Open Secrets: The Explosive Memoirs of an Indian Intelligence Officer (24 page)

There is a perception that because of her domestic compulsions more than anything else had prompted Indira Gandhi to carry out nuclear implosion at Pokharan. This is not a correct perception. Lal Bahadur Shashtri was responsible for ordering weaponisation of India’s nuclear programme. Scrounging of old records would prove this beyond any doubt. Indira Gandhi pursued the policy adopted by Nehru and Shashtri. Indira did sure render a cardinal service to the nation by going nuclear. It was a historical imperative for India to go nuclear in the face of Chinese nuclear capability and the growing axis between Washington, Islamabad, and Peking. However, the Rajasthan bang did not buoyed up public morale. They did not shun the path of agitation. The Pokharan bangs were compounded by the sound and fury of Sanjay’s marriage to Maneka Anand and his involvement in the Maruti, people’s car controversy.

The developments in Sikkim, a protectorate, too caused serious concern. The Chogyal (king) and his American wife Hope Cook, it was alleged, had embarked on secessionist activities. Extremely dangerous political tussle between the Chogyal and the pro-democracy and pro-Indian forces headed by Kazi Lehndup Dorji Khangsrapa rocked the Himalayan kingdom. It threatened India’s security concerns. Protestations were voiced by Pakistan, Nepal and China and diplomatic demarches from other countries too expressed serious concerns about the fate of Sikkim. Finally the Indian Army moved into the capital town of Gangtok. A hastily called and questionably conducted referendum had endorsed the merger of Sikkim with India leaving many pertinent questions unanswered. The 333-year-old monarchy, unique to the Bhutia Lepcha tribes, came to an end.

Such were the domestic scenario when a renewed Naga peace move shakily lumbered to its feet. The Naga and Mizo dependence on China had also added to the concern of Delhi. Indira’s advisors too opted for another tryst with peace. This was followed by an initiative by the Nagaland Baptist Church leaders to bring the feuding parties to the negotiation tables. Another Peace Council was formed sometime in May 1974. I was directed in June 1974, to assess the mood of the important Naga underground and over ground leaders. While I concentrated on the underground task Joshi took charge of the over ground leaders. I hurriedly consulted the leaders like Kevi Yallay, Zashie, Biseto, Ramyo and a few middle rung leaders of the underground army. My findings were encouraging. The major underground leaders were ready to give peace another try. I do not know if my association had in any way softened the attitude of the jungle fighters. Nonetheless, I derived a lot of satisfaction out of such contacts and considered it as a landmark in my intelligence career.

The Nagaland Peace Council (NPC) submitted a 4-point memorandum to the Governor L. P. Singh. Following this an All Naga Public Peace Conference (comprising Naga delegates from all tribes of Nagaland) was held at Kohima. The meeting endorsed the NPC call to the underground to hold fire and stop recruitment and tax collection drive.

I had the unique opportunity to go between the office of the governor and some of the important underground leaders that helped in preparing the minds of the Naga leaders to consider a peace formula that sought a political settlement within the Indian Constitution. Both M. Ramunny and S. C. Dev helped me immensely.

*

I must admit here with a sense of guilt that I was called upon for the second time to subvert the loyalty of a section of the UDF members of the Nagaland legislature. My targets included a Sema and a few non-Angami MLAs. I did whatever I could do to ‘motivate` them to defect to the NNO at the behest of the masters in Delhi.

That was my second tryst with blatant unlawful activities. By that time I had come to realise that intelligence machineries are blatantly used for promoting political interests. Agencies like IB are not mere tools of safeguarding the security of the country. They are required to serve the narrow political interest of the ruling elite.

I did not carry any briefcase for them. The psychological bombarding done by me was followed up by ‘incentive package’ from the Raj Bhawan. I was not intoxicated by the idea of changing democratically elected government by dubious means. As a small operator of the Intelligence machinery I was used for a limited purpose. I was not the first and the last intelligence station deputy to be used/misused by the government to subvert the Constitutional process. This has become a part and parcel of the democratic value of the Indian polity. This political domino game had by then become a trademark of Indian democracy and the use of the intelligence organisations had become a routine affair. There was no law in the country; still there is none, which can call intelligence officers before any Committee of the Parliament to give accounts of their activities. The IB and the R&AW did not suffer; they still do not, from the ‘bane of accountability’ to the constitutionally formed machineries of the country.

