One Hundred Victories (52 page)

{43}
This assessment of moderate corruption on the part of Barwari comes from author interviews with US officials, including the team leader. Sources for this section also include author interview with Barwari, October 21, 2011, and multiple shura meetings in October 2011.

{44}
Author interview, March 13, 2012.

{45}
Author observations on visits to Kandahar Province. Fazluddin Agha’s death was reported by Reuters on January 12, 2012. He was killed by a suicide car bomber along with two sons and two bodyguards.

{46}
This account is principally based on author interviews with Dee on August 18, 2012, and Bill Carty on February 1, 2013, and email exchanges. See also “Kandahar Police Chief Survives Suicide Attack,” Aljazeera.com, January 11, 2012.

{47}
Author interviews with Bill Carty, October 28, 2011, and February 15, 2012.

{48}
{48}
The team members’ quotations and actions in this chapter are principally drawn from direct observation and author interviews with Hutch, Greg, Dustin, Cameron, and other team members, October 9–10, 2011; with Hutch and Greg on February 14, 2012; and with Hutch and Cameron on October 24, 2012.

{49}
{49}
Bob Woodward revealed the existence of the CIA’s Counterterrorist Pursuit Teams in
Obama’s Wars
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010).

{50}
{50}
Author interviews with ODA 3325 members in October 2011, and with Aziz in Paktika, October 11, 2011, and March 27, 2012. Aziz’s history with the special forces, his role in Paktika, and his hospitalization were also discussed by Brigadier General Chris Haas in an author interview on October 4, 2011.

{51}
{51}
In addition to interviews with Hutch and other team members about their views and approach, this characterization draws on an unpublished paper written by Hutch entitled “Twenty Tribes at a Time.”

{52}
{52}
These events in Rabat and Nawi Kalay, and the first battle in Pirkowti, were recounted by team members in the author interviews cited above. Details of Aziz’s actions were also provided by him in the separate author interviews cited above.

{53}
Hutchinson, “Twenty Tribes at a Time,” and Powerpoint presentation prepared by ODA 3325.

{54}
Author interview with Lieutenant Colonel John Meyer, October 10, 2011. The quadrupled rate of fire from the Pakistani side of the border is also cited in a DOD News Briefing given by ISAF Joint Command Lieutenant General Curtis Scaparrotti on October 27, 2011. He said, “With respect to the number, in the south along Paktika’s Khost—Patika border area with Pakistan, the cross-border fires this year are about—are over four times higher than they had been in the past year, so considerably higher.”

{55}
Author interview with Mary Kettman, October 27, 2012, and subsequent email exchanges regarding her experiences and OTI activities in Paktika. Additional information about the Afghan Stabilization Initiative was supplied by the USAID Office of Transition Initiatives in Washington, DC, on March 18, 2013.

{56}
Details about Abbasin and his role are cited in a US Treasury Department press release, ”Treasury Continues Efforts Targeting Terrorist Organizations Operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” dated September 29, 2011. This account of the operation is based on the author’s observations.

{57}
Julius Cavendish, “Afghanistan’s Dirty War: Why the Most Feared Man in Bermal District Is a U.S. Ally,”
Time
, October 4, 2011. An earlier version was published by
The Independent
on March 18, 2011, which includes the ISAF statement that its investigation could not substantiate the UN report: “A NATO spokesman said that its own investigation of Azizullah turned up nothing. ‘There was a derogatory report via UN channels last summer, but when we tried to research it, there was really little information to substantiate what were essentially claims,’ said Lieutenant-Colonel John Dorrian, chief of operations at NATO’s public affairs unit in Kabul. As a matter of due diligence, we subsequently tried to backtrack to the origin of the claim, but nothing credible could be found.”

{58}
Author interviews with team members and Aziz. US State Department official Jess Patterson and an Afghan intelligence official in Kabul confirmed this description of the Paktika government and the elders’ response to the allegations about Aziz. The latter interviews occurred on December 30, 2012, and April 4, 2012.

