Magnificent Delusions (53 page)

For several months, then, the killing of bin Laden cast a shadow over US-Pakistan relations. Pakistan demanded that the United States vacate the Shamsi Air Base in the Balochistan desert that it had used for operating drones over Pakistan's tribal areas. The United States agreed because Pakistan had the legal right to terminate the base and Americans had alternative staging sites for the drones anyway. Islamabad then asked for a comprehensive treaty between the two countries “to regulate” all aspects of the relationship. Washington said that would take time. The United States then slowed the flow of aid but did not cut it off. Pakistanis thought the worst was over.

On September 13, 2011, terrorists attacked the American embassy in Kabul. Grossman called me in to the State Department for what I knew would be another difficult meeting. As I sat down in his ground-floor office, he exclaimed, “We had a terrible day yesterday.” The Afghan Haqqani network, which was based in Pakistan's tribal areas, had apparently perpetrated the embassy attacks. For years the United States had asked Pakistan to act against them, but the ISI considered them allies since the days of the anti-Soviet Jihad. A truck bomb a few days earlier, which injured seventy-seven Americans, was also traced to the same terrorist group.

Grossman said that the latest attack in Kabul would now be the main topic of discussion for the meeting between Clinton and Pakistan's foreign minister, Hina Rabbani Khar, which was to take place in a few days. Pakistan wanted to discuss a memorandum of understanding as a first step toward a full-fledged treaty. Grossman said it seemed that the two sides were in “parallel universes.” Pakistanis spoke about everything but terrorism, pretending it was not happening. What we need, he said, is “a conversation among adults trying to solve a problem.” It was time to “put it all out there.”

The US diplomat shared with me his frustrations in dealing with Pakistan. Soon after he came to office in January CIA contractor Raymond Davis had killed two Pakistanis in Lahore on suspicion of trying to rob him. The United States had claimed diplomatic immunity. Davis
had been in Pakistan for three years, but the US embassy had never notified the Pakistan government that he was a diplomat. The ISI then fueled protests over American efforts to spy on Pakistan through men like Davis.

Davis was released when a judge allowed him to pay blood money to the victims' relatives; Islamic law had provided a face-saver. The ISI also managed to seek more details about CIA personnel in Pakistan after helping Davis win his freedom. But Grossman recalled that the incident marked a downward spiral in the US-Pakistan relationship that had hit rock bottom after the United States discovered bin Laden in Abbottabad. The best way to strengthen relation between nations was to “civilianize and privatize” them, he said. At that time 90 percent of Pakistan's relations with the United States were government related. They involved military-to-military, intelligence-to-intelligence and State Department-to-Foreign Office interaction. Business, investment, travel, tourism, education, and everything else represented only 10 percent of ties.

According to Grossman, healthy bilateral relations were usually 60 percent private and 40 percent government. He went on to say that the US geological survey had conducted flights in Afghanistan and revealed a wealth of rare earth metals. The logical conclusion was that something like that was also present on the Pakistani side, “since geology does not follow the Durand Line.” But, he argued, there was something wrong in a relationship when Pakistan would not even allow a flight of the geological survey because of the fear that “you want our nukes,” he said wistfully.

As Pakistan's ambassador, I could not tell my American counterpart that in my heart I agreed with his analysis.

Clinton met Khar at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York a few days later. She had been a friend to Pakistan as first lady, senator, and, now, as secretary of state. During this meeting, which I attended, she also voiced her exasperation over Pakistan's policies. According to Clinton, there was significant evidence that the Haqqani network based in Miranshah, in Pakistan's North Waziristan province, organized and executed the attacks on the US embassy and ISAF headquarters in Kabul.
There had been communication between the Haqqani network and elements within the Pakistan government prior to the attack.

“We know the relationship between the Haqqani network and the Pakistan Army and ISI,” Clinton said. The United States believed that Pakistani officials shared intelligence with the network and facilitated movement of its operatives. The Haqqani network moved men and materials across the border, and some of its operatives who moved in just prior to the recent attacks were still in Afghanistan awaiting orders. “This was not intelligence provided by Afghans or Indians but gathered from many sources,” Clinton explained.

The United States wanted Pakistan to act against the Haqqani network or to let the United States punish them by ending ISI facilitation for the terrorists. It also wanted decisive action against Lashkar-e-Taiba, a Pakistani group that had links to Al-Qaeda and was involved in the November 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai. Clinton also shared what she described as US concern about “governance issues.” She supported democracy in Pakistan but found the civilian government adrift. “One can't pretend that the military and ISI are not following a different agenda” from the civilian leaders, she observed.

Clinton also complained that there was an effort to paint everything the United States did for Pakistan negatively. “This effort is led by the ISI,” she said meaningfully. The Pakistani media environment was “toxic” with anti–United States stories that had no basis. There were concerted efforts to shape a negative public opinion of the United States. “Pakistan can better inform its public,” the top US diplomat asserted. When the United States criticized Pakistan, she noted, it did so openly and officially. But anti-United States statements and stories in Pakistan were unattributed, and the hidden hand behind these needed to be curbed. “Pakistan,” Clinton said, “has entire machinery devoted to sowing hatred against the United States.”

