One Hundred Victories (53 page)

{94}
Author interview with Dinter, March 10, 2012, and Haas, April 3, 2012.

{95}
This incident was related in an author interview with Brad Hansell, March 12, 2012. The issue of corruption and the drug eradication campaign in Maiwand and Kandahar Province generally was also discussed with Major Brian DeMarzio and other members of the SOTF-S staff, VSCC-South’s Lieutenant Colonel Brian Mack, and Major Sean Walrath in briefings on March 11, 2012. The information in this chapter is primarily based on author interviews with ODA 7233 and local Afghans, as well as personal observation during March and August 2012 visits. Other sources are noted below.

{96}
Author interviews with Najibullah and Hansell, March 2012. The quotation is from an author interview with Najibullah on March 13, 2012. Some Afghans, like Najibullah, only use one name.

{97}
Author interview, March 14, 2012.

{98}
Author interviews with Hansell and direct observation in a meeting with Kala Khan.

{99}
Author interviews with Abdullah Niazi and Hansell; direct observation.

{100}
Author observations of events in Maiwand in the immediate aftermath of the massacre.

{101}
Author interview with Chris Haas, April 3, 2012, and direct observations of command staff lawyer.

{102}
Author interview with Lieutenant Colonel Richard Navarro, August 13, 2012.

{103}
Author conversation on patrol, March 14, 2012.

{104}
This incident is cited in the preliminary and final reports of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) on the protection of civilians. The final report says, “According to reports, the ALP commander along with two other ALP members beat and kicked the detainees, tied the detainees to their car and dragged them behind the moving car, killing both detainees. ALP members informed international military forces that the detainees had escaped.” See United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,
Afghanistan: Annual Report 2012. Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict
(Kabul: UNAMA, 2013), 44. See http://unama.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=K0B5RL2XYcU%3D&tabid=12254& for online text of the report.

{105}
This account is based on author interviews with Hansell, Navarro, Angel Martinez, Jim Huggins, and other US officers, as well as email communications.

{106}
Author interviews with team members and Afghans and direct observation, August 2012.

{107}
Author interviews with J. R. Jones, Martinez, Navarro, and Brian Rarey, August 2012.

{108}
Author interviews, August 1–3, 2011, with the command master chief senior enlisted adviser; the N3 operations officer; the senior chief petty officer in charge of ALP program support; the Support Center director of Special Operations Task Force–Southeast, Uruzgan; and command group and team members in Tarin Kowt. The official name of SEAL Team Six was changed in 1987 to United States Naval Special Warfare Development Group (NSWDG), or DEVGRU. It and the army’s Delta Force are also referred to as “special mission units” or “tier-one” forces.

{109}
Author interviews with SEALs in Tarin Kowt; author interview with a retired senior special operations officer in charge of the Philippines operation, August 31, 2012. The author also viewed a videotape of the operation that killed Abu Sayyaf commander Abu Sabaya on June 21, 2002. See also Geoffrey Lamber, Larry Lewis, and Sarah Sewall, “Operation Enduring Freedom–Philippines: Civilian Harm and the Indirect Approach,”
Prism
3, no. 4 (2012): 117–135; Colonel David S. Maxwell (ret.), “Foreign Inter­nal Defense: An Indirect Approach to Counter-Insurgency/Counter Terrorism, Lessons from Operation Enduring Freedom–Philippines for Dealing with Non-Existential Threats to the United States,” paper delivered at Foreign Policy Research Institute conference, Washington, DC, December 6, 2011. For SEAL activities in Africa, see
Ethos
, published by Naval Special Warfare Command, Issue 8, n.d., 4–9, www.sealswcc.com/pdf/navy-seal-ethos-magazine/ethos-magazine-issue-8.pdf.

{110}
Author interview with Mike Hayes, Uruzgan, March 17, 2012, and copy of his commander’s guidance.

