Muslim Fortresses in the Levant: Between Crusaders and Mongols (119 page)

… in this year the sultan ordered the restoration of the curtain wall at al-Bīra, and he created the finest buildings and spent his money on its [i.e. the curtain wall] construction.
⁴¹

Creswell had described the rebuilding of the fortifications in a humorous way: “Qaytbāy was so pleased with his work that he gave himself a new title –
– Master of the fortresses of Rūm,” which appears in an inscription in Cairo.
⁴²
This is the last account of Mamluk construction work along the Euphrates frontier before the Ottoman conquest.

Though the Sultanate’s administrative structure survived through several long periods of internal strife, the defense of the periphery in general and the Euphrates frontier in particular could not maintain itself throughout such uncertain periods that could last for a substantial length of time. The governors of towns and fortresses in remote districts largely relied on a strong central government to provide a field army in times of enemy raids or full scale invasions. Funds for the upkeep of garrisons and maintenance of fortifications for the most part seem to have depended on the Sultanate’s treasury. Even if resources were partially taken or supplemented from local taxes, this required an order from the central authority. Large-scale repairs and renovations were initiated by the Sultan and supervised by his closest and most able amirs. Fortresses may have been reasonably maintained when the defense of the frontier was put in the hands of the Türkmen chieftains, though it is doubtful if they had the resources or whether their political interests were always identical to those of the Sultanate. In times of trouble, the frontier defenses again became the sultan’s direct responsibility and in both cases noted above the sultan indeed intervened. Though Barqūq and Qaytbāy showed concern, the changes they ordered along the eastern frontier were negligible. Barqūq’s nominal preparations resulted in a devastating invasion. This, however, did not prompt the Mamluks to act. No lesson was learnt and almost seventy years later the Aqquyunlu managed to conquer a large section of the middle Euphrates and once again the enemy’s army arrived at Aleppo. The success of the defense system largely depended on a centralized authority, the sultan’s political strength and the extent of his control of the army. If the sultan did not have all of these, the Sultanate’s frontiers were only truly secure in times of peace.

Notes

Introduction

1 Survey group: Prof. R. Ellenblum, Prof. R. Amitai, Y. Shapira and K. Raphael.

1

Ayyubid fortresses in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries

1 Petersen, A.,
Dictionary of Islamic Architecture
(London and New York, 1996), 89.

2 Creswell, K. A. C.,
Fortifications in Islam Before
A.D.
1250
, Proceedings of the British Academy 38 (London, 1952), 112–16. Badr al-Jamālī was a general of Armenian origin who commanded the army (r. 1074–94).

3 William Archbishop of Tyre,
The History of Deeds Done Beyond the Se
, trans. E. A. Babcock and A. C. Krey (New York, 1976), vol. 2, book 13, 9 (Tyre), book 17, 219 (Ascalon); Ellenblum, R.,
Crusader Castles and Modern Histories
(Cambridge, 2007), 243–4.

4 I was not able to visit
, as it is currently in an Egyptian military zone. The study of the fortress has been done from maps, photographs and articles.

5 Ibn
, Jamāl al-Dīn
b. Sālim,
Mufarrij al-kurūb fī akhbār banī ayyūb
(Alexandria, 1953), vol. 3, 215–16.

6 Yāqūt al-Rūmī,
al-buldān
(Beirut, 1957), vol. 3, 397.

7 Johns, C. N., “Medieval
,”
QDAP
1 (1931): 21–33.

8 Dangles P.
et al., Le Chateau d’Āğlūn/Qal’at ar-Rabad Jordanie,
Report intermédaire de la mission menée en mars et avril 2002, I.N.R.A.P. 2002.

9 Battista, A. and Bagatti, B.,
La Fortezza Saracena Del Monte Tabor (AH 609–15;
AD
1212–18)
(Jerusalem, 1976).

10 Ellenblum, R., “Who built
?,”
DOP
43 (1989): 103–12; Amitai, R., “Notes on the Ayyubid inscriptions at
(
Nimrod),”
DOP
43 (1989): 113–19.