Operation Mercury (22 page)
Authors: John Sadler
By midday the reality was that the attack had completely run out of steam and that the New Zealanders were depleted, exhausted and increasingly short of ammunition. Worse, they were vulnerable to a strong effort from the defenders, steadily reinforced by fresh companies from 11th Battalion, 85 Mountain Regiment, themselves elite troops.
By late afternoon Burrows, still with only three companies, had decided to abandon the attack on Pirgos and to lend his remaining strength to Dittmer's attack on Hill 107. The brave remnants of D company could only watch, clinging to their toehold on the eastern flank, as more and more German reinforcements were landed:
The mortar and machine gun fire on the open ground was heavy, and we were lucky to get back alive. When we reached the âdrome the planes were landing (some leaving âdrome too) and the parachutists were jumping out and getting straight into battle for the Germans were counter-attacking on the right flank.
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There was little that the 20th could do to assist their hard pressed comrades of the 28th. Despite their constant valour the ground before them was swept with fire and without mortars no progress could be made; casualties were heavy and mounting. After conferring with Burrows, Dittmer decided he would return to Brigade HQ and request Andrew and Leckie to come up in support. Both, however, declined, stating that they needed to hold back and consolidate. Colonel Dittmer has not left a record of his thoughts at that moment.
21st Battalion had begun their own advance in support at 7.00 a.m. and had achieved significant gains, moving westwards immediately south of Hill 107 and reaching the village of Vlakheronitsa, as far forward as the positions D company of the 22nd had held on the 20th. They encountered relatively light opposition but, realising that the advance further north had stalled, Colonel Allen halted to take stock.
Realising the risk to their southern flank the Germans began to strengthen the defenders in the village. Les Young recalled the advance:
Two companies of the 21st went forward without incident right into the village of Xamaduhori. It was apparent that any infiltration that had occurred had withdrawn during the hours of darkness. We endeavoured to pass through the village but were met with a hail of machine gun fire and a fair amount of mortar fire. A number of casualties were suffered at this stage â¦. We received orders to withdraw to our previous position but the delay had been fatal â the enemy had appreciated the position and followed through smartly and it became a question of running the gauntlet to get round and over the hills to our original positions. There were a number who did not make the grade.
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This was an opportunity lost. Hargest's conventional plan of attack had laid the emphasis on the heavily defended coast route whilst the enemy's flank hung in the air. Had the thrust been offered as a feint and the weight of the attack developed around and to the south, then this might have proved decisive. The history of the campaign is, of course, littered with so many âwhat ifs'. The plain fact was that the counter-attack had completely stalled; when Andrew and Leckie refused to support Burrows and Dittmer the chance was lost. It was a dire blow and must have been doubly so for the survivors of the two forward battalions; that Crete was lost was no fault of theirs.
Beneath the strengthening sun, the harsh light mocking the hopes of the night, the advance elements of the 20th had battered their way forward to the eastern rim of Maleme aerodrome. It was a case of so near and yet so far. Their loss had been grievous and the mocking orb drew in the omnipresent swarm of Me109s. There was little more that could be done. Lieutenant Maxwell, the single officer still on his feet, remembered with bitter gall:
We reached the clear part of the âdrome all right â there was stacks of aircraft, some crashed, some not â I remember P. Amos saying âI've carried this anti-tank rifle all the way and I am going to have one shot'. He fired two shots into one aircraft and made a mess of it. Broad daylight â at this time we had come under most intense mortar and machine-gun fire with the clear ground of the âdrome in front of us. I pulled the Company back about 100 yards, back into the cover of some bamboos.
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Charles Upham, who had performed so valiantly, shared the bitterness and frustration felt by the men on the ground; those who had fought so hard and achieved so much despite bad planning and worse timing:
If only the attack had gone in at the right time we'd have had the hours of darkness when we were very successful, and it was only when it got to eight o'clock in the morning that the Germans got on top of us. We were completely successful until then, we advanced right through the aerodrome, some fellows went right past the aerodrome, along the beach, we got right up by the aerodrome where the Germans were in force. But once it got daylight these fellows had a lot of machine guns and there was a lot of them, whereas the ones we were meeting in the dark were sort of panicky.
