Operation Mercury (24 page)

As the attack closed around the flank of the gallant but hugely outgunned Petrol Company, the Axis gained the summit of Pink Hill where they quickly established machine-gun nests. At this point the situation seemed critical, the battalion reserve was no more than platoon strength when, quite suddenly, the day was saved by the intervention of none other than Captain Forrester of the Buffs, late of the Military Mission, leading a scratch force of Greek soldiers and Cretan auxiliaries:

The wild charge of the immaculate Forrester and his ragged heroes was an incident straight from the pages of Dumas or G.A. Henty; the kind of inspired derring do that Churchill rightly loved. In the immediate tactical context it stemmed the tide. A second German thrust, to the east around the vital bastion of Cemetery Hill, was seen off in a similar stylish fashion by more Greeks led by Captain H.M. Smith.

By 2.00 p.m. on the afternoon of the 23rd the retreat had been completed and the German forces advancing from the west could link up with Heidrich's detached contingent.
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As the day wore on the German fire increased. This was bad enough but both brigade and division were more fearful of a general outflanking move from the south – the line before Platanias was already looking untenable. For Hargest and Puttick this must have seemed a replay of the Greek nightmare; their troops, massively outgunned, facing an enemy who was growing steadily in numbers with full tactical air support.

That night, with the fear of encirclement growing, the weary New Zealanders would be obliged to consolidate on the Galatas heights, ‘…behind the 4th and Kipp's 10th Brigade'. The battle could not now be won but neither was it yet lost. The Germans had sustained fearful losses but there still remained a possibility that some form of deadlock might ensue, until the inexorable demands of Operation Barbarossa led to a withdrawal.

Churchill had already cabled Freyberg that: ‘The whole world is watching your splendid battle on which great events turn.'
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He had also urged Wavell to continue the battle as a means of tying down enemy forces, thus enabling him to consolidate the situation in North Africa. More improbably, he then suggested sending more reinforcements including tanks, in the belief the Axis were at their last gasp. On the ground the fight for Maleme was over. The battle of Galatas was about to begin in earnest.

As the New Zealanders withdrew first to the Platanias line then onto the heights before Galatas, the Germans increased the build-up at Maleme, wasting no time in repairing the ravaged airstrip, now finally free of the attentions of the British gunners. Before the day was out the first Me109s had arrived as had two batteries of 95 Mountain Artillery Regiment, 95th Anti-Tank Battalion bringing a score of 50-mm guns, the first infantry formations from 141 Mountain Regiment and 55th Motor Cycle Battalion.

Soon the entire divisional strength would be deployed and the balance not just of numbers but of firepower would swing massively in favour of the Axis. The battle was now directed personally by Ringel, who had flown in late the evening before. The fight for Crete was no longer about vertical envelopment, it was to be a straight contest between conventional forces, even if it was the airborne arm who, at such catastrophic cost, had prised the door open and held it wide for just long enough.

Student's participation, humiliatingly, was reduced to the role of spectator. He would have to suffer the gall of watching Ringel, the plodder, consolidate what should have been his victory. The Austrian informed the surviving paratroops that all forces remaining in the west and centre were under his direct command – Ringel Group. Ramcke had the job of consolidating the survivors from Maleme into a single battalion which was detailed to secure the left, coastal flank of the advance. This was now a Wehrmacht, not a Luftwaffe operation. Whatever was salvaged would be to Ringel's credit and not that of Student whose star, which had once flashed so brightly in the higher echelons of the Nazi command, had now dipped irrevocably and would soon vanish entirely from sight.

Ringel identified four main priorities:

1. To secure Maleme airfield

2. To occupy Souda Bay

3. To rescue the survivors at Rethymnon and Heraklion

4. To secure the occupation of Crete and the final defeat of the Allied forces.

Ironically, it was the rigid adherence to these orders that would enable the final withdrawal to and evacuation from the south coast by Sphakia to succeed. Ringel was determined to secure the island from west to east rather than north to south. Galatas was to be the target of the General's next move, a strong and concerted attack from three sides, the Alpine troops bearing the brunt in the centre, supported by a powerful thrust on the right flank, using two fresh battalions to snuff out the Greeks holding Alikianou and then to cut the coast road in the rear of the New Zealanders.

On the Allied side Freyberg had caught some of Hargest's angst. He felt that the continuous harassment from the air and the gathering weight of German ground attacks would prove too much for his tired men. It may well have been at this point that his mind turned to what, a couple of days previously, would have seemed unthinkable – the need to consider how best to save whatever forces could be saved. London, increasingly outpaced by events, was urging Wavell and Cunningham to make further efforts: ‘… great risks must be taken to ensure our success.'
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If a stand was to be made then the range of low hills around Galatas was an excellent choice as the topography favoured the defender; the sweeping bracket of hills before the town begins in the north where Red Hill rises beyond the ribbon of the coast road. The ridge that bends east encompassed Wheat Hill, Pink Hill and, at the eastern extremity, the lump of Cemetery Hill that pushed forward into the dead zone of no man's land. The arc of this high ground was bisected by Ruin Ridge, with the crest of Ruin Hill rising to the west.

