Muslim Fortresses in the Levant: Between Crusaders and Mongols (58 page)

The fact that a fortress had been taken by the Mongols was a sufficient reason for Baybars to fortify and garrison the site. It appears that most of the work carried out during the first decade of his reign was done out of fear that the Īlkhānid army would return and retrace the footsteps of the Mongol invasion of 1260.

The fortresses along the main Trans-Jordanian highway going from north to south were rebuilt for similar reasons. The arrival of the Mongol army headed by Ketbugha on the banks of the Jordan,
⁵⁸
prior to the battle of
, emphasized how crucial it was to secure the main roads running through the Sultanate. In addition to the fear of losing Karak,
, Bosra,
and
once again, the fortresses in Trans-Jordan were a means of establishing Mamluk authority. They continued to serve as local and regional administration centers, providing security for the local population and for pilgrim and merchant caravans traveling to and from the holy cities of Mecca and Medina.

Due to the existence of Frankish enclaves along the Mediterranean coast, the route across Trans-Jordan became the main line of communication between Cairo and Damascus. Karak passed to the Mamluks in 1263. New sections were built while others were renovated and the garrison strengthened.
⁵⁹
Shawbak was taken soon after. Its governor swore allegiance to the sultan and the Christian population took an oath on the New Testament.
⁶⁰
probably fell during the same year. Ibn
includes it among the fortresses destroyed by the Mongols and restored by Baybars when he rose to power.
⁶¹
There is no detailed information as to how and under what circumstances the fortress was transferred to the Mamluks.

During the same year (1263) Baybars ordered the destruction of the fortress at Mount Tabor. The fortress was built by
and
in 1211,
⁶²
and counted as one of the largest in the region. In 1255 Mount Tabor reverted to the Franks. On receiving permission from the Pope the Order of the Hospitallers rebuilt and garrisoned the fortress.
⁶³
Baybars’ decision to destroy it probably stemmed from problems similar to those encountered by the Ayyubids. The need for an eceptionally large garrison and the high cost of maintaining the fortress may have been beyond the means of the Sultanate at the time. Mount Tabor was not an administrative center and though it commanded inland routes these were obviously not of great importance to the Mamluks. According to Burchard of Mount Sion, who wrote in 1283, Mount Tabor served as the Mamluk sultan’s hunting grounds.
⁶⁴
In 1264, a number of Syrian
nuwwāb
were sent to restore Shaqīf Tīrūn (Cave de Tyron), located 20 km northeast of Sidon. The fortress had been captured and destroyed by the Mongols and remained in ruins until Baybars ordered it to be rebuilt, armed and its storehouses filled with supplies.
⁶⁵
It is a fairly small fortress and its garrison would have been limited in number. It seems likely that Baybars decided to rebuild the site because it overlooked the coast. Its status was thus similar to that of Qāqūn.

After the restoration of the Euphrates and Trans-Jordan fortresses owned by the Ayyubid princes and amirs, Baybars turned to the Frankish strongholds. A different and more complex set of considerations came into play when contemplating the conquest and restoration of the large inland Frankish strongholds, and the policy differed greatly from that followed by the Mamluks when dealing with the Frankish coastal fortifications.

The remaining Crusader enclaves along the coast did not have sufficient military power to face the Mamluks in battle or to threaten the new Sultanate. The possibility, however remote, that a new Crusade would arrive by sea to re-conquer Jerusalem and Egypt, was the main cause for the aggressive policy conducted by the Mamluks. The Ayyubid and Mamluk lack of a strong navy brought about the scorched earth policy that was carried out methodically against the Crusader strongholds along the coast.

This policy had been ell established by the end of
al-Dīn’s reign. The Mamluks did not regard the sea or the navy as important as their land forces, which enjoyed greater attention, funding and respect.
⁶⁶
The Mamluk navy did not raid Frankish strongholds and could not prevent the Franks from landing on the Sultanate’s coast.
⁶⁷
The navy was of modest size and it anchored only in Egyptian ports. Thus it seems that Baybars had no option but to follow
al-Dīn’s policy.
⁶⁸
In the years 1265–6 Caesarea, Arsūf, Haifa and Jaffa fell into Mamluk hands one after the other.
⁶⁹
A different way of guarding and supervising the coastal region without investing in a large navy, was by settling the area with Kurdish, Mongolian and Turkish populations loyal to the sultan.
⁷⁰
The conquest of Qāqūn can be linked to this policy of Baybars. Although Qāqūn is not located directly on the coast it kept a watchful eye on the Frankish movements along the shoreline and served as an administrative center for this new population which had recently been settled by the sultan. Safad and Hunin were conquered in the same year (1265),
⁷¹
neither of which is located on the Sultanate’s frontier. Their Mamluk garrisons were never put to the test; they were never besieged or attacked and were seldom called upon to assist in large-scale campaigns. Their main ole until the fall of the Crusader kingdom was to help establish the Mamluk regime and safeguard the local population. While Qāqūn may have served the new Muslim population that was settled in the region, Safad was officially turned into a
niyāba
– a large regional administrative center. In addition to refortifying the citadel Baybars built markets, a caravanserai and mosques.
⁷²
According to Johns,
underwent a similar development.
⁷³
Although they were refortified and garrisoned, the military role of these fortresses was considerably reduced even before the Frankish kingdom fell.