Reagan: The Life (94 page)

Shultz was sorely tempted to resign. By office he was the president’s right arm for foreign affairs, but Reagan had rejected his advice in favor of that of Poindexter. He wanted to be a good soldier and support the president’s policies, but he was convinced Reagan didn’t know what policies Poindexter was making in his name. And Shultz refused to cover for Poindexter.

He agreed to appear on
Face the Nation
but soon wished he hadn’t.
Host
Lesley Stahl asked an obvious question: “
Will there be any more arms shipments to Iran, either directly by our government or through any third parties?”

“It’s certainly against our policy,” Shultz responded.

“That’s not an answer,” Stahl observed. “Why don’t you answer the question directly? I’ll ask it again. Will there be any more arms shipments to Iran, either directly by the United States or through any third parties?”

“Under the circumstances of Iran’s war with Iraq, its pursuit of terrorism, its association with those holding our hostages, I would certainly say, as far as I’m concerned, no,” Shultz replied.

“Do you have the authority to speak for the entire administration?” Stahl pressed.

“No,” Shultz said, reddening with anger and embarrassment.

R
EAGAN, PRESUMABLY, SPOKE
for the administration. The president observed the mounting skepticism and realized he had to answer the questions himself. He called a news conference. “
Eighteen months ago, as I said last Thursday, this administration began a secret initiative to the Islamic Republic of Iran,” he said in an opening statement. “Our purposes were fourfold: to replace a relationship of total hostility with something better, to bring a negotiated end to the Iran-Iraq war, to bring an end to terrorism and to effect the release of our hostages.” Reagan said he had recognized that the initiative entailed great risks for both the American hostages and the administration’s Iranian interlocutors. “That’s why the information was restricted to appropriate cabinet officers and those officials with an absolute need to know.” For the first time the president acknowledged the dissent among his advisers. “This undertaking was a matter of considerable debate within administration circles,” he said. “The principal issue in contention was whether we should make isolated and limited exceptions to our arms embargo as a signal of our serious intent.” Reagan didn’t identify the disputants by name, but all the reporters and many of those watching the news conference on television understood that the prime objector was George Shultz. “Several top advisers opposed the sale of even a modest shipment of defensive weapons and spare parts to Iran. Others felt no progress could be made without this sale. I weighed their views. I considered the risks of failure and the rewards of success, and I decided to proceed. And the responsibility for the decision and the operation is mine and mine alone.” Reagan quoted Abraham Lincoln on controversial decisions: “If it turns out right, the
criticism will not matter. If it turns out wrong, ten angels swearing I was right will make no difference.”

Reagan refused to apologize for the course he had chosen. “I understand this decision is deeply controversial and that some profoundly disagree with what was done. Even some who support our secret initiative believe it was a mistake to send any weapons to Iran. I understand and I respect those views, but I deeply believe in the correctness of my decision. I was convinced then and I am convinced now that while the risks were great, so, too, was the potential reward. Bringing Iran back into the community of responsible nations, ending its participation in political terror, bringing an end to that terrible war, and bringing our hostages home—these are the causes that justify taking risks.”

Reagan said he would continue to take risks to enhance American security. But his past policy toward Iran had become counterproductive on account of the heavy and often inaccurate media attention. And so it was being changed. “To eliminate the widespread but mistaken perception that we have been exchanging arms for hostages, I have directed that no further sales of arms of any kind be sent to Iran. I have further directed that all information relating to our initiative be provided to the appropriate members of Congress. There may be some questions which for reasons of national security or to protect the safety of the hostages I will be unable to answer publicly. But again, all information will be provided to the appropriate members of Congress.”

He opened the floor to questions.
Helen Thomas asked if he thought the credibility of his administration had suffered as a result of the recent revelations, coming soon after the swapping with the Soviets of Zakharov for Daniloff.

Reagan denied, as he had before, that there was any trade of Zakharov for Daniloff. The premise of Thomas’s question was simply wrong. As for the Iran enterprise: “There was no deception intended by us. There was the knowledge that we were embarking on something that could be of great risk to the people we were talking to, great risk to our hostages. And therefore we had to have it limited to only the barest number of people that had to know.” In language that inadvertently conjured memories of
Richard Nixon and
Watergate, Reagan continued, “I was not breaking any law in doing that.” He explained, “I have the right under the law to defer reporting to Congress, to the proper congressional committees, on an action, and defer it until such time as I believe it can safely be done with no risk to others.” He said the relevant congressional committees
would receive briefings shortly. He added, as an afterthought to his Nixonesque denial of legal culpability, “We were not negotiating government to government. We were negotiating with certain individuals within that country.”

Thomas followed up. “Are you prepared now to disavow the finding which let you make end runs around the Iranian arms embargo?” she asked. “Are you going to tear it up?”

“No, as I say, we are going to observe that embargo,” he replied, somewhat confusingly. “And it’s part of the same reason that, as I’ve said, we were doing this in the first place: And that is to see, among the other issues involved, if we can help bring about peace between those two countries, a peace without victory to either one or defeat and that will recognize the territorial integrity of both. And this is something that all of our allies are seeking also. But I think the people understand that sometimes you have to keep a secret in order to save human lives and to succeed in the mission, just as we went into Grenada without prior notice, because then we would have put to risk all of those men who were going to hit the beach.”

Another reporter asked about Shultz. Had the president and the secretary of state ever spoken about the latter’s resignation?

“There’s been no talk of resignation,” Reagan said.

Chris Wallace of
NBC News wanted Reagan to resolve a seeming contradiction. “Mr. President, you have stated flatly, and you stated flatly again tonight, that you did not trade weapons for hostages. And yet the record shows that every time an American hostage was released—last September, this July, and again just this very month—there had been a major shipment of arms just before that. Are we all to believe that was just a coincidence?”

