Nazi Paris: The History of an Occupation, 1940-1944 (14 page)

The term “Aryanization” is not usually to be found in a standard English dictionary, nor does it appear in the index of many reputable histories of the Vichy period.
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Yet it is indispensable for any description of the Occupation and its policy toward the Jews. Starting in 1941, “administrative commissars” were assigned to French firms identified by the CGQJ's Service du Contrôle—ever prompted, of course, by the Germans—as being under Jewish influence, that is, having Jewish owners, directors, or stockholders. Their number grew exponentially in 1942 from hundreds to thousands.
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Once dossiers on these various businesses were prepared by the French and approved by their German supervisors, they could either be Ayranized by eliminating Jews or liquidated through sale to non-Jewish clients. All revenues were to be turned over to a German agency called the Treuhand for short.
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If this procedure sounds complicated, it was. And it was often far from satisfactory. German officials repeatedly expressed criticism about “simulated Aryanization,” about “straw men” who camouflaged residual Jewish influence, and about the “deplorable” performance of the CGQJ's bureaucracy.
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A dilemma for the Occupation, especially as manpower needs in Eastern Europe began draining away its ranks, derived from the lack of personnel. Either the Germans themselves would need to take over Aryanization, or they must leave it to the French and suffer the misbegotten consequences. There was actually no choice but the latter, and the explicit policy became to pursue Aryanization “with approval but without participation” of the Germans, while the French were expected to act “independently and on their own responsibility.” One complication for this policy was the desire of the Vichy regime to maintain property and funds, insofar as possible, in French rather than German hands.
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The end result was an immense bureaucratic apparatus that lurched on during the rest of the Occupation. If highly imperfect, this operation was not at all negligible. Whereas the rate of Aryanization declined slowly in early 1942, statistics rose again that autumn and averaged about 400 a month for the year.
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Consequently, after gathering about 2.6 million francs in 1941, the Treuhand could claim to have collected more than 8 million francs from 3,951 firms by the end of September 1942. This record was achieved despite undeniable “organizational frictions” and the tendency of French functionaries to act “as if Aryanization were a measure solely introduced and executed” by the Germans.
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On the contrary, unless one counts exhibitions and musical performances in Paris, it was probably the most elaborate and successful example of Franco-German collaboration during the war years.

A major reform of the Aryanization program was attempted in the autumn of 1942 as part of a general reorganization of the CGQJ under Darquier de Pellepoix, who vowed to effect a total elimination of Jewish influence from the French economy. The erratic Service du Contrôle was abolished and a new section (Aryanisation Économique) was installed in its stead at the CGQJ to alleviate the “incoherence” of months past. All of this activity occurred as usual under pressure from the Occupation. For the Germans, as French Minister of Finance Pierre Cathala remarked, it was important to “reinforce their pretensions.”
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Whether the administration thereby became any more efficient is difficult to measure but doubtful. In July 1942, Heinrich von Stülpnagel judged that economic
Entjudung
was progressing well enough in the Occupied Zone, except for Paris, where the staff of the CGQJ had nonetheless tripled from 170 to 543. In all, according to one German estimate, by early November dossiers had been started and commissars assigned to nearly 33,000 French enterprises. That round figure seems inflated. Yet if Aryanization still remained incoherent and incomplete, it was certainly not for lack of paperwork.
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In discussing the deportation of Jews from France, one might speculate about when the action was put into motion. Certainly no later, the answer must be, than early October 1941. Just before leaving Paris at that time for an appointment with Adolf Hitler in Berlin, Otto Abetz was approached by Zeitschel, his assistant for Jewish affairs, who recommended that Abetz urge the Führer to order the shipment of all Jews in French concentration camps “to the East” in order to relieve crowding. During his conversations with Hitler, Abetz raised the subject and gained approval for the action, provided adequate transportation could be arranged for it.
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Before year's end, the details were specified. The plan was to gather 1,000 Jews (a figure later set at 1,100) in Compiègne by transferring a large number of them from Drancy. These “Jewish-Bolshevik elements” would be readied as a “work detail” and must therefore be able-bodied males.