In an effort to address all possible issues Clinton then took up the nuclear question. “The US has said many times that it has no intention to denuclearize Pakistan,” she pointed out. If Pakistan wanted to be accepted as a nuclear state and be considered for a civil nuclear option in the future, then there was no reason for it to oppose proliferation of fissile material. The United States had invited Israel and India—the other
countries outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty—to work with the major powers on fissile cutoff. Pakistan, then, was the only intransigent one. She made clear that the United States' interest was solely about fissile material falling into terrorist hands.

“It was one thing to invest in a nuclear program for your own security,” Clinton went on. “This was a sovereign decision Pakistan took, as did India and Israel. But Pakistan went ahead and proliferated to Libya and North Korea.” Pakistan's leaders should not act as if there were no difference between Pakistan's behavior and that of Israel and India in nuclear matters, she stated. “If Pakistan wants parity with these countries, it should act like them,” she concluded. Pakistan had to “overcome the mistrust engendered by onward proliferation.”

Khar's response only proved Clinton's points. Instead of addressing the specific issues, she insisted that “the U.S. should not humiliate Pakistan and its institutions publicly.” Pakistan needed “rock-solid evidence” on ISI's alleged ties to terrorists, she said. “Our sacrifices and contribution to the counter-terrorism effort must also be fully appreciated.” The American representatives shook their heads as Khar stated that Pakistan was being made “a scapegoat.”

After Clinton had left the room Khar told other Pakistani participants that in her opinion the meeting had gone well. I told her frankly that her bland statements had cut no ice with the Americans. Pakistan needed to address the substantive issues, I said, or we risked far more than our relations with the United States.

D
URING HER YEARS
in exile from 1997 to 2007, Benazir Bhutto had given great thought to dealing with Pakistan's myriad problems. She realized that her previous stints as prime minister had not lived up to her promises. On both occasions the elected government was not allowed to complete its term. Although the army and ISI had made it difficult to alter Pakistan's national security policies, civilian leaders' inexperience and lack of preparation had also impeded their success, as had their reputation for corruption. Bhutto wanted to be better prepared if she got a third chance to lead the country.

A few months after 9/11 I had opted for exile in the United States. In 1999, after irritating the Sharif government, I spent a few months under arrest. As is often the case in Pakistan, Pakistan Federal Investigating Agency (FIA) had initiated false criminal cases against me to cover up political motivations. As a vocal critic of Musharraf, I could not expect to be spared under military rule. Thus, the prospects of teaching at a US university and researching at an American think tank were far preferable to the possibility of another spell in prison.

Bhutto and I met regularly during her visits to the United States, where she was well liked on the lecture circuit. We discussed Pakistan's future. I often shared the findings of my research, which shed a very different light on the country's history from what most Pakistanis have been led to believe. In 2005 Zardari arrived in the United States for medical treatment after eight and a half years in prison. My wife, Farahnaz Ispahani, and I continued our discussions about Pakistan with Bhutto and Zardari.

On most occasions Bhutto identified terrorism and military rule as Pakistan's greatest problems. She argued that Pakistan could not make any progress without tackling the terrorist menace. The country also had to turn away from militarism and invest in its people. Education, health care, and infrastructure should take priority over spending endlessly in the name of national security. Pakistan, she felt, had become less secure as a result of neglecting human development. The policy of using nonstate actors to bolster national security had backfired, and Jihadi terrorists now posed a major risk to Pakistan.

In
Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military
, published in 2005, I documented the longstanding ties between Pakistan's Islamists and the state-security apparatus. I argued that US aid for military regimes in Pakistan had not only undermined Pakistani democracy; it had also inadvertently helped foster religious extremism. In a comment that offended Pakistan's military, I said that Pakistan had become a rentier state: it lived off payments from a superpower for its strategic location and intelligence cooperation rather than on the strength of the productivity of its economy.

Bhutto asked me to write a paper for her on how the foreign policy of a future democratic government should differ from that of the
previous military regimes. In my paper I pointed out that Pakistan had made a mistake when it attempted to become a regional power while also being dependent on assistance from other countries. A better option for Pakistan would be to normalize relations with India and Afghanistan. Chinese President Jiang Zemin had also suggested just that in his address to the Pakistani Parliament in December 1996.

“We should look at the differences or disputes [with neighbors] from a long perspective,” Zemin had said, suggesting, “If certain issues cannot be resolved for the time being, they may be shelved temporarily so that they will not affect the normal state-to-state relations.”
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His message to Pakistanis, whom he called China's “friends in need and brothers bound by common fate,” had been unmistakable: Pakistan should not allow disputes with its neighbors to hold its foreign relations hostage. It should set aside the unresolved issues and pursue normal relations for its longer-term stability.

I argued in my paper for Bhutto that just as China did not give up its rights over Taiwan, Pakistan need not give up its claim on Kashmir. But it should start trade with India, which would enhance Pakistan's economic growth. It would also ensure peace, which is a precondition for development. In the case of Afghanistan, Pakistan should befriend the government in Kabul instead of trying to impose one of its choosing. Pakistan would need to put all terrorist groups out of action, come clean on its nuclear program, and admit that its resentment of the United States was because we were dependent on it.

Since 1947 dependence, deception, and defiance have characterized US-Pakistan relations. We sought US aid in return for promises we did not keep. Although even strong allies do not have 100 percent congruence of interests, in the case of Pakistan and the United States, the divergence far exceeded the similarities. Pakistan wanted to be able to act like Hafez Assad's Syria while demanding that the United States treat us like Israel.