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Sporadic fighting continued all day but, as the fatal sun began to wane, it was obvious the German grip on Maleme was both unbroken and, by now, unbreakable. The Allies had been harassed by the Luftwaffe throughout the long day and, by the time the shadows began to lengthen, the invaders felt sufficiently emboldened to throw out a cordon of fighting patrols.
Swinging onto the offensive for the first time, the alpine troops, well supported by artillery, struck at the Maoris of the 28th, on the left of the battered remnants of the 20th. Despite the battering and exhaustion the New Zealanders rose from their meagre cover as the mountain troops crested the ridge. Led by Major Dyer who was armed with nothing more than a walking stick, they hurled themselves forward. Dyer himself left a most vivid description of the fight:
A scattered band of dark figures under the trees ⦠with knees bent, and leaning to the right they slowly advanced firing at the hip. They did not haka, for this was not rehearsed. Instead, there rose from their throats a deep shout âAh! Ah! Ah!' as they advanced. Then the cartridges in their magazines being exhausted, they broke into a run with bayonets levelled and their shouts rising as they went ⦠And the pride of the German army turned and fled.
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Four years later, in the course of his trial, Student had this to say: âWhen on the 21st May all the reserves had jumped and conquered the aerodrome of Maleme, from that time the battle for Crete was won for Germany.'
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In this assumption he was to be proved entirely correct. Despite the disastrous events of 20 May, Student had perceived immediately the fact that the bare foothold gained at Maleme on that crucial first day held the key to eventual success. His keenness and the inestimable advantage of superior communications ,coupled with the exemplary manner his subordinates carried out his orders, indicates a strength and unity of command, a level of strategic understanding far in excess of that possessed by the Allies.
Student's calm appraisal is made with the benefit of hindsight and, though correct, his appreciation was not immediately clear to the German troops at Maleme, who still considered their position extremely precarious. Fresh detachments from 5th Mountain Division were being flown in to consolidate the expanding toehold and the indefatigable Major Wenning was, once again, in the air:
As the high coastal mountains of Crete appear over the horizon and we can slowly recognise the markings of the bay of Canea we can see in the middle of this a huge, black tower of smoke. That must be the airport at Maleme ⦠covered in vast smoke and dust clouds, a large number of Ju52s circling above it. Coming closer we realise the reason for this circling. On the airfield which is extremely small there are lying a number of crashed planes and some of these are burning. One Ju52 which is landing collides with one of these wrecks, spins around and lies motionless in the middle of the narrow, inadequate landing strip. This diminishes our chances of landing especially as I can count ten other planes in the air which were circling before we arrived. Despite this my pilot tries to land three times without success because during each approach to the strip suddenly another plane turns in from the side, cutting us off. On the airfield itself we can see shells exploding. The enemy artillery is pouring an accurate fire onto the runway, their batteries somewhere in the mountains and well disguised because we can't make out the muzzle flashes although we try hard. For this reason already this morning several Ju52s suffered direct hits while landing causing many dead and wounded. All in all a rotten situation.
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On the ground, the equally formidable Lofty Fellows was also in action:
I had a Bren gun and two loaders, a good position, it was a dugout, roofed in with a fire opening ⦠and these two chaps were fantastic, they had a pair of binoculars and being artillery lads they could pick up movement, mortar crews being put into position and all this sort of thing and they were only too pleased to tell me where to fire, not that I could see anything, and they'd say, OK it's 1500 yards or right of the bridge entrance or so many degrees and I'd bang a few shots away, and there was a Vickers gun up the hill somewhere and when they saw our stuff hit the ground they'd start up theirs, and there was a Naval chap on top of the hill and he'd supply the odd 4-inch shell just to stir things up. So we had quite a good time. The Germans put an attack in to try and shake us out but with all our firepower they decided to retire and they went back up the beach so I wound up the sights of the Bren gun and just let in rip just to help them on their way. It was very pleasing to watch them ducking and diving. I believed in firing guns as long as they'd fire and I kept on all afternoon with a four gallon can of water alongside. They always reckoned you could throw the barrel of a Bren gun into water to cool it, pull it out and start again, and they were right, you could. I don't know how many rounds I fired but I was continuously reloading it and firing even after it got dark.