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It will be recalled that Otto von Stülpnagel, then mired in the hostage crisis, offered no objection to such arrangements and in fact assured his superiors in Berlin that sending “a certain number” of prisoners to Germany or to “the East” would be the most effective reprisal against attacks on German military personnel in Paris.
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This development, it should be emphasized, originated in Paris and began well before the Wannsee Conference of January 1942, a date that is ordinarily regarded as the defining moment for the Final Solution.

In early 1942, Werner Best confirmed the Occupation's intentions and added more details. The contingent of Jews at Compiègne must be aged 18 to 55, “fit for labor” (
arbeitsfähig
), and French, stateless, or from an occupied country (thus no English or American Jews would be taken, in order to avoid retaliations abroad).
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On 10 March, Dannecker attended a conference in Berlin—the same meeting where the Star of David was mandated for France—and there set out for Reich officials the urgency of deporting Jews from the overflowing quarters at Compiègne. Speaking for the RSHA, Eichmann concurred. Several agreements were struck between the two men. Spouses in mixed marriages would be exempted. The Jews selected should have good shoes and at least one blanket. Their names should be inscribed on a list, one copy of which was to be sent to Himmler's office in Berlin and another to Auschwitz. This casual bureaucratic mention of Auschwitz at the very least dissipated any lingering doubt about what was meant by the recurring and ritual phrase “to the East.”
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Ten days later, back in Paris, Dannecker spelled out the consequences. The first deportation convoy,
Sonderzug
767, would leave Paris on 28 March and arrive in Auschwitz at exactly 5:00 AM on the morning of 30 March (although actually the first train left on 27 March). The prisoners would be composed solely of French, Polish, and Russian Jews. Although the MBF declined to provide enough German guards, “contrary to [a] request” from Dannecker's office, third-class carriages, instead of freight cars, would be used for the first rail transport across Germany. Repeatedly, in German dispatches and reports, it was explicitly stated that this action was to provide labor for a camp that famously bore a jarring inscription above its main gate of entry: “ARBEIT MACHT FREI.”
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That summer, shipments from France—now directly from Drancy—became routine. The shortage of guards remained a headache, and hence the deployment of freight cars also became routine. However, the problem of transportation was soon resolved. At a meeting in mid-May with Lt. General Otto Kohl, the head of the Eisenbahntransportabteilung (ETRA), Dannecker was delighted to find his interlocutor “an unmitigated opponent of Jews,” who ardently favored “a Final Solution of the Jewish question with the objective of a total destruction of the enemy.” Kohl promised to provide rolling stock to deport as many as 20,000 persons “to the East.” He was prepared to be “radical,” he said, even at the risk of seeming “crude.” Dannecker had found his man.
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The only issue now was to secure adequate space at camps in Eastern Europe that could be made available to accommodate all the Jews from France. Dannecker proudly reported his interview with Kohl to RSHA headquarters and inquired whether facilities were ready to receive steady detachments of Jews from Drancy. He would be “grateful,” Dannecker wrote on 15 May, if a contingent of 5,000 able-bodied Jews (only 5 percent women and no children) could be accepted and located at once. Far from being prodded by Berlin, one can only conclude, SS men in Paris were seizing the initiative on their own.
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Eichmann was delighted. He, too, stressed that only the physically fit should be sent to Auschwitz, but he wanted the pace to be increased. Three thousand Jews a week was not enough. There was talk of sending 10,000 in late June and another 22,000 by mid-July. To encourage such a hastened tempo of “evacuation,” as he called it, Eichmann paid a visit at the outset of July 1942 to Paris, where he conferred with Dannecker. Together they determined that “the Final Solution” was currently proceeding “smoothly and certainly” in the Occupied Zone, although the operation could be further accelerated.
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It is worth noting that the Paris Embassy registered “no reservations” (
keine Bedenken
) about this policy and that Abetz personally approved a quota of 40,000 Jewish laborers for Auschwitz. His only stipulation, as a sop to Vichy, was that the deportations should begin with foreigners and not affect French Jews until later. Neither Eichmann nor Dannecker found reason to reject that principle so long as they controlled its practice.
