Magnificent Delusions (29 page)

Discussing relations with India, Bhutto insisted that his aim remained an “honorable political settlement.” He wanted to see Pakistan's military budget reduced, but whether such a cut would be possible would depend on India.
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In a subsequent meeting with Sober Bhutto opened up further, saying that he still had “problems to contend with” in his relations with the Pakistani military. During a visit to an army officers' mess Bhutto had found officers telling him that India had not really defeated Pakistan and that Pakistanis “could give a very good account of themselves if they really had to fight.”
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Pakistan's army was apparently preparing its officers and men for another war rather than learning a lesson from repeated defeat. The army blamed foreign powers and Pakistani politicians for their poor performance and argued that they would do better if they had better equipment. Like American diplomats who served in Pakistan right after partition of India in 1947, Sober sympathized with Pakistan's leaders. Bhutto and his colleagues were trying to forge what Bhutto
termed a “New Pakistan,” just as Pakistan's founding generation had struggled to build their new country carved out of India. There was passion and enthusiasm in Islamabad as there had been in Karachi twenty-three years earlier.

But Sober could not understand why Pakistan was focusing on rebuilding its military before anything else. After all, the country was short of resources; poverty, disease, and illiteracy were rampant; and the loss of East Pakistan meant that it had fewer borders to protect. Still, Pakistan sought fighter jets and tanks. Sober's astonishment in this regard was similar to that of Americans who had seen Pakistanis requesting military assistance in the country's early years, ignoring other pressing problems. History was now repeating itself.

T
HE NEWS THAT
Pakistani forces in the Eastern wing had surrendered had stunned Pakistanis because the West Pakistani media had been projecting imaginary victories of the Pakistan army. The religious parties had plastered the walls in major cities with posters and stickers bearing the slogan “Crush India.” And only four days before the surrender, Radio Pakistan had announced that “The question of any surrender is ruled out because our troops are determined to lay down their lives.”
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Although the military high command knew better, it did not prepare the people of West Pakistan for defeat until the very end. Only at that time did the government release sketchy reports of a grim military situation and fighting against all odds. On the afternoon of December 16, around the time the formal surrender ceremony was being held at the Race Course grounds in Dhaka, the Pakistan government put out a twenty-seven-word statement that read, “Latest reports indicate that following an arrangement between the local commanders of India and Pakistan, fighting has ceased in East Pakistan and the Indian troops have entered Dhaka.”
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For West Pakistanis, fed on rhetoric of imminent victory in Jihad, this was a colossal anticlimax. The war had been lost and there was no way of turning the tables. Amid nationwide depression, reported
the
New York Times
, “People went to mosques to pray and weep.” Newspaper editorials demanded why Yahya had not told the people that defeat was so near and why he had not ordered the army to fight the Indians to death.
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Farland informed the State Department that he foresaw the “eventual retirement of Yahya” and the “rise to real power of Bhutto” in the aftermath of defeat. He also noted that the US government enjoyed “exceptional access” to Pakistan's government during the difficult situation and that such access to Pakistani leaders, including Bhutto, should continue for the foreseeable future. But he warned that the United States “should not confuse access with leverage with regard to what West Pakistan sees as its national interests.” As things turned out, Pakistan's elite continued to see India as an existential threat and therefore defined national interest through that prism.

In an uncharacteristically realistic analysis the US ambassador observed that the Soviets would have a very limited role in West Pakistan, whereas the Chinese would retain the position of a major ally for West Pakistanis. He foresaw a period of “bitter recriminations” within the establishment and among the general public in West Pakistan. Farland said that the army was “exhausted but intact” as an institution, even though public confidence in the army had been shaken. The Pakistan army, he said, “may lean on Bhutto” to shoulder major responsibility for rebuilding national morale.
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As the American ambassador forecast developments within the power corridors correctly, US journalists described the national mood in their dispatches. “The Pakistanis believe that India will never rest until Pakistan ceases to exist,” wrote
New York Times
reporter Malcolm Browne. “Lopsided military budgets seem certain to dominate the economy of Pakistan,” he predicted. The problem, he wrote, lay in “the illusion of military parity with India.” The latest war had shattered the illusion that had been “painfully maintained through two earlier wars since independence in 1947.”
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But Pakistanis preferred to live in denial, so they would soon try to re-create the illusion.

Browne pointed to “the Pakistani supposition that in the final hour of need China and the US would come to the rescue” during the East Pakistan debacle. He had seen signs in the garrison town of
Rawalpindi that read, “We love you, Mao and Nixon.” Apparently, a map had been published “showing Chinese troops charging down into India.” Browne noticed “a thrill of expectation” after reports that the US carrier
Enterprise
was headed for the Bay of Bengal. “There were even a few who believed up to the end that Russia would pull in her claws and return to the mediating role she assumed in ending the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965,” he observed.

But there was little, if any, soul-searching among Pakistanis. Instead, the surrender in Dhaka was compared to the fall of Muslim Baghdad in 1258 to the Mongols. Like the thirteenth-century defeat, this one was also attributed to the elite's lack of piety, inadequate military preparedness, various conspiracies, and the enemy's cunning. Some Pakistanis even sought to metaphorically relocate Pakistan. “Many Pakistanis are speaking of growing closer to Central Asia and away from the Indian subcontinent,” reported Browne. “New and stronger ties with Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan seem likely.”

