Reagan: The Life (91 page)

This was more, in fact, than anyone had been talking about. But Gorbachev liked the idea. “We could say that, list all those systems,” he said.

Shultz liked it too. “Let’s do it,” he said.

Reagan was pleased. “If we agree that by the end of the ten-year period all nuclear weapons are to be eliminated, we can turn this agreement over to our delegations in Geneva so that they can prepare a treaty which you can sign during your visit to the U.S.”

“Well, all right,” Gorbachev declared, sounding suddenly hopeful. “Here we have a chance for an agreement.”

Yet there remained the sticking point. “What I am seriously concerned about is another factor,” Gorbachev said. “What we are talking about is to comply strictly with the unlimited
ABM Treaty for the purpose of pledging not to exercise the right to withdraw from the treaty for ten years. We are doing this under conditions of reducing nuclear weapons. We don’t understand, then, why the American side does not agree to
having research, development and testing be restricted to the confines of the laboratory.” A definite understanding of this matter was essential, lest confusion, ill will, and national insecurity arise. “Hence the ABM Treaty has to be strengthened, which means we cannot remove the mention of laboratories from our text.” Gorbachev repeated, “The question of laboratories is of fundamental importance.”

Reagan repeated his earlier statement that the American interpretation of the ABM Treaty did not confine research and testing to laboratories. Yet he thought they were splitting hairs unnecessarily. “From the standpoint of the substance of the issue, in my opinion, it is of no importance. Our aim is to safeguard ourselves from a revival of missiles after they have been destroyed, in order to make a kind of gas mask against nuclear missiles.” Reagan noticed Gorbachev shaking his head. “I have already spoken of this,” he acknowledged. “And I have also spoken of the danger of nuclear maniacs.”

“Yes, I’ve heard all about gas masks and maniacs, probably ten times already,” Gorbachev said with a sigh. “It still does not convince me.”

“I’m talking about one possibility of what can happen after ten years,” Reagan said. “Perhaps there will be nothing of the kind. Perhaps the people who become the leaders at that time will decide that the system is too costly to deploy and will give up the SDI. In any case, the world would welcome it if we could undertake to reduce nuclear weapons and not make this issue a stumbling block. We are asking not to give up SDI, and you are trying to determine now what will happen in ten years.”

Gorbachev shook his head. “If we make a stipulation acknowledging the possibility of conducting research work relating to SDI within the confines of the laboratory, that will not mean that the American government will not be able to decide questions relating to the program,” he said. “Such a stipulation will not prohibit research, development and testing, including the kind that relates to space weapons. But it would make it possible to guarantee a strict interpretation of the ABM Treaty. It would make it possible to prevent bringing such weapons out of the laboratories, out in the atmosphere and into space. These are completely different things. We are talking about an agreement that is supposed to strengthen peace instead of subjecting it to new dangers.”

“I’m not demanding the right to deploy ABMs in space,” Reagan said. “I’m only talking about research permitted by the ABM Treaty. By the way, the Soviet Union is not entirely without reproach in this. I’m refer
ring to the
Krasnoyarsk radar station. We have differing interpretations of the ABM Treaty—that’s a fact.”

“What we are talking about is seeing to it that SDI testing takes place only in the laboratory,” Gorbachev said. “We cannot go along with allowing it to come out into the atmosphere or into space. That is unacceptable to us. It is a question of principle.”

Reagan let his annoyance show. “You’re destroying all my bridges to continuation of my SDI program,” he said. “I can’t go along with the restrictions you demand.”

“Is that your final position?” Gorbachev said. “If so, we can end our meeting at this point.”

Reagan took a deep breath. He shrugged wearily. “Yes, it is,” he said. “The whole thing comes up against the fact that your side and our side differ as to what is permitted by the ABM Treaty and what is not.”

Gorbachev made sure he understood what the difference was. “From our discussion I conclude that the U.S. wants to reserve the possibility of conducting tests of the SDI program not only in the laboratory but also outside, in the air and in space. If that’s so, there can be no agreement between us.”

