Open Secrets: The Explosive Memoirs of an Indian Intelligence Officer (52 page)

A
kharku
(militant) friend owing allegiance to a faction of the KCF called me aside to a lonely patch inside the Jalianwala Bagh. He guided me to the residence of a factory owner Satnam Singh Kanda and told me that two messengers had reached Amritsar from Pakistan with a message for the Panthic Committee and a few selected senior ideologues. He also gave me to understand that an emissary of Dr. Sohan Singh had left for Kathmandu to receive instructions and cash support from the ISI operatives. His warning was clear: Jasbir experiment of Delhi was doomed to fail. Too many powerful forces were against a peaceful settlement and the latest scion of the Brar (a caste) family was surely not the real deliverer.

As we prepared to leap on to the next assignment of facilitating establishment of firm contact between Jasbir Singh Rode and the members of the Panthic Committee we faced insurmountable problem of eluding the ever-vigilant operations by K.P.S. Gill and shadow operations by my IB colleagues. While I was supposed to throw dust in their eyes I was also enjoined the duties of feeding the police chief with live operational intelligence. It was a cruel game of wit. I was sure that Gill was in the know of the essence of the peace operation I was handling. His enormous moustache could not hide his wary smiles that he often threw at me.

Both the governor and the home minister declined to declare a particular area near Govindwal as a safe zone. Satish Sharma suddenly became incommunicado. The Prime Minister was beyond my reach.

A section in the Operations Cell of the IB too adopted a hostile attitude. Mr. A. K. Doval headed that group. He was more inclined towards killing the terrorists than advancing the peace process. In the process, several Punjab observers alleged Doval collected ransom money and money for sparing lives of the villagers. It was not difficult to fathom their designs. It’s not that I did not try to draw attention of the DIB. But Mr. Narayanan was not in a position to remedy the obstacles, coming from politicians and bureaucrats. Regarding Doval he said his trusted officer was a Dervish.

The militant groups holed up inside the temple complex had, in the meantime, started erecting fortifications and bunkers at all conceivable defensive and offensive positions. Certain reports received from intelligence moles lodged in the ‘
parikrama
’ indicated arrival of fresh weapons and explosive devices.

K. P. S. Gill too deployed his machine gun positions after scanning the ground position from aerial photographs. His strategic deployment was much more scientific than the frontal attack during Operation Blue Star. He was ready for his kill. The Prime Minister too evinced keen interest in working out the blueprint of Operation Black Thunder, a meticulously planned action to flush out the terrorists from the Golden Temple and adjacent buildings.

Pressured by one scandal after another and a simmering revolt in the party the Prime Minister was tempted to give war a better chance over peace. War is a spectacular event that catches common men’s imagination. Violence around thrills them as long as the violent acts do not touch their homes. Peace is a tortuous process, mostly misunderstood and often misinterpreted as weak-kneed attitude of the government. Rajiv required something spectacular, peace of the grave and not peace of the souls. He was painfully indecisive after having taken the bold step of releasing Jasbir Singh Rode and after facilitating his installation as the
jathedar
of the
Akal Takht
.

It was as clear as daylight that the peace initiative was jinxed. Rajiv’s political colleagues and bureaucratic hierarchy were not in favour of ushering in peace, as it would have frozen the flow of illegal dough to their pockets.

My request to abandon the ‘peace operation’ was turned down and I was given two important tasks: to facilitate meetings between Jasbir and the Panthic Committee leaders and to build up armed resistance against the hardliner militants holed inside the temple complex. Wasn’t that contradictory to the emerging pattern of police action? It was, but the government decided to function in a self-defeating contradictory manner.

Our attempts to establish the Panthic Committee leaders fructified partially. The terrorist and police ambush parties critically challenged us several times. On one occasion our Suzuki van was ambushed by a gang headed by Wairyam Singh Bhurenangal at a lonely stretch of canal road between Barwala and Gharyala in lower majha area. They stopped firing after Jasbir ventured out of the van and spoke to them. We were escorted to a bunker to meet Kanwarjit Singh, Gurbachan Singh Manochahal and Dalwinder Singh, all members of the Panthic Committee. They were ready for initiating ‘peace talks’ with certain riders. Their demands included: immediate ceasefire, safe passage out to the terrorists holed inside the temple complex and nomination of a mutually acceptable team to establish contact with the factious leaders of the armed bands. Manochahal gave broad hints that he was ready to lead the ‘panthic’ delegation to negotiate with the government.

