Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East (69 page)

The emerging frustration with the performance of the infantry reflects the limitations of non-motorised formations in seeking a rapid decision, and the relative inexperience of this arm of the German army. Despite having actively participated in previous campaigns, the infantry had remained in decidedly secondary roles, and were seldom called on to fight battles of the kind now being experienced on the eastern front. The war diary of the
LVII Panzer Corps noted that the arrival of the
106th Infantry Division on the line was the division's first combat deployment against the Red Army. Yet, to the veteran panzer corps, it was soon evident that the infantry were ‘not fully accustomed to the enemy's method of fighting and therefore suffered a disproportionately high number of losses’.
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Similarly, a badly co-ordinated attack by the
251st Infantry Division on 2 August ended in a costly rout, which resulted in the divisional commander being relieved of his command. Within the division it was soon dubbed the ‘black day’ with losses so high that two regiments had to disband one battalion
each.
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Under the intense pressure of attacks from both the east and west, on the afternoon of 1 August
Schmidt's XXXIX Panzer Corps was no longer able to hold closed the eastern side of the Smolensk pocket.
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Thus, only five days after finally closing the ring,
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it was once again open with one German pilot reporting Soviet troops ‘running off to the east’.
Bock was aghast and again issued orders that the gap was to be closed jointly by Hoth's
20th Motorised Infantry Division in the north and Guderian's
17th Panzer Division to the south.
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In spite of their joint responsibility, Bock's orders set off a new round of bickering among the panzer groups with each side insisting the other should do more to seal the gap. Guderian's panzer group asserted that the village at
Ratschino, where Soviet troops had built a bridge across the river to escape eastwards, was clearly inside 9th Army's operational area and, in any case, the surrounding terrain made it ‘completely impossible’ for 17th Panzer Division to assault. Furthermore, Panzer Group 2's war diary complained it was ‘
incomprehensible’ why this position was ‘given up’ in the first place.
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The counter-claim from Schmidt's XXXIX Panzer Corps was equally emphatic, claiming that its line was already 75 kilometres long, under attack from numerous Soviet divisions and that the original thrust to
Ratschino was only undertaken because Panzer Group 2 could not fulfil its task of closing the ring from the
south.
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The dispute is an instructive example of the depths to which the army was sinking. The hole was just six kilometres wide and, although bitterly defended, the reluctance of the army's two most powerful panzer groups to undertake this task shows that they were under severe strain with greatly reduced offensive capabilities. Observing his armoured forces on 2 August, Bock commented, ‘we are at the end of our tether’. He also drew attention to the great stress this was causing within his command. ‘It is bad that the nerves of those burdened with great responsibility are starting to waver; today there was an argument with Strauss…Unfortunately I also became
angry.’
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While Hoth's panzer group was stretched thin defending in the north, Guderian's forces were performing a frantic juggling act, concurrently defending at Yel'nya, attacking towards Roslavl and attempting to pull out anything not absolutely necessary for these operations to rest and refit.
At Yel'nya on 1 August the attempted extraction of the
10th Panzer Division from the front had to be reversed with the withdrawn units rushed back into action to counter strong enemy pressure on Vietinghoff's right flank. Under these circumstances, the panzer group noted that no rehabilitation could take place and that more infantry was needed,
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but Guderian's request for another infantry division was flatly rejected by Army Group Centre.
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Meanwhile, a perpetual state of crisis hung over the German position at Yel'nya. The 60-kilometre-wide salient was caught in an unrelenting battle, typified by artillery fire which transformed the landscape into a cratered wasteland. On 1 August
Vietinghoff reported to Army Group Centre that, in the average area of a company, upwards of 200 shells landed in five minutes as the troops lay helplessly in their foxholes.
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The following day (2 August) the
268th Infantry Division reported 300–400 shells landing in one hour in the area of a battalion.
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On 3 August during an enemy attack, Vietinghoff's corps was hit with 1,550 shells, the majority of which came from heavy-calibre 15cm guns.
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Hearing such reports, Halder characterised Soviet artillery fire as ‘insufferable’
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– a fact borne out by the debilitating cost of holding Yel'nya. On 2 August
XXXXVI Panzer Corps recorded that the SS
Das Reich
division had thus far suffered nearly 3,000 casualties with company strengths in some instances as low as 60–70 men.
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Only two days later the same diary reported company strengths had sunk further, in some cases to just 20 men.
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As
Halder anxiously observed: ‘The holding of this “bridgehead” costs us much blood.’
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Material losses were also mounting, which led to a particularly disquieting conclusion in the XXXXVI Panzer Corps war diary: ‘The losses have swelled so much that they are no longer bearable in view of later assignments.’
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In spite of its cost, no one in the German command considered giving up the Yel'nya salient.
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Halder was still hoping to use it as a springboard for further operations to the east and Hitler was, in general, opposed to any form of withdrawal, even if tactically
advantageous.

