Magnificent Delusions (49 page)

Ayub contemptuously rejected Talbott's claim that Pakistan already had the ability to deter its enemies without testing because
the Indians knew it had nuclear bombs. “As any military man knows,” he said, “before a weapon can be inducted into military service—even a water bottle—it must be tested.” According to Talbott: “He meant the comment to carry particular weight, since he was the son of Mohammad Ayub Khan, the first in a series of generals to rule the country.”
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Talbott and Zinni then had a much calmer exchange with the army chief, General Jehangir Karamat. In him, they detected “a subtle but discernible undertone of long-suffering patience bordering on scorn” for Pakistan's political leadership. But Karamat avoided hyperbole. He asked for “a new, more solid relationship” with the United States, in which there was no “arm twisting” or “forcing us into corners.”

Further, the American arguments against testing did not impress the army chief, as he was also concerned about India's desire to “cut Pakistan down to size.” In his view the ruling party in India sought to use nuclear intimidation to “solve the Kashmir problem once and for all” by forcing Pakistan to give up all claims to the disputed territory. The US officials understood that they had “gotten the same answer to our entreaties in both our meetings: a bombastic ‘no' from the foreign ministry and a polite one from the cool customer in Rawalpindi.”
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Talbott then described his conversation with Sharif as “a Hamlet act” that he found “convincing in its own way” but “rather pathetic.” The prime minister said his own political survival was at stake. If he did what the Americans wanted—not test—Sharif claimed that Talbott would find himself dealing “not with a clean-shaven moderate like himself” but instead with an Islamic fundamentalist “who has a long beard.”
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On the evening of May 28 Sharif announced in a televised speech that Pakistan had successfully exploded five nuclear devices earlier in the day. The US ambassador in Islamabad, Tom Simons, noted that Sharif blamed the international community for failing to restrain India, which in turn had forced Pakistan to go nuclear. He spoke of “tough times ahead” and called for “an era of austerity and simplicity” in anticipation of harsh international sanctions.

To show his solidarity with his people, Sharif said he would give up “the newly-opened and palatial Prime Minister's Secretariat building,” which he proposed could be converted into a hospital, women's university, or some other charity use. Reporting on the speech to Washington, Simons quipped, “It remains to be seen how long Pakistanis will rally around the flag once international sanctions kick in, further challenging this already vulnerable economy.” He described Sharif's notion that “Pakistanis will ‘sacrifice' by giving up long cherished ‘rights' such as stealing natural gas and electricity and avoiding taxes” as unrealistic. “Pakistanis have always preferred talking about eating grass (in pursuit of national security) rather than actually having to eat it,” Simons observed.
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He was proven right. The day after the nuclear tests the government froze all foreign currency accounts in Pakistani banks, offering to pay them back in Pakistani currency. Although the measure was designed to bolster the country's foreign exchange reserves, the account holders did not like this forced sacrifice. What's more, the prime minister's secretariat was never converted into a hospital or university and to this day continues to house the government's offices.

The United States imposed economic sanctions on both India and Pakistan in the aftermath of their nuclear tests. Private lending and US government credits as well as guarantees to the two governments were shut down as were all military sales. But agricultural credits continued as did lending to the private sector. As expected, the restrictions affected Pakistan more than they did India. This led to increased anti-Americanism and greater pro-Taliban sentiment in Pakistan. The ISI argued that the nuclear tests had exacerbated tension with India, which in turn increased “Pakistan's need for a pro-Pakistan, anti-India regime in Kabul.”
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If the rationale for Pakistan's acquisition of nuclear weapons was to feel secure, it did not entirely succeed; nuclear tests should have bolstered Pakistan's national self-confidence, and the government should have focused on ending external military adventures involving irregular forces. But instead the government told Pakistanis by way of media propaganda that the country's “nuclear assets” were now under threat from the United States, India, and Israel.

There was no substance to this fear. Even at the height of the Cold War, the United States had not “taken out” Russia's nuclear weapons; India could not risk the fallout of radiation from Pakistani nuclear facilities by sabotaging them; and Israel was too far away. The contrived fear of the nuclear weapons being taken away or destroyed served only one purpose: to maintain Pakistan as a national security state. Instead of nuclear weapons being seen as a source of ultimate security for Pakistan, Pakistanis were now scared about the security of their nuclear weapons.

The possession of nuclear weapons also encouraged impunity in the ISI's clandestine operations in Afghanistan and Kashmir. Members of the Northern Alliance that was fighting the Taliban claimed that regular Pakistani troops were now fighting alongside the Taliban, although Americans were unable to find evidence to support these claims. Nonetheless, the United States recognized the possibility that “Pakistani military advisors were involved in training Taliban fighters.”
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Pakistani nationals constantly bolstered the ranks of Afghan Taliban. At one point the US embassy in Islamabad estimated that 20 to 40 percent of Taliban soldiers were Pakistani. US diplomats acknowledged that the presence of Pakistani volunteers in Afghanistan “solidifies Pakistan-Taliban relations.” But the United States still adopted the formal position that “this does not indicate outward or official Pakistani government support.” Osama bin Laden was reported as “supporting pro-Taliban Arab fighters from an office in Herat”—an Afghan city bordering Iran and away from the Taliban stronghold of Kandahar.
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This was apparently misinformation from Taliban and Pakistani officials who wanted to hide from the Americans the closeness between the Taliban and bin Laden.