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Eichmann's trip to Paris was crucial because it was shortly followed by detailed planning for the most sensational incident of the second phase of the Occupation. Within a fortnight, on 16 and 17 July 1942, that planning was converted into action. A massive round-up of Jews took place, not only in Paris, but also throughout the Occupied Zone and in some parts of the Unoccupied Zone. Thousands were caught in this net—12,884 to be exact (3,031 men, 5,802 women, and 4,051 children).
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Of these, many hundreds of adults were sent to Drancy, where they were readied for immediate deportation. Another large contingent was consigned to camps in the Loiret. And the rest, mostly parents with their children, were huddled into the Vélodrome d—Hiver, a mammoth sports arena on the Seine near the Eiffel Tower that gave its name (Vel d—Hiv) to the entire affair. As Ernst Jünger dispassionately noted in his diary, one could hear “wailing in the streets” of Paris. No incident during the Occupation years has been so carefully documented and so closely studied. It would therefore be supererogatory to recount a lengthy narrative of events that occurred in July and in the months that followed. Suffice it to record here that in all about 40,000 Jews were deported from France before the end of 1942.
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From the standpoint of the Occupation, this decisive action was a stirring success (although admittedly below original expectations), which was made possible by the convergence of three salient factors. The first was the blinking green light in Berlin. After his return to the German capital, Eichmann remained in close contact with authorities in Paris, notably with the cluster of SS and Gestapo personnel. Meanwhile, with exquisite timing, Himmler reached Auschwitz on 17 July for a tour of inspection. While there, he also visited the adjacent camp of Birkenau in order to witness the selection and extermination of 449 Jews who had just arrived from Holland. Others were to be literally worked to death.
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The fact that Jews in France would meet the same fate was certainly known to Himmler and Eichmann and, presumably, to some of those with whom they had direct dealings. What cannot be precisely determined is who or how many persons in Paris were at that time privy to the truth.

A second factor was the favorable alignment of planets in Paris. Oberg was now in place there, assuring a firm hand in police affairs that had hitherto been lacking. He was assisted by the savvy Knochen, who played a better second fiddle than first. Although he had been active in planning the Vel d’Hiv razzia, Dannecker was reassigned at this moment and replaced by the equally relentless Heinz Röthke, who was placed in command of distributing the prisoners. The machinations of this triumvirate could be conducted without interference from either Heinrich von Stülpnagel's military administration or Abetz's Paris Embassy. The only real impediment was Laval, who continued to insist that solely foreign Jews should be deported, offering no objection, for example, to the shipment of 3,100 Romanians and 1,100 Greeks. For the most part, that wish was initially respected by the Germans, especially after Himmler signaled his acquiescence.
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Laval's other caveat, however, created surprise and consternation. He wanted the more than 4,000 Jewish children who had been captured to accompany their parents into exile on the dubious assumption that the Germans intended to organize a new state for them in Eastern Europe. This would avoid pathetic scenes of families being torn apart in Paris. Besides, Vichy had no desire to provide care for such a large number of orphans. The rub for Oberg and his underlings was that shipping children in freight cars might seem scarcely less humane, and it was likely to raise skepticism about the assiduously cultivated myth that Auschwitz was nothing more than a work camp. Consulted by Knochen from Paris, Eichmann gave his consent to Laval's request. The children would be deported—never to return.
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Third, Laval's two conditions aside, the French were on board. René Bousquet made all the difference. In Vichy's view, the entire purpose of his taking charge of the national police was to secure the independence of French law enforcement. But the price of that illusory autonomy was Bousquet's concession that the French police would fully collaborate with Oberg in quashing obstreperous and undesirable elements. And they did. Hundreds of Jewish residences were invaded by French officers, who then herded their captives into busses, guarded them in detention centers (including the Vel d—Hiv), and escorted them to the railway depot at Drancy-Le Bourget. This cooperation of French police and gendarmes, according to German military reports, was “extraordinarily good.” Otherwise, the undermanned forces of the Gestapo and the German Feldgendarmerie could not have carried out an operation of such magnitude, and there would consequently have been no Vel d’Hiv. Even if German goals for deportation were, and remained, well short of stated objectives, Franco-German collaboration clearly made the implementation of Nazi racial policy far more feasible.
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