Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East (24 page)

96
Fedor von Bock, KTB ‘Vorbereitungszeit’, Fol. 10,
War Diary
, p. 205 (27 March 1941).

97
Ibid., Fol. 12, p. 208 (30 March 1941). Despite a lengthy entry for 30 March Halder's diary is again devoid of discussion of Bock's dissatisfaction, suggesting once more his desire for concealment.

98
Ibid., Fol. 17, p. 214 (14–16 May 1941).

99
Italics in the original. Adolf Hitler,
Mein Kampf
(New York, 1999), p. 654.

100
Although this book dates from 1928 it was not in fact published until after the war. Gerhard Weinberg (ed.),
Hitler's Second Book
(New York, 2003), p. 17. In English this book is sometimes referred to by the title of an earlier edition: ‘
Hitler's Secret Book
’.

101
Ibid., p. 152.

102
Ibid., p. xxii.

103
Von Below,
Als Hitlers Adjutant 1937–45
, p. 184.

104
Italics in the original. Franz Halder, KTB II, pp. 336–337 (30 March 1941). See also Hürter,
Hitlers Heerführer
, pp. 205–222.

105
There is a strong case to be made for ideological similarities between Operation Barbarossa and the Polish campaign, but one should not under-estimate the drastic radicalisation of German policies between September 1939 and June 1941.

106
Erich Ludendorff,
Der Totale Krieg
(Munich, 1935). The translation appears under the title
The Nation at War
(London, 1936).

107
Ludendorff,
The Nation at War
, p. 168.

108
Beatrice Heuser,
The Bomb. Nuclear Weapons in their Historical Strategic and Ethical Context
(Harlow, 2000), p. 109. In regard to applying this definition it could be argued that although the bulk of Germany's military might was employed against the Soviet Union from June 1941 it was only later that Germany's economy was likewise switched to a total war footing.

109
Italics mine. KTB OKW, Volume I, p. 341 (3 March 1941).

110
Helmut Krausnick and Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm,
Die Truppe des Weltanschauungskrieges: Die Einsatzgruppen der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD 1938–1942
(Stuttgart, 1981). See also Theo Schulte,
The German Army and the Nazi Policies in Occupied Russia
(Oxford, 1989),
Chapter 9
, ‘German Army Relations with the SS/SD’; Raul Hilberg,
The Destruction of the European Jews
(Chicago, 1973), pp. 196–197.

111
Franz Halder, KTB II, p. 337 (30 March 1941).

112
Warlimont,
Im Hauptquartier
, Band I, p. 177; Robert Cecil,
Hitler's Decision to Invade Russia 1941
, p. 157. Warlimont's contention that most officers present failed to follow Hitler's speech or could not grasp its true signifance is simply untenable.

113
Bartov, ‘Soldiers, Nazis, and War’, p. 60.

114
Gerhard Weinberg, ‘22 June 1941: The German View’,
War in History
3(2) (1996), 228–229.

115
Helpful in understanding the evolution of the relationship between the Wehrmacht and the NSDAP is the insightful essay by Jürgen Förster, ‘Motivation and Indoctrination in the Wehrmacht, 1933–45’ in Paul Addison and Angus Calder (eds.),
A Time to Kill. The Soldier's Experience of War in the West 1939–1945
(London, 1997), pp. 263–273.

116
Jürgen Förster, ‘The German Army and the Ideological War against the Soviet Union’ in Gerhard Hirschfeld (ed.),
The Politics of Genocide: Jews and Soviet Prisoners of War in Nazi Germany
(London, 1986), p. 17.

117
Förster, ‘New Wine in Old Skins?’, p. 310; Jürgen Förster, ‘Das Unternehmen “Barbarossa” als Eroberungs- und Vernichtungskrieg’ in Militärgeschichtlichen Forschungsamt (ed.),
Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg
, p. 446.

118
Moritz (ed.),
Fall Barbarossa
, p. 321, Document 100: ‘Richtlinien des Chefs des OKW für die Verfolgung und Ermordung der Politischen Funktionäre der Sowjetunion (Kommissarbefehl), 6. Juni 1941’.

119
Moritz (ed.),
Fall Barbarossa
, p. 316, Document 97: ‘Erlaß Hitlers über Gewaltmaßnahmen gegen die sowjetische Bevölkerung und über die Einschränkung der Bestrafung von Wehrmachtangehörigen für Kriegsverbrechen in der Sowjetunion (Kriegsgerichtsbarkeitsbefehl), 13. Mai 1941’.