Instead of pausing to reflect on what had gone wrong, Pakistanis sought someone to blame, and over time different factions settled on their choice among Yahya, Mujib, and Bhutto as the domestic villains. There was unanimity, however, regarding the external cause of the disaster: India had caused Pakistan's breakup, and the rest of the world, including the United States, had not done enough to stop Indian aggression.

Bhutto was in New York, representing Pakistan at the United Nations, when Pakistan's army surrendered in Dhaka. He knew he would now lead Pakistan, as Yahya's position had become untenable. There were spontaneous demonstrations in several Pakistani cities against the military dictator. Junior officers had heckled a senior general close to Yahya when he tried to give a speech at army headquarters. Some senior generals were even coercing Yahya to hand over power to Bhutto. As soon as Bhutto got word of this development he sought a meeting with President Nixon and Secretary of State Rogers. The Americans then hastened to arrange the meetings at short notice.

Although Rogers had not dealt with Bhutto before, he knew that most US officials had reservations about him. Rogers had mentioned
to Nixon in the Oval Office a few days earlier that Yahya might turn over Pakistan's affairs to Bhutto. Nixon had exclaimed, “The son-of-a-bitch is a total demagogue.”
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Nixon said that during his 1967 private trip to Pakistan, Ayub had given him “a rundown” on Bhutto. “He's a pretty good judge of men,” Nixon said, referring to Ayub, going on to say that Bhutto was “just bad news.”
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The US president also noted that Bhutto was “leftish.” But Nixon did not quite know the real source of Bhutto's left-wing orientation. “Is he anti-India? Anti-U.S.?” the president had asked. Kissinger had explained that the Pakistani leader was “violently anti-Indian” and “pro-Chinese.” But there was a silver lining for the United States in the prospect of Bhutto's rise to the helm in Pakistan: “In a way we gain a lot if he comes in,” Kissinger remarked, pointing out that Nixon had less obligations to Bhutto than he did to Yahya.
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It is implausible that Bhutto knew of that specific exchange between Nixon, Kissinger, and Rogers; he had enough friends among Americans to know what US leaders thought of him. As such, he decided to clarify things at the outset during his meeting with Rogers. Bhutto said that he knew he was sometimes referred to as the “Yankee-baiting Former Foreign Minister,” but he was nonetheless determined to open a “new chapter” in the history of Pakistan-US relations.

Bhutto's choice of words in expressing appreciation for US support for Pakistan in the ongoing crisis was interesting. He said that the US government had stood by the “basic principles of international law and civilized society as these had emerged after World War II.” Pakistanis, he went on, valued American actions and statements, which, he said, “were important in demonstrating that World War II had not been fought in vain.” Bhutto knew that the State Department had been less keen on Nixon's policy of tilting toward Pakistan, so he wanted to make the point that the United States had done the right thing.

The two main points Bhutto made to Rogers related to the Soviet Union and India. He said that “The whole picture of international law had been disrupted by Soviet behavior in the South Asian crisis.” According to him, there were unconfirmed reports
that the Soviets had “gone even to the point of providing Soviet personnel on Indian warships” and had “equipped Indian vessels and aircraft with latest missiles and technology.” This was clearly meant to establish Bhutto's credentials as being anti-Soviet. On India, Bhutto said he was prepared for reconciliation with Pakistan's traditional enemy.

The Pakistani leader wanted India to “act with magnanimity” or risk becoming an “enemy of Pakistan for all time.” He drew the analogy with the enmity between Carthage and Rome in ancient times, which lasted for almost a century. If India missed the present opportunity, Bhutto said, “There would be hatred for all time, utter chaos and terrible massacre.” He wanted the Indians to understand that he would “need a month or more to prepare public opinion for what has taken place.”

Although Pakistan had lost another war, Bhutto insisted that “India must act in humility.” He added that in his view the Indians lacked vision and he could not be confident of the Indian response. Rogers observed that despite Indians' capacity to appear magnanimous publicly, they could be “very sanctimonious and self-righteous.” Bhutto concurred, making the point that for that very reason a US role was necessary. “The U.S. should make clear to India that it had treaty relationship with Pakistan and that it was not going to fold up its carpets and leave,” he said.

Bhutto also reminded Rogers of the ongoing dispute over Kashmir. Describing Mujib as a “good speaker” but “very blank in the head,” he anticipated that the Bengali leader would not remain a central figure in Bangladesh beyond three months. Thus, he wanted an opportunity to explore the possibility of a “loose confederation” between East and West Pakistan.
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The meeting between Bhutto and Nixon before Bhutto's return to Pakistan was rather short because of Nixon's other prescheduled engagements. But Bhutto did tell Nixon that “Pakistan was completely in the debt of the United States for its support during the recent trying days.” He repeated what he had said to Rogers about being called a “Yankee Hater” in the past and promised closer ties with the United States. Bhutto spoke of Nixon's “personal leader-
ship and support,” joked about being willing to manage his 1972 presidential campaign, and repeated the views he had shared with Rogers regarding India and the Soviet Union.

For his turn, Nixon used the opportunity to let Bhutto know that he cared about Pakistan and would work with its new leader as he had with previous ones. For Bhutto it was important to build bridges with the White House and the State Department before he assumed power in Islamabad. Pakistan would need US assistance again, especially if it were to continue confronting India.