Nazi Paris: The History of an Occupation, 1940-1944 (16 page)

An intimidating sight known to every Parisian during four years

PART III

H
OLDING
O
N

(November 1942–June 1944)

Chapter 11

A T
URN OF
F
ORTUNE

O
peration Torch brought the war back to France. After the fall of Paris in the summer of 1940, the din of battle had receded to faraway places—to the islands of the Pacific and the steppes of Russia. During that time, the French capital lay in waiting, sullenly quiet, its population apathetic and its public life usually subdued despite sporadic outbursts of violence. The Anglo-American landing in North Africa abruptly changed that atmosphere and focused everyone's attention on the fact that Western Europe was once more destined to become a scene of combat. Now military action was just across the Mediterranean waters in the Maghreb, directly involving territory that was both technically and emotionally a part of the French nation. Thus, in November 1942, a third phase of the Occupation began.

The configuration of France and the nature of the Occupation were likewise suddenly altered. In personal letters to Marshal Pétain, Adolf Hitler explained why the Third Reich must take “necessary measures” of self-defense by crossing, and thereby erasing, the demarcation line.
¹
German troops rushed to the southern coast and pointed their binoculars across the sea. In effect, they thereby annexed Vichy France to the Occupied Zone and assumed command everywhere from Roubaix to Marseille. For the military administration this move had daunting implications. It meant that an entirely new bureaucracy would need to be installed in the former Unoccupied Zone and, accordingly, that there would be a need for a batch of new
Feldkommandanten
with their offices and their staffs and their complex relations to local French prefects and mayors. The immense space between the demarcation line and the shores of the Midi would henceforth have to be supervised and administered, just at a time when manpower needs elsewhere had greatly reduced the MBF's staff in Paris. Heinrich von Stülpnagel and Carl Oberg agreed that to function effectively under the new circumstances, the German army and the police would require a simplification of procedures as well as a redistribution of all personnel. The status quo was no longer tenable.
²

In Paris, German authorities attempted to evaluate the new situation in reports to their superiors back in Berlin. Although there was general agreement among them, it is useful to separate these sources into three main components. The first raft of messages emanated from security police and SS officers, often in the form of dispatches addressed directly to Heinrich Himmler. He was told that there was now increasing talk of a forthcoming liberation and that “many have changed their position.” Operation Torch had created “a hitherto unknown Germanophobia” in France, with as many as 95 percent of the population now anticipating an ultimate Allied victory. But uncertainty about the immediate future was such that a “nervous climate” prevailed in Paris, even though the annual Armistice Day ceremonies on 11 November 1942 passed without any public incident.
³
When the Allied campaign bogged down in Tunisia in early December, the populace's initial enthusiasm was dampened, and a more realistic mood of “stolid resignation” settled in, as Helmut Knochen commented. Parisians began to understand that a military outcome was not near: instead of three months, liberation might have to wait five years. Still, by the beginning of 1943 there was no denying a “general rejection of all things German” and a widely shared hope among the French for “an imminent collapse of Germany and an Allied victory in this year.”
⁴