120
Christian Streit, ‘Partisans – Resistance – Prisoners of War’ in Joseph Wieczynski (ed.),
Operation Barbarossa. The German Attack on the Soviet Union June 22, 1941
(Salt Lake City, 1993), p. 262.

121
Christian Streit, ‘The German Army and the Policies of Genocide’ in Gerhard Hirschfeld (ed.),
The Policies of Genocide: Jews and Soviet Prisoners of War in Nazi Germany
(London, 1986), pp. 3–4; Jürgen Förster, ‘The Dynamics of Volksgemeinschaft: The Effectiveness of the German Military Establishment in the Second World War’ in Allan Millett and Williamson Murray (eds.),
Military Effectiveness
, Volume III:
The Second World War
(Winchester, 1988), pp. 196–197.

122
Streit, ‘Partisans’, pp. 262–263; Christian Streit,
Keine Kameraden: Die Wehrmacht und die sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen 1941–1945
(Stuttgart, 1978), pp. 37–46, 313. See also Gerd R. Ueberschär,
Generaloberst Franz Halder
(Zürich, 1991), pp. 63–64. Like most of the German generals, Halder's role in the war of annihilation only came into focus after his death. Prior to that he worked for fifteen years with the US Army Historical Division and in 1961 was awarded the Meritorious Civilian Service Award, the highest American civilian award, for his services to the army. See Christian Hartmann, ‘Franz Halder – Der verhinderte Generalstabschef’ in Ronald Smelser and Enrico Syring (eds.),
Die Militärelite des Dritten Reiches. 27 biographische Skizzen
(Berlin, 1995), p. 218.

123
Horst Mühleisen, ‘Fedor von Bock – Soldat ohne Fortune’ in Ronald Smelser and Enrico Syring (eds.),
Die Militärelite des Dritten Reiches. 27 biographische Skizzen
(Berlin, 1995), p. 72.

124
Geyer, ‘German Strategy’, p. 574.

125
Von Hassell,
Vom andern Deutschland
, p. 200 (4 May 1941 – referring to a discussion on 8 April). See also von Hassell's comments, p. 209 (16 June 1941); von Hassell,
Diaries
, p. 173 (4 May 1941). See also von Hassell's comments, p. 189 (16 June 1941).

126
Omer Bartov,
The Eastern Front, 1941–45, German Troops and the Barbarisation of Warfare
(London, 1985).

127
See also Bodan Musial,
‘Konterrevolutionäre Elemente sind zu erschiessen’. Die Brutalisierung des deutsch-sowjetischen Krieges im Sommer 1941
(Berlin, 2000). There is also no mitigating credibility to attempts by Ernst Nolte to ameliorate the deliberate German intent to pursue genocide with claims that these were simply a repetition of Soviet practices since the revolution and therefore not a new or profoundly significant development in the spiral of violence taking place in the east: Ernst Nolte, ‘Zwischen Geschichtslegende und Revisionismus? Das Dritte Reich im Blickwinkel des Jahres 1980’ in
Historikerstreit. Die Dokumentation der Kontroverse um die Einzigartigkeit der nationalsozialistischen Judenvernichtung
, 6th edn (Munich, 1987), pp. 13–15.

128
Interestingly, Robert Thurston's research suggests that in spite of German brutality and the harsh rule of the Stalinist state, in particular the purges of the late 1930s, most Red Army men still fought out of a voluntary desire to serve the Soviet state. Robert Thurston, ‘Cauldrons of Loyalty and Betrayal: Soviet Soldiers’ Behavior, 1941 and 1945’ in Robert Thurston and Bernd Bonwetsch (eds.),
The People's War. Responses to World War II in the Soviet Union
(Chicago, 2000), pp. 235–250. Additionally, a leading work by John Barber and Mark Harrison has noted that the Soviet population's widespread support for the war effort existed independently of the state terror apparatus. John Barber and Mark Harrison,
The Soviet Home Front 1941–1945: A Social and Economic History of the USSR in World War II
(London, 1991), pp. 12–13, 60, 68.