“But you have to understand that experimentation and research cannot always be kept within the laboratory,” Reagan said. “Sometimes it is simply necessary to go outside the laboratory.”

Gorbachev tried again. “You must understand me,” he said. “To us the laboratory issue is not a matter of stubbornness or hard-headedness. It is not casuistry. It is all too serious. We are agreeing to deep reductions and, ultimately, the destruction of nuclear weapons. And at the same time the American side is pushing us to agree to give them the right to create space weapons. That is unacceptable to us. If you will agree to restricting research work to the laboratory, not letting it out into space, I will be ready in two minutes to sign the appropriate formulation and adopt the document.”

“I can’t go along with that,” Reagan said. For the first time he appealed to Gorbachev as a practical politician. “You and I have different positions, different problems. In your country, nobody can criticize you without winding up in prison. In my country the situation is different. I have a lot of critics who wield great influence. And if I agree to such a formulation, they will launch a campaign against me. They will accuse me of breaking my promise to the people of the United States regarding SDI. So I pledge
not to deploy the corresponding systems for ten years, and to restrict ourselves to research permitted by the
ABM Treaty. I’m not asking for anything out of the ordinary.”

Gorbachev responded in like vein. “If I understand you, Mr. President, you are now addressing me in a trusting manner, as a man who occupies in his country a position equal to yours,” he said. “Therefore I say to you frankly and in the same trusting manner: If we sign a package containing major concessions by the Soviet Union regarding fundamental problems, you will become, without exaggeration, a great president. You are now literally two steps from that. If we come to an agreement on strengthening the ABM Treaty and on laboratory research, which will not rule out work within the SDI framework, it will mean our meeting has been a success.”

He paused to let Reagan consider how he would look to history. Then he shrugged. “If not, let’s part at this point and forget about Reykjavik.” He added, “But there won’t be another opportunity like this. At any rate, I know I won’t have one.”

He turned reflective. “I firmly believed that we could come to an agreement,” he said. “Otherwise I would not have raised the question of an immediate meeting with you. Otherwise I would not have come here in the name of the Soviet leadership with a solid store of serious, compromising proposals. I hoped that they would meet with understanding and support from your side, that we could resolve all issues. If this does happen, if we manage to achieve deep reductions and the destruction of nuclear weapons, all of your critics will not dare open their mouths. They would then be going against the opinions of the overwhelming majority of people in the world, who would welcome our success. If, on the other hand, we are not able to come to an agreement, it will obviously become the job of another generation of leaders. You and I have no more time.”

His voice acquired a bitter tone. “The American side has essentially not made any concessions, not a single major step to meet us halfway,” he said. “It’s hard to do business on that basis.”

Eduard Shevardnadze tried his hand. “Let me speak very emotionally, because I feel that we have come very close to accomplishing this historic task,” he said. “And when future generations read the record of our talks, they will not forgive us if we let this opportunity slip by.”

Reagan attempted again to reach Gorbachev. “I want to say one thing to you as one political leader to another,” he said. “I am being subjected to criticism which began even before I came here. They were saying that
I would make concessions, that I would agree to a lengthy period of time of not withdrawing from the ABM Treaty. And so I ask you as a political leader to take one step which will substantially facilitate our relations and the solution to many questions for both of us. Let me say frankly that if I give you what you ask it will definitely hurt me badly at home.”

Gorbachev frowned in resignation. “Let’s end it here,” he said. “What you propose is something we cannot go along with. I’ve said all I can.”

Reagan appeared equally pained. Even now he wasn’t ready to admit failure. He thought if he kept talking, he might squeeze that last concession from Gorbachev. “Are you really going to turn down a historic opportunity for agreement for the sake of one word in the text?” he said.