A second opinion originated from the hierarchy of military administration, percolating up from several
Kreiskommandanten
in the Paris region to their
Feldkommandant
, whence on to the Commandant of Greater Paris, then finally to MBF Stülpnagel. From the resulting dozens of memoranda between November 1942 and March 1943, it is possible to extrapolate a consistent pattern that largely corroborated the impressions gathered by Himmler's RSHA in Berlin. The French were reacting with a certain
Schadenfreude
, harboring few doubts about an eventual German defeat and adopting the attitude of a somewhat bemused bystander. There was plenty of negativism toward the Occupation but no sign of a “terrorist movement” or an open rebellion. An uprising would be likely only in the event of “a successful enemy invasion.” Rather, the Germans would have to reckon with passive resistance and tantrums of rejection: delays, discourtesy in shops, and slowdowns in factories.
⁵
“Today Germany no longer has very many friends,” lamented one
Kreiskommandant
in a Paris suburb, while another remarked, “The attitude toward Germany is altogether degraded.” They estimated that a maximum of 10 percent of the population might be considered collaborationist. It was not surprising, then, that “there is talk of a decisive turn of fortune in the war.”
⁶
These frank expressions following the North African landing were more than enough to reveal the hollowness of military celebrations in Paris at the end of January 1943 marking the tenth anniversary of the Nazi seizure of power. Notably, in the morning there was a solemn wreath-laying at the cemetery of Ivry, and in the evening a splendid gala at the Palais de Chaillot with the motto: “Wir werden siegen, weil uns Adolf Hitler führt” (We shall be victorious because Adolf Hitler leads us).
⁷
Such expansive German confidence was meanwhile belied by the unfavorable bulletins that continued to reach Paris as the battle of Stalingrad approached its disastrous conclusion. The consensus among military officials of the Occupation was that everything depended on the course of outside events. Only an impressive German triumph could alter the ambient gloom, and that was apparently not in the offing.
⁸

Diplomatic channels did not present any more consolation. The Foreign Office in Berlin was informed that although Paris was outwardly calm, public opinion had in fact hardened. “A considerable worsening” of circumstances was the only conclusion to be drawn. Sponsored by the Paris Embassy and a frequent visitor to the French capital, Professor Friedrich Grimm was only slightly more sanguine. He detected a “general confusion” there and speculated that 10 percent of Parisians favored collaboration, 10 percent remained firmly opposed, and the other 80 percent still temporized. But he also confirmed that the drift of public perception under the Occupation would depend on military developments in the Mediterranean and Russian theaters. Whatever transpired, Grimm observed, there was nonetheless little danger of an insurrection in France simply because “the populace is tired.”
⁹
All things considered, after the first week of November 1942, the prognosis of German authorities in Paris was neither uplifting nor reassuring. The optimism that had characterized the first two phases of the Occupation was rapidly dissipating, and the swagger was gone.

This evident decline of verve and self-confidence tended to exacerbate already existing internal conflicts. Upon closer examination, the entrails of the military administration were not a pretty sight. Truth to tell, Heinrich von Stülpnagel was scarcely more successful than his cousin Otto had been in containing the erosion of his authority. He seemed perpetually embattled on all sides. First, as before, the MBF was forced to fend off the diplomatic corps. At odds over policy with Joachim von Ribbentrop because of his zealous support of Pierre Laval, Otto Abetz was recalled in December 1942 to Berlin, where he languished as if in exile for a full year.
¹⁰
Yet the Paris Embassy remained active and, under Rudolf Schleier, managed to give Stülpnagel unrelenting grief, as the following two examples illustrate. Recently transferred from Wiesbaden and appointed in Paris as the Reich's diplomatic representative for economics and finance, Richard Hemmen conferred in January 1943 with Laval. Stülpnagel had not been informed about the meeting, and he was incensed to learn of it. Hemmen was summoned to the Hotel Majestic, where the general complained about being excluded and coldly advised him that the MBF alone held the power to negotiate directly with heads of the Vichy regime. Attempts by Schleier to soothe Stülpnagel's ruffled feelings were ineffective. He would be willing to talk further with a delegation from the Embassy, Stülpnagel huffed, but only after he had received a written explanation of Hemmen's action.
¹¹

Although this affair concerned a relatively minor matter, it was an indicative one. That was made clear by another festering dispute over the control of propaganda. Despite the Embassy's putative authority to regulate all matters political in France, the Propaganda Section of the military administration continued to issue bulletins and directives. The result was duplication and friction that prompted an appeal for arbitration to the OKW's chief of staff, Wilhelm Keitel, who chose to back the Embassy. He did so, however, without consulting Joseph Goebbels, whose propaganda ministry in Berlin had a stake in maintaining an open line to the MBF staff in Paris. They could all expect more trouble, one observer correctly remarked, when Goebbels found out and undertook a counterattack.
¹²
Again, nothing was settled. One of Abetz's first actions after returning to his post at the Rue de Lille in December 1943 was to draft and circulate a list of eight instances in which the Propaganda Section had interfered with the political initiatives of the Embassy. It was one against all and all against one.
¹³