129
BA-MA, RW 19/164, ‘OKW/Wehrwirtschafts- und Rüstungssamt’, Fol. 126 (30 January 1941).

130
Alex J. Kay,
Exploitation, Resettlement, Mass Murder: Political and Economic Planning for German Occupation Policy in the Soviet Union, 1940–1941
(Oxford, 2006), pp. 7–8; Cecil,
Hitler's Decision to Invade Russia 1941
, p. 137.

131
Müller, ‘Von der Wirtschaftsallianz’, pp. 159–160; Christian Gerlach,
Kalkulierte Morde. Die deutsche Wirtschafts- und Vernichtungspolitik in Weißrussland 1941 bis 1944
(Hamburg, 2000), pp. 59–76.

132
As cited by Joel Hayward,
Stopped at Stalingrad. The Luftwaffe and Hitler's Defeat in the East, 1942–1943
(Lawrence, 1998), p. 6.

133
Franz Halder, KTB II, p. 283.

3 Barbarossa's sword – Hitler's armed forces in 1941

Carrying fear before them and expectation behind – Hitler's panzer arm

Materiel
deficiencies within the army were in no way a sudden or surprising occurrence, having dogged it since the start of the war. They could hardly be attributed to battlefield losses which had been relatively light. Instead, the lack of coherent overall direction, systemic inefficiency, corrupt officialdom, rivalries between the armed services, stifling bureaucracy, and the poorly co-ordinated actions of economic planners, military commanders and industrialists led to the army's predicament. Added to this was the inherent shortage of manpower, raw materials and specialised machine tools. The result was plain; while the
Soviet Union and
Britain almost doubled their armament production in only the second year of the war, and the
United States tripled theirs,
Germany's armament production stagnated and achieved no further growth between 1940 and 1941.
¹

Beyond administrative complexities, Germany's armament industry also suffered from structural flaws owing to the specialised assembly process which, as a rule, turned out technically advanced, high-quality weapons in a daunting multiplicity of makes and designs, but for these reasons proved unsuited to the demands of mass production. Underscoring the extent of industrial dispersal and accordant organisational overlap is the bewildering array of armaments being constructed which at its height saw 425 different models of aircraft in production, and equipped the army with 150 different makes of trucks and motor-cycles.
²
Eventually the gross impracticality of this confused and inefficient system drew a harsh rebuke from
Hitler, who insisted in May 1941 that ‘more primitive, robust construction’ must follow with the introduction of ‘crude mass-production’.
³
Even if immediately enacted such measures would have
been too late to have any bearing on the assembling invasion force. However, they do reflect the lamentable state of the German war economy and its inability to come of age before the crucial turning point of the war was reached. Indeed, true reform of the armaments sector proved to be another whimsical flirtation of Hitler's erratic mind and soon succumbed to his over inflated self-assurance in the success of Barbarossa. Accordingly,
War Directive 32 (issued 11 June 1941) opened with the conceited claim: ‘After the destruction of the Soviet Armed Forces Germany and
Italy will be military masters of the European continent.’ It then went on to formally direct the main industrial effort towards the air force and navy.
⁴

The shift away from army production was not a new occurrence, having been a feature of the incoherent armaments policy pursued since the defeat of
France. After first reducing the size of the army in the wake of the victory in the west, the later prospect of an eastern campaign forced a reversal, increasing it to 180 divisions and doubling the number of armoured divisions. Yet, in spite of the extensive expansion, the army was relegated by the OKW to third place among the priorities of the three services – a decision that went unchallenged by Hitler and the OKH.
⁵
Again, rank over-confidence in the coming campaign was to blame, with
Jodl stating:

The next intended army operation can be easily carried through with the present strength and munitions allotment…If we must soon carry out such a great campaign then one can do it just the same with 12 panzer divisions as with 24 panzer brigades as more will not be available before spring anyway. In that case one saves an enormous amount of auxiliary weapons and rearward services.
⁶

Echoing this audacious assessment, the army's weapons department later concluded that the reduced capacities and existing stockpiles would be sufficient to cope with ‘
all
conceivable future requirements of the war’.
⁷

The implications for Barbarossa were profound. Not only was the army lightly armed, but rectifying the problem by switching resources back to it would be a laborious process requiring many months before tangible results could be seen on the battlefield. Yet the short campaigning season and the time demands of the operational plan did not allow for this, meaning the war would have to be won rapidly without recourse to, or reliance on, new industrial production, which in any case was being squeezed to a trickle.