This requires major system correction. The politicians should understand that as the fabric of the democracy weakens the intelligence machinery could be more ruthlessly used by power hungry political elites. Indira Gandhi did this blatantly when she deviated from the democratic norms and imposed internal emergency. In recent times, as I write this chapter, the democratic government in Gujarat, used the entire state machinery, especially the state intelligence to let loose communal carnage on the minority community. The central intelligence agency stood by as mute witness. The central government headed by the BJP whimpered and hiccupped till the higher judiciary stepped in to protect the rule of law.

The worst scenario can be— a rogue cabal of intelligence boss and ambitious Army officers can subvert the democratic process, especially when the political players are nose dipped in criminalisation of politics. The allurements are many and the opportunities are limitless. The political breed must understand that their pet toys like the IB, CBI and R&AW can misfire and injure them. The nation should be secured by Acts of the Parliament to rein in the intelligence and investigative fraternity. In the interest of our fragile democracy we cannot allow ISI like organisations to take root.

Reverting back to subversion of the constitutional process in Nagaland more than mine the efforts of M. Ramunny and S. C. Dev played decisive results. These extra constitutional efforts that had become a trademark of Indian democracy finally resulted in the ouster of Vizol government and swearing of a NNO ministry under John Bosco Jasokie, a nationalist Catholic Angami leader. His ministry was, however, defeated on the floor of the assembly by the UDF and the impasse was followed by another round of President’s rule.

*

Around March 1974, information was received that the NFG was contemplating to send another big Naga gang to China under self styled Brigadier Vedai Chakesang. I was immensely helped by a Chakesang staff member and to some extent by a Tangkhul member of the Naga Army, whom I had succeeded in infiltrating in the Vedai gang. This educated boy from Soraphung village in Ukhrul district was given a ‘cover appointment’ in the IB and was trained in secret communication and other tradecrafts. He managed to send timely information about the proposed itinerary of the gang. I received another opportunity to try my Manipur tactic. Several mobile teams were deployed along the proposed route that the gang intended to take. The Indian Army too succeeded in engaging the gang a couple of times on the basis of intelligence provided by the IB. I was later given to understand that the gang could not sneak past the security net that we managed to cast along the route. However, a small gang had crossed over to the Burmese territory after the Shillong Accord was signed on November 10, 1975. By that time I had left Nagaland on transfer to Calcutta, a mirage of happiness that I thought waited in the oasis of my hometown.

The IB achieved a crowning breakthrough when my friends Abraham of Manipur and Vikose Sema (not real name), both members of the underground
Tatar Hoho
were persuaded to attend an important Hoho meeting on August 14, somewhere in between Iganumi and Lasami in lower Sema area. The all-important session was held in the backdrop of preparations for the renewed peace talks and readiness of a large number of the underground leaders to have lasting peace in Nagaland.

We were left with no doubt about the horizontal and vertical division among the top Naga leaders, both over ground and underground. No one in Delhi and Kohima believed in the possibility of emergence of total unanimity over the proposed peace talks. But a major section of the Phizo group had come around to the point of having a negotiated settlement of the issue. That’s what we were pitching for.

The Iganumi-Lasami
Tatar Hoho
meeting provided deep insight into the conflicts prevailing among the underground leaders. It also helped the IB to identify the real hardcore UDF leaders who were inclined to drag the insurgency on more for political benefits than for any well being of the Naga people.