Stülpnagel's second worry was Fritz Sauckel. Whereas the German military administration ordinarily tried to spare public sentiment in Paris and to avoid overbearing demands, Sauckel's blustering determination to raise quotas for the recruitment of labor risked an unpopularity that complicated dealings with French officials there and in Vichy. Moreover, against Stülpnagel's express wishes, Sauckel appointed a personal envoy in Paris, Julius Ritter, who (like Hemmen) took it upon himself to confer privately with Laval. When Sauckel departed after a stay in the French capital in early August 1943, he profusely thanked the MBF for the “far-reaching agreement” they had attained on the labor question. To this, the well-informed Stülpnagel retorted with indignation that Ritter had already violated the “comradely spirit” of their accord and that the MBF alone was authorized to conduct direct negotiations in the name of the Occupation. He demanded that Ritter be so instructed. Otherwise, in light of their “mutual distrust,” the military administration threatened to withdraw altogether its cooperation in the labor recruitment program, which would surely be a crippling blow.
¹⁴

A third challenge came from the relatively new power base being created by Oberg. As the supreme German police commander, he had initially been successful in squeezing out competitors. On a visit to Paris in mid-November 1942, for instance, the head of the Abwehr, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, agreed to turn over to Oberg all files concerning the chase after Communists, which had previously been managed in the Hotel Lutétia. Similarly, control of munitions stored at German depots in France, formerly the domain of military
Feldkommandanten
, was henceforth assumed by Oberg's police force.
¹⁵
There was yet another factor to be considered. Since France was once again a war zone, renewed importance was accorded to the military command post known as OB West under Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, who demanded a free hand for law enforcement in the former Unoccupied Zone. This claim led to a conflict with Oberg, who insisted that “observations of anti-German actions” within the police everywhere in France must continue under his direction.
¹⁶
To back up his chief, in a report filed on 17 August 1943, Knochen deplored the “passive resistance” and lack of dedication in the ranks of the French police and bluntly proclaimed the need for a purge. The Gestapo should not hesitate, he declared, “to arrest certain [police] functionaries and to expel them to the Reich.” This exclamation drew immediate objections from both the Paris Embassy and the German military administration. Knochen was accused of mixing fact with fiction, leading to “exaggerated conclusions.” To the contrary, he was told, the French police bureaucracy, though sometimes acting with hesitation, was functioning perfectly well. Calling Knochen on the carpet at the Hotel Majestic, Stülpnagel demanded a reasoned explanation of the “contradictions” in his statement. Evidently it was not satisfactory. Knochen would soon be gone.
¹⁷

This intensified in-fighting of the Occupation—often sharp, even when petty—undoubtedly betrayed a markedly heavier atmosphere in Paris during 1943. Another symptom of it was the open discussion and preparation for a “serious circumstance” (
Ernstfall
), a standard euphemism for an anticipated Allied invasion of the Continent.
¹⁸
This expression recurred intermittently during the spring and summer as bad news about the war accumulated. On the Eastern Front, after the surrender of Field Marshal Paulus at Stalingrad in February, the last major German counterattack was repulsed in July, and the Russians began their slow and inexorable push toward Berlin. By that time, the North African campaign had come to a close: Rommel had been defeated, and the Anglo-Americans reigned everywhere from Egypt to the Atlantic. Sicily was invaded and Mussolini deposed that July, bringing the enemy one step closer. Finally, on 2 September 1943, the Allies landed on the shores of Italy. Surely France would be next.