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For the crack troops of Ringel's division their arrival on Crete was anything but tranquil. The planes barely touched down and the soldiers bundled out into the baking dust, a dread chorus of mortars and small-arms fire, their raucous greeting. Victory seemed far from being assured. Lofty Fellows witnessed one of the RAF's infrequent sorties as a pair of Blenheims strafed the overcrowded beach. Wenning's plane had ditched quite close to the waterline. The major, though temporarily knocked unconscious, emerged unscathed as did his shaken passengers. Wenning made his way along the shore, hitherto a tranquil backwater but now littered with the detritus of war. He made sure to wear his sunglasses and adopt a suitably nonchalant air. He found that prisoners had been put to work to level out the moonscape of craters. Apparently, when some had demurred, Major Snowatzki had provided motivation by shooting three out of hand.
The first serious Allied attempt to counter-attack was mismanaged at Brigade level and, despite the extraordinary valour of the main two attacking battalions, it had failed. A prime opportunity to wrest back the initiative and win the battle had been squandered. The Germans, regardless of the risk to men and machines, did not intend to squander the respite. Nonetheless, as the passages quoted above show, the invaders at Maleme were far from having things all their own way. British artillery, well dug in and despite the indifferent quality of the captured Italian 75s, continued to harass and delay the build-up. Lofty Fellows and his fellow machine gunners guaranteed the Germans a warm welcome.
As the spirited attempt by 20th and 28th Battalions ran out of steam in the afternoon of 22 May at 5.00 p.m., Freyberg called a fresh conference and threw his full weight behind orders for another assault. This time the attacking force would comprise the whole of 5 Brigade, strengthened by the addition of the 18th New Zealand and 2/8th Australians. Puttick appeared ready for the challenge but suffered a fresh crisis of confidence when, on reaching 4 Brigade HQ, he received intimation of renewed German aggression in the Galatos sector.
The euphoria which had earlier buoyed Hargest had been replaced by a profound pessimism â he did not consider 5 Brigade could do any more. The mood was infectious and Puttick was sufficiently alarmed to order the complete withdrawal of the entire brigade. Freyberg was most reluctant to accept the need for further retreat as this would effectively neutralise any prospects of renewing the offensive.
He had become increasingly worried as the afternoon of the 22nd wore on. Wavell had refused further reinforcements and doubts were beginning to crowd the General's tired mind. He had commanded the New Zealand division all the way through the heartbreak of the Greek fiasco and its continued survival was now at stake on Crete. He was being pulled in two directions. He had his duty to Wavell, to Churchill and the Empire and, at the same time his obligation to the home government. New Zealand did not have unlimited resources of manpower on which to draw, the division represented the cream of the Dominion's manhood.
It was a heavy burden for any man to bear and the General had had doubts about the viability of the defence from the outset. The Germans dominated the skies, making daylight operations virtually impossible. He had men but these were deployed along the long strip of the western flank of the island. He lacked transport, armour and artillery support. With the enemy now tightening his grip on Maleme the pendulum was inexorably swinging in his favour.
The news from his forward divisional and brigade commanders, Hargest and Puttick, was dispiriting, they told him the men were exhausted and demoralised, that the link between 4 and 5 Brigades had been severed and that the Germans were probing, in strength, toward Galatas. In fact most of this was untrue. The New Zealanders were full of fight and not the least bit despondent. The surviving parachutists in Prison Valley were not an immediate threat, effectively neutralised. In tactical terms the time was still ripe for a determined assault along the line 21st Battalion had taken, to hook around to the south of Hill 107 and pinch out the salient around Maleme.