{59}
Author interviews with Aziz, October 11, 2011, and March 27, 2012.

{60}
Author interview with Aziz, March 27, 2012.

{61}
Author interview with Steve Townsend, Bagram, February 26, 2011.

{62}
Jim Gant, “One Tribe at a Time,” Nine Sister Imports, Inc., 2009. Some readers, such as former Ambassador Ron Neumann, were concerned by Gant’s account, saying that he had taken sides in a dispute that pitted one tribe against another. According to the official VSO methodology formulated by the special operations command, the teams were to rely on the consensus of elders and to seek a tribal balance in areas populated by a variety of groups. Moreover, Afghan Local Police were supposed to perform purely defensive functions and promptly turn over any detainees to police custody.

{63}
Author interview with CFSOCC-A official, June 8, 2011.

{64}
The dialogue and action recounted in this section are based on the author’s observations during visits to Kunar in August and October 2011 and interviews with team members and Afghans, including Nur Mohammed and local police, the Afghan Interior Ministry in-processing team, acting district governor Shah Mahmoun, NDS intelligence official Abdul Shah Wali, District Augmentation Teams, and US district support team civilian officials. Post-tour interviews were conducted with the team leader and team sergeant at Fort Bragg on February 15, 2012.

{65}
In addition to the interviews cited above, author interview with Lieutenant Jake Peterson, October 16, 2011.

{66}
Author interviews with Jay Schrader on August 5, 2011, and February 15, 2011.

{67}
Quotations are from author interview with Mark, senior communications sergeant, August 6, 2011, and Nur Mohammed, August 5, 2011.

{68}
The quotation is from an author interview with Lieutenant Colonel Bob Wilson on February 14, 2012; he also discussed the issue in an interview on August 4, 2012, as well as in interviews with 3310 commander Major Eddie Jimenez and Sergeant Major Rotsaert on August 7, 2011, and October 14 and 15, 2011. Wilson also said he experienced the same “red-centric” or enemy-focused approach when he tried to persuade the brigade commander based in Khost to conduct operations to close two passes on the Pakistan-Paktiya border to support efforts to establish Village Stability Operations there. A senior US officer recounted that Jack Keane, an influential but unofficial adviser to General Petraeus, had urged that brigade commander to focus on enemy kill-and-capture operations. Several US officers related accounts of such pressure during battlefield circulations conducted by Keane.

{69}
Author interviews with Wilson (cited above); Colonel Mark Schwartz, October 6, 2011; and Lieutenant General Curtis Scaparrotti, ISAF Joint Command, April 2, 2012.

{70}
Author interview with 3310 commander Major Eddie Jimenez and Sergeant Major Rotsaert on August 7, 2011, and October 14–15, 2011.

{71}
The account of the operation and dialogue in this section is principally drawn from author interviews with the ODA 3316 team leader, Matt; the chief warrant officer of ODA 3313; 3310 company commander Jimenez; and battalion commander Wilson.

{72}
This account draws principally on author interviews with the participants and secondarily on the unclassified version of the official investigation, known as the Clark Report. The Pakistani government has never acknowledged that its personnel fired first on the American and Afghan troops. See Stephen A. Clark, “Investigation into the Incident in Vicinity of the Salala Checkpoint on the Night of 25–26 Nov 2011: A Report,” United States Central Command, 2011, www.centcom.mil/images/stories/Crossborder/report%20exsum%20further%20redacted.pdf.

{73}
Clark Report, as well as author interviews with Mike, chief warrant officer 2, who was the ground force commander for the operation, February 15, 2012; his battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Bob Wilson, February 14, 2012; the CJSOTF-A operations officer, Lieutenant Colonel Brad Moses, March 29, 2012; and Colonel Heinz Dinter, CFSOCC-A, March 10, 2012.

{74}
Quotes are from author interview with Mike, February 15, 2012; additional information was supplied by interviews and email exchange with Wilson.

