Open Secrets: The Explosive Memoirs of an Indian Intelligence Officer (65 page)

However, my fresh forays into the Punjab affairs did not go unrewarded. AISSF (Manjit), Panthic Committee (Manochahal), Atinderpal Singh, former MP, Gurtej Singh, former secretary SAD (M) decided to support the civic elections in Amritsar, Ludhiana and Jullandhar, in which the BJP emerged successful due to Hindu backlash against Sikh militancy in the urban pockets. Some militant groups aligned to Dam Dami Taksal and splinter groups of the KCF and KLF supported the urban civic elections.

The factious Akali Dals and the ‘softened’ militant groups showed greater enthusiasm when elections to the Punjab Legislative Assembly and Parliament seats were declared for June 1991. AISSF (Manjit) and the Panthic Committee (M) decided to field record number of candidates. A faction of the Babbar Khalsa supported them. A large number of relatives of the killed and detained militants too came forward to contest the elections. This neat national gain was achieved through acts of negotiations between certain separatist groups and representative of the political government. Chandrashekhar and Subodh Kant Sahay exhibited boldness in extending hands of conciliation to certain exhausted and disillusioned groups. I think I earned a space for myself as the trouble-shooter of the lame duck government.

Pakistan backed Second Panthic Committee, militant groups aligned to it, and Babbar Khalsa opposed the election process. They indulged in ‘operation elimination’ of election candidates and succeeded in killing over 22 of them. Under pressure some of the militant and aligned political forces declared that if elected to the state assembly they would pass a resolution demanding creation of Khalistan. However, Dr. Sohan Singh’s outfit asked the people to impose ‘people’s curfew’ on the election dates. Pakistan influenced groups were directed by the ISI to scuttle the elections at any cost. Success of the democratic process, they averred, would weaken the cloudburst of terrorism in Kashmir.

Interestingly enough, Dr. Sohan Singh had maintained a discreet contact with Indira Congress through one of his sons, a member of the Indian Administrative Service, and through the family of Sardar Swaran Singh, a former minister in Indira Congress government. What game was he playing and what was the game of Rajiv Gandhi? It is difficult to give a sure shot answer. A former director of Punjab Health services, Dr. Sohan Singh had established a vast network amongst the civil servants and elite members of the civil society. They wanted that the final negotiation on the ‘pending issues’ should be done through more credible and acceptable Jat than marginal figures like Jasbir Singh Rode, Atinderpal Singh and Manjit Singh. S.S. Mann had lost credibility as a negotiator and interlocutor. High velocity erratic swings on Khalistan issue had proved that Mann lacked firm psychological consistency that was expected from a former officer of the Indian Police Service. Incidentally Mann did not enjoy good vibes with the traditional Akali leaders and the ‘aristocratic face’ of the families of Dr.Sohan Singh and Sardar Swaran Singh.

The most bizarre incident of this phase was the decision of Subodh Kant Sahay to seek re-election to the Parliament from Ludhiana constituency. Elected to the Parliament from Ranchi (Jharkhand) in the wake of V. P. Singh’s tirade against ‘corrupt’ Rajiv Gandhi Subodh had lost all credibility in his home constituency. The idea to seek re-election was mooted by Manjit Singh with whom I was in dialogue and was supported by assorted ‘truckers lobby’ who operated enormous interstate fleets from the mine belt and industrial centres of Bihar and adjacent West Bengal. Kailash Nath Agarwal (
Mamaji
) and guru Chandra Swami pitched in with monetary support from Mumbai’s film lobby and suppliers to the Union Home Ministry.

I seriously objected to his decision to contest election from Punjab when I was asked to give my opinion. My objections arose from two counts: the peace initiative, in which I was intimately involved, should not be used to serve limited political ends when Punjab was still in ferment. The Second Panthic Committee and the ISI were in cahoots to scuttle the elections and Operation Rakshak I and II launched by the Indian Army to flush out the militants achieved only limited success. The militants had achieved spectacular ‘success’ that had created a spectre of hellish helplessness.