Pakistani critics of the Taliban—like me—found America's traipsing around the question of ISI backing for the Taliban distressing. We could see evidence of official tolerance and support for the Taliban in our cities. Posters of Osama bin Laden, taped speeches by Jihadi clerics, and Taliban publications inserted in Pakistani newspapers were distributed or sold openly outside mosques. Pakistani journalists traveled to Kandahar and Kabul with ISI facilitators and
returned to tell their stories. But both Pakistani and US officials kept up appearances, saying that there was insufficient proof of Taliban activity in Pakistan.

In August 1998 Clinton authorized cruise missile strikes on an Al-Qaeda camp in Afghanistan. In his memoir he said that he had responded to CIA intelligence about a meeting between bin Laden and his top staff. Al-Qaeda had only recently attacked the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and attempted to hit a US naval vessel. “The meeting would provide an opportunity to retaliate and perhaps wipe out much of the al Qaeda leadership,” Clinton explained. “We had to pick targets, move the necessary military assets into place, and figure out how to handle Pakistan.”
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If the United States launched air strikes inside Afghanistan, its planes would have to pass through Pakistan's airspace. Clinton realized that “Pakistan supported the Taliban and, by extension, al Qaeda.” He also knew that “the Pakistani intelligence service used some of the same camps that bin Laden and al Qaeda did to train the Taliban and insurgents who fought in Kashmir.” The US president worried that if Pakistan found out about the planned attacks in advance, “it was likely that Pakistani intelligence would warn the Taliban or even al Qaeda.”
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After the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, Strobe Talbott had started talks with Pakistan's Foreign Secretary Ahmad and India's Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh so as to reduce chances of military conflict in South Asia. He worried that if the US missiles passed through Pakistani airspace, Pakistan might assume that India had launched them. Pakistan could retaliate, “conceivably even with nuclear weapons.”

Clinton decided to send the vice chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, General Joe Ralston, to have dinner with the top Pakistani military commander at the time the attacks were scheduled. Ralston would tell him what was happening a few minutes before the US missiles entered Pakistani airspace, “too late to alert the Taliban or al Qaeda, but in time to avoid having them shot down or sparking a counterattack on India.”
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When the attack occurred, however, bin Laden and his deputies were not in the Zhawar Kili camp. The US strikes killed several members of a Pakistani Jihadi group and, according to Clinton, “some Pakistani officers who were reported to be there to train Kashmiri terrorists.”
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Taliban leader Mullah Omar publicly declared that the Taliban “will never hand over bin Laden to anyone and [will] protect him with our blood at all costs.”
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The United States thus established that there was a Pakistani connection with bin Laden because of the presence of Pakistanis at the Al-Qaeda camp.
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But instead of pressing Pakistan on this issue, US officials became defensive when Islamabad “decided to take a hard line against the strikes.” The Pakistani Foreign Ministry called US officials to “protest the illegality of the U.S. action.” Assistant secretary of state for South Asia, Karl Inderfurth, did “not expect the negative Pakistani reaction to subside.”
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“The most sincere reaction of the government of Pakistan to the Bin Laden strikes,” wrote Inderfurth, “is exasperation at the unneeded difficulties this event has created for them in dealing with their domestic political situation, and in particular, in keeping the religious parties happy and relatively off the street.”
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When the Americans pressed him to do something about Al-Qaeda, Sharif asked them to train an ISI team secretly in order to hunt down bin Laden—a plan that did not materialize.

Howard and Teresita Schaffer, in their book,
How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States
, highlighted Pakistani leaders' tendency to consistently invoke negative domestic public opinion as a negotiating tactic. The Schaffers are both veteran American diplomats with extensive experience in South Asia. They have noted, with hindsight, what US officials ignore while dealing with Pakistanis. “Pakistan has often used its weakness as a strategic asset in its negotiations with the United States,” they point out.
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Sharif employed this “having the lower hand” tactic once again when Pakistan's military precipitated the “Kargil crisis” in the summer of 1999, creating the specter of nuclear war.

In December 1998, at Clinton's invitation, Sharif visited Washington. He sought the end of the sanctions imposed after Pakistan's nuclear tests. For his part, Clinton urged Pakistani action on terrorism and nudged Sharif toward India-Pakistan rapprochement. Soon after the visit the US embassy in Islamabad complained that the Pakistani government was “not disposed to be especially helpful on the matter of terrorist Osama bin Laden.” Pakistani officials apparently “all took the line that the issue of bin Laden is a problem the U.S. has with the Taliban, not with Pakistan.”

In an effort to persuade Pakistanis to change their policy on Afghanistan, US Ambassador William Milam met with Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz. He urged the Pakistani government to “get active in trying to convince the Taliban to expel terrorist Osama bin Laden” and to change its pro-Taliban policies. “Have four years of all-out support for the Taliban improved Pakistan's position?” Milam asked Aziz. He insisted that Pakistan needed to use its influence with the Taliban to convince them to expel bin Laden to a place where he could be brought to justice.

The ambassador found that “Aziz listened carefully, but his response contained little that was new.”
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Meanwhile, the Pakistanis began their dialogue with India. The two countries agreed to open the passenger bus service between Delhi and Lahore. On February 20, 1999, Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee traveled to Lahore on the inaugural bus trip. Vajpayee's bus diplomacy led to “a summit filled with symbolism and hope of warmer relations” between the two nuclear-armed adversaries.
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Clinton then publicly commended the two prime ministers “for demonstrating courage and leadership by coming together and addressing difficult issues that have long divided their countries.”
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