{75}
Initial press reports contain Pakistani government denials, as in Dion Nissenbaum, Tom Wright, Owais Tohid, and Adam Entous, “Airstrike Ravages U.S.-Pakistan Ties,”
Wall Street Journal
, November 28, 2011. Press questions of Clark are in his DOD News Briefing on the report, December 22, 2011, www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?tran​scriptid=​4952. For Pakistan’s official reply to the Clark Report, see “Pakistan’s Perspective on Investigation: Report Conducted by BG Stephen Clark into 26th November 2011 US led ISAF/NATO Forces Attack on Pakistani Volcano and Boulder Posts in Mohmand Agency,” published by Pakistani military’s Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), January 23, 2012, available at www.ispr.gov.pk/front/press/pakistan.pdf.

{76}
The report states that “RC-E did not forward the CONOP to NBCC [the Nawa Border Coordination Center] or ODRP [the US Office of Defense Representative in Pakistan].” Clark Report, p. 21, paragraphs (4) and (5).

{77}
Author interview with General John Allen, Kabul, April 3, 2012.

{78}
This account is based on author interviews with General John Allen, April 3, 2012; Brigadier General Chris Haas, April 3, 2012; Colonel Heinz Dinter, April 5, 2012; and three other US officials with direct knowledge of the events.

{79}
ISAF press release 2011-11-CA-013, dated November 26, 2011. The text of the release read: “The International Security Assistance Force is investigating an incident that occurred early this morning along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.”

{80}
See Stephen A. Clark, “Investigation into the Incident in Vicinity of the Salala Checkpoint on the Night of 25–26 Nov 2011: A Report,” United States Central Command, 2011; DOD News Briefing with Brigadier General Clark on December 22, 2011, posted at www.defense.gov.

{81}
The observations from Haas are from author interviews with him on August 9, 2011; October 4, 2011; October 31, 2011; and April 3, 2012.

{82}
Author interviews with Ryan Crocker, August 8, 2011; October 30, 2011; and April 1, 2012.

{83}
CJSOTF-A ALP Weekly Tracker, October 31, 2011.

{84}
Author interview with Dinter, Kabul, March 10, 2012.

{85}
Author interview with Colonel Mark Schwartz, Bagram, October 6, 2011.

{86}
RAND used a polling firm that hired and trained Afghans to do the polling. The firm conducted three “wave” polls between November 2010 and June 2011. The sample size was 10,000 in 26 districts that had Afghan Local Police, with an average of 430 Afghans interviewed per district. See “Assessment of Opinion Poll and Team Reporting for Village Stability Operations in Afghanistan: Wave 3,” RAND unclassified briefing, October 30, 2011. Wave 2 was produced in April 2011.

{87}
Author interviews with team leader in Kunar, October 17, 2011, and with Chris Haas, October 31, 2011.

{88}
Author interview with member of Haas’s staff, April 7, 2012. The issues and events in this section draw on interviews with Haas, Dinter, Colonel Beau Higgins, Captain Wes Spence, Colonel Pat Stevens, and other members of Haas’s staff.

{89}
Author interviews with the Group Support Battalion commander and numerous CJSOTF-A staff, October 2011 and March 2012.

{90}
James R. Marrs, “Findings and Recommendations of AR 15-6 Investigation: Credibility Assessment of Allegations of Human Rights Violations Appearing in a Human Rights Watch Report,” USFOR-A-DJ2, United States Forces–Afghanistan, 2011; author interviews with Schwartz, Bagram, October 6, 2011, and March 29, 2012.

{91}
Author interviews in Kabul, October 3 and 5, 2011, and March 9, 2012.

{92}
This account is drawn from author interviews with Haas, Dinter, Schwartz, Higgins, Spence, Stevens, and other members of Haas’s staff as well as two Afghan officials.

{93}
Author interview with Haas, Kabul, April 3, 2012.