Open Secrets: The Explosive Memoirs of an Indian Intelligence Officer (68 page)

I faced tooth and nail opposition from the TechInt subordinates in organising a research and development unit. It was a necessary corollary to the Joint Scientific Advisory Board that was earlier set up with the help of distinguished scientists of the DRDO and the IITs. I forced the decision on the recalcitrant veterans and pooled together some of the bright boys to work on fabrication of miniature radio transmitters, compact receivers and improving the facilities of fax interception and satellite communication monitoring. The younger officers welcomed the move. They were keen to prove their mettle and were denied opportunities by the fossilised higher echelon of the TechInt unit. Some of the boys did extremely well.

We fabricated two compact vehicles for mobile surveillance duties. The utilities included VHF radio trans-receiver, still/video photography, spot telephone tapping by using crocodile clip system and direction finders.

Another innovation was the use of concealed digital VHF communication in the surveillance cars and motorcycles and the use of mercury battery powered concealed radio earplugs synchronised with concealed microphones. These were ideally suited for foot and static surveillance.

Another experiment of locating a master VHF trans-receiver at the TV tower for enhancing communication facilities all over Delhi and the National Capital Region met with astounding success. The boys in the R&D unit also successfully devised mobile HF radio telephony between Delhi and destinations like Aligarh, Saharanpur and Agra by fabricating a special bumper mounted high gain antenna. These were no mean achievement for the boys who had all along been rotting in the border check posts and had been undergoing humiliating stagnation.

Despite Rajiv Gandhi’s sincere efforts the government departments were reluctant to embrace the computer culture. The IB had procured a few PC ATs and XTs for data processing and storing. A few trained clerical staff used the computers as substitutes for Remington typewriters with limited memory. The senior echelon, however, managed to get computers installed in their office rooms simply because the computers came along with air conditioners, the holy boxes were kept under permanent wrap and the cooling machines kept both the biological and artificial brains cool enough to make the government tumbling along. Only a few favourite of the top boss managed to be showered with computers and air conditioners.

Back in 1984 I had acquired in Canada a primate PCXT that was used by the kids. I was virtually afraid of handling the magic box and to use MS-DOS and Word Perfect medium for simple word processing. But my sons had cajoled me into learning the tricks of the rudimentary machine with vast potential. Gradually I understood the immense potential of the virtual brain and started browsing through advanced study materials on the aspects of application of computer in intelligence work. I was offered an opportunity to submit a paper to the Director IB on the aspects of application of computer in: a) data processing and storing, b) immigration control, c) on line communication, d) integrated data and voice communication, fax, satellite communication included, e) cryptography, f) project presentation and g) manpower rationalisation. B. K. Kaushik helped me immensely in preparing the PAR (Project Appraisal Report).

I also pointed out that the existing satellite communication facility was a white elephant. The main hub in Delhi was a stand-alone system having no connectivity with the analysis and operations desks. The other hub in Bangalore contributed very little to the communication facilities of the organisation. I offered a daring proposal for shifting the Delhi hub and integrating it with a Central Communication Command Module (3CM).

My colleagues up and down the hierarchy were shocked to see me entering the room of M.K. Narayanan and sharing a cup of tea with him after about 200 days. We discussed both the project papers and were directed to explain my ideas to the upper echelon of the IB in a specially convened meeting. YY Bose, the bubbling Deputy Director and XX Kaushik, a pragmatic Assistant Director, helped me in preparing the computerised projection of the intricate schemes. Most of the senior officers smiled behind their cuffs and advised me not to confuse them with strange ideas. Narayanan slept over the proposals for a while and summoned me again to discuss the feasibility of providing connectivity between the Delhi satellite hub and his main camp. I explained that installation of a leased PSTN line covering a distance of 18 kilometres would cost about Rupees 10.2 million. UHF connectivity, on the other hand would cost about Rupees 10.5 million. My scheme of establishing the 3CM would cost a little over Rupees 2 million. He threw a challenge and asked me to complete the job in three months before his retirement. At the same time I was given the command of the fledgling computer unit of the IB.

