amongst the chaungs of the east coast, which had been blocked by the Navy, and an attempt at rescue from the mainland was easily foiled.

A captured officer remarked that the arrival of tanks at Yebadin, which was completely unexpected, had upset the entire plan of defence. The moral effect of the weapon had clearly been as great as the physical.