{111}
The events of 2012 recounted in this chapter draw on author interviews with Hayes, members of his command group, teams under his command, the Village Stability Coordination Center director, and a company commander in March and August 2012, as well as the author’s direct observation. Some interviews were conducted by video teleconference.

{112}
Author interview with Hayes, Uruzgan, March 19, 2012. See Ann Marlowe, “The Back of Beyond: A Report from Zabul Province,”
World Affairs Journal
, March/April 2010. A battalion of 4/82 BCT posted in Zabul and Uruzgan in 2009 was ordered to pull back to focus on Highway One in January 2010. One of the two Afghan battalion commanders, however, did make the effort to learn Pashto, as Carlotta Gall reported on May 23, 2011, in the
New York Times
in “A Slice of Afghanistan Well Secured by Afghans.”

{113}
Author interview with civil affairs team sergeant, August 2012.

{114}
Author interview with Dan Green, March 20, 2012, and numerous author interviews with Brian Strickland in August 2011 and March 2012. The Strickland remark is quoted from a March 19, 2012, interview.

{115}
Maria Abi-Habib, “SEALs Battle for Hearts, Minds and Paychecks,”
Wall Street Journal
, August 29, 2012.

{116}
The training of the commandos and the mission in Zabul were recounted in interviews with Marshall, the SEAL platoon commander; Lieutenant Colonel Ahmadullah Popal; and operations officer Shah Janan, March 18, 2012.

{117}
Information in this passage is from author interviews. See also Tom Vandenbrook, “Black Hawk Crash Kills Seven U.S. Troops,”
USA Today
, August 16, 2011; Bill Roggio, “11 NATO, Afghan Troops Killed in Helicopter Crash in Kandahar,”
Long War Journal
, August 16, 2011.

{118}
This account is based on author observations and conversations, August 17, 2012.

{119}
Details on career from author interview with ODA 1114 team sergeant Russ, March 24, 2012.

{120}
Author interview with ALP commander Abdullah Khan, Zarghan Shah, March 25, 2012. Two of his brothers had joined the regular police and army and had been sent to Balkh and Farah provinces in the north and west, respectively. One of them had been killed. The ALP commander said he was determined to stay in Paktika to take care of the widow and his mother.

{121}
This account is drawn from author observations at the shura, the lunch, and a tour of Yahya Khel and author interviews with Haji Yar Mohammed and other Afghans on March 26, 2012.

{122}
The quotation is from an author interview with company commander Major Mike Bandy, Sharana, March 25, 2012. The account is based on interviews with team members and Jess Patterson. See also Kevin Sieff and Javed Hamdard, “Rogue Afghan Police Officer: A Taliban Infiltrator’s Road to Fratricide,”
Washington Post
, April 1, 2012.

{123}
Author interview with Jess Patterson, December 30, 2012.

{124}
Author interview with Russell, December 17, 2012.

{125}
Author interviews with 1st Special Forces Group team members. The Sar Howza shooting, which occurred on March 26, 2012, was reported in a US Department of Defense casualty report press release dated March 28, 2012. Sergeant William R. Wilson III of 2-28, 172nd Infantry Brigade died of his wounds suffered in the shooting.

{126}
This section is based on author interviews with Captain Jae Kim, other members of ODA 1411, and Afghans in Paktika in November 2012, in addition to follow-up emails with the team leader.

{127}
The MATVs were equipped with the Common Remotely Operated Weapon System, or CROWS.

{128}
The information on OTI projects was supplied by the USAID Office of Transition Initiatives.

{129}
Author interviews with ODA 1411 members.

{130}
I witnessed the meetings described in this section in Surobi and Orgun and conducted interviews with Afghans and team members who were present on November 11 and 12, 2012.