The boys of the TechInt accomplished the magic a couple of days before Narayanan retired. The 3CM was set up somewhere next to the heart centre of the Union Home Ministry that provided integrated connectivity to most of the field detachments of the Intelligence Bureau all over the country. A special extension was provided to the functional room of the Director, which offered him the facility of keeping an eye on the system, if he so desired. The doubting toms and the dark pit intriguers were foxed to see that my ‘arch enemy’ Narayanan danced a small tango and declared that a breakthrough was achieved in the field of integrated data and voice communication. I would not like to elaborate the facilities that were installed and integrated. But the 3CM included all conceivable communication facility that could be afforded by the IB without resorting to importation of costly hardware and software.

The next rational step was to dismantle the old satellite communication regime that was strangely handled by an officer who presided over the ‘security’ set up of the agency. My resolve to decentralise the satellite communication system and integrate it with intelligence production units was strengthened after a brief holiday trip to Leh. That godforsaken place near the volatile LOC, Siachen battleground and the Chinese border depended on antiquated HF wireless for connectivity to Srinagar and Delhi. The PSTN system remained mostly dysfunctional. In fact, the Army also mostly depended on HF communication and line communication exclusively maintained by the Signals Corps.

On my return to Delhi I decided to shift two satellite sub-hubs to Srinagar and Leh with provision of setting up another dish at Jammu. I forced through the proposal and transported the Leh instrument through Manali, Rohtang Pass, Drus and Kargil. It was a daring operation but the boys suffered and enjoyed the thrill of the treacherous journey through the ravaged terrain. It was again a celebration time. The beleaguered staffs in Srinagar and Leh were allowed to have free connectivity to their home telephones through the patching facility at the 3CM. Intelligence flowed at faster pace and in secured manner. Later the scheme was extended to Guwahati, Itanagar, Calcutta and Chennai. I could not complete the scheme of connecting Guwahati hub to Imphal, Kohima and Shillong through exclusive leased PSTN lines.

Suddenly the satellite communication wing of the IB took a quantum jump and my proposal to set up another 30 stations was processed with usual caution, delay and dramatics by the mandarins in the ministries of finance and home. I believe the proposal has finally has seen the light of the day and very soon the IB is going to be garlanded with a white albatross.

The satellite technology has been revolutionised since I chanced to handle the technology way back in 1992. The government of India had at that point of time turned down my proposal to digitalise the voice and data transmission via satellite hubs. They should have, in fact, gone for VSATs and briefcase mounted SATCOM equipment for the remote locations. The easiest option to connect the remote and rugged locations is the use of SATPHONE, Videophone, and Internet connectivity through the VSAT equipments. It will probably take another 50 years for the ministry mandarins to elongate their cranial capabilities to the periphery of technical revolution in SATCOM and Information Technology.

However, my efforts to cut out a slice of monitoring operations of the ‘footprints’ of Chinese and Pakistani communication satellites and tracking down some of the US communication and spy satellites were scotched by the ministry. The Research and Analysis Wing of the Cabinet Secretariat, they concluded, should exclusively handle the domain. In the face of strong opposition I abandoned the idea but not before my boys succeeded in zeroing on some of the transmissions by Islamabad based hubs exclusively used by the Inter Services Intelligence. I am still in favour of sharing of efforts by the IB, R&AW and the MI in matters of SigInt operations and pooling of the results at the level of National Security Council. Single window handling often leads to technological and human blindness. This has been amply proved by the Kargil fiasco. Security matters of the nation, I think, should not be left to the idiosyncrasies of individuals belonging to a single agency. Multiplicity with tight coordination often brings out the best results.