Moreover, I pointed out that the ‘transporters’ were in no position to mobilise vote for him, though they could finance his election to a considerable extent. Subodh Kant overruled me and went ahead with his desperate effort to retain the parliamentary seat. The ambience of violence also affected him when the car he was travelling in was hit by an improvised mine. This was the final nail on the sieved election panorama in Punjab. In the face of serious breakout of violence the elections were postponed from June 1991 to 1991.

It would be unfair to ridicule the Punjab peace initiatives of Chandrashekhar and Subodh Kant Sahay. Rajiv Gandhi was unhappy with these initiatives as his agency based initiatives were short circuited by the protégé government for two salient reasons: Chandrashekhar firmly believed that with his background of anti-congressism he could break new grounds with the aggrieved Sikh community. He and Subodh Kant also believed that by wooing the Sikhs they could obtain electoral mileage. The forces under Pakistani influence sabotaged the later calculation. The former did result in some tangible results. It widened the existing fissures between the squabbling and warring militant factions. The badly divided movement had generated waves of violence to subjugate the Sikh masses and to please the Pakistani bosses. But the Sikh civil society had seen through the game. The increasingly criminalized movement had lost touch with the people, who were initially alienated by three great tragedies, Operation Blue Star, Delhi carnage and Operation Black Thunder. They now pined for peace and economic prosperity.

Chandrashekhar’s was a more acceptable political face to the Punjab separatists, who had adopted an uncompromising attitude to the Nehru-Gandhi family. The fresh initiatives coupled with enhanced security operations had brought about qualitative changes in the security ambience of the state.

However, the Assam initiative of the new government did not make any progress. Between Operation Bajrang (November ‘90) and return of Hiteshwar Saikia to power in 1991 summer elections the ULFA had suffered certain body blows. Hiteshwar, true to his political salt, had succeeded in deftly manoeuvring the disillusioned cadres of the AASU and AGP and a section of the disenchanted ULFA cadre.

Though the top leadership of the ULFA had taken shelter in Bangladesh with active support of the ISI operatives and under the tutelage of the Director General of Forces Intelligence, an ISI type outfit dominated by Bangladesh Army, its massive organisational wings had managed to strengthen grassroots support inside Assam. Some of the top leadership were imparted training in Pakistan and Afghanistan and were spurred into fresh violent activities soon after Hiteshwar Saikia assumed power.

In one of his visits to Guwahati, Dibrugarh and other places in Assam Subodh Kant was given an impression by Governor D. D. Thakur that a section of the ULFA headed by its publicity secretary Sunil Nath was ready for negotiation with the government. This move was based on certain false indices. Thakur’s legal acumen was not matched by his political wisdom. Certain fringe associates of the ULFA, especially a few media persons were used to contact the local leaders at Nowgong, Nalbari and Tezpur. I had accompanied a group to Nalbari in April 1991, and returned with the impression that a good number of unemployed Assamese youth had become weary of the prospect of a prolonged armed struggle. But they were intimidated and silenced by the armed groups. My recommendation to the Union Minister of State for Home Affairs was that another round of tough armed action by the government was necessary to soften up the fringe elements. The hard core was still determined to carry on the struggle and they were in the process of establishing linkages with the NSCN (Khaplang), Kachin Independent Army (KIA) and other Burmese insurgent groups. They were already sucked into the ISI and DGFI network. The internal security imbroglio in Assam had acquired foreign support. That was the time to use ‘military option’ to soften the foreign linkages and to weaken the ‘mass control’ established by the ULFA.

In fact, these recommendations were partially implemented after Operation Rhino launched by the Army in September 1991, sometime after the government headed by Chandrashekhar bowed out of power.

*

The final ignition that blew up the marriage of convenience between Rajiv Gandhi and Chandrashekhar was as absurd as the story of his coronation at the Ashoka Hall. The alleged farcical ‘surveillance’ on Rajiv’s residence by two constables of Haryana police had triggered off the final break. The course of events on the fateful day have not been properly analysed and assessed.

Though the SPG cover was substituted by other security personnel, Rajiv Gandhi had a layer of security around him. Most of the non-VIP visitors were required to register their names at the entry point. The Intelligence Bureau had access to these materials. Besides the security personnel some Intelligence Bureau personnel were also deployed in the outer and inner security rings of Rajiv Gandhi. The Director of the Intelligence Bureau, M.K. Narayanan was a personal friend of the former Prime Minister.