On paper Puttick's forces were more than adequate but he had withdrawn most of the fighting formations to the rear – the whole of 5 Brigade. No use of potential reinforcement from Chania/Souda had been proposed, so the actual defenders comprised the various ad hoc formations which had, with considerable gallantry, secured the line till now. These were, on Pink Hill, the remnant of the Petrol Company, with Major Russell's improvised detachment of largely support personnel. Further north lay the Composite Battalion holding the ground from Wheat Hill to the shore.

It may be surmised that Puttick intended the fight for Galatas to be no more than a holding action while a further withdrawal was in hand. He had positioned two fresh, first class battalions, both Australian, 2/7th and 2/8th, as the ‘hinge' on which such a further retreat would turn.

The weary defenders could clearly discern the steady reinforcement of Heidrich's survivors as the 23rd wore on. The paratroops would not, in fact, be expected to play a significant role in the attack. They were regarded by their replacements from the Mountain Division as being played out, not that the Alpinists had any sympathy for the cream of the Luftwaffe.

If the New Zealanders possessed one vital asset it was Howard Kippenberger. It was he who, during the night of 23/24 May, persuaded Puttick to release 18th Battalion to shore up the right flank and to place the defence under Inglis' command, making the battle very much a 4 Brigade affair. With the Brigadier keeping his HQ back toward the coast road and Kippenberger ranging along the line, there was little more that could be done.

With the Composite Battalion being withdrawn to the line of Ruin Ridge, Gray's 18th took up positions on Red and Wheat Hills but left out Ruin Hill. Grey simply did not have sufficient troops to hold his extended line, which reached from the coast in the north-west to the ground held by Russell Force to the east. The opportunity was not wasted and, during the 24th, three German companies from the 1st Battalion of 100 Mountain Regiment dug in on the reverse slopes and positioned their heavy mortars to enfilade Red Hill. If they could clear this then they could repeat the performance and drive the defenders from Wheat Hill in turn.

Throughout the day the 18th fought with courage and resolution, closing on the flanks of the new salient. So fierce were they that Colonel Utz, bearing in mind Ringel's maxim ‘sweat saves blood', decided to leave Galatas well alone until the Stukas could be called in the following day. Despite the stout resistance offered by the New Zealanders, their numbers were still few.

When Kippenberger walked the line of the Composite Battalion's new positions next morning he was keenly aware that both officers and men were exhausted. Moving reserves up from east of Galatas during daylight hours was virtually impossible, all that was immediately available were the tired remnants of 20th Battalion. Even the aggressive Kippenberger felt an intimation of impending disaster.

In contrast to their depleted adversaries, the Germans, since Utz had drawn a halt on the 24th, were building up their strength so as to be able to launch a concerted series of attacks all along the line; exactly the level of pressure Kippenberger feared. In echelon from the north, Ramcke Group would attack with two battalions, then 2nd Battalion of 100 Mountain Regiment, the 1st in close support and finally, the remains of Heidrich's paratroopers on the southern flank. Utz, leading the Alpine troops, would deliver the main blow, his battalions augmented by the addition of all of the anti-tank and artillery formations – a most powerful spearhead.

Against this formidable firepower Colonel Gray had only a handful of mortar bombs remaining. Upon request for re-supply he was issued with thirty more – all there was to be had.
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The Germans had conceived a high regard for these stubborn and resilient New Zealanders and were cautious about throwing men into the attack without air support – ‘sweat saves blood'. Ramcke's brigade had called down Stukas in the morning and Utz spent a frustrating afternoon awaiting his. As there was a marked and understandable reluctance to force the issue on the ground with the risk that the attackers were then caught by their own bombs, the afternoon wore on with only sporadic fighting.

The twin bastions of Wheat Hill and Pink Hill were crucial objectives of a successful assault and dominated any attempt to infiltrate over the lower ground. In the late afternoon, when the Cretan sun was at its strongest, the pressure of Ramcke's attack in the north, sustained by overwhelming fire support, began to wear down the defenders in that sector. Inglis sent in his two reserve companies, all the 20th had left to offer, to seal the breach. Even the battle hardened
Fallschirmjäger
were awed by the ferocity of these New Zealanders who simply refused to give up their positions regardless of the weight of bombardment.

With his final reserves now battling in the line, Kippenberger faced the full weight of Utz's attack once the Stukas had again assaulted Galatas; the siren wail of these deadly dive-bombers, competing with the shock of exploding bombs and the incessant crack of the Axis mortars firing from Ruin Hill. Into this inferno Utz committed his elite attack formations. As he was receiving repeated requests from the harassed defenders of Wheat Hill for permission to retreat, Kippenberger went forward to see for himself the effect of the German bombardment:

The pressure was intense, by sheer weight of metal and numbers Utz's battalions were able to bludgeon their way forward. Every man who fell amongst the defenders was irreplaceable.

Captain Bassett, attempting to move within the New Zealanders' shrinking perimeter, found the effort: