Open Secrets: The Explosive Memoirs of an Indian Intelligence Officer (66 page)

From the above, it gets reconfirmed that the suggestions given by the Intelligence Bureau were confined to a reiteration that the existing security arrangements be scrupulously followed. No fresh security arrangements were contemplated.”

Some leading members of the fourth estate had also elaborately commented on the failure of the IB in providing Rajiv Gandhi with correct election assessment on two occasions—in 88-89 and 91-92 elections.

Whatever it is, destiny pushed in another man, Narasimha Rao to the central portal of power, who was preparing for a quiet retirement just about a month after Rajiv was assassinated by the LTTE. Most of Rajiv’s coterie made way for the new power hunters. But the new Prime Minister, still lacking clear parliamentary majority, did not bring about any change in the leadership of the Intelligence Bureau. Many tongues had wagged about intelligence failure and inability of the IB to cater pinpointed intelligence estimate about the LTTE design. Attacks were directed against the R&AW as well.

As a close-circuit observer, however, I would like to add that the Intelligence Bureau had not succeeded in generating ‘precise and penetrating’ intelligence about the LTTE conspiracy to kill Rajiv Gandhi. The IB and the R&AW simply did not have the capability of deciphering the wireless codes used by the LTTE in maintaining contact with its India based cells. It is surprising that committees and commissions set up by the government did not dissect the performance of the IB and R&AW on the very critical issue of VVIP security.

Rajiv Gandhi, by a curious tryst of destiny, became the third member of the family to depart in Grecian tragic way. A noble person, high above many around him, however, was enormously misunderstood because of series of error of judgement. He was not cut out to tackle the jackals around him as his mother was. He had failed to understand that the Congress Establishment that existed almost all over the country, as residue of the original Indian National Congress had tried to use him for perpetuating their power bases. Rajiv did not possess the capability of fusing them into a pan-national political force. After the honeymoon period he was simply overwhelmed by them.

I had deep personal regards for the son of Indira Gandhi, whom I considered as a landmark national leader of our times. Unfortunately Rajiv did not get time to be burnt in the kiln of political ferment. Given the time he would have surely matured out of the influence of his scheming coterie and highly ambitious regional satraps. I could only silently salute the grieving family with which my destiny had become entwined, even though I was emotionally closer to the Sangh Parivar.

BACK TO THE FIRING LINE

If you admit that to silence your opponent by force is to win an intellectual argument, then you admit the right to silence people by force.

Hans Eysenck

Soon after Chandrashekhar government demitted office I reported back to the Intelligence Bureau. I was offered by the MoS a deputation posting either to the Home Ministry or the Information and Broadcasting Ministry. I declined the offer mainly to prove that I had not walked out of the IB out of fear of the Director, who had not taken kindly the allegations of collaborating with his personal enemies and working against his friend-Rajiv Gandhi. Fear often blurs the rational thinking process; insecurity invariably makes a man aggressive. I was not afraid and I refused to be intimidated by subjective views of people. The inner knowledge that I contravened official regulations by dabbling in politics was always in the upper crust of mind. But I could not desist from the dangerous game. However, I never subverted any professional norm of the IB and I had not lost my personal regard for ‘simple’, sympathetic and innovative Narayanan, who later tried to emulate the curious hi-fi friends of the Prime Minister. Surprisingly once he brought in Sam Pitroda, a friend of Rajiv, to lecture us on intelligence technology. That was the high mark of sycophancy of Mr. Naraianan. He was sold out to the Congress and became a Gandhi family loyalist.

Amidst whispers of drastic disciplinary action against me for joining the office of the Minister of State for Home Affairs a couple of days before M.K. Narayanan replaced R.P. Joshi I prepared for the worst; reversion to my state cadre, West Bengal. At home we prepared for relocating the children, one at the IIM Ahmedabad and the other in a Delhi college. We redesigned our family budget and decided to cut a couple of corners to facilitate higher studies of our children.

However, the ire fell upon me from an unexpected flank. The Director was sure unhappy with me for extraneous reasons and not for professional incompetence. He might have not appreciated my ‘pro-active initiative’ in intelligence operations. No conservative intelligence boss would like his officers to exercise the four Is—`
initiative, imagination, innovation and invasive tactics
’, at least not in India. Most of them preferred to follow the beaten furrows, according to rules of the game ‘enshrined’ in the ‘tradecraft’ Bible of the Bureau.

I must admit that despite his misplaced disposition towards me Narayanan was perhaps the first Director of the Intelligence Bureau who injected modernism in the Jurassic organisation. Besides progress made in the area of technology he had devised ways and means to draw up futuristic intelligence appraisal system on various facets of internal issues, including internal security problems. For the first time IB had started, albeit temporarily, systematic study of the ‘fault lines’ in the country. But this was surprisingly done from the law and order point of view and not in a comprehensive manner encompassing the socio-economic, historiographic and geo-political parameters. For certain reasons Pakistan, ISI, creeping American advances in Asia, the post-Cold War geopolitical realities, Islamist thrust in Afghanistan and its ramification in India and incursion of the mafia lords in the political and social system did not receive much attention. The situation had slightly improved after V.G.Vaidya had taken over from M. K. Narayanan. But Narayanan was the third most important visionary in the IB after B. N. Mallick and T.V.Rajeswar. He made a precious second new beginning.

Being a parent for over 30 years I now understand that the parents are as much under scrutiny of their children as the children are by their parents. Most parents do not recognise this privilege of the children. That brings in social and parental tragedy. DIB’s view about me had changed. However, my estimate of the metamorphosis of Narayanan did not undergo any major change when I was banished to the ‘technical wing’ of the Intelligence Bureau.

Instead of reversion to my state cadre I was posted as the chief of the technical wing of the IB. Be that as might be, for the first time in the history of the Intelligence Bureau an officer of the Indian Police Service and an intelligence operator was posted as the chief of the ‘technical wing’. I was removed from the intelligence mainstream as a punishment for my ‘alleged defiance’ of the authority.

I was advised not to activate my ‘political contacts’ against this order. I had not turned to lobbying when I was clumsily removed from SIB Delhi by the machinations of M. L. Fotedar and V.S. Tripathy. This time too I did not run for cover and walked into the super secret technical wing with my head high and mind open. I knew I had a lot to learn and a lot to teach. I was prepared to face many hostile glances and suffer a thousand subtle cuts.

I may belie the expectation of the readers by my inability to completely undress the technical wing of the Intelligence Bureau. It is the final frontier of intelligence tradecraft that cannot be unmasked without destroying the core of the nuclei.

The technical wing of the Intelligence Bureau had a laboured growth. At its vintage youth of 117 years (2004) the Intelligence Bureau was conceived as a subordinate investigation and intelligence-gathering machine of the British Empire. Some experts trace its origin to the ‘Thuggy Department’ of Col. Sleeman in the post1857 period. Its genesis is older than the MI5 and MI6 and interlocked with the evolution of the British Empire. I do not intend to narrate the history of the evolution of modern intelligence system in India.

The organisation, mostly police in character, depended basically on Human Intelligence (HumInt), which helped the district administration in criminal and revenue administration and keeping its powder ready against the malcontent and yet to be subjugated Indian potentates and nascent nationalist political activities. The earliest tools used mostly consisted of uni-focal field telescope, phone tapping (only eavesdropping) by using crocodile clips and wires and communication lines used by the railways and postal departments. The legendary
dakharkara
(postal runner), mule trains and pigeon mail continued to be the usual mail transmission system to the remote areas before the rugged First World War valve/diode/cathode operated wireless sets came into vogue. India under the firm boots of the Empire flanked by spoiled princely brats and a helpless and defenceless people did not require more sophisticated tools of technical intelligence. The boots, bayonets, bullets and the baboos were good enough to rule over the geo-cultural entity called India.

Introduction of police photography as an aid to criminal investigation and investigation against the nationalists revolutionised the concept of technical intelligence. The bulky and rugged German cameras gradually found way into the inventory of the Central Intelligence Bureau that helped in updating the ‘rogue’s gallery’ of the nationalist leaders and the ‘terrorists’ who aimed to overthrow the foreign regime by violent means. The revolutionised concept of the use of clandestine cameras was adopted much later, that too by modifying the switching mechanism of the bulky cameras. The uses of micro-mini and camouflaged tiny electronically powered cameras were introduced in a limited scale much later in the last millennium, say around 1985.

The concepts of chip based digital micro cameras have been introduced only recently. Sometime in early seventies the use of telephoto lenses were used as a prop to clandestine photography. Some such devices were used on Indo-China borders and the borders with Pakistan. Border stations of the IB in Arunachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, Sikkim had used deftly these scantily supplied equipments in locating, identifying and mapping the enemy army formations and fortifications. Some of the young officers often drew excellent sketch of the Chinese formations based on observations made through high-resolution Second World War vintage binoculars. Very back in 1975 I was amazed to observe an enterprising officer using a tripod mounted vintage telescope (most used by amateur stargazers) at the remotest outpost at Dongkung (Sikkim) to map the Chinese positions at Lungzhang, Changlung and Gambaxoi. The junior officer, P.K. Majumdar, was an excellent artist. He made out good sketches of the Chinese fortifications. His performance convinced me that lack of scientific equipment often helped in sharpening up the inner skills of a person. In the IB I had witnessed many such wondrous initiatives from the young recruits.