{131}
Kimberly Dozier and Adam Goldman, “Counterterrorist Pursuit Team: 3,000 Man CIA Paramilitary Force Hunts Militants in Afghanistan, Pakistan,” Associated Press, September 22, 2010; Mark Mazzetti and Dexter Filkins, “U.S. Military Seeks to Expand Raids in Pakistan,”
New York Times
, December 20, 2010; Greg Miller, “CIA Digs In as Americans Withdraw from Iraq, Afghanistan,”
Washington Post
, February 7, 2012.

{132}
Author observations at the shura, Orgun, Paktika, November 11, 2012, and interviews with Afghan and US officials.

{133}
Greg Miller, “Secret Report Raises Alarms on Intelligence Blind Spots Because of AQ Focus,”
Washington Post
, March 20, 2013. A webcast of Brennan’s confirmation hearing on February 7, 2013, is posted at the website of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

{134}
The events in these paragraphs are largely based on the author’s email communications with Captain Kim and phone interviews with battalion and other special operations officers.

{135}
Rebecca Parr, “Special Forces Soldier James Grissom, of Hayward, Remembered by Friends, Family,”
Mercury News
, April 1, 2013, www.mercurynews.com/breaking-news/ci_22917925/special-​forces-​soldier-grissom-hayward-remembered-by-friends.

{136}
In August 2012, a special operations team was sent to Andar from northern Afghanistan for the final weeks of its tour.

{137}
Author interviews with team intelligence officer in Andar, November 10, 2012.

{138}
Author interview with Major Jason Clarke, AOB 1320, Sharana, November 9, 2012. The degree of Taliban control in the districts of Andar and De Yak was outlined in a
New York Times
article, and RC-East officials at the time verified the accuracy of this article for the author. See C. J. Chivers, “Afghanistan’s Hidden Taliban Government,”
New York Times
, February 6, 2011. See also Joshua Foust’s post, “The Push into Andar,” at Registan.net, February 2, 2011.

{139}
The quotations from Andar officials Diciwal and Ramazon are from author interviews with them and personal observations in Andar, November 10–11, 2012.

{140}
The conventional forces were pulling back their small footprint from Maidan Shah, Sayadabad, and Jagatu to FOB Shank in Logar. They would have small advisory Security Force Assistance Teams (SFATs) at FOB Airborne in northern Wardak and at Shank to mentor the Afghan army corps and kandaks.

{141}
This account is drawn from author interviews with Lieutenant Colonel Brad Moses, Bagram, October 7, 2011, and March 29, 2012. See also Jean McKenzie, “War by Other Means,” Part 3, “Guardians of Wardak,”
Global Post
, June 28, 2010, www.globalpost.com/dispatch/afghanistan/100625/us-aid-afghanistan-taliban-3-qaeda?page=0,0.

{142}
Author interview with Afghan army chief General Sher Mohammed Karimi, April 3, 2012. The description of Wardak and of the events that took place in that province is drawn from numerous author interviews with Afghan officials and US officers responsible for operations there at different points in time, including Major General John Campbell and his RC-East staff on February 25–27, 2011; Lieutenant Colonel Bob Wilson on October 6, 2011, and February 14, 2012; Lieutenant Colonel Brad Moses on October 7, 2011, and March 29, 2012; and CJSOTF-A J-3 on November 14, 2012, as well as other interviews cited in this section and personal observations.

{143}
Author interview with Major General Tony Thomas, Kabul, November 6, 2012.

{144}
Ibid. Statistic from the CJSOTF-A ALP Weekly Tracker, January 28, 2013.

{145}
The statement issued by Karzai’s presidential office is quoted in Thom Patterson, “NATO: No Evidence for Afghan Claim of Possible Torture, Murder by U.S. Forces,” CNN, February 25, 2013.

{146}
Yaroslav Trofimov, “U.S. Set to Pull Forces from Afghan District,”
Wall Street Journal
, March 20, 2013.

{147}
Dylan Welch and Hamid Shalizi, “Insight: Afghan Move Against U.S. Special Forces Tied to Abuse Allegations,” Reuters, February 26, 2013.