“You say that it’s just a matter of one word,” Gorbachev objected. “But it’s not a matter of a word. It’s a matter of principle.” He was angry now. “We cannot agree to a situation in which you are expanding your SDI and going into space with it while reductions of nuclear weapons are going on. If I go back to Moscow and say that despite our agreement on deep reductions of nuclear weapons, despite our agreement on the ten-year period, we have given the United States the right to test SDI in space so that the U.S. is ready to deploy it by the end of that period, they will call me a fool and an irresponsible leader.”

He tried once more. “If you agree to restrict research to the laboratory, then there will be a framework. For ten years you will have enough work to do research within the SDI framework and inside the laboratory. And you will be able to say that you are continuing the SDI, that you are not giving it up, if that is so essential to you for the American people.”

Now Reagan sighed. “After our meeting in Geneva I was convinced that you and I had established personal contact of the kind the leaders of our two countries never had before,” he said. “You and I understood each other very well. But now, when I have asked you a personal favor which would have enormous influence on our future relations, you have refused me.”

“There are various kinds of favors,” Gorbachev replied. “If you came to me and said you were having trouble with your farmers, they were demanding increased grain purchases by the Soviet Union, that you were asking this as a personal favor, I could understand that. But I can’t understand how you can ask the U.S.S.R. to grant the U.S. the right, during the period of deep reductions and elimination of nuclear weapons, to test an ABM system in space, to implement SDI in its entirety, at the same time
we were destroying our offensive nuclear potential. If you think about it, that wouldn’t even be right for the U.S. It would create nervousness, a lack of trust and is completely unacceptable to us. You don’t need that kind of favor either.”

“But if you don’t have nuclear weapons, you won’t have anything to threaten us with,” Reagan said yet again. “The defensive system could not be deployed earlier than in ten years’ time; we have gone along with that deferment. As for the word ‘laboratory,’ it has its own particular meaning and subtext. They would simply tell me in that case that I had capitulated, that I had given away what I had promised not to give away. All of the other formulations we have taken from you. We are saying we will comply with the ABM Treaty for ten years. And now I see that nothing is coming of it, and all because of one word which has such specific meaning. I simply don’t understand how you can think that I want to gain some special military advantage. After all, it’s you, with your actions, who are violating the ABM Treaty. Yet we are not telling you to eliminate what you have. We’re not setting that condition and we will not even mention it outside this room.”

Reagan sighed once more, wearily. “But now it’s a matter of one word,” he repeated. “Perhaps you will propose a different formulation? But the text now contains everything you have asked for—not to exercise the right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for ten years, strict compliance with its provisions and the conduct only of the kind of research, development and testing which are permitted by the treaty. For this reason I want to ask you once more to change your viewpoint, to do it as a favor to me so that we can go to the people as peacemakers.”

Gorbachev refused. “We cannot go along with what you propose,” he said. “If you will agree to banning tests in space, we will sign the document in two minutes. We cannot go along with something else. We have already agreed to what we could. We are not to blame.”

He made ready to leave. “Even though our meeting is ending this way, I have a clear conscience before my people and before you,” he said. “I have done everything I could.”

Reagan realized the historic opportunity was slipping away. For a rare moment in his life he experienced self-doubt. He scribbled a note and passed it to Shultz. “
Am I wrong?” the note asked.

Shultz whispered, “No, you are right.”

Reagan then gathered his papers. “It’s too bad we have to part this
way,” he told Gorbachev. “We were so close to an agreement.” His voice grew angry and disappointed. “I think you didn’t want to achieve an agreement anyway. I’m very sorry.”

“I am also very sorry it’s happened this way,” Gorbachev said. “I wanted an agreement and did everything I could, if not more.”

“I don’t know when we’ll ever have another chance like this and whether we will meet soon,” Reagan said.

“I don’t either,” Gorbachev replied.

R
EPORTERS HAD BEEN
barred from the talks and had received no word of how the discussions were going. But most assumed, because Reagan and Gorbachev delayed their departures, that something was afoot. They crowded the front of
Höfði House to assess the demeanor of the principals as they emerged.