It was correct that IB and other security agencies were regularly issuing security appreciation of threat to Rajiv Gandhi and his family members from Punjab terrorists, Kashmir insurgents and insurgent groups of the North East. These were, however, generalised alerts. There was no specific hard intelligence. Most of these were assessed alerts culled out from disjointed intelligence inputs. There was, however, no input that some people in Haryana were planning to harm the former Prime Minister. Two Haryana police officers, crude as they were, could do little to penetrate the security and intelligence ring around Rajiv Gandhi without the IB knowing about it. But on that 6th day of March, 1991, they were there and were identified by the security and intelligence people. The whole thing smacked of a dirty ploy.

Om Praksh Chautala’s flare for such country gimmick is well known. He was the person who had despatched hundreds of drunken Devi Lal supporters to the heart of Delhi to discredit V.P. Singh and hasten his downfall. When asked to enquire into the matter by Subodh Kant Sahay I extended my antenna in the IB and Delhi police and gathered that the Rajiv’s friends in the IB and some of his coterie members had overplayed the whole incident. The matter should have been brushed off as a joke and the prolonged telephonic exchange between Chandrashekhar and Rajiv should have not added another shady chapter in Indian politics.

In the din of the big political bang no one ventured to probe the role played by the IB in providing Rajiv Gandhi with an alibi to try his luck in the next elections. They had advised Rajiv that ‘the good days were round the corner.’ It was a wrong advice. Rajiv Gandhi had deduced that the right time had come to seek a mandate of the people. The IB and other fortunetellers again told him that Indira Congress was poised to win over 250 seats if the elections were held in the ensuing summer.

Om Prakash Cahutala had, in his characteristic rural Jat style, had provided Rajiv Gandhi with a ready scissor to cut the fragile linkage with the minority puppet government of Chandrashekhar. Rajiv Gandhi had committed another error by hastening the downfall of the constitutional interregnum. Providence had pushed him towards a course of action that ended a little after 10.20 pm on May 21 at Sriperumbudur in Tamil Nadu.

*

Destiny had pushed Rajiv Gandhi to Sriperumbudur, a fateful journey that had started from Bhubaneshwar in Orissa, which had earned the ubiquitous distinction of biding final adieu to two former Prime Ministers, Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi.

It would not be prudent for me to comment on the failure of the intelligence agencies in protecting the former Prime Minister. Investigation agencies and Commissions have variably commented on the inadequacy of ‘hard intelligence on security threat from the LTTE’ to Rajiv Gandhi. The Jain Commission, which went into the issues related to the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, has been variably commented upon by people wearing differently coloured glasses. Some portions of the Commission’s report were critical of the alleged failure of the IB in providing adequate intelligence and for arranging the required quantum of security for Rajiv Gandhi. Only a minor observation of Jain Commission report is quoted below:

“24.5 This reaction of the Intelligence Bureau to the extremely grave nature of fresh threats to the life of Rajiv Gandhi was obviously grossly inadequate and disproportionate in nature.

The fresh threat perception appears to have been conveyed to Shri Rajiv Gandhi as is evident from a letter dated February 13, 1991, written by V. George, Private Secretary to Shri Rajiv Gandhi, to the Lt. General of Delhi requesting the Delhi Administration to beef up Security arrangements for Shri Rajiv Gandhi in view of the threat perception given by the Intelligence Bureau. (Annexure S—75). From the letter, it transpires that the Intelligence Bureau had suggested the following measures in view of the fresh security threats to Rajiv Gandhi :—

“The latest intelligence report communicated by IB gives an alarming note with regarding to the security arrangements or Shri Rajiv Gandhi and his family members. IB has recommended a certain scale of security beefing up...

(The intelligence report communicated vide IB’s Secret circular memorandum No. 32/VS/90(3)-II dated 23rd January, 1991 states that “Besides providing adequate static armed guards, PSOs, Ring—round teams, Isolation Cordon, Pilot and Escort vehicle and other necessary security components adequately armed with conventional and automatic weapons, it would be necessary to enforce security precautions like searching, ensuring reliability of persons employed on armed duty, purity of food etc.)”