Handling the SATCOM problems was far easier than handling the computer wing of the IB. Besides the shortage of hardware and software I faced two insurmountable obstacles. The major obstacle was the National Informatics Centre (NIC), a public sector undertaking that handled computer networking, and monopolised supply, installation of hardware and software. I resented the fact of state control of the information media. But that was not the age of globalisation and privatisation.

The other obstacle was the reluctance of the senior IB officers to switch over to computer culture and similar opposition from the secretarial staff. They did not agree to remove the curtain of ignorance. Another unexpected sector challenged the establishment of an integrated computer system in the organisation. A dynamic but close minded egocentric officer who handled Punjab operations and his clones in Kashmir operations wanted to ‘own’ stand alone systems, separated from the ‘mainframe’ operations. I found it futile to explain to them that data security in respect of their respective fields of operation would not be jeopardised by the proposed integrated system. They would control their specialised software and accessibility would be governed by unique key system. I failed to convince them. Some of them are still around and still they run their own mini e-empires simply because they are not willing to adopt revolutionary technological breakthrough.

I had to literally wage a war with the NIC on matters related to the choice of hardware and software for the immigration control centres in Delhi, Mumbai, Calcutta and Chennai. I wanted to opt for powerful CPU based computers that could store several gigabytes of data and provide real-time connectivity to the mainframe computer in Delhi. The NIC tried to push an ‘array system’ comprising of 4/6 low capacity computers, minus the facility of connectivity with the mainframe. It’s difficult to disagree with the Indian system and walk out unscathed. The NIC had developed several well-oiled alleyways inside the governmental departments. The greasy alley stalkers defeated my loud protests. But I took out some concessions here and there.

I faced the most miserable experience with the computerisation of the immigration system at Attari railway station that handled Indo-Pak traffic. The hardware was new and the software efficient. But the police officers operating the machines did not find the computerisation programme conducive to their oily practices of extracting money from the violators of the immigration control system. Most of the computers became ‘inoperable’ due to intentional sabotage, mishandling, and disinclination to punch in the database.

I also failed to achieve online connectivity between the mainframe computer and the immigration terminals at the major air and seaports. The database, very funnily, were physically carried to Delhi for feeding into the memory of the mainframe computer.

Another area of failure was to computerise the databases of arriving and departing Pakistani nationals. The IB unit in Delhi operated by old fogies refused to venture into the computer culture. Though a small beginning was made in Delhi the Foreigner’s Registration Officers in the states were not equipped with computers to log and store the relevant data. Exchange of data between the IB and the states were abnormally delayed and the flawed system allowed hundreds of Pakistani and Bangladeshi nationals to melt into the milieu. The security hazard posed by this anomalous situation was conveyed to the Union government after conducting grassroots level research. But the soft democracy that often tends to lapse into anarchy was very tardy in responding to the menace. Vote bank compulsions and ‘minority wooing’ strategy of the political parties severely neglected this vital aspect of national security.

Nothing exemplifies better the security menace to a nation from a flawed immigration control system than the horrendous crime against humanity perpetrated by the Islamist terrorists in America on 11.9.2001. India has already tested a similar assault on the symbol of its political power when the Islamists mounted an attack on the Parliament building. It is very difficult to convince the key mandarins and politicians that Immigration Control is as much a tool to fight terrorism as the men in uniform and their Kalashnikovs are.

I failed in two other vital sectors. My efforts to synthesise the officers of the intelligence generation and analysis wing (G officers) with the officers of the Technical Intelligence wing (T officers) did not take off. Most of the G officers, irrespective of rank and profile treated TechInt as a servicing unit. They were summoned whenever TechInt operations were required to be mounted. The Technical officers very often did not feel emotional attachment to the task and were not concerned for perfect matching of the edges of the two wings. The ‘T officers’ maintained distance from the ‘G officers’ smarting under genuine perception of step-motherly treatment, My proposal to integrate the two streams at training and functional levels was not accepted by the policy makers of the organisation.