Some documents supplied by ‘friends’ Abraham and Vikose had confirmed our earlier information that Th. Muivah was appointed as the ‘Ambassador Plenipotentiary’ of the Federal Government of Nagaland to the Peoples’ Republic of China. He and Isak Chisi Swu disagreed with the peace formula. They were in constant touch with the ISI, the Pakistani intelligence agency, and the Chinese emissaries through KIA friends (there are authentic secret reports on this connectivity). They did not denounce Phizo but treated him as a moth eaten page of Naga history. Very few Naga observers were aware that the Nagaland imbroglio was heading for a new course, despite the Phizoite leaders agreeing to settle down within the Indian constitution.

The Director Intelligence Bureau and the Governor of Nagaland appreciated the coverage of the
Tatar Hoho
meeting. Murkot Ramunny, the evergreen Naga expert had taken me to the Governor L. P. Singh for briefing him on the
Tatar Hoho
meeting and the implications of fresh gangs preparing to leave for China.

*

Around mid 1974 I had managed to get into another controversy. One of the sensitive channels managed by the IB claimed that it was in a position to intercept all communications between A. Z. Phizo and the important underground leaders. These were taken as ultimate Vedas of intelligence input on the top echelons of the Naga leadership. I had no reason to suspect this channel. But some of the communications to Phizo from Mehasieu, Ramyo, Biseto and Zashie as well as some of Phizo’s to them had struck discordant notes. Most of the contents of these letters, which were supposedly carried by human carriers, reflected information contained in the daily summary of information that were prepared by my office. I observed this strange coincidence for over a period and came to a tentative conclusion that some fertile mind fabricated most of these letters for which the IB paid hefty amounts.

I discussed the matter with R. P. Joshi. He was a man of few words and it was difficult to get him committed to my ideas. But around the time Vedai Chakesang was preparing to take out a gang to China I noticed that the contents of our daily summary were being reflected in some of these letters exchanged between the top Naga leaders. A glaring piece of misinformation about Th. Muivah crossing over to Nagaland at that point of time under instructions from Phizo convinced me that someone was misleading us for the love of money. Phizo and Muivah were not in the best of terms around the time the Nagaland Peace Council initiated the process of a fresh peace accord. Most of the NNC/NFG leaders were inclined to go along with the peace initiative and Muivah and Isak were opposed to it. They were physically in China. Some delicate pro-Chinese channel operating from Calcutta, Dhaka and London had conveyed the objection of the Chinese and the Pakistanis to the new peace accord. They indicated that Beijing and Islamabad would have no problem in betting on Muivah-Isak stallion instead of the tired Phizo horse.

I had no intention to unmask my colleague who was responsible for earning some fat bucks by manufacturing these letters. But for the sake of the organisation and the country I strongly pleaded with my boss to have a second look into the scam. I produced a comparative chart on the materials catered in our daily summary and the contents of some of the letters. I also drew his attention about the misinformation contained in some of the letters. Joshi handled the matter in his own characteristic way and we were able to plug that manufactured intelligence channel. It saved the IB from serious embarrassments. But a few top analysts in Delhi did not wholeheartedly support my initiative. I had to present myself before two of the Delhi analysts and explain the nuts and bolts of my findings. They were finally convinced and I believe this prized communication channel had dried up considerably after I left Nagaland. It was, in today’s lingo ‘a severe case of intelligence sexing up.’

*

Around the time I happened to operate in Nagaland we as well as the Naga undergrounds suffered from communication problems. The facilities of fax, internet and cell phone were unknown and the Naga undergrounds did not have access to High Frequency radio communication. Their letters and messages were routed through Dhaka, Bangkok, Kathmandu and some safe accommodation addresses in Delhi, Calcutta, Gwahati and Mumbai. The Dhaka channel was active even after Bangladesh came into existence. A top Naga underground leader explained this circuitous communication process to me. I had no reason to disbelieve him.

We intercepted almost all the suspected postal mail at Kohima and other subsidiary stations. The most incriminating evidence that we could gather was the receipt of dollar bills and cheques from foreign donors by the church leaders. Some of the dollar bills were misappropriated by some of the IB operatives. Several complaints were received in this regard from the church leaders and H. Zopianga, the chief secretary. This had forced me to take some corrective measures to ensure that the dollar bills reached the correct addressees.