I was advised to wait for the considered views of the government, especially the home minister and the Prime Minister. I waited in vain. Certain sources inside the armed militant groups advised me that a top leader in Delhi had sent out words to a selected band of KCF, KLF and AISSF leaders to stonewall the peace efforts. Punjab grapevine pointed the doubting fingers at Buta Singh and Governor Ray.

My second assignment to send in weapons to Jasbir Singh Rode to enable him to fight the recalcitrant terrorists inside the temple complex was also delayed by Delhi’s chronic indecision. The final nod was received in March end and I carried the weapons in a special flight to Amritsar. These were hidden in a couple of fruit baskets and were carried by my operational associates and me to Jasbir’s Golden Temple den. The weapons supplied to him were intended to arm a dedicated ‘shaheedi group’ (suicide squad) of 15 people with a view to staging a coup against the gangs headed by Surjit Singh Penta, Malkiat Singh, Jagir Singh and Nirvair Singh, etc.

In this venture too I faced opposition from my colleague and a political leader. The colleague had a man from the Babbar Khalsa installed inside the ‘
parikrama
,’ He tipped off the groups headed by Jagir Singh and Malkiat Singh Ajnala. The Rangretra Dal of Buta Singh also widely circulated the receipt of weapons by Jasbir Singh Rode. I objected to this double play by the players of the same team. In reply I received advice to concentrate on my part of the job. What a bloody job it was!

Prior to this Jasbir was prodded to form a committee to remove the armed militants from the temple premises. The committee comprised Malkiat Singh Ajnala (KCF), Swarn Singh Khalsa (AISSF), Vishakha Singh (Babbar Khalsa) and Fouja Singh (KLF). This was violently opposed by Jagir Singh and Nirvair Singh. On this occasion Mohkam Singh accosted me in the corridors of the living quarters above the ‘
parikrama
’ and warned of severe consequences if I did not abandon the divide and rule policy. His threat was accompanied by the touch of cold steel at my groin. Gurdev Singh Kaonke rescued me.

The plan to use limited force against the armed militants was put into motion and some unexpected support came from a faction of the Babbar Khalsa. The groups owing allegiance to Jasbir and the entrenched terrorists exchanged fire on three occasions in which three hardcore KCF ‘
kharkus
’ (militants) were eliminated. We did not expect a single stroke victory but anticipated that Jasbir should be able clean up the holy premises before the Baisakhi festival at Damdama Sahib at Talwandi Sabo, near Bhatinda.

Kalyan Rudra and I met Jasbir and the high priests at the Keshgarh Sahib Gurdwara at Anandpur, at the residence of Savinder Singh. This time we carried two quintals of wheat for the family of the priest in which six AK47 were concealed. The weapons were meant to be used against a group of KCF headed by ‘General’ Labh Singh.

Our visit was designed to formulate a conciliatory speech by the
jathedar
of the
Akal Takht
that could prepare the grounds for the peace talks. The draft of the speech was examined by certain political leaders in Delhi, who insisted on open denouncement of Khalistan demand and withdrawal of armed resistance. This was not acceptable to the militant leaders. They pressed for a slow process to climb down from the high pitch militancy that was almost hijacked by Pakistan and foreign-based militant leaders.

The hardcore militant leaders’ plan to hold a ‘
sarbat khalsa
’ at Amritsar was frustrated by Jasbir Singh and us. He was prevailed upon to hold All World Sikh Convention at Talwandi Sabo Gurdwara near Bhatinda on the occasion of Baisakhi festival.

The Punjab administration did not cooperate with our request to slacken police operations in and around Talwandi Sabo for a week. Some parallel reporting to Punjab administration by the IB prompted this unusually tough stand. This duplicity had hindered the movement of a few top militant leaders and they threatened to withdraw support from Jasbir Singh Rode. I received a note from Gurjit Singh that directed me to withdraw from the ‘initiative’ and to pay attention to my family’s safety. Gurjit was one Sikh youth who had been seriously polluted by the ISI. I did not expect him to take a soft stand at Talwandi Sabo. I ignored his warning but did not lower my guard.