To the south Schweppenburg's
XXIV Panzer Corps began its thrust towards
Roslavl on 1 August. The initial attack was supported by planes from Loerzer's II
Air Corps, but these ran into very strong anti-aircraft fire over Roslavl and none of the estimated 35 aircraft returned without some form of damage.
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On the ground
Schweppenburg's 4th Panzer Division had been given considerable rest towards the end of July, substantially raising the number of combat-ready tanks
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and allowing it to resume offensive operations. An envelopment of Roslavl, however, required a second thrust which, in the absence of additional motorised forces, fell to
Geyer's IX Army Corps. In spite of the weakness of the Soviet flanks
and the relatively small operation theatre, Geyer's offensive made clear the unsuitability of infantry as a substitute for motorised units.
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The infantry divisions moved too slowly to exploit weaknesses or effect rapid encirclements, and their ability to concentrate firepower at the spearhead of an attack was limited. This left 4th Panzer Division to undertake the lion's share of the work, which in its rejuvenated state it succeeded in doing. Roslavl was taken from the south and by 3 August the panzers linked up with Geyer's struggling forces.
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The pocket was closed, but still not hermetically sealed and large numbers of Soviet troops continued to break out.
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Days later Halder complained in his diary: ‘Encircled enemy elements at Roslavl have escaped. The Russians have a remarkable ability to move on roads impassable to us and to build concealed river crossings.’
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Although the operation was clearly another painful Soviet defeat, the fact that it was the only offensive action Army Group Centre could manage – and a small one at that – to redress the many trouble spots on its front says much about Bock's strategic paralysis. Indeed, given the degree of pressure on Bock's extensive front and the absence of any substantive reserves, Halder judged Bock's decision to attack towards Roslavl as ‘downright careless’.
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The operation was also instructive for its cost. Just two days after the start of the offensive
4th Panzer Division had lost almost a quarter of its tanks
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and Schweppenburg's corps (including
3rd Panzer Division fighting further south) was reporting that its forces, ‘irrespective of the necessary reconditioning work, must also have a 4 day rest for the physical and mental strain’.
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This, however, was impossible to achieve as local Soviet attacks continued, one of which on 6 August succeeded in places at breaking through the 3rd Panzer Division's front.
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Sustaining offensive operations was indeed taxing, costing material, consuming stockpiled resources of fuel and munitions and exacting a steep toll on the men. While the battle for Roslavl remains an undisputed victory at the operational level, it is instructive of the limitations of the German army
in the east and a warning against the enduring optimism for a large-scale offensive solution to the still elusive German
victory.

As
all of Guderian's panzer corps concurrently parried and attacked,
Lemelsen's XXXXVII Panzer Corps was juggling the demands of the front as well as attempting to begin the refitting process. The
29th Motorised Division was attacking the remnants inside the Smolensk pocket, the devastated
18th Panzer Division was licking its wounds in the rear area, and the
17th Panzer Division was split between defensive battles along the front and withdrawing some its units. The panzer divisions had lost a great deal of their combat strength and the plan was now to amalgamate certain components, ‘at least to make a part fully combat ready again (especially in the 18th Panzer Division)’. Yet even this limited goal was met with difficulty as the Quartermaster-General reported, ‘the spare parts have not been brought forward in the necessary quantities’. Furthermore, a shortage of oil was slowing down all movement and having an ‘extremely harmful effect’. Evidently, Lemelsen's corps was caught between totally inadequate offensive strength and an extremely limited ability to bring about any form of restoration, which resulted in the worrying conclusion: ‘In a further commitment, the corps intends to initially leave behind a part of the panzers until overhauling and replenishment with oil is completed.’
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A clear indication that German operations had fallen well short of their objectives was the contrasting discrepancy in strategic reserves available to each side. On 1 August Halder noted that the OKH reserve was entirely committed with nothing remaining beyond what the army groups now commanded.
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By contrast, the Soviets were believed to retain some 28 divisions behind the front with 13 more in the process of formation.
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These, in addition to the numerous Soviet armies already manning the front, would make the resumption of major eastward operations all the more difficult for the Germans, especially in their weakened state. In a letter home on 3 August, General
Heinrici stated: ‘[When the enemy] units are all half destroyed, he stuffs new people in and attacks again. How the Russians manage this is beyond me.’
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A report by General
Walter Buhle, following a visit to Guderian's panzer group, ‘cries for troop replacements for the panzer and infantry divisions’.
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The most comprehensive study of German military losses in World War II noted that July 1941 cost the Wehrmacht more soldiers than any other month
on the eastern front until December 1942 and January 1943 at the battle of Stalingrad. The number of German dead in July 1941 was put at 63,099 men.
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Across
the whole eastern front the forward movement of German reinforcements from the home replacement army was in no way keeping pace with losses.
Army Group South had so far lost 63,000 men (including wounded) and gained only 10,000 replacements,
Army Group Centre 74,500 men with 23,000 replacements, and
Army Group North 42,000 losses to just 14,000 replacements. Bock's army group was clearly the main priority, but even here the results were disappointing. The army group had a shortfall exceeding 50,000 men and the best Halder could hope for was a further 10,000 men arriving in the next eight to ten days, although this, like everything else, depended on the tenuous German transportation system. In any case, Halder calculated that this would leave Bock's armies with the following projected shortfalls: Weichs's 2nd Army 30,500 men; Strauss's 9th Army 15,000 men; Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group 5,000 men and Hoth's 3rd Panzer Group 4,000 men.
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Such calculations, however, could not account for losses suffered in the intervening days.