Another stream of photography, video photography was introduced in early eighties and was sparingly used to cover politically significant open events. Two cameras available with the Technical Division were mostly used to please the top bosses on important social events. The camcorders were introduced well after 1984 and the uses of pinhole video cameras, concealed video transmitters were introduced well after 1990. The Intelligence Bureau has not yet opted for buttonhole video transmitters and other tiny video recorders and transmitters. Technology revolution came at snail’s pace due to a number of reasons and constraints. I would like to elaborate this a little later. Let me first start with describing the feared and misunderstood wing of the IB as much as I am permitted by my commitment to the agency and duty to the nation as a knowledgeable citizen.

*

Officers who are directly recruited as Junior Intelligence Officers (Grade I-Technical) and Assistant Intelligence Officer (Grade II-Technical) man the technical wing of the IB. The top position was normally manned by a reputed scientist on deputation from one of the scientific organisations of the government of India. He worked under nominal supervision of a generalist intelligence technocrat. The top scientific advisor was mostly accommodated on recommendations of some men of importance and based on who knew whom. No great scientific mind went behind the dust layers to revolutionise the scientific tradecraft for gathering and denial of intelligence. It’s not that the hired scientific minds did not conceive ideas for upgrading the technical wing. But lack of awareness among the general intelligence officers, absence of initiative among the middle and upper level police officers, who manned the organisation and absence of appreciation in the controlling bureaucracy in the Finance and Home Ministry killed most of these pioneering proposals. The political and bureaucratic Establishment had started appreciating the need for using scientific gadgets to the aid of intelligence generation and other internal security duties (also normal police work) much after the Punjab thunderbolt hit them on the head and the country lost its most illustrious Prime Minister to the bullets of the assassins in 1984. That is another sordid part of the gap that exists between the prime intelligence organisation and the insensitive controlling ministries and politicians.

The raw workforce acted as the bulwark of the organisation. Trained along with the similarly recruited officers of the general intelligence wing they were subjected to rigorous police-type training and rudimentary skills in intelligence gathering. Most intensive training was imparted on aspects of wireless radio trans-receiving systems, maintenance and repair. They were also trained in Morse key operation. At one point of time, especially during B. N. Mallick’s regime productive efforts were made to fabricate indigenous trans-receiver sets to supplement the decaying First and Second World War contraptions and a few US manufactured backpack field wireless sets used against Japan. These bulky warhorses stood the IB in good stead until a few modern and compact German and US made sets were acquired well after 1985. Much slimmer Japanese sets were introduced well after 1990. However, by that time the world of communication had undergone revolutionary changes. I had used some of the sturdy backpack sets in the North East in monitoring back and forth movements of the Naga, Mizo and Meitei insurgent groups to Pakistan and China. I wish I had with me the pound sized radio transmitters and the modern day VSATs and other sleek communication gadgetry. But those old sets had their own charm both for Carrier Wave (CW) and Voice Communication (VC).

The directly recruited officers are selected from the cream of the universities, mostly first class science graduate and postgraduates. With a twist of luck and chance most of them can qualify for the All India Services and equivalent placement elsewhere. But the unimaginative human resources development programme of the IB mostly succeeded in milling, grinding and pulverising the excellent manpower to docile, submissive and tunnel visioned Assistant Central Intelligence Officers (grade II Tech).

Exposed to some aspects of police training, specially designed intelligence courses, the boys are given intensive training in wireless and other communication equipments and preliminary training in handling other TechInt gadgets before most of them are pushed out to BCPs (Border Check Posts) and difficult stations to man the wireless communication facilities. Cut off from the general intelligence and technical intelligence mainstream and mostly living in subhuman condition, often in non-family stations, the officers gather moss of anger, frustration and cynicism in no time. Subjected to police-style demeaning discipline and deprivation the officers started steadily shedding the veneer of high grade university education and aspiration to rise above the Mores keys, valves, transistors and resistance coils. They developed resistance to new ideas even. Some of them turn corrupt.

Heartless levels of hierarchy lack of upward mobility in lateral branching off and total absence of research an development facilities aggravated their disillusionment. Lack of exposure to modern equipments and advanced learning facilities clogged their minds with cobwebs characteristic of retarded baboodom. The officers were forced to stagnate for over 17/20 years in one rank, as the upper decks of the pyramid were very narrow, though mobility in the general intelligence side was slightly better.