We decided not to allow the chance of peace slip away simply because Rajiv Gandhi was being short-fused by his home minister and some top level Punjab police and IB officers who favoured war over peace. Kalyan Rudra and I camped at a secret location near Talwandi Sabo Gurdwara guarded by armed youths supposedly loyal to Jasbir. We had kept a force ready nearby to rescue Jasbir if the terrorists threatened his life. Between us we requested Jasbir to strike a balance and not to annoy the terrorists. He was advised not to mention about Khalistan and give stress on return of peace and prosperity to the people of Punjab and to highlight the theme of forgive and forget as propounded by the Sikh Gurus.

Jasbir, the high priests and Gurdev Singh Kaonke played their assigned roles. But Gurjit Singh struck the most discordant note. His speech, read out by an AISSF youth, virulently supported the demand of a separate country for the Sikhs. The Talwandi Sabo show was a moderate success. While we scored a low-key victory by holding the conference in spite of opposition from the ISI, Punjab police and a section of the IB, the ISI succeeded in manipulating some hardcore terrorists to stick to their guns. Pakistan was not ready to surrender its strategic gains in the Indian Punjab. Unfortunately for India the top leadership did not comprehend the intricate games played by Pakistan. Some political leaders and bureaucrats and intelligence operatives played into Pakistani hands.

Jagir and Nirvair Singh, on the other hand, staged a spectacular show in the Golden Temple on the Baishakhi day. They unfurled ‘Khalistan flag’ and indulged in wanton firing from assorted weapons that created panic in the adjacent markets and residential areas.

The Amritsar and Talwandi Sabo developments made it clear that Delhi’s Jasbir initiative hadn’t taken off along the desired trajectory. I was fully convinced that Jasbir was not insincere. He walked strictly along the furrow drawn up by the planners. Rajiv Gandhi and his think tank wished to fly on a single damaged wing and half an un-optimised engine thrust. He had not acted upon some of the salient parameters of the ‘operational arrangements’ drawn up before Jasbir was released. The other wing and engine of the craft that he was piloting were revved and elevated in different direction. The state administration and the police forces were not properly sensitised and tuned to keep pace with the peace initiative. A section in the IB tried to fly in different direction. Rajiv’s home minister Buta Singh played as much cunning a game as the one played by his illustrious predecessor, Giani Zail Singh. Rajiv Gandhi had failed to rein in his key cabinet functionary.

A competent police chief like K. P. S. Gill was not expected to tuck his tail and watch the killer gangs with a drooping moustache. He did what he was expected to do. Mounting pressure of the hardcore terrorist made it clear that they had two clear options: to settle for peace or to prepare for a decisive action. Most of the armed groups egged on by Pakistan and foreign-based Khalistani activists had opted for war.

Pakistan’s game was not difficult to understand. After a decisive victory in Afghanistan it was readying to exploit another fault line in Kashmir. Unmindful of the strategic advantage enjoyed by Pakistan Delhi had reached another ill-conceived accord—Rajiv Farooq Accord that— provided for power sharing between the National Conference and Indira Congress. The elections to the state assembly were blatantly rigged. Frooq had prepared himself to go the way Barnala had chosen in Punjab. His credibility had eroded beyond repair. July 1988 had witnessed terrorist type bomb blast in Srinagar and the Kshmiris staged a demonstration on August 17th on the occasion of Zia-ul-Haq’s death. In fact by early September Pakistan backed terrorist had displayed that Kashmir was the main theatre, Punjab was a diversionary tactical tango. The year 1988 marked the beginning of direct infiltration into Indian Kashmir by the operatives of the Joint Intelligence North (JIN) of the ISI. Benazir Bhutto continued the process initiated by Zia, despite Indian PM’s friendly overtures to the daughter of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto.

Peace is a more tortuous process than firing straight from the hip. Peace often requires more blood letting than war. But, history’s finest threads are often woven by peace though war is more eulogised and than sung by poets and sopranos.

War begets war, especially when war is fought against our own people, the citizen of the country. An enemy can be kept permanently on the war list. The erring citizens cannot be. They are better vanquished by sagacious statesmanship combined with pragmatic political and administrative measures. I believed in this eternal truth yesterday in the North East and I still believe in the golden rule of peace prevailing over war; the winning of heart through peace. I thought I had succeeded in convincing the bosses in Delhi to give peace another try. The renewed peace process did not exclude use of force by the state authority and a new force gathered around Jasbir Singh Rode.