Reagan sidestepped. “Chris, the only thing I know about major shipments of arms—as I’ve said, everything that we sold them could be put in one cargo plane, and there would be plenty of room left over. Now, if there were major shipments—and we know this has been going on—there have been other countries that have been dealing in arms with Iran. There have been also private merchants of such things that have been doing the same thing. Now, I’ve seen the stories about a Danish tramp steamer and Danish sailors’ union officials talking about their ships taking various supplies to Iran. I didn’t know anything about that until I saw the press on it, because we certainly never had any contact with anything of the kind. And so, it’s just that we did something for a particular mission. There was a risk entailed. And Iran held no hostages. Iran did not kidnap anyone, to
our knowledge. And the fact that part of the operation was that we knew, however, that the kidnappers of our hostages did have some kind of relationship in which Iran could at times influence them—not always—but could influence them. And so three of our hostages came home.”

Wallace wasn’t satisfied. “On that first point, your own chief of staff, Mr. Regan, has said that the U.S. condoned Israeli shipments of arms to Iran,” he said. “And aren’t you, in effect, sending the very message you always said you didn’t want to send? Aren’t you saying to terrorists, either you or your state sponsor—which in this case was Iran—can gain from the holding of hostages?”

Reagan denied it. “No, because I don’t see where the kidnappers or the hostage-holders gained anything,” he said. “They didn’t get anything. They let the hostages go. Now, whatever is the pressure that brought that about, I’m just grateful to it for the fact that we got them. As a matter of fact, if there had not been so much publicity, we would have had two more that we were expecting.”

Sam Donaldson of ABC News was Reagan’s least favorite reporter because, to Reagan’s thinking, Donaldson was more interested in skewering his subjects than in revealing the truth. Donaldson played to form this evening. “Mr. President, when you had the arms embargo on, you were asking other nations, our allies particularly, to observe it, publicly,” he said. “But at the same time, privately, you concede you were authorizing a breaking of that embargo by the United States. How can you justify this duplicity?”

Reagan didn’t like being called a liar, even if a synonym was employed. He kept his temper only with difficulty. “I don’t think it was duplicity,” he replied. “And as I say, the so-called violation did not in any way alter the military balance between the two countries. But what we were aiming for, I think, made it worthwhile. And this was a waiver of our own embargo; the embargo still stays now and for the future. But the causes that I outlined here in my opening statement—first of all, to try and establish a relationship with a country that is of great strategic importance to peace and everything else in the Middle East, at the same time, also, to strike a blow against terrorism and to get our hostages back, as we did.”

“Sir, if I may,” Donaldson continued, “the polls show that a lot of American people just simply don’t believe you. The one thing that you’ve had going for you, more than anything else in your presidency, your credibility, has been severely damaged. Can you repair it?”

Reagan’s anger grew evident. He came close to blaming the media,
Donaldson included, for the whole affair. “Well, I imagine I’m the only one around who wants to repair it,” he said. “And I didn’t have anything to do with damaging it.”

Bill Plante of
CBS News spared Reagan more of Donaldson, but the difference hardly mattered. “Mr. President, you say that the equipment which was shipped didn’t alter the military balance. Yet several things: We understand that there were 1,000 TOW antitank missiles shipped by the U.S. The U.S. apparently condoned shipments by Israel and other nations of other quantities of arms as an ancillary part of this deal—not directly connected, but had to condone it, or the shipments could not have gone forward, sir. So how can you say that it cannot alter the military balance? And how can you say, sir, that it didn’t break the law, when the National Security Act of 1977 plainly talks about timely notification of Congress and also, sir, stipulates that if the national security required secrecy the president is still required to advise the leadership and the chairmen of the intelligence committees?”

Reagan shook his head. “Bill, everything you’ve said here is based on a supposition that is false,” he said. “We did not condone and do not condone the shipment of arms from other countries. And what was the other point that you made here?”

“There were the antitank missiles, sir.”

Reagan wasn’t used to such sustained skepticism. It seemed to affect him. “Oh no, about the—that it didn’t—no, that it didn’t violate the—or that did violate the law,” he fumbled. “No, as I’ve said, the president, believe it or not, does have the power if, in his belief, national security can be served, to waive the provisions of that law as well as to defer the notification of the Congress on this.”

Plante still wanted to hear about the antitank missiles. “Isn’t it possible that the Iraqis, sir, might think that a thousand antitank missiles was enough to alter the balance of that war?” he asked.

“This is a purely defensive weapon,” Reagan replied. “It is a shoulder-carried weapon. And we don’t think that in this defensive thing—we didn’t add to any offensive power on the part of Iran. We know that Iraq has already announced that they would be willing to settle the conflict, as we’ve said, with no winners or losers. And the other parts happened to be spare parts for an antiaircraft Hawk battery. And, as I say, all of those weapons could be very easily carried in one mission.”

Charles Bierbauer of
CNN inquired about Israel. “Mr. President, I don’t think it’s still clear just what Israel’s role was in this,” he said. “The
questions have been asked about a condoned shipment. We do understand that the Israelis sent a shipment in 1985, and there were also reports that it was the Israelis that contacted your administration and suggested that you make contact with Iran. Could you explain what the Israeli role was here?”

“No,” Reagan responded, “because we, as I say, have had nothing to do with other countries or their shipment of arms or doing what they’re doing. And, no, as a matter of fact, the first ideas about the need to restore relations between Iran and the United States, or the Western world for that matter, actually began before our administration was here. But from the very first, if you look down the road at what could happen and perhaps a change of government there, it was absolutely vital for the Western world and to the hopes for peace in the Middle East and all for us to be trying to establish this relationship. And we worked—oh, it started about eighteen months ago, really, as we began to find out some individuals that